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Chapter 1
Between Mobility and Migration: 
The Consequences and Governance  
of Intra- European Movement
Mark van Ostaijen and Peter Scholten
One of the cornerstones of the development of the European Union is the principle 
of free movement within the EU.  The EU has created an unprecedented area in 
which not just capital, goods and services but also people can move around rela-
tively freely. This freedom of movement is guaranteed by EU law and enshrined in 
the principles of the Lisbon strategy with the objective of creating ‘more and better 
jobs, by reducing obstacles to mobility’ (European Commission 2004, 2007). 
Especially after the EU enlargements in 2004 and 2011 with various Central and 
Eastern European (CEE) countries, the scale of EU movement has grown signifi-
cantly. Migration from the EU Member States in Central and Eastern-Europe (CEE) 
has evolved into one of the main migration flows within Europe (Black et al. 2010). 
For instance, it resulted in more than 2.2 million people from Poland engaged in 
international migration or mobility between 2004–2007 (Grabowska-Lusinska et al. 
2009). This contributed to a ‘new face’ of East-West migration in Europe (Favell 
2008; Favell and Recchi 2010). It is therefore important to know more about migra-
tion from Central and Eastern to Western parts of Europe. Because this ‘new face’ 
has not remained without consequences (Van Ostaijen et al. 2017).
This ‘new face’ triggered for instance national Ministers to call for attention that 
“this type of immigration burdens the host societies with considerable additional 
costs” (Mikl-Leitner et al. 2013) and ask to combat ‘the improper and abusive use’ 
of the Posted Workers Directive (Hundstorfer et al. 2015). In a response, the then 
Home Affairs Commissioner, Cecilia Malmström, criticized this outcry and stated 
that: “they are mixing apples and oranges” by “mixing up internal EU mobility and 
immigration” (Hansen 2015). By an external research report, the European 
Commission concluded that: “the overall evidence suggests that this situation is not 
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2placing major issues and burdens” (EY 2014, p. 2). This makes visible that this 
‘new face’ caused contestation, in many member-states. For example, in France, the 
‘Polish plumber’ played a significant role in the public debate that led to the rejec-
tion of the EU constitution in 2005, in Sweden there were fierce debates around 
‘new’ beggars and homeless people (Favell and Nebe 2009) and the Dutch Deputy 
Prime Minister called upon a ‘Code Orange’ for a better awareness on the ‘shadow 
sides’ of free movement (Asscher and Goodhart 2013). This reveals a paradigm 
conflict between the European Commission versus its member-states and local 
municipalities regarding free movement as a clearly contested issue and a site of 
policy conflict.
But next to its political and policy relevance, there are a number of theoretical 
questions regarding this ‘new face’ of ‘East-West migration’ (Friberg 2012; Black 
et al. 2010; Favell 2008; Düvell and Vogel 2006; Okolski 2001; Wallace and Stola 
2001). First of all, how should we understand this new European free movement? 
Do we need to understand this as more permanent settlement or as more flexible, 
circular and temporary migration? Secondly, since certain local authorities point at 
issues in their territories, what are the specific social consequences for (urban) 
municipalities? And thirdly, how do local authorities react to this and what kind of 
policy networks and governance approaches have evolved as effective responses?
Therefore, the key objective of this book is to develop a better theoretical and 
empirical understanding of the consequences of European free movement, with a par-
ticular focus on the significance of East-West migration. In other words, a focus on 
migration from Central and Eastern to Western parts of Europe. To meet this aim, this 
book has a threefold structure: first a section on ‘types of intra-European movement 
and their consequences’, followed by a section on ‘multi-level governance’ which is 
complemented with a section on ‘perspectives from sending and receiving regions’.
Guided by this structure, the book first conceptualizes European free movement 
and this ‘new face’ of East-West migration as ‘CEE migration’ by distinguishing 
different types of CEE migrants to understand the range of consequences. 
Furthermore, it relates to how policies responded to these consequences, so it inves-
tigates the governance responses to CEE migration. In order to connect ‘both sides’ 
of the story, it also incorporates the Eastern or sending countries perspective of 
emerging and new migration corridors in and outside Europe, including Poland, the 
Czech Republic and Turkey. As such, this book addresses central questions as 
whether free movement or ‘East-West migration’ can be empirically understood as 
either mobility or migration, what this means in terms of the social and economic 
implications for the host area as well as the area of origin, and what type of gover-
nance approaches are associated with these implications.
1.1  Conceptualizing Free Movement and Its Consequences
In migration and integration studies it has remained unclear how we could under-
stand ‘European free movement’. Should it be perceived as a ‘new’ type of migra-
tion, as permanent settlement or as more flexible, circular and temporary migration? 
M. van Ostaijen and P. Scholten
3As Adrian Favell argues: “Within this, European citizens –old and new- can move 
freely against a wider, transnational horizon that encourages temporary and circu-
lar migration trends, and demands no long term settlement or naturalisation in the 
country of work” (Favell 2008: 705–706). However, this contrasted with studies 
acknowledging a more diversified picture including the more permanent settlement 
migration as well (Engbersen et al. 2013; Friberg 2012, 2013). These studies show 
that beyond the seasonal and circular forms of migration, other types of migration 
have emerged which involves a more permanent presence of CEE migrants in the 
receiving regions. Some migrants maintain transnational connections that connect 
them to their region of origin as well as their host regions. Some settle permanently 
in their receiving societies and bring over or found new families, while in other 
cases, migrants move on to other parts in Europe (Glorius et al. 2013; Lafleur and 
Stanek 2016). Thus, we see a diversifying picture in European free movement, with 
a large variety between individual citizens.
Therefore, this book starts with explicating two important assumptions. First 
of all, based on previous research (Engbersen et al. 2013; Friberg 2012, 2013), we 
assume that European free movement towards Western Europe is characterized by 
significant diversity and heterogeneity in socio-economic status and time-span. 
This means that although there are many CEE migrants working in low-qualified 
and low-paid jobs, there are also medium-skilled and highly skilled migrants 
working at, for instance, universities or in the (medical) business industry. This 
socio- economic diversification includes a varied perspective on socio-economic 
status which leads to a socio-economic differentiation of CEE migrants in types 
of migrants, such as: ‘knowledge workers’, ‘entrepreneurs’, ‘manual workers’, 
‘persons working in private households’, ‘sex workers’, ‘trafficked persons’, ‘stu-
dents’, ‘non-working spouses/partners and children’ and ‘beggars and homeless 
people’.
Next to the socio-economic differentiation, European free movement is charac-
terized by variation in time, in the temporality of stay. This includes a wide range 
between temporary flexible categories and permanent settlement. This variation 
could lead to large differences concerning to what extent host societies develop 
extra procedures, policies and legislation. Both diversifications are visualized in 
the figure below, which visualizes the socio-economic and temporal differentia-
tion in two axes and shows a variety of different types of CEE migrants that one 
could associate with the varieties considered. While we are sensitive for the 
mobility versus migration language debate, for aims of academic clarity, we 
stayed close to the body of literature on migration studies here, to be able to give 
our fieldwork the most effective and feasible starting point possible. Because the 
Fig. 1.1 below has been used as a heuristic device in this project to sensitize the 
research focus for the varieties involved, not to (normatively) depict specific cat-
egories for this research. The empirical chapters will give substance to the specific 
‘corners’ of this figure.
Besides the socio-economic diversification, this research presumes that European 
free movement is spatially ‘unevenly distributed’ (Gijsberts and Lubbers 2015; 25). 
This implies that CEE populations tend to be spatially concentrated in specific rural 
and urban areas. As such, a second expectation is that, given the ‘uneven distribution’ 
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4of migrants in specific localities, the diversification of intra-European movement 
also leads to a diversification of local consequences: not only in terms of labour 
market issues, but a wide range of issues that evolve from short-term (housing) to 
long-term implications (language and education) in the receiving and sending coun-
tries. We assume that different types of CEE migrants have different social implica-
tions on the receiving urban and rural regions. This holds importance for the social 
consequences related to European free movement, since implications of circular and 
footloose migration can be expected to be primarily socio-economic, concentrating 
particularly on labour market incorporation and housing issues. While implications 
of settlement migration can be expected to be more of a socio-cultural character, 
raising issues like language skills, education and participation. Therefore, this 
points to issues of integration, segregation and social cohesion in urban regions. An 
important issue is the effect of CEE migrants in disadvantaged neighbourhoods in 
their contribution to strengthen or weaken the social cohesion within these neigh-
bourhoods (Musterd et al. 2016). Therefore, to study this spatial specificity and 
concentration of CEE migrants in specific urban and rural spaces, we distinguished 
several ‘domains’ regarding socio-economic, socio-cultural and legal- political 
issues, in which we expected that European free movement could cause implica-
tions. For that aim we comparatively studied implications regarding labour market, 
registration (socio-economic); education, language, communication, societal par-
ticipation, housing and neighbourhood issues (socio-cultural); and social security, 
health care and political participation issues (legal-political). We expected that 
European free movement could cause implications in all these domains, differ-
entiated by the spatial context in which CEE migrants reside or work. With this 
division we aimed to guide and structure our analysis primarily on the social conse-
quences in the urban regions.
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Fig. 1.1 Socio-economic and temporal differentiation of CEE migrants
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51.2  Governance of Free Movement in a Multi-Level Setting
The second part of the book focuses on how local, national and European (govern-
mental) authorities responded on features related to ‘European free movement’ in 
its multi-level setting. Since European free movement is clearly related to European 
Union regulations of free movement, adopted by member-state permissions in the 
‘opening’ of their labour markets and faced by local municipalities in terms of hous-
ing and neighbourhood consequences (Black et  al. 2010; Van Puymbroeck et  al. 
2011; Engbersen and Snel 2012), this can clearly be seen as a topic in a multi-level 
setting. And since multiple governmental bodies are involved in this issue, it holds 
importance to stress the differences between the governance structures of Sweden, 
Turkey, the Netherlands and Austria. The four selected countries represent four dis-
tinctly different political-administrative institutional models, spanning multi-level 
to unitary organization of decision-making. They range from Austria’s formally fed-
eral system with strong elements of multi-level corporatism and extensive social 
partnership participation in decision-making to Turkey’s unitary state system with 
policy-making set in a highly hierarchical top-down institutional framework (Sert 
et al. 2015: 8). Between these two cases, Sweden and the Netherlands display ele-
ments of lingering – but different - traditions of corporatism and social partnership 
decision-making located within unitary state systems that feature strong aspects of 
a local decision-making capacity. At an overarching level, three of the countries, 
Austria, Netherlands and Sweden, are well-established democracies (Lijphart 2012) 
and EU members while Turkey is from a strict institutional European perspective 
and with regard to intra-European movement an ‘outlier case’ since Turkey has an 
‘EU Candidate’ status. But for a variety of reasons, that will be explained at length 
later on, Turkey has relevance. Because of historical (ethinc ties with Bulgaria), 
geographical (proximity of large urban regions) and legislative (non-EU member- 
state but importance on European migration flows) reasons, Turkey has relevance 
and importance. Thus, from a strict institutional European perspective, what could 
be defined as an ‘outlier’ case, contains multiple reasons why Turkey is an impor-
tant and relevant case for this research. The table below outlines the variances in the 
case-studies selected, particularly regarding the outlook of governance structures 
Table 1.1.
Table 1.1 Governance contexts
Governance context parameters
Degree of freedom Partly free Free
Politico-administrative 
institutional model
Unitary Federal Unitary 
decentralised
Unitary
State – Social partners relation Top-Down Corporatist Semi corporatist Post 
corporatist
Type of welfare state Welfare 
state
Conservative Mixed Social 
democratic
Country Turkey Austria Netherlands Sweden
1 Between Mobility and Migration: The Consequences and Governance…
6Table 1.2 shows the differences between the cases, based on centralized state 
traditions. Most relevant is to what extent his variances are of influence in how the 
local, national and European authorities interact with each other on the issue of CEE 
migration. The literature, which outlines this multi-level setting, observes a growing 
role of local governments in general and cities in particular in global and multi-level 
systems (Brenner 2004; Holston and Appadurai 1999; Isin 2000; Le Gales 2002; 
Sassen 1999). It has become manifest that in the context of ‘glocalization’, cities are 
becoming hubs for innovation in governance networks. Therefore, cities should not 
only be studied as subnational governments that are affected by Europeanization 
(Emelianoff 2013), but as key players in multi-level networks and as motors of 
policy dynamics ‘from below’, also within the topic of ‘European free movement’. 
From this perspective, local governments develop various strategies to influence 
national and EU policymaking (Heinelt and Neiderhafner 2008; Scholten et  al. 
2017). One strategy involves lobbying or negotiating policy preferences at other 
levels of government, also described as ‘vertical venue shopping’ (Pralle 2003; 
Guiraudon 2000). Vertical venue shopping means that if local governments cannot 
achieve certain policy preferences at their own level, they can act as policy entrepre-
neurs in relation to other levels of government. This venue shopping can take place 
via formal channels where governments of different levels meet, but also via infor-
mal policy lobbying or political networks. Such efforts can influence governance 
processes at other levels which involves networking and coalition building with 
other cities or local governments (Gustavsson et al. 2009) and transnational munici-
pal networks (Kern and Bulkeley 2009). These actions can be considered as hori-
zontal governance processes of local authorities interacting and developing 
relationships with each other. Next to these horizontal interactions, local govern-
ments can also interact vertically with more central or national located authorities to 
adopt or modify policies, laws and legislation.
To understand the role of local authorities in their responses towards European 
free movement, we will focus on the policy networks and governance approaches in 
relation with other public, private and NGO stakeholders. For that aim we devel-
oped a conceptual frame to understand the policy networks and governance 
approaches in its multi-level setting (Scholten 2013). With a typology of four theo-
retical ideal types of governance approaches we aim to understand to what extent 
public authorities constructed horizontal and vertical relations to develop policies, 
laws and legislation on CEE related topics:
 1. Multi-level governance
Characterized by a more or less equal relationship in terms of engagements and 
participation among the various levels that are relevant to a specific governance 
Table 1.2 selected urban 
regions in the country cases
Country Urban region I Urban region II
Austria Vienna Linz
Netherlands Rotterdam The Hague
Sweden Stockholm Gothenburg
Turkey Istanbul Edirne
M. van Ostaijen and P. Scholten
7situation. In multi-level governance situations, policies at various levels are syn-
chronized without a clear hierarchy. In the case of intra-European movement, the 
concept multi-level governance would apply in particular to situations where the 
local, national and European level are involved. When one of these levels is miss-
ing, we can also speak of ‘multiple level governance.’
 2. Top-down governance
Characterized by a hierarchical relationship in which the highest level steers the 
overall governance response for actors from all other involved layers. ‘Lower’ 
policy levels are primarily involved in terms of policy implementation, not pol-
icy formulation.
 3. Bottom-up governance
Characterized by a leading role of local governments in agenda setting and for-
mulating policy solutions that require policy actions also at other ‘higher’ levels 
of governance. In the literature, this model has also been described as the ‘local-
ist’ model.
 4. Disjointed governance
Characterized by ‘horizontal’ governance processes at various levels, without 
actual vertical relations between the different levels. In this model, the policy-
making logics at different levels are largely decoupled.
To address European free movement in its multi-level setting, the case studies are 
analysed by the above-distinguished ideal types of governance.
1.3  Outline of the Book
The aim of this book is to comprehensively address a theoretical and empirical 
understanding of the consequences of intra-European movement in general and 
CEE migration in particular, in terms of variety of types of migration and social 
implications and its linkage with governance approaches. Whereas the current state 
of the art in the literature provides a good overview of migration flows and the vary-
ing types of migration from CEE countries, the social implications of CEE migra-
tion for urban regions and how urban regions deal with this from a governance 
perspective have been relatively unexplored (Friberg 2012; Black et al. 2010; Düvell 
and Vogel 2006; Okólski 2001; Wallace and Stola 2001; Geddes and Boswell 2011). 
In the sections that follow we will elaborate on these elements and further develop 
the expectations that guide us throughout this book. This leads us to the following 
sections:
 1) ‘Types of intra-European movement and their consequences’. This part 
addresses the size and types of CEE migration, addressing the more sociological 
and migration studies questions to understand European free movement more as 
a circular, permanent or more flexible phenomenon; addressing the social conse-
quences perceived by stakeholders in the urban regions, addressing geographic, 
sociological and migration issues to understand the spatial implications of 
European free movement;
1 Between Mobility and Migration: The Consequences and Governance…
8 2) ‘Multi-level governance’. This part addresses the policy networks and gover-
nance responses, including political science, public administration and 
 governance studies issues to understand European free movement as a multi-
level phenomenon;
 3) ‘Perspectives from sending and receiving regions’, addressing the conse-
quences for sending regions such as Poland, Czech Republic and Turkey
It is important to mention that especially the first two parts are guided by theoreti-
cally or conceptually informed notions on ‘consequences’ and ‘governance’. As 
such, the first section in the book is guided by a typology of different types of free 
moving EU citizens. The introduction elaborates on this typology, based on previ-
ous studies of free movement in the EU (such as Black et. al. 2010). Chapter 2 by 
Deniz Sert distinguishes eight types of ‘EU free moving citizens’ based on two 
dimensions, including the time-specificity of movement. In her contribution she 
observes that creating a typology of CEE migration and including a diversified pic-
ture of types of migrants in this research as a heuristic device for comparison creates 
a tool with an exploratory value for answering research questions in a valuable way. 
The added value of this heuristic device can be seen in Chap. 3 in which Ursula 
Reeger shows, guided by the diversification of CEE migration, what kind of social- 
and economic implications free movement has regarding stakeholders. This has 
been studied with a focus on its urban specificity, acknowledging that free move-
ment is ‘unevenly spread’ amongst specific rural and urban municipalities. It shows 
that a detailed look at the implications in various domains for different types of 
migrants reveals that these are often interrelated with each type displaying its own 
“chain of implications”. For some types of migrants, these linkages result in vicious 
cycles difficult to escape or a domino effect of implications, multiplying their effects 
due to their social or economic position. These empirical chapters are comple-
mented by Chaps. 4 and 5 by Godfried Engbersen en Rinus Penninx. In Chap. 4, 
Godfried Engbersen translates the empirical data to the broader debates within soci-
ological theory on liquid modernity  (Engbersen 2012). By his concept of liquid 
migration he concludes that the findings show that this liquidity or temporality of 
mobility does not cover the full story. More long term or settlement types show that 
there is more to say than only the ‘new face’ of East-West fluidity could suggest. In 
Chap. 5, Rinus Penninx questions the ‘newness’ of this migration and compares this 
with other migration regimes in the past. He concludes that comparisons are hard 
because of the changed and different regulatory context, legal instruments and the 
position of private organisations in the management of this migration. As such, he 
provides some context embeds the findings in a historical framework.
The second section on ‘governance’ focuses on how local, national and European 
(governmental) authorities responded to the types of free movers and their social- 
and economic implications. This is also guided by a conceptual frame, a typology 
of five theoretical ideal types of governance approaches to map the horizontal and 
vertical relations in which policies, laws and legislation on CEE related topics are 
developed. In her Chap. 6, Karin Zelano shows the story from ‘inside Brussels’ and 
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level. She reveals a more top-down approach and a governance gap between the EU, 
member-states and local municipalities on this issue. In Chap. 7 by Gregg 
 Bucken- Knapp, Jonas Hinnfors, Andrea Spehar and Karin Zelano, they show the 
empirical governance variety between the selected cases of The Netherlands, 
Sweden, Austria and Turkey. And despite the institutional and political difference 
between the cases, multi-level governance seems to be absent in most instances. In 
his Chap. 8, Dion Curry develops indicators to understand multi-level governance 
in much more detail and embedded in the multi-level governance literature. He 
reveals how the findings develop this strand of literature for instance by showing the 
need to separate out multi-level contexts from multi-level governance. Finally, in 
Chap. 9 Alex Balch observes the central role of national governments on European 
decision-making. He sees a lot of political conflict and contestation which causes 
social denizenship for some citizens in Europa. Highlighting the politicized charac-
ter of this topic, he shows how the findings could be understood in relation to politi-
cal science literatures and beyond.
In the third section ‘perspectives from sending and receiving regions’ it connects 
the findings on intra- European movement to the literature on Central and Eastern 
European countries such as Poland and the Czech Republic, which are important 
‘sending’ countries of intra- European movement, as well as Turkey as a new emer-
gent destination country of migration from Central and Eastern Europe. In Chap. 
10, Marta Kindler shows in detail the positive and negative effects of free movement 
for Poland as a sending and receiving country. By a detailed analysis of what is 
going on in Poland she shows the ‘double governance challenge’ evolving in Poland. 
By focussing on Czech careworkers in Austrian regions, Dusan Drbohlav and Lenka 
Pavelkova show in Chap. 11 a new emerging type of MICO, of migration and com-
muting, in-between old notions of settlement, transborder movement and mobility. 
And finally, in Chap. 12, Deniz Karci Korfali and Tugba Acar show how a diversifi-
cation of migration affects the regions of Edirne and Istanbul and how this contrib-
utes to the ‘key importance’ of governance challenges. They also explain the 
specificities of the Turkish case as a state centred hierarchal order and top-down 
approach on policy, to better understand the position of Turkey as case within 
European free movement. Finally, in the Chaps 13 and 14, Mark van Ostaijen, Peter 
Scholten and Adrian Favell formulate concluding thoughts on the project of 
IMAGINATION, the empirical and theoretical contributions and how this can be 
interpreted into larger bodies of knowledge. More specifically, Adrian Favell con-
cludes on the whole volume with an epilogue reflecting on the contributions of the 
book to the literature on European free movement.
As can be understood from previous notions on the subsequent chapters, this 
book is set-up to relate the empirical data gathering with broader theoretical debates. 
As such, the first two parts: ‘consequences’ and ‘governance’, are finalized with 
theoretical chapters. As such, in the first ‘consequences’ part, the debate is focus-
sing on the body of literature in migration studies and beyond, questioning if this is 
an ‘exceptional’ phenomenon, can we see it as ‘liquid migration’ or is this ‘new 
1 Between Mobility and Migration: The Consequences and Governance…
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face’ of East-West or CEE migration more ‘old wine in new bottles’? In the ‘gover-
nance’ section, the debate focuses on Europeanization literature and governance 
studies, contesting the multi-level character of this governance setting and discuss-
ing the European politics and policymaking processes of free movement. These 
chapters are written by scholars who are experts in their field, invited to reflect on 
the empirical contributions and to embed this into a number of thematically related 
theoretical discussions. The authors of these chapters were not involved in the 
IMAGINATION project, but do reflect on the IMAGINATION findings in their con-
tributions. All these chapters were discussed during a workshop in Gothenburg in 
December 2015 by the authors.
1.4  IMAGINATION Project
The empirical material stems from a research project funded by the Joint Programing 
Initiative (JPI) Urban Europe: IMAGINATION, ‘Urban Implications and 
Governance of CEE migration’. This 3-year project of empirical research was car-
ried out between June 2013 and June 2016, implemented by interdisciplinary teams 
in Turkey, Sweden, Austria, the Czech Republic, Poland and The Netherlands 
including sociologists, political scientists, geographers and public administration 
scholars. This interdisciplinary approach of the IMAGINATION research project 
also stimulated the confrontation of the empirical findings on European free move-
ment with broader literatures from migration studies, geography, sociology, politi-
cal sciences and public administration theory.
The project followed an innovative approach in terms of methodology. The 
empirical analyses in the book are based on comparative large-scale in-depth inter-
views with various stakeholders, as well as a systematic data collection effort, docu-
ment analyses and literature review. In terms of interviews, stakeholders were 
involved from very different positions, in order to allow for a multiple perspective 
analysis of CEE migration. This includes policymakers from different levels, but 
also representatives from migrant organizations, NGO’s, housing corporations, 
labour recruitment agencies and business associations. We believe that this not only 
allows for a more balanced ‘multi-actor’ view on CEE migration, it also provides a 
more comprehensive, valid and reliable method for the study of a topic on which 
official data is often lacking or incomplete. This applies in particular to the case of 
CEE migration, as many migrants are not registered.
Thus, as primary unit of analysis not countries or cities, but urban regions were 
selected as most significant objects of research. Since European free movement is 
not only an urban but also a rural phenomenon, local consequences are often not 
limited by the city boundaries where many migrants live, but also located into 
nearby suburban and rural areas where CEE migrants work. The notion of urban 
regions thus focuses on cities together with their suburban areas and nearby rural 
areas to capture the complementary social implications within daily urban systems 
of labour, housing and leisure. Urban regions were selected from three countries 
M. van Ostaijen and P. Scholten
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(The Netherlands, Sweden and Austria), which received relatively large numbers of 
CEE migrants but ‘opened’ their labour market borders to CEE countries in differ-
ent periods and in different ways. Next to this we selected one non-European  ‘outlier 
case’ (Turkey) to study the consequences of EU laws and regulations on the urban 
cases in a non-EU member state. The selected urban regions were Fig. 1.2.
It is worth to mention some important considerations in the case study selection 
process. First of all, as important selection criterion, Austria, the Netherlands and 
Sweden are representations of different transition regimes in Europe. They all 
opened their borders at different points in time (Sweden in 2004; the Netherlands in 
2007; Austria in 2011 for A8 countries), which allowed the project to study the 
effects of this variety. But in this book, also other cases are included, such as:
 a) A most-likely case (Poland);
 b) A least-likely case (Czech Republic)
 c) An outlier case (Turkey)
We will explain this rationale first. Because first of all, Poland and the Czech 
Republic are two important sending (and receiving) regions of CEE migrants. 
Especially Poland has been the most significant sending country during the free 
movement regulations. As mentioned before, with more than 2.2 million people 
between 2004–2007, Poland can be considered as a very significant and ‘most- 
likely case’ to study this phenomenon (Grabowska-Lusinska et al. 2009). The Czech 
Republic instead, has always been a rather reluctant case of international migration. 
Czechs seem to be well rooted and reluctant in moving out. The overall Czech emi-
gration is relatively low compared with some of the other countries in this book (see 
the chapter of Drbolav and Pavelkova in this book). However, statistics are rather 
unreliable since most movement is not formally registered. This can be seen by 
other, estimated, stock data of 13,000 Czechs working in Austria in 2014 (see Chap. 
11 of Drbolav and Pavelkova). According to this data, Austria is an important and 
significant rising country for transborder movement and Czechs working abroad. 
This raises various questions regarding the drivers and opportunities of these mov-
ers and how they do not comply with the general reluctance of Czechs. This legiti-
mates the significance of this least-likely case of Czech Republic in this volume. 
And finally, the fourth section is completed by the case study on Turkey. First of all, 
from a strict institutional European perspective, Turkey could be seen as an ‘outlier’ 
case. However, for a number of reasons, Turkey has relevance and importance to 
gain knowledge about this emerging phenomenon. First of all, because of historical 
interrelations and legacies, a significant number of Bulgarians have a Turkish pass-
port. This has historically evolved into a stable amount of transborder movements 
between Bulgaria and Turkey. It is interesting to see to what extent this historical 
migration corridor changes by new regulatory legacies from the EU. Next to this, 
from a geographical point of view, and with a focus on urban consequences, one of 
the most proximate and largest urban regions outside the European territory is, next 
to for instance Saint Petersburg, the Istanbul urban region. Next to this, Edirne is 
selected as a more rural and border region, to gain a better understanding of 
1 Between Mobility and Migration: The Consequences and Governance…
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 transborder movements. Edirne maintains a large Bulgarian- Turkish community 
and the region of Edirne is one of the most important entry points of Turkey. As 
illustration, in 2010, 1.5 million people from CEE countries entered Turkey via the 
region of Edirne on a total of 2.5 million and 600.000 CEEs entered Istanbul on a 
total of seven million people (Korfali et al. 2014). To conclude, it holds relevance to 
study the impact of EU rules and regulation on Turkey and the eventual effects on 
migration from CEE to EU and vice versa. Are these figures in- or decreasing, why 
and what are the consequences for both sending and receiving regions? Thus, from 
a strict institutional European perspective, what could be defined as an ‘outlier’ 
case, there are multiple reasons to include Turkey as an important and relevant case 
for this research.
1.5  Methodological Considerations
While this book is built upon the comparative framework outlined above and the 
data collected in the context of the IMAGINATION project, it is worth considering 
some methodological issues here. To overcome a repetition of argumentation, spe-
cific issues of methodology are considered in the forthcoming chapters. However, 
the chapters share an overall methodological framework that will be discussed in the 
following.
First of all, to make a systematic comparison, and to select case studies, all 
research went through a bibliographic and statistical analysis of secondary data 
sources which enabled a preliminary comparative setting. For that aim, the research 
teams have collected available data on CEE migration pertaining to their respective 
countries, and tried to synchronize these figures. First, they utilized secondary 
sources, reviewing the literature of previous research as well as available official 
statistics. This provided with a valuable source on stocks and flows of migrants 
including basic demographic features such as age and gender, but lacks important 
information on education, professional background or legal status. Additionally, 
especially where no official data were available, teams conducted semi-structured 
interviews with different stakeholders to get estimates of the scale of CEE migration 
and to discover different types of migration. These included representatives of the 
CEE migrants mostly from different migrant organizations, officials from local gov-
ernments, relevant private agencies such as labour recruitment agencies, and NGOs 
involved in the related areas of migration like housing corporations and educational 
institutions. The analysis in Chap. 2 contains the key features of this first data- 
gathering step. As mentioned in that chapter it shows the outcome of exploring, 
classifying and summarising quantitative data that could be gathered around the 
selected cases in this project.
Secondly, the study included a multi-level stakeholder analysis to capture the 
perceptions of stakeholders in various positions concerning the consequences as 
well as the governance of intra- European movement. In all case studies, the survey 
was distributed amongst experts, local and national policymakers as well as NGO’s. 
1 Between Mobility and Migration: The Consequences and Governance…
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The strength of a multiple stakeholder analysis is that it enables the project to cap-
ture a variety of perspectives, from different positions as well as focussing on differ-
ent elements of governance. The multiple-stakeholder analysis involved three 
interrelated stages of data gathering (Table 1.3) (see: Enengel and Reeger 2015) of:
 (1) Online survey (primary inventory of implications, N = 174)
 (2) Expert interviews (qualitative in-depth information on stage 1, N = 57)
 (3) Focus groups (reflection of the findings from stages 1 and 2, N = 65)
As a first step, the online survey was implemented as a ‘mapping exercise’, to 
establish a primary inventory of relevant issues and types of migration. The design 
was comparatively developed and implemented during spring 2014  in all eight 
urban regions and resulted in 174 returned questionnaires. The people selected for 
this questionnaire was based on our previous experience working in the research 
domain of CEE migration, having done the desk research of phase one and the 
informal interviews. The professionals that came up from that work have been con-
sulted in this explorative phase. Content-wise, the questionnaires were built up, just 
like the interviews and focus groups, on the three main pillars of this research. 
Respondents were asked about a) types of CEE migration b) urban consequences of 
CEE migration and c) governance issues relating to CEE migration.
Secondly, after mapping the outcomes of the survey, additional expert interviews 
were set up to delve deeper into what has been mentioned in the online survey. 
Similar to the online survey, experts were selected according to predefined criteria 
based on variety of 1) their relationship to the respective urban regions 2) their pro-
fessional affiliation (NGO, public, private). The interviews were held during autumn 
and fall of 2014 and involved 57 expert interviews with 66 interviewed participants. 
With the explicit aim to follow-up on the online survey, especially those were 
selected who indicated interest in future participation, complemented with those 
unable or not initially approached for the survey. The interviews were transcribed 
and a systematic grid of codes and sub-codes enabled a comparative analysis.
Table 1.3 Overview respondents
Urban region Online survey Expert interviews Urban living lab
Austria Linz n = 23 n = 8 (9) n = 8
Vienna n = 23 n = 5 (7)
National level — n = 1
The Netherlands The Hague n = 15 n = 5 n = 16
Rotterdam n = 15 n = 5
National level n = 16 n = 2
Sweden Gothenburg n = 22 n = 8 (12) n = 30
Stockholm n = 15 n = 5 (7)
National level — n = 4
Turkey Edirne n = 24 n = 7 n = 11
Istanbul n = 21 n = 7
National level — —
M. van Ostaijen and P. Scholten
15
Finally, the multi-stakeholder analysis was complemented by Urban Living 
Labs, focus groups of deliberative exchange of ideas and reflections on preliminary 
research findings. This method enabled to validate some initial findings and bring 
further and deepen ideas about data found. Participants were selected based on the 
interviews and the people mentioned. Since much depended on the professional 
involvement of stakeholders in this issue and the knowledge they have, all three 
phases were layers of chronological snowball sampling strategies. This contains 
clear biases for which the research was sensitive, but was chosen in order to get the 
most relevant expertise on board as possible. All Living Labs were held in December 
2014 on four sites and were recorded, transcribed and analysed in a comparative 
fashion. As such, all data collection carried out in all six urban regions was guided 
by a strict common framework. In total, more than 250 contacts with key stakehold-
ers from the public sector, semi-public, private institutions and with NGOs have 
taken place.
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Chapter 2
The Diversification of Intra-European 
Movement
Deniz Sert
2.1  Introduction
The literature on free movement among the 28 member states of the European 
Union (EU) divides along two main themes. The first set of studies analyses the 
nature and type of intra-European movement. Here, the central focus tends to be one 
of the main migration flows within Europe – namely, the movement of Central and 
Eastern Europeans (CEE) who are mostly citizens of the EU (Black et al. 2010). In 
migration studies, this freedom of movement within the EU is increasingly articu-
lated in terms of ‘East’ to ‘West’ migration. Many studies show how this migration 
pattern within Western Europe is expanding beyond the seasonal and circular forms 
of labour migration that initially characterized CEE migration, to one characterized 
by more permanence (e.g., Recchi 2008; Favell 2008; Eade et al. 2006; Düvell and 
Vogel 2006; Engbersen et  al. 2011, 2013; Castro-Martin and Cortina 2015). To 
illustrate, Engbersen et al. (2011; Engbersen et al. 2013) contend that along the two 
axes of attachment to country of origin and destination, there are now four catego-
ries of intra-European movement: (1) bi-national; (2) circular; (3) settlement and; 
(4) “footloose”. This typology captures the fact that some migrants preserve trans-
national ties that attach them to their region of origin as well as their host countries 
while others remain permanently in receiving societies, later reuniting with family 
members or establishing new families in the receiving country (ibid.). Others still 
may continue their expedition to other parts of Europe or may rather end up “foot-
loose”, experiencing problems accessing the labour market in the receiving country 
as their ties with the home country fade (ibid.). Studies also show that different 
types of migration are related to different stages of migration, moving from an ini-
tial stage of temporary work abroad, through transnational commuting to permanent 
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settlement, where these phases largely depend on the labour market opportunities in 
the destination regions (Friberg 2012).
A second set of studies considers this free movement as a form of socio- economic 
participation on the European labour market, where migrants are seen as a key 
driver of economic integration. This stream in the literature focuses more on the 
subsequent effects of free movement, largely taking it for granted that this move-
ment is essentially about ‘labour migration’ (Pascouau 2013; Martín and Venturini 
2015; Barslund et  al. 2015). While some studies underline the phenomenon of 
“social dumping” produced by migrants’ readiness to work for low wages in bad 
working conditions (Amelina and Vasilache 2014), others question if this is a form 
of welfare – rather than labour – migration. Still others argue that liberalization of 
movement in the EU is producing a workforce that is more aware of the European 
dimension of the labour market (Andrijasevic and Sacchetto 2015).
Based on a research conducted in Austria, Sweden, the Netherlands and Turkey 
in 2013–2016, this chapter largely contributes to the first line of literature on intra- 
European movement with one key argument: diversification of CEE migration. 
While drawing the main migration corridors from CEE countries to the less-focused 
cases of Austria, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Turkey, we argue that migration pat-
terns within these corridors are diversified on two levels: time (i.e., temporary ver-
sus permanent migration), and; socio-economic status (i.e., high-skilled workers 
versus non-workers). This typology is also presented in Chap. 1, as Fig.  2.1. 
Consequently, in that typology we choose eight categories or types of migrants 
(TOMs) that cover most of the surface of the typology. These are: 1) knowledge 
workers; (2) entrepreneurs; (3) manual workers; (4) persons working in private 
0
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Fig. 2.1 CEE migration before and after the 2004 and 2007 enlargements
Country (Before/After): Austria (2002/2013), Netherlands (2003/2013), Sweden (2000/2012), 
Turkey (2003/2012)
Source: Sert (2014), updated by the author
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households; (5) sex workers and trafficked persons; (6) students; (7) non-working 
spouses and children, and; (8) beggars and homeless people. This categorization on 
time and socio-economic status is an important contribution to the literature as it 
avoids the typical singular reliance on migrants’ ethnicity/national citizenship 
(which holds limited analytical relevance) to focus on their labour-market position 
instead.
Migration corridors are utilized here as frames of observation. The concept of 
corridors enables us to observe different forms of asymmetry in movement (Carling 
2015). The destination countries chosen for this research represent different stages 
in relation to CEE migration. To illustrate, while Austria and the Netherlands issued 
transitional arrangements concerning intra-European ‘labour migration’ during the 
2004 and 2007 enlargements, Sweden opted out of such a policy choice. Turkey is 
included in the analysis as a case study with a very different immigration regime, 
since the EU regulations on CEE migration are not applicable. Moreover, the cor-
ridors are not evaluated solely at the country level. Different urban regions were also 
included in the analysis adding leverage to the analysis of the diversity of CEE 
migration. Two urban regions were included for each country: Vienna and Linz in 
Austria, The Hague and Rotterdam (the Netherlands), Stockholm and Gothenburg 
(Sweden), and Edirne and Istanbul (Turkey). The concentration on urban regions 
uncovered further diversification of CEE migration, since we observed more trans-
national patterns in bordering urban regions, such as Linz and Edirne. Still, consid-
ering a multilevel perspective, the country level is more determinant than the specific 
urban level to identify responses, policies and even consequences of CEE migra-
tion, where cities located in the same country often seem to display similar responses 
and register the same consequences.
The chapter proceeds as follows. The first section presents the methodology, 
underlining the issues of inaccessibility and incomparability of available data. The 
second part provides a brief outline of the historical background of East-West 
migration before the 2004 and 2007 enlargements. Subsequently, the effects of the 
eastern enlargement of the EU are analysed with a specific focus on the transitional 
arrangements where the four countries chosen for the research represent compara-
ble cases. The fourth section defines and details the main migration corridors. The 
fifth part depicts the types of migrants involved in each country and urban region, 
with a focus on the feminization of migration. The final section presents some con-
cluding remarks.
2.2  Methodology and Issues
As outlined in the methodological considerations of Chap 1, research teams in 
Austria, Sweden, the Netherlands and Turkey collected available data on CEE 
migration pertaining to their respective countries, and tried to synchronize these 
figures to produce systematic comparisons. Each research team outlined and anal-
ysed existing data on the number of CEE migrants across four data clusters: (1) 
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country of origin, gender, educational levels, stocks and flows; (2) migration motives 
(i.e., labour, family, and/or study); (3) duration of migration (i.e., temporary versus 
permanent), and; (4) labour market participation (i.e., whether employment was 
formal or informal). All the teams followed a dual approach on methodology.
First, as mentioned in Chap. 1, they utilized secondary sources, reviewing the 
literature of previous research as well as available official statistics. This provided 
with a valuable source on stocks and flows of migrants including basic demographic 
features such as age and gender, but lacks important information on education, pro-
fessional background or legal status. As such, although CEE migration in Europe is 
a highly debated issue, finding comparable data proved difficult. To demonstrate, 
the Central Population Register (CPR) in Austria works with a system of continuous 
reporting on the changes of main residences at the municipal level covering all per-
sons who have registered a main residence in Austria for more than 90 consecutive 
days. This provides a valuable source for an overview on stocks and flows of 
migrants including basic demographic features such as age and gender, but lacks 
important information on education, professional background or legal status. In the 
Netherlands, population statistics provide reliable information about the registered 
‘migrants’ in the country. However, only those migrants who intend to stay in the 
Netherlands more than 4 months need to register, making statistics incomplete and 
socially selective. There are analyses of CEE migration derived from representative 
samples from these population registers, but the problem remains that many CEE 
migrants are not registered. There are also survey studies based on non- representative 
sampling of CEE migration, which provide better insight into the more volatile 
category of temporary (and often less integrated) CEE migrants in the Netherlands, 
but the unemployed and other non-working migrants tend to be absent in these. In 
Sweden, data on CEE migration were derived from official statistics (i.e., from 
Statistics Sweden, the Swedish Work Environment Authority, the National Board of 
Health and Welfare, and the Swedish Higher Education Authority). Like the 
Netherlands, there is a time dimension in the population registers where only those 
migrants who declare their intention to stay for at least one year in Sweden are 
included in the population statistics. Moreover, like in Austria the official data 
hardly provide any information on the educational levels of CEE migrants. In 
Turkey, the problem of availability of data is more critical than other cases. 
International migration in Turkey became a policy concern only in the late ‘90s, and 
collection and distribution of data have been considered as statistically important 
only after the establishment of the Directorate General of Migration Management in 
2014, as envisioned by Law 6458 on Foreigners and International Protection 
(YUKK) adopted in 2013.
Secondly and additionally – especially where no official data were available – 
teams conducted qualitative interviews to estimate the scale of CEE migration and 
to uncover the different types of migration. Within this second approach, semi- 
structured interviews with different stakeholders were conducted. These included 
representatives of CEE migrants in the different migrant organizations, officials 
from local government, relevant private outfits (e.g., labour recruitment agencies), 
and NGOs involved in migration-related areas (e.g., housing and education). In that 
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regard the upcoming paragraphs are the outcome of the exploring, classifying and 
summarising quantitative data gathering steps in this project. But overall, although 
CEE migration in Europe is a highly debated issue, finding data – especially com-
parable data – proved difficult.
2.3  CEE Migration Before the Enlargements
Migration from CEE countries to Austria, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Turkey 
occurred long before the EU enlargements. In Austria, two groups of CEE migrants 
have been of particular importance. The first are refugees from the communist coun-
tries (who continued to arrive until the late 1980s) and the second are labour 
migrants and their families. Due to its neutrality during Cold War, Austria received 
three major waves of refugees: from Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia (1968) and 
Poland (1981). For many, Austria was only a transit country on their way to other 
destinations (Enengel et al. 2014). At the beginning of the 1960s, Austria was con-
fronted with a growing need of additional labour and started to recruit workers from 
countries such as Turkey and Yugoslavia (ibid.). Despite the original model – a rota-
tion of temporary ‘guest workers’ – many of these migrants stayed and brought their 
families to Austria. To this day, Turkish- and Balkan-origin workers comprise the 
most important and growing foreign-born groups in the country (ibid.).
Like Austria, the Netherlands also received refugees from Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia, and Poland during the same periods (1956, 1968 and 1981, respec-
tively) (Bonjour 1980: 48; also cited in Ostaijen et al. 2014). Unlike other countries, 
the Netherlands also faced a unique type of movement of those Polish soldiers who 
had fought with the Allied forces to liberate the Netherlands from German occupa-
tion during World War II. These soldiers often stayed and married Dutch women. 
There was also marriage migration of women from CEE countries, particularly 
from Poland, who married Dutch men, the so-called ‘Polish brides’ (Dagevos 2011; 
also cited in Ostaijen et al. 2014). Again, like Austria the Netherlands has also been 
an important destination for labour migration. Even before and shortly after World 
War II several thousand CEE nationals, mainly from Poland and Slovenia, arrived 
to work in the Dutch mines (Brassé and Van Schelven 1980; also cited in Ostaijen 
et  al. 2014). 50,000 Poles were estimated to work as seasonal workers in Dutch 
horticulture in the late 1980s (Dagevos 2011: 31; also cited in Ostaijen et al. 2014).
Like Austria and the Netherlands, Sweden was (and still is) a destination for 
humanitarian immigration, and in increasing numbers (Boguslaw 2012; also cited 
in Zelano et al. 2014). Unlike the two other cases, Sweden followed a more cautious 
immigration policy in terms of labour migration. In the wake of the economic 
downturn at the beginning of the 1970s, Sweden allowed labour migration only if 
demand could not be met by the existing domestic workforce. These obstacles for 
free movement were removed with Sweden’s accession into the EU in 1995 (Zelano 
et al. 2014).
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Immigration from CEE followed a different trajectory in Turkey. In the Early 
Republican Period, usually categorized under Balkan migrations, there were large 
influxes from Bulgaria, Romania, and Yugoslavia. After the war of independence, as 
part of its nation and state building efforts, the country needed human capital to 
build a homogenous nation state and welcomed migrants of Sunni-Islam origin 
from countries such as Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia. In the period of 1940 and 
1945, more than 20,000 people migrated to Turkey with Bulgarians, Romanians and 
Yugoslavians representing 73%, 19% and 8% of this migrant community, respec-
tively (Korfalı et  al. 2014). During the Cold War, a similar trend was observed. 
Approximately 800,000 migrants entered Turkey, those from Bulgaria forming the 
largest group followed by those coming from Yugoslavia (ibid.). Large-scale migra-
tion from Bulgaria during this time was due to Bulgaria’s negative policies against 
its minorities, including those of Turkish ethnicity. Overall, the history of CEE 
migration to Turkey has been dominated by migration of people of Muslim origin 
from Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Romania, usually looking for a safe haven. This pat-
tern thus somehow resembles the humanitarian migrations in other countries under 
research. Lately, with the neo-liberal economic policies of governments in Turkey 
after 1990, different types of migration have been observed.
2.4  Enlargements, CEE Migration, and Transitional 
Arrangements
The EU enlargements bringing in the mostly Eastern European countries of the 
A10 in 2004 and Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 (the EU-2), had significant effects 
on both the mobility of people within the EU and near abroad (i.e., Turkey). 
Figure 2.1 depicts the volume of CEE migration in the four countries under research 
before and after the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, showing a substantial increase in 
the number of CEE migrants in Austria, Sweden, and the Netherlands, but a decrease 
in Turkey.
Accordingly, as of 2013 there were a total of 330,000 officially registered per-
sons in Austria who were born in the CEE enlargement countries. This figure was 
one third higher compared to 2002. The number of CEE migrants has also risen in 
the Netherlands. Just before the EU enlargement of 2004, in 2003, there were about 
62,000 CEE residents in the country. This number was only 50,000 in the 1990s. As 
of 2013, the number of CEE migrants in the Netherlands increased to almost 
180,000, three times more than the same figure in 2003. Sweden also faced an 
increasing number of CEE migration. From 2000 to 2012, the number of individuals 
born in one of the CEE EU member states increased by almost 80%, from 80,000 to 
150,000.
In Turkey, there was a reverse pattern: the proportion of CEE migrants of the 
total number of regular migrants who received residence permits in Turkey declined 
from 40% in 2003 and to 22% in 2011. This can be explained by two factors. First, 
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Turkey has begun to receive higher numbers of migrants from non-CEE countries in 
general, likely causing the ratio of migrants from the CEE countries to fall. Second, 
the number of CEE migrants has declined as they have shifted their migration des-
tination towards the EU following the home country’s EU accession. The finding 
reiterates the position of Turkey as a reference case in the IMAGINATION research.
Following the two enlargements, the number of CEE migrants in Austria, Sweden 
and the Netherlands did not increase overnight. Some member states opted for tran-
sitional restrictions, which allowed member states to temporarily restrict the right of 
workers from the new member states to move freely to another member state to 
work. Such transitional arrangements had been applied in most of the previous 
enlargements of the EU.  Among the four countries under research here, it was 
Austria and the Netherlands that have issued such transitional arrangements in rela-
tion to intra-European movement (See Table 2.1).
Austria put in place transitional rules during both the 2004 and 2007 enlargement 
processes. Concerning the labour market access of CEE migrants, Austria declared 
that workers from the new member states needed a work permit sponsored by the 
employer. After one year of legal employment, workers were free to move within 
the labour market. After 18 months, those family members residing with the work-
ers also received this right. The restrictions were lifted for the EU-10 in May 2011 
and for Romania and Bulgaria by the end of 2013. In fact, transitional rules had not 
restricted freedom of settlement in Austria where the citizens of the new EU-member 
states could arrive as students, retirees or to join family members. They also had the 
right to found businesses, where they could be self-employed.
A year after lifting the transitional rules (2012), net migration from the CEE to 
Austria reached a zenith of 20,000. Because there is not municipal-level, register- 
based census that provides figures on employment of individuals during this time, 
the effects of the end of the transitional rules in May 2011 can only be made based 
on employment data and extensive in-depth analysis provided by the Federal 
Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Consumer Protection (Enengel et al. 2014). 
Table 2.1 Transitional arrangements (Source: Sert (2014), updated by the author)
Country Policy
Years of 
application
Austria Workers from the new member states require a work permit 
sponsored by their employer. After one year of legal employment, 
workers free to move within the labour market. After 18 months, 
those family members residing with the worker also receive this 
right.
EU-8: 
2004–11
EU-2: 
2007–13
Netherlands Workers from the new member states require a work permit for the 
first two years of employment.
EU-8: 
2004–07
EU-2: 
2007–13
Sweden No transitional restrictions were applied. Not 
applicable.
Turkey Not applicable. Not 
applicable.
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Hence, the impact of liberalization one year after the end of the transitional provi-
sions amounted to an increase of almost 27,000 persons or in relative terms about a 
one-third increase compared to April 2011 (ibid.). Based on the expert interviews 
conducted in Austria, some of these workers were not new immigrants, but had 
already been in Austria and had only legalized their existing employment. 
Interestingly, almost half of these new workers were commuters who did not move 
to Austria (ibid.).
Similarly, the Netherlands also issued transitional restrictions, which required 
that workers from the new member states obtain a work permit for the first two years 
of their employment. After 2007, when the restrictions for Poles and residents from 
the other new member states of 2004 were revoked, the figure of migrants from 
these countries rose. Studies conducted in the Netherlands during this time illustrate 
the implications of the transitional restrictions on CEE immigration and give a sense 
of comparison between the cases of 2004 and 2007, as transitional restrictions were 
still in effect in the latter case (e.g., Weltevrede et al. 2009, Engbersen et al. 2011, 
Engbersen et al. 2013, Snel et al. 2014, also cited in Ostaijen et al. 2014). Focusing 
both on registered and non-registered CEE labour migrants, these studies show that 
because of the transitional regulations that were still effective towards the citizens 
of EU-2 enlargement countries of 2007, many Romanian and Bulgarian respondents 
were often self-employed rather than holding formal jobs (ibid.).
Contrasting the Austrian and Dutch cases, Sweden did not employ any transi-
tional restrictions during either enlargement. In 2004, Sweden was the only EU 
member state that refrained from implementing transitional rules, where the UK 
and Ireland implemented minor ones to moderate the impact of the prospective 
immigration flows. Similarly, in 2007 Sweden again elected not to apply restric-
tions. Additionally, in 2008 Sweden liberalized its labour migration policy. With the 
change, instead of having state institutions evaluate the demand for immigrant 
labour via labour market tests, authorization to conduct the assessment was dele-
gated to employers (Zelano et al. 2014). Having a work permit in Sweden now only 
depends on having a job offer with a wage that is in accordance with a collective 
agreement or at the same level as collective agreements in the industry concerned 
(Wadensjö and Gerdes 2013). Despite cautionary calls that insisted on transitional 
restrictions, studies by Doyle et al. (2006), Ruist (2013) and Wadensjö and Gerdes 
(2013) have proved that the fears of welfare abuse were exaggerated; immigrants 
from the expanded EU show no dramatic deviation in earnings, work conditions, 
educational levels or social welfare provisions (Zelano et al. 2014).
Overall, in Sweden – where no transitional restrictions were applied – the reser-
vations on CEE immigration proved entirely unfounded. In Austria and the 
Netherlands, where transitional restrictions were employed, the restraints only 
affected formal employment. Immigrants from the CEE member states still arrived 
in both countries, working on a self-employed basis.
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2.5  Main Migration Corridors
Migration corridors are tracks that form under specific conditions and enable move-
ment of people within a geographical setting, in our case between the CEE countries 
and Austria, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Turkey. Inspecting the four country cases 
under research, the emergence of different migration corridors facilitating the move-
ment of migrants can be explained by the classic push–pull factors theory, where 
migration is determined by the presence of attracting pull factors at destination, and 
repelling push factors at origin (Lee 1966). Demographic growth, low living stan-
dards, lack of economic opportunities, and political repression are typically cited 
push factors in the place of origin. Demand for labour, availability of land, good 
economic opportunities, and political freedoms that attract migrants to certain 
receiving countries are common examples of pull factors (Castles and Miller 1998; 
Sert 2010). Regarding CEE migration towards our four country cases, geographical 
proximity, historical ties, and political conditions such as endorsement of transi-
tional periods are also among the facilitating conditions of movement. Table 2.2 
identifies the main migration corridors between the CEE countries and Austria, 
Sweden, the Netherlands and Turkey based on the volume of immigrants from these 
countries.
In view of that, Austria’s main migration corridors are with Romania, Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic. An analysis of the Statistics Austria Population 
Register shows that immigrants from the new EU member states – the EU-10 of 
2004 and EU-2 of 2007 – comprised almost 300,000 persons in 2013, with growth 
in 2002–13 being 26% for the EU-10, and 95% for the EU-2 (Enengel et al. 2014). 
The increase of migrants from Romania and Bulgaria was much more noticeable 
compared to immigrants coming from bordering countries: the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Slovakia as well as Poland, who had already been arriving in Austria in 
larger numbers during the 1990s (ibid.). While geographical proximity and histori-
cal and transnational ties seem to play a more important role in creation of migra-
tion corridors with Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic, political conditions 
(i.e., accession to the EU) appear to be also relevant for movement originating in 
Romania.
Table 2.2 Main migration corridors (Ranking) (Source: Sert (2014), updated by the author)
Poland Romania Bulgaria Hungary Others
Austria 2 1 3 4a
Netherlands 1 4 2 3
Sweden 1 2 3 4b 5c
Turkey 4 1 2d 3e
aCzech Republic
bEstonia
cLithuania
dUkraine
eMoldova
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Like in Austria, Poland, Hungary, and Romania constitute important migration 
corridors to the Netherlands. Bulgaria is an additional important corridor. In the 
Netherlands, the number of immigrants from Poland almost tripled in 2004–13, 
from approximately 60,000 to 110,000, while the number of Hungarians grew one- 
third to almost 20,000 persons (Ostaijen et  al. 2014). In 2013, almost 21,000 
Bulgarians arrived in the Netherlands, a five-fold increase since the 2007 enlarge-
ment (ibid.). Romanian migrants, comprising almost 18,000 people the same year, 
nearly doubled after the enlargement (ibid). These figures are derived from the 
Dutch Population Registers. As many labour migrants do not register in the 
Netherlands, it is assumed that the actual number of CEE migrants is probably 
much higher (ibid.). Recent studies, operating advanced statistical estimation tech-
niques, projected that in 2010 about 340,000 CEE nationals (both registered and 
not) were present in the Netherlands, either temporarily or permanently (Van der 
Heijden et al. 2013, also cited in Ostaijen et al. 2014).
Like in Austria and the Netherlands, Poland, Romania and Hungary form the 
major migration corridors to Sweden, followed by Estonia and Lithuania. Based on 
figures provided by Statistics Sweden, there are almost 75,000 Polish, 22,000 
Romanians, 16,000 Hungarians, 10,000 Estonians and 9000 Lithuanians in Sweden 
(Zelano et al. 2014). Like in Austria, geographical and political factors are impor-
tant in the formation of these corridors.
Like in other countries, Romania is a main migration corridor also towards 
Turkey, along with Bulgaria, Ukraine and Moldova (Korfalı et al. 2014). Partially 
because of its location and partially because of its status, Turkey has rather different 
migration corridors than other countries under research here (i.e., countries like 
Ukraine and Moldova). While the link with Moldova can be explained by the his-
torical and linguistic closeness of the Gagauz people living there (they speak 
Turkish), the corridor with Ukraine is mostly the result of economic factors.
2.6  Types of Migration (TOMs) and the Feminization 
of Migration
Based on earlier studies, comparative insight and inductive reasoning, we can cate-
gorize migration patterns within these corridors on two levels: duration (i.e., tempo-
rary versus permanent migration), and; socio-economic status (i.e., high- versus 
low-skilled migration). Consequently, a typology of CEE migration is fashioned 
depicting eight different categories or types of migrants (TOMs). These are: (1) 
knowledge workers; (2) entrepreneurs; (3) manual workers; (4) persons working in 
private households; (5) sex workers and trafficked persons; (6) students; (7) non- 
working spouses and children and; (8) beggars and homeless people. The typology 
is structured following an account of abductive reasoning (Yanow 2012), which is 
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formed along formal–informal non-employment levels, taking into consideration 
different characteristics such as migrants’ skills, the sectors in which they are 
employed, their vulnerability as well as the duration of their migration (i.e. tempo-
rary versus permanent). The typology shows that CEE migrants should not be con-
sidered a homogenous category, but rather a highly differentiated one. As previous 
studies such as Engbersen et  al. (2013) have proposed, the typology here also 
includes high- and low-skilled migrants as well as temporary versus permanent 
ones. Unlike previous studies, though, the effort of creating a typology of CEE 
migration here is realized not within a single country but in four different countries 
(and eight different urban regions). Regarding the typology, there are some major 
findings relevant for all four countries and urban regions (See Table 2.3). Table 2.3 
provides a comparative synthesis of the typology with certain drawbacks on internal 
coherence. There is an asymmetry of information, for instance, for the same cate-
gory of migrants, the main activity sectors for some countries and urban regions, 
and about chronological evolution.
To begin, there is a small presence of knowledge workers in all countries, but 
there are more differences than similarities. In Austria, high-skill positions in the 
labour market are usually reserved for Austrian citizens, with a certain level of 
improvement in this situation (Enengel et al. 2014). With regard to the urban regions 
of Linz and Vienna, we have less region-specific information. In the Netherlands, 
despite the conventional belief that CEE migrants hold low-skill jobs, there is an 
observed heterogeneity in the labour market positions of the migrants from the 
CEE, where migrants also have high-skill employment (Ostaijen et al. 2014). While 
there is less region-specific information with regard to Rotterdam, we observe 
Romanians and Hungarians taking on some positions in international organizations 
in The Hague. Contrary to Austria and the Netherlands, the highest shares within the 
skill-level distributions in occupations of migrants in Sweden are detected in high- 
and medium-skill jobs (Zelano et al. 2014). While high-skill jobs are accessible for 
migrants in Sweden, we observe a decreasing pattern in Stockholm compared to 
Gothenburg. Although migrants taking high-skill positions are exceptional in 
Turkey, Istanbul is considered to attract highly skilled migrants. The conventional 
wisdom especially in Edirne holds that migrants from the CEE have higher skills 
than the local population.
Because of the legal conditions that determine the entry to the formal labour 
market, the category of entrepreneurs is observed as an important path for formal 
employment in all four countries. In Linz and Vienna, there are many one-person 
companies especially in the construction and care sectors. Similarly, in Rotterdam 
and The Hague, self-employment in the construction sector is common. Self- 
employment as a means of formal employment is also observed in Sweden, where 
Estonians have a higher share. Interestingly, in Sweden the number of self-
employed female migrants is increasing both in Stockholm and Gothenburg, 
pointing to a feminization of CEE migration in this category. Self-employment as 
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a means of formal status in the labour market is also detected in Edirne and 
Istanbul, mostly in the form of small enterprises. Thus, there is a clear relationship 
between the presence of legal restrictions on employment in the formal labour 
market in the host country and the use of self-employment as strategy of migrants 
to achieve formal status. To illustrate, as the transitional rules were lifted in Austria 
and the Netherlands, there was – as expected – a decrease in the trend of self-
employment. Similarly, as more regulations were applied in the berry-picking 
market in Sweden, the number of self-employed migrants in this sector rose 
(Zelano et al. 2014).
Manual workers are commonly observed in the cases under research except for 
Turkey. In Austria, the tourism, construction and agricultural sectors employ large 
segments of CEE migrants, both in the formal and informal employment schemes. 
In Vienna, there are mostly Slovakians and Hungarians taking on jobs in the gas-
tronomy sector and viticulture. In Linz, there are more agricultural workers in the 
rural areas. In the Netherlands, there are seasonal workers in horticulture and agri-
culture, mainly composed of Polish migrants. Regarding Rotterdam and The Hague, 
we have less region-specific information due to the lack of data. In Sweden, there 
are low-skilled workers in both the formal and informal labour market in construc-
tion, cleaning and welding. Both in Gothenburg and Stockholm, we observe that the 
number of young, male migrants has been increasing since 2004. While there are a 
few cases of young Moldovan males in the construction sector in Istanbul, generally 
in Turkey internal migration of the local Kurdish population – and lately the increas-
ing number of asylum seekers from Syria  – supply the demand for manual 
workers.
Persons working in private households as a category are identified in all four 
countries. In Austria, there is a trend of circular migration of females especially in 
the care sector for the elderly as well as informal employment of migrants as clean-
ers. The category is observed both in Vienna and Linz, where migrants from Poland, 
Slovakia (and increasingly Romania) work in private households. Similarly, in the 
Netherlands there are also migrants who usually work in informal arrangements in 
the domestic care and cleaning sectors. Both in Rotterdam and The Hague, the cat-
egory is mostly composed of Bulgarians, which is expected to change with the end 
of transitional arrangements. With regard to the care sector in Sweden, while official 
numbers show a small immigrant overrepresentation in the health sector, informa-
tion about unregistered migrants is rather patchy at best. In Stockholm 7% and in 
Gothenburg 9% of registered migrants work in the nursing and cleaning sectors. In 
Istanbul, irregular domestic labour  – both in temporary and permanent arrange-
ments – is common and is largely dominated by female Bulgarian and Moldovan 
migrants. In all four cases, a dominant issue in relation to migrants working in pri-
vate households as care workers, nannies, cleaning persons, and gardeners is the 
problem of registration, where the distinction between regular versus irregular 
migrants becomes difficult to distinguish.
Another category where the distinction between formal and informal arrange-
ments is hard to differentiate is sex workers and trafficked persons. In Austria, there 
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are both registered and unregistered sex workers, and forced prostitution can be 
observed in both cases. While most registered sex workers in Vienna are Hungarian 
and Romanian, there is insufficient information about the urban region of Linz. In 
the Netherlands, prostitution is legalized under certain conditions and CEE migrants 
are known to be victims of trafficking, but there are no official statistics. In The 
Hague, 25% of registered sex workers are known to be from CEE countries. In 
Sweden, there are young women staying for short periods of time. In Stockholm, 
there are few women from Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Moldova, the Baltic coun-
tries and Poland working in the sector. In Gothenburg, the Roma from Bulgaria and 
Romania are more visible. In Turkey, human trafficking, especially from Moldova, 
is a known phenomenon and for both urban regions the category is relevant, but less 
is known. Overall, on the one hand some sex workers are not registered and working 
informally. On the other hand, there are many registered sex workers that may rep-
resent a voluntary choice of profession in a formal setting. Within this latter group 
there are also many that are forced into prostitution. Thus, sex workers and traf-
ficked persons are usually mixed in this category.
Students as a category of CEE migration are rising in volume in all four coun-
tries. In Austria, the number of CEE students is increasing where Bulgarians con-
stitute a large category. In the Netherlands and Turkey, there are also many CEE 
students. In Sweden, the number of CEE students is also increasing with gender 
differences. Student mobility is an expanding phenomenon not only among the 
member states of the EU, but also in Turkey (Findlay et al. 2012; Van Mol and 
Timmerman 2013). Students may utilize education as a means of access to per-
manent residency within a country (Gribble 2008), but further research is needed 
to understand the motivations and future plans of CEE students in the four 
countries.
Less is discerned about the qualitative features of the migration of non-working 
spouses and children, but quantitatively this category is visible in numbers in all 
four countries, while receiving less attention both in policy and academic circles. 
In Austria, children constitute a small portion of CEE migration. In Vienna, there 
are 7931 children registered, where cross-border school attendance is an emerging 
issue. In Linz, the category has minor relevance, mostly dominated by Romanians. 
In the Netherlands, family-related migration is increasing and mostly led by 
females, i.e., women migrating first and husbands joining later, which is very dif-
ferent than the historical migration of single males. In Rotterdam, a large share of 
CEE migration is related to families. In The Hague, the number of CEE children 
going to school has doubled since 2010. In Sweden, the second largest reason for 
registering for a residence permit is intention of family members to accompany 
their spouses and parents. Similarly, in Turkey the highest proportion of residence 
permits granted upon education is at the primary level (i.e., mostly children). For 
the latter two cases, region-specific information is not available regarding this 
category.
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In contrast to the category of non-working spouses and children – which receives 
little policy and academic attention – the category of beggars and homeless people 
emerges as a sensitive issue that attracts public debate, although the numbers of this 
type of migration are rather low compared to the other categories. In Austria, beg-
ging is a sensitive public issue, but there are no reliable figures. In Vienna, beggars 
are often commuting from the neighbouring countries, especially from Slovakia and 
Hungary. In Linz, a growing number of beggars of Roma descent are observed. In 
the Netherlands, the number of beggars and homeless people are low and decreas-
ing. In Rotterdam, there are non-registered Bulgarians selling journals, or street 
musicians. In The Hague, there is a public debate about homeless CEE nationals, 
mainly Polish. In Sweden, there are 379 homeless EU citizens; the majority are 
males with an average age of 38 years old from Romania as well as Poland, Bulgaria, 
Slovakia and Spain (Zelano et al. 2014). In Stockholm, NGO Crossroads receives 
on average 120 visits every day. In Gothenburg, the numbers are increasing with the 
majority being female migrants. In Turkey, beggars and homeless from CEE is a 
rare phenomenon.
Overall, within many categories there is an observed feminization of migration, 
which is described here as an increasing number of female migrants in CEE migra-
tion. In Austria, the gender composition of CEE migration has changed a lot since 
the end of the Cold War. Female migrants from CEE (being 15 years and older) have 
an increasing presence and importance, clearly outnumbering males. In 1991, the 
proportion of male migrants among all CEE-migrants ranged at around 70% with 
only little variation between the sending countries and with around one third not 
having reached the age of 30 years Today, young and middle-aged female migrants 
have gained importance and visibly exceed the number of males. Women from CEE 
are more visible in the service sector, in child care as well as caring for old-aged 
people in private households. These occupations have strong demand in Austria, 
thus providing a considerable number of jobs, but generally pay modest incomes 
and are often organized on an informal basis. The urban regions of Vienna and Linz 
do not show a variance from this trend on the national level. While the figures of 
residents that were born in the EU-8 do not show big differences in gender patterns 
in the whole of Vienna urban region, the study by Lechner et al. (2010) referring 
primarily to the (daily) commuters in the Austro-Hungarian border region (south-
eastern parts of the region of Vienna) show clear gender- and age- specific patterns. 
Accordingly, about 75% of the Hungarian workers are male. Many of these migrants 
choose to commute to Austria daily, as they can stay and live in western Hungary 
(with lower living and residential costs) and work in the border regions of Austria 
for higher wages than they would earn at home. Thus, geographical proximity is a 
determining factor of this type of migration, where males show a stronger presence 
than females.
In the Netherlands, there is also a tendency towards feminization of migration, 
where the majority (albeit a small portion in some cases) of the officially registered 
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CEE migrants are females (51% of Polish and Bulgarian, 54% of Hungarian, and 
60% of Romanians). While the proportion of females among the labour migrants is 
low (Nicolaas 2011, Jennissen 2011), females are overrepresented in migration for 
family motives (Gijsberts and Lubbers 2013). Looking at the ratios at the level of 
urban regions, in Rotterdam the total percentage of females is more than the males 
in all three municipalities. The difference is profound among Romanian migrants, 
where females are overrepresented in all municipalities (63% in Rotterdam; 62% in 
Schiedam and 72% in Lansingerland). Similarly, the male-female ratio in The 
Hague region is also in favour of the female migrants, where the total percentage of 
females is more than the males in all three municipalities. In the municipalities of 
The Hague and Westland, women are overrepresented among both Romanians (59–
60% female) and Hungarians (63–4% female). In the municipality of Delft, a simi-
lar overrepresentation is true for the Polish (62% female).
In Sweden, gender distribution shows a variance between registered and unreg-
istered migrants. While the flows of regular and registered CEE migrants are 
 characterized by a rather even gender distribution, the group of CEE immigrants 
overlooked by the official records is dominantly male. In 2012, of the 148,998 
individuals living in Sweden born in one of the EU-10 countries the gender distri-
bution was 45% male and 55% female. For the CEE as a whole, the gender distri-
bution has been more or less the same throughout the period 2000–12, with a 
somewhat larger share of women than men (an average of 42% men, 58% women). 
The same is true for the five largest immigrant populations, with the exception for 
the Polish and Lithuanian ones, where the share of males have increased slightly 
during the 10 years period between 2000–2012 (Statistics Sweden 2013b). Of the 
2732 citizens from the CEE region who obtained Swedish citizenship in 2012, 
1627 were women and 1105 were men (Statistics Sweden 2013a). Polish women 
consist the largest category representing 36% (975) of all CEE naturalizations in 
Sweden in 2012. In the urban region of Stockholm, women had a larger share than 
men in both the municipality of Haninge and Stockholm (51 and 56% respec-
tively). In Södertälje, the ratio was 48% women, 52% men. In the region of 
Gothenburg, women were the larger category in all three municipalities ranging 
from 53 to 60%.
In Turkey, the number of female CEE migrants with residence permits in 2011 
was approximately 59% of total regular CEE migrants. In previous years, the share 
of residence permits given to women was 55% in 2008, 54% in 2009, and 55% in 
2010. These high percentages of female migrants among the CEE migrants were 
also higher than the averages of female migrants among total migrants in Turkey. 
For rge same years, female migrants constituted 50% (2008), 51% (2009), 52% 
(2010) and 54% (2011) of total migrants in Turkey, which are below the proportion 
of women among CEE migrants. In a more detailed analysis, it is demonstrated that 
there was a gender balance of CEE migration between 2003 and 2005, male pre-
dominance in 2006 and 2007, and female predominance after 2008. A similar trend 
of increasing female domination is also observed, when we look at the work per-
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mits. An analysis of gender distribution of CEE migrants with work permits in the 
year 2008 shows that female migrants constitute only 37% of the CEE community 
holding employment permits. However, the difference between women and men 
with employment permits started closing in 2009 when women constituted almost 
half of the CEE migrants with work permits. Moreover, in an increasing trend the 
proportion of women among CEE migrants with employment permits in 2010, 2011 
and 2012 rose to 52%, 65% and 67%, respectively.
However, like in Sweden the gender distribution may show a variance between 
registered and unregistered migrants. While the flows of regular and registered CEE 
migrants are characterized by recent female predominance, looking at the apprehen-
sion data (a basic variable for estimation of unofficial migration) especially in 
Edirne, we see that it is predominantly male. However, there is also a variance 
among unregistered migration between irregular labour migrants and irregular tran-
sit migrants. While female CEE migrants may largely dominate the former (like in 
Austria, there is a strong demand for domestic female workers), the latter is largely 
a male-dominated phenomenon. In Istanbul, the variance is also visible between 
different types of migration.
2.7  Conclusions
Regardless of the variances in accessibility, type and disposition of data in the 
four countries, the exercise of mapping of migration corridors and analysis of 
types of migration from CEE countries to Austria, the Netherlands, Sweden, and 
Turkey see interesting conclusions develop. International comparisons are chal-
lenging, where disparities in data-collection practices between countries, the 
changing nature of political unions (in our case for example, being a member of 
the EU or applying transitional rules), and informal paths of migration all con-
tribute to the problem. The lack of data is observed on the international level, as 
well as supranational, regional and local levels. On the supranational level, even 
though CEE migration is mostly about intra-European movement, unavailability 
of comparable data among the EU member states on the movement of EU citi-
zens deserves policy attention. On a regional level, inaccessibility of comparable 
data between urban regions in a given country also demands further elaboration. 
There is a need to build mechanisms that enhance data collection at these differ-
ent levels.
Within this context, creating a typology of CEE migration as a heuristic device 
for comparison produces a tool with great exploratory value for answering further 
research questions. To illustrate, the almost trivial presence of knowledge workers 
in high-skill jobs in all four countries is instructive both for understanding de- 
qualification of migrants from the CEE countries in the labour market and recogniz-
ing the glass ceiling created by established structures. There is room for further 
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research about this group, such as collecting information about their patterns of 
integration or modes of professional advancement. In all four countries, self- 
employment seems to be a useful instrument for migrants from different CEE coun-
tries to overcome the limitations created by the recognized structures, such as 
transitional rules in the case of Austria and the Netherlands and strict labour market 
regulations in the case of Sweden and Turkey.
Whether there are signs of emerging ethnic economies in these countries also 
remains to be explored. In Austria, the Netherlands, and Sweden, manual workers 
are taking seasonal jobs mostly in the agricultural sector, implying that we can pre-
dict new routines of circular migration, where the difference between registered/
unregistered migrants is blurred. In all four cases, persons working in private house-
holds are parts of unregistered or irregular migration patterns, leaving room for 
further research to understand both the scale and nature of this type of migration. A 
similar reflection can be made about sex workers and trafficked persons, non- 
working spouses and children, and beggars and homeless people. All three groups 
include at-risk persons, and more research needs to be done to recognize the level 
and character of their vulnerabilities. The number of foreign students is increasing 
in all four countries, also opening a rather new venue for research.
The typology created here shows that the labour market remains an important 
governing factor in this specific types of CEE migration, but that new and changing 
patterns of free movement within the migration corridors are also in evidence, leav-
ing room for more analytical insights and interpretation about the drivers, impacts, 
and modes of integration of migrants. The typology confirms that ‘CEE migrants’ 
should not be considered as a homogenous, but rather as a highly differentiated 
category with high and low skilled, as well as temporary and permanent migrants. 
There is also a need to address the feminization of migration, which is described 
here as increasing number of female migrants in CEE migration, an observed phe-
nomenon in all four countries, maybe more in some than others. Very basically, we 
still do not know much about the gender relations among CEE migrants or the 
changing profile of female CEE migrants.
The country cases selected for this research also help us to draw conclusions 
about migration corridors. The cases illustrate the importance of historical context. 
Certain migration corridors have always been active. For example, the migration 
corridors between Poland and the Netherlands, or Bulgaria and Turkey have seen 
flows that have not eroded but rather transformed over time. In many ways, institu-
tional regimes, rather than geographical proximity, have played a larger role in these 
transformations. The country cases with their different applications of transitional 
restrictions create specifically interesting comparisons. In Sweden, where no transi-
tional restrictions were applied, concerns about the costs of admitting CEE migrants 
proved groundless. In Austria and the Netherlands, where transitional restrictions 
were in place, the limits only had consequences for formal employment. Deploying 
different tactics, such as self-employment, migrants from the CEE member states 
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still arrived and worked in both countries. Taking everything into account, today we 
see a diversification of intra-European movement, where historical context, institu-
tional structures and individual schemes have all contributed to the alteration of 
existing migration corridors.
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Chapter 3
Consequences of Intra-European  
Movement for CEE Migrants  
in European Urban Regions
Ursula Reeger
3.1  Introduction – Setting the Scene
In Europe today, EU citizens are free to move within the entire EU and may take up 
jobs, enter universities, enjoy retirement or try their luck wherever they want to. As 
many scholars have pointed out (Favell 2008, 2009; Ciupijus 2011; Castro-Martin 
and Cortina 2015) this complete freedom of movement marks a turning point in 
European history, and the predominant direction of movement is currently from 
East to West. Post-accession migration from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) thus 
brings back old European migration patterns, in which CEE migrants are making 
use of this still quite new freedom of movement. So, being mobile as such is simple 
and easy without any legal constraints whatsoever, as nowadays even more sceptic 
EU 15 countries like Austria and Germany have abolished most of the transitional 
provisions regulating access to their labour markets. One might exaggerate and say 
that the official term “mobility” implies that internal EU migrants never really arrive 
anywhere, but are rather floating freely through the EU, which of course is a com-
pletely inaccurate picture. With the national level becoming less important in the 
present setting, having been “taken out of the equation”, CEE migrants are arriving 
at and settling within varying periods of time in cities and urban regions, which are 
still the most important destinations, though rural areas, e.g. in Southern Europe, are 
also becoming more attractive destinations (see Caglar 2014). Still, CEE migration 
to Western Europe is to a large extent an urban issue.
From the EU’s point of view, free intra-European movement between Central- 
Eastern and Western Europe is praised as a win-win-win situation with gains for 
Western economies, higher wages for migrants and returning capital and talent for 
Eastern economies (Favell 2008: 705). But it is clearly necessary to look at this 
phenomenon from a more nuanced perspective (1) in terms of potential barriers in 
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different fields CEE migrants may face in their new destinations and (2) in terms of 
different groups of CEE migrants and their access to local resources. This will make 
it possible to overcome the rather one-dimensional view on an in fact rather hetero-
geneous group of people.
This chapter is going to explore the accessibility of CEE migrants to the labour 
market, housing, the welfare system, the school system and society as such. The 
previous chapters outline a definition as well as the actual presence of different 
groups of CEE migrants in urban regions in Austria, the Netherlands and Sweden. 
We will be looking at groups of migrants who are present on the labour market, both 
formally and informally employed (knowledge workers, entrepreneurs, manual 
workers, persons working in private households, sex workers), and at groups whose 
primary purpose of staying abroad is not work-related (students, partners or spouses, 
children as well as beggars and homeless persons).
This chapter presents both the obverse and the reverse side of free movement by 
looking at the pathways of these different types of CEE migrants into various 
domains and their access to local resources in six target urban regions based on 
qualitative empirical data. Details on methodology and the stakeholder-based 
approach can be found in Chap. 1. The question is, whether the access to and provi-
sion of local resources – which in the present context is understood as functional 
integration – runs as easily and seemingly smoothly as the freedom of movement 
promoted by the EU indicates. How are CEE migrants impacted by free movement 
in terms of inclusion and exclusion in central domains, and do migrant groups differ 
in this respect? If yes, in what way? This chapter provides a multidimensional syn-
thesis pertaining to patterns of consequences for different types of CEE migrants 
based on assessments from key stakeholders across six urban regions in Austria, the 
Netherlands and Sweden. Implications of CEE migration in the Turkish urban 
regions of Istanbul and Edirne are analysed in Chap. 11. Nevertheless, references 
will be made as to a comparison between urban regions within and outside the EU.
3.2  State of the Art: Studies on CEE Migration
During the past 25 years, the vast body of literature on the renewed European East- 
West migration has oftentimes focussed on analysing stocks and flows, on migra-
tion patterns, contributions to and advancements in migration theory, on labour 
migration and on facets of integration (in different fields like the labour market or 
housing). In geographical terms this has mostly been done for (a) single sending 
countries, with Poland being the most important as well as the most investigated 
country, and (b) single receiving countries, regions or cities (e.g. in the UK and in 
Germany). With the aforementioned paradigm shift in the legal-political framework 
and the emergence of free movement, scientific interest has moved on to post- 
accession migration and its particularities (Black et al. 2010; Glorius et al. 2013). It 
is still concentrating on distinct types and patterns of EU-internal East-West move-
ment but is also addressing issues of functional integration in the receiving regions 
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such as labour market segmentation, inclusion, exclusion, and de-qualification. 
There is a growing awareness among migration scholars that even though European 
‘mobile citizens’ nowadays basically have the same rights as citizens of the receiv-
ing EU countries, they still may face pronounced barriers and experience “integra-
tion needs” (Collett 2013) similar to those of migrants from outside of the EU, 
usually on the local level of regions and cities. Furthermore, the national frame-
works in the receiving member states may still determine registration requirements, 
for example, which are connected to accessing the welfare system or the labour 
market in those countries that implemented transitional provisions.
While in-depth analyses of implications related to lacking language skills and 
subsequent difficulties in finding proper information by accessing local resources 
are rarely available, issues concerning the labour market situation of CEE migrants 
have remained in the centre of scientific attention (e.g. Drinkwater et  al. 2010; 
Ciupijus 2011). In this context, de-qualification is one of the key aspects that has 
already been analysed from various perspectives since the re-emergence of European 
East-West migration in the wake of the fall of the Iron Curtain more than 25 years 
ago (Fassmann et al. 2014). Compared to other immigrant groups like guest workers 
in the 1960s and 1970s, CEE migrants display an above-average level of education 
which they oftentimes cannot translate into corresponding positions in the receiving 
labour market. To give an example from Austria: According to the Labour Force 
Survey (Statistics Austria 2015), the share of university graduates in the Austrian 
born population aged 15–64 was 15 per cent in 2014 compared to 23 per cent for 
CEE migrants.
Apart from the analysis of factors that explain the ongoing de-qualification of 
CEE workers, it has been shown that precarious work associated with downward 
occupational mobility is the price CEE migrants are willing to pay to gain higher 
wages in the “West” (Voitchovsky 2014). For Romanians and Bulgarians, who were 
shut out from some Western national labour markets for a longer period of time, 
bogus self-employment was an important pathway into these labour markets and 
often resulted in an even more pronounced precariousness combined with wage 
competition (Ciupijus 2011: 546). Being known, described and used as “hard work-
ers” hinders CEE migrants from social participation and language learning, as 
described in the British context (MacKenzie and Forde 2009): “certain workplaces, 
particularly those embodying classical features of secondary labour market jobs, do 
not facilitate overcoming social and cultural exclusion”, which might be passed on 
to the children of CEE migrants, as many temporary migration projects become 
more permanent (Ciupijus 2011: 546).
Though scholars are increasingly aware of the fact that CEE migrants are a very 
heterogeneous group, many recent studies still focus on migrant workers in danger 
of facing rather unfavourable conditions. Still, some scholars have looked into dis-
tinct groups of mobile CEE citizens. Favell (2009), to give an example, has elabo-
rated on elite professional movers whom he calls “Eurostars” in “Eurocities”, a 
predominantly urban hub phenomenon, where “an invisible migration of West 
Europeans has laid path now for young, talented and educated Poles, Hungarians, 
Romanians and others heading in the same direction” (ibid: 178  f.). Comparing 
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their situation in London, Amsterdam and Brussels, Favell sees mobile EU elite 
professionals in general as blocked to some extent. Even though the official barriers 
inhibiting their movement have been abolished completely, they still face serious 
long-term consequences of social isolation and local as well as national barriers 
(e.g. in housing) related to language and the “the internal secrets of a national ‘cul-
ture’ reserved to native speakers” (ibid: 180). Turning from these successful CEE 
migrants to those finding themselves in a destitute position, Garapich (2014) looks 
at street homeless in London among migrants from Poland and distinguishes 
between two types: The first one comprises persons who fled from a troubled his-
tory in some way (unemployment, homelessness and substance abuse in the country 
of origin), while the second one “is composed of people, who have descended into 
poverty and subsequent substance abuse after migrating to Britain”. The latter type 
is linked to structural features like their weak position in the labour market and their 
subsequent loss of housing in the tight and expensive London housing market. 
Garapich found that “structurally rejected people ... form strong ties despite (or 
because of) a hostile exclusionary and hegemonic social environment of the neolib-
eral order” (ibid.).
Other bodies of literature look at different domains of functional integration 
rather than at distinct groups of CEE migrants. Concerning the situation on the 
housing market, Ciupijus (2011: 542) points out that although they nominally have 
the right to access social housing in Britain, the general scarcity in this housing seg-
ment “left many mobile CEEs (most of them employed in poorly paid, secondary 
labour market jobs) with the unattractive option of expensive private accommoda-
tion”. The question of whether this concentration in a certain segment of the hous-
ing market leads to residential segregation has been addressed by Sabater (2015), 
who has shown that in the UK EU ‘mobile’ citizens from Poland – in comparison to 
those from Spain, Italy and Portugal  – are overrepresented in disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods.
3.3  Empirical Results: Implications of CEE Migration 
in Selected Urban Regions
3.3.1  Preliminary Remarks: Urban Regions and the Notion 
of Space
The main focus of this chapter is the analysis of the consequences of intra-European 
movement for various types of CEE migrants in European urban regions. These 
consequences are by and large related to the labour market, housing, the welfare 
system, the school system, and societal participation. Generally speaking, there are 
two different angles from which the implications can be looked at: that of the indi-
vidual migrants and that of the cities and urban regions. To give an example: 
Children from CEE in schools may have difficulties following the lessons due to 
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lacking language skills, which is a problem on the individual level. From the urban 
regions’ point of view, the presence of migrant children in schools may lead to 
changing needs and focuses and thus represent a cause for action, which in turn has 
urban consequences. Both kinds of implications are to some extent interlinked but 
they can be clearly distinguished. This contribution focuses on the individual per-
spective, which the experts have frequently elaborated on, with eventual side glances 
at the urban perspective.
From the perspective of European receiving cities, CEE migration adds to the 
ever-growing migration-related diversity that urban regions across Europe have 
been facing during the past decades. This fact changes and challenges cities and 
their subsystems. Cities cannot steer immigration as such, as this is dealt with on the 
national level and in the case of intra-European movement on the European level, 
but they are the places where migrants actually arrive and where integration needs 
and challenges become visible. The urban regions that are going to be explored 
include two capital cities (Stockholm and Vienna) that are at the same time the larg-
est cities in the respective countries, the second and third largest cities of the 
Netherlands, Rotterdam and The Hague, and two smaller urban regions in Sweden 
and Austria (Gothenburg and Linz). Generally speaking, the urban regions con-
cerned vary significantly in size but display a common main feature, namely a con-
siderable inflow of CEE migrants over the past decade, and even earlier, to both the 
core cities and the surrounding areas. The latter areas also attract CEE migrants 
because housing might be cheaper, the city is still easily accessible, and because 
rural areas offer employment opportunities (e.g. in agriculture). We expect distinc-
tive implications in the core cities with a larger experience of immigration and a 
more differentiated labour market compared to the surrounding municipalities, 
where (CEE) migration may not be that “common” and where migrant labour is 
often concentrated in one specific sector.
A central discriminating factor between the urban regions that shapes both the 
extent and the variation of types of migration and subsequently – such is the assump-
tion  – of the implications is that of spatial proximity. While Sweden and the 
Netherlands do not share any common borders with one of the CEE sending coun-
tries, Austria directly neighbours on four CEE countries, which literally surround its 
entire eastern part and with which it shares a long common history, not only regard-
ing migration. A similar situation can be found the Edirne urban region (see Chap. 
12). Short-term mobility is thus much more likely in this central European area 
because the related risks and costs for the migrants are comparably low. For CEE 
migrants from neighbouring countries, Austria is a kind of lab “for trying out” 
migration or simply for working “abroad” and living at home (e.g. daily commut-
ing). This makes a huge difference to the other destinations in Sweden and the 
Netherlands, where larger distances have to be overcome and where the related risks 
and costs are higher. So there are two facets of the notion of “space” that have to be 
taken into account, namely (1) the factual distance between origin and destination 
and (2) spatial variations in labour market structures and job opportunities within 
the receiving urban regions.
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3.3.2  Relevance of Different Types of CEE Migration 
in European Urban Regions
Before actually starting to answer the core research question, one needs to know, 
whether and to what extent the different types of CEE migrants defined in the pres-
ent context are relevant for the stakeholders’ work in the six urban regions. Results 
from the online survey that aimed at gathering first insights into relevant themes 
show the following: All groups have been mentioned as relevant by the local stake-
holders across all urban regions (see Fig. 3.1), which is not surprising because the 
groups were pre-defined based on the assessment and analysis during the mapping 
exercise (see Chaps. 1 and 2).
A closer look reveals both similarities and differences between (1) groups of 
CEE migrants and (2) urban regions. The relevance of a specific group in the stake-
holders’ work furthermore provides a preliminary indication as to the urban conse-
quences felt in specific contexts. As a majority, manual workers occupy much of the 
stakeholders’ engagement; they are the most important group in all urban regions 
except for Gothenburg. In Linz, Rotterdam and The Hague this goes hand in hand 
with a pronounced relevance of accompanying family members, which is discussed 
in terms of housing and consequences for the school system. Knowledge workers 
and entrepreneurs have been particularly relevant in Vienna and Rotterdam, though 
with varying urban consequences: While knowledge workers are mostly associated 
with positive outcomes for the urban regions, entrepreneurs may find themselves in 
difficult situations and may display detrimental outcomes for the urban labour mar-
ket, as will be described later. Interestingly enough, only Austrian stakeholders are 
also dealing with consequences of CEE workers in private households, which is 
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Vienna Linz Stockholm Gothenburg Rotterdam The Hague
Knowledge workers Entrepreneurs Manual workers
Workers in private households
Non-working partners 
Sex workers, trafficked 
persons Beggars, homeless 
Students
Fig. 3.1 Relevance of eight types of CEE migration for the stakeholders’ work in six urban 
regions (Source: IMAGINATION online survey 2014. N = 113. Note: In each city individually, 
stakeholders were asked about the relevance of the different groups in their work)
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probably due to spatial proximity and the presence of commuting care workers. 
Beggars and homeless persons, who receive a lot of media attention and are often in 
the focus of discussions of intra-European movement as such throughout Western 
Europe, were mostly mentioned by Swedish and Dutch respondents. More impor-
tantly, and this was revealed later during the expert interviews and the focus groups, 
there are enormous differences in the stakeholders’ perceptions and narratives as to 
who is “really important” in the respective urban setting, which leads to varying 
urban consequences that were raised. In the Netherlands, stakeholders were mostly 
concerned with temporary manual workers having a low socio-economic status and 
tended to neglect the fact that some CEE migrants stay for longer periods of time or 
even for good, while Swedish stakeholders were more concerned with beggars and 
homeless persons.
In Austria, given the specificity of spatial proximity, both temporary and perma-
nent forms of CEE migration were discussed. Another divergence in the stakehold-
ers’ assessments pertains to the definition of the “urban region”. While Austrian and 
Swedish experts did not elaborate on the big picture and oftentimes discussed only 
the spatial entity they were concretely working in, Dutch stakeholders often dis-
cussed rural surroundings, where – and this is the link – most temporary workers 
find jobs in horticulture. This needs to be mentioned as a limitation to the data as it 
has probably resulted in a bias.
3.4  Consequences for Different Types of CEE Migrants
In the following, a basic distinction will be made between labour migrants and those 
not economically active in the receiving urban regions. Further refinements as to the 
various types of CEE migration will then be displayed throughout the discussion of 
the results. Implications will be presented for the position on the labour market, the 
fields of housing and the local level of the neighbourhood, registration and social 
security, social participation, and the school system. Furthermore, we will take a 
closer look at potential interconnections between implications in these domains.
3.4.1  The Situation of Economically Active CEE Migrants: 
A Question of Legal Status
Though the freedom of movement has led to a pronounced diversification of types 
of CEE migration, taking up a job in order to escape unemployment, hoping for 
higher wages or broadening one’s experience still are the predominant reasons to go 
abroad. Within the group of labour migrants, there are short-term and long-term 
forms including eventual fluent transitions that mainly depend on the success and 
prospects on the receiving labour market. Another distinctive feature shaping the 
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trajectories in the receiving urban region is the legal status on the labour market 
ranging from informal to formal to mixed forms, as some CEE migrants hold both 
a formal and an informal job.
Next, the individuals’ level of qualification has to be taken into account: It has 
oftentimes been proven that a large share of CEE migrants is highly qualified, with 
knowledge workers per definition being the only group able to translate their quali-
fications into adequate positions on the receiving labour market. Their presence has 
mainly been assessed as positive for urban regions – in terms of economic gains and 
filling gaps on the labour market, a fact that also holds true for Edirne in Turkey (see 
Chap. 12) – and for individual migrants in terms of broadening their experience and 
gaining higher wages. Compared to the other groups, knowledge workers have 
rarely been mentioned by the stakeholders across urban regions and thus appear to 
be “invisible” because they are capable of navigating the different parts of the sys-
tem easily. Being formally employed translates into an unproblematic registration, 
and the related access to welfare benefits works somewhat automatically. Due to 
comparatively high salaries, their access to decent housing merely depends on the 
general availability of flats, which appears to be difficult in the urban regions in 
Sweden and Austria (most of all in the capital cities), where the overall situation on 
the housing market is rather tight. Nevertheless, many find housing in better-off 
neighbourhoods where they – again – remain invisible. For them, even the contested 
field of language competence is not seen as particularly relevant from the point of 
view of the stakeholders because their English is oftentimes sufficient, at least in the 
workplace. Concerning this group, the stakeholders were mainly concerned about 
their need for better information regarding rules and regulations in the different 
fields and also regarding the transfer of welfare benefits once they decide to move 
to another country or return to their country of origin.
Continuing with the individuals’ level of qualification, a central issue potentially 
applying to all other CEE migrant groups on the labour market irrespective of their 
length of stay and to some extent interlinked with their legal status is de- qualification, 
which is defined as a mismatch between the qualification “brought along” and the 
skill level acquired in the job at the destination. Since CEE migrants are oftentimes 
very qualified, the risk of doing de-qualifying work is high. A lack of information 
about the recognition of qualifications, weak networks and insufficient language 
skills are decisive reasons for this risk. Stakeholders have discussed this issue from 
extremely different perspectives, with the national specificities playing a more 
important role than differences between urban regions in the same country. It is a 
top-priority for Austrian stakeholders, who consider it a negative consequence for 
many CEE migrants that is closely connected to complex regulations concerning the 
nostrification of qualifications and lacking language skills. Not mentioned at all by 
Swedish stakeholders, the issue was discussed in the Netherlands from an entirely 
different perspective: CEE migrants may actually do de-qualified work but at the 
same time they qualify themselves in terms of tacit skills, international perspective 
and portfolio-building, a line of argumentation that once more proves the domi-
nance of the “temporary view” in the Dutch context.
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In order to understand the situation of CEE entrepreneurs in the urban regions 
one has to keep in mind that the majority of them chose self-employment (1) as a 
strategy to enter the labour market as long as the transitional provisions in Austria 
and the Netherlands were applied, with Sweden refraining from this post-accession 
strategy to protect the labour market, and (2) as a strategy to be employed in a sector 
where gainful employment is not feasible. From the point of view of the stakehold-
ers in the Dutch and Austrian urban regions, this resulted in high numbers of self- 
employed CEE citizens, many of whom are still marginalised one-person companies 
facing unfavourable situations in many respects, even though the transitional restric-
tions have been lifted. Thus, self-employed work is often linked to wage dumping, 
exploitation and de-qualification. Beyond that, some CEE migrants are essentially 
pushed into self-employment (concentrated in some branches like construction, 
care work, and taxi driving), an issue linked to an even higher risk of (self-)exploita-
tion and less secure working conditions. Local employers in this way reduce per-
sonnel costs and avoid administrative burdens aggravating both short- and long-term 
gainful employment. Blurred lines between self-employment and informal work 
may reduce the claims regarding welfare benefits. Furthermore, the low socio- 
economic status of these entrepreneurs decreases their chances on the housing mar-
ket, and long working hours are detrimental to language learning and societal 
participation as such.
Many of these CEE entrepreneurs are in fact manual workers, a group that obvi-
ously displays various strategies as to length of stay and legal status on the regional 
labour markets, which in turn results in different trajectories of inclusion and exclu-
sion in the central domains. In the Netherlands, stakeholders have addressed this 
group mainly in terms of short-term gainfully employed manual workers subject to 
clustered contractual relationships. In this context, temporary employment agencies 
act as gatekeepers. They are very much interested in managing and controlling these 
migrants in terms of wages and regarding security issues but also regarding travel 
costs and housing. These short-term workers are hired on the basis of all-inclusive 
package deals and are mostly employed in the rural surroundings of the cities, which 
display a more monocultural economic profile. Migrants may profit from the condi-
tional services that the agencies and employers offer as they do not have to take care 
of housing and transport. However, the issue becomes negative, when their auton-
omy and private behaviour are dictated by labour conditions (compare van Ostaijen 
et al. 2015). All-inclusive package deals are likely to result in multiple dependen-
cies, which can imply that employees are in a vulnerable position towards their 
employers. Discrimination or intimidation could cause employees to feel unable to 
speak up about their rights and labour situation or feel afraid to empower them-
selves. Further consequences include wage discrimination, labour discrimination 
and intimidation by fines for breaching rules set out for housing behaviour as well 
as by threatening to terminate labour contracts if employees speak up about improper 
labour conditions. For Sweden and Austria, this sort of all-encompassing relation-
ship between employers and employees in short-term agricultural work has only 
been marginally touched upon.
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Though identified as an important part of CEE migration, the type “persons 
working in private households” has not been elaborated on much by Dutch and 
Swedish stakeholders, while Austrian and Turkish stakeholders have put a lot of 
emphasis on it (for details on Turkey see Chap. 12 and Sert et al. 2015). Usually 
involving women, the ever-growing demand for care work and domestic work in 
mostly middle-class households has attracted a growing number of persons, thus 
contributing to the ongoing feminisation of CEE migration. In this field, two major 
types have been discussed by the experts: (1) care workers who go back and forth 
on a bi-weekly basis, by and large only feasible in the Austrian urban regions as they 
are spatially close enough to CEE for this kind of strategy (compare Enengel and 
Reeger 2015), and (2) women in informal cleaning jobs as well as males engaging 
in gardening and renovation work in private households, also mostly in an informal 
way and scrutinized in all urban regions. Care workers constantly commute between 
their life at home and a household in Austria, where they take care of sick and 
elderly persons 24/7. Although there are many positive stories to be told including 
benefits for both the women (in terms of higher wages) and the persons being cared 
for (as they can stay at home in their familiar surroundings), some care workers may 
find themselves in situations where various detrimental factors coincide: Living 
with their employers may result in a pronounced dependence with eventual cases of 
exploitation when they are asked to carry out domestic work not in their remit and 
furthermore keep them away from a broader societal participation. According to the 
stakeholders, this group is hard to reach and kind of hidden in the private house-
holds. Nevertheless, most of this work is carried out in a formal way (mostly self- 
employed, rarely employed by an agency or the household itself), with full access 
to welfare benefits, though the transfer of claims is still often unclear. The second 
group comprises all other forms of domestic help, carried out mainly by CEE citi-
zens already residing in the urban regions who sometimes engage both in an official, 
formal job and in informal domestic work to earn some extra money. These kinds of 
services are in high demand with “these ambitious ‘new Europeans’ being in danger 
of becoming a new Victorian servant class” (Favell 2008: 711). In the following, a 
closer look will be taken at the general implications of informal work regarding the 
domestic sector as well as other parts of the economy.
Generally speaking, informal workers (in construction, the service sector, private 
households) are in a very vulnerable position as these kinds of work arrangements 
are often associated with exploitation and a pronounced dependence on the 
employer. This assessment also holds true e.g. for informal work in Istanbul (see 
Chap. 12). Yet, these types of jobs still seem to offer an alternative way to earn 
money for those who are not able to find or are kept away from a formal job. But on 
the labour market they are affected by de-qualification, competition and eventual 
displacement, e.g. due to an even cheaper labour force from more Eastern parts of 
CEE, wage-related discrimination, a complete lack of labour rights, poor working 
conditions and long working hours. Beyond these effects regarding the labour mar-
ket, informal work results in a spiral of negative interrelated effects in terms of 
inclusion, or rather exclusion, regarding other resources: a weak position on the 
housing market with few choices, no access to welfare benefits (including accident 
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insurance), social marginalisation due to long working hours, and limited chances 
to learn the language.
The situation of CEE sex workers is again characterized by a spiral of effects 
mostly depending on their status in terms of formal and informal work and also as 
to whether sex work is prohibited in the respective urban setting or not. Sex work in 
areas where it is officially forbidden is driven underground or online, sometimes 
related to human trafficking, and reinforces the exploitative structure of this activity. 
Due to the stigmatised position, access to housing may be difficult, as can be access 
to social benefits, which in turn leads to general marginalisation and hardly any 
societal participation.
3.4.2  The Situation of Family Members: Depending 
on the Single Earner
Though the majority of CEE migrants enter Western European urban regions in 
order to find an employment, there are also groups not primarily pursuing economic 
goals. Accompanying partners and spouses who are themselves not (officially) par-
ticipating in the labour market have as such not been discussed much in terms of 
consequences by the experts. Their situation largely depends on the socio-economic 
position of their partner, which may leave them either in a weak position if their 
partner is part of the informal labour market or in a satisfactory situation if their 
partner has a well-paying, formal job. Access to social benefits also depends on this, 
since family members are able to apply for financial aid and benefits only if their 
partner is formally employed. For the Austrian case, stakeholders elaborated that 
access to the labour market is particularly difficult for this group because they face 
childcare duties that are often difficult to combine with a job. Consequently, this 
non-participation in the labour market has wide-ranging consequences for them, 
their children and also for the economically active partner, who may have to work 
longer and harder in order to provide for the family. Non-working spouses and part-
ners have more difficulties learning the language as they lack social contacts because 
their childcare duties hinder them from spending time attending language training.
Across all urban regions family reunification is an ongoing process which clearly 
affects the schools in the receiving areas and puts attention on the role of CEE chil-
dren in families and the education system. Schools face challenges resulting from 
the notion of “mobile EU-citizens”. In the Netherlands, the assessment once again 
concentrates on the temporality of stays and on children entering and leaving 
schools frequently. Furthermore, a lack of knowledge about regulations regarding 
the school age has been addressed as has the situation that parents simply leave their 
children at home instead of sending them to school because they are more inclined 
to take care of them in the family.
Spatial proximity once more shapes the assessments in the Austrian urban 
regions: Recently, some CEE children and teenagers have been heading to Austria 
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to attend compulsory or vocational schools in the border region while still residing 
in their country of origin or attending boarding schools. CEE pupils therefore lead 
to changing needs and focuses at school, which has been particularly underlined in 
the case of the fast-growing urban region of Vienna. CEE citizens acknowledge the 
positive effects of sending their children to Austrian schools in terms of a later entry 
into the Austrian labour market. On the other hand, the more peripheral schools 
benefit from additional pupils and do not run the risk of being closed down.
In terms of education-related implications the Austrian example shows the need 
for a differentiation between two groups of CEE pupils: Children who migrate in 
early childhood usually integrate very quickly and more easily into the education 
system as they learn the language at kindergarten and school in a “hands on” fash-
ion. Older newcomers (such as teenagers) accompanying their parents face more 
difficulties in following the lessons due to insufficient German language proficien-
cies and diverging curricula. This problem is aggravated by the fact that most mea-
sures are implemented within compulsory education but would also be necessary in 
vocational schools where school attendance is no longer compulsory. Moreover, 
academic high schools do not offer substantial supporting measures and it is there-
fore often recommended that these newcomers attend ordinary schools. Many of 
them have little or no knowledge of German and are therefore particularly challeng-
ing to include into the education system. These problems discourage many teenaged 
newcomers from attending vocational schools, which leads to a subsequent loss of 
individual future opportunities and human capital.
The Swedish results do not offer any indication that CEE migration has major 
implications for the education sector. Education for the younger CEE citizens, i.e. 
under the age of 18, seems to work well. This can result from the fact that, e.g., 
Gothenburg has an established practice of offering schooling to the children of 
rejected asylum seekers, and the public administration representatives were almost 
puzzled by the respective question. CEE pupils are not considered a problematic 
group, maybe partly due to the rather permanent presence of CEE citizens in the 
region. Children accompanying homeless CEE citizens are welcome to attend pri-
mary and secondary schools and this process seems to work well.
3.4.3  The Situation of Students: Rarely Discussed by the 
Experts
Just like in the case of knowledge workers, stakeholders did not elaborate much on 
students from CEE, who have been assessed as a rather positive facet of intra- 
European movement. With many of them being embedded in European schemes 
like ERASMUS and being present on a temporary basis, they are seen as an enrich-
ment of urban society and the university scene. Nevertheless, they also may face 
problems, e.g., on the housing market, where many find themselves in a disadvan-
taged position lacking relevant social connections and information on how the 
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system works and how to navigate bureaucratic formalities. The latter also applies 
to finding adequate jobs alongside their studies, and CEE students run the risk of 
taking on informal work and being faced with the related disadvantages like dis-
crimination and exploitation with a similar situation for CEE students in Turkey 
(see Chap. 12). Language proficiency and the necessity to learn the new language 
were discussed rather divergently: While Dutch stakeholders argued that students 
were exempt from having to learn Dutch if their English was sufficient, Swedish 
and Austrian stakeholders viewed local language proficiency as a necessary require-
ment to enter the labour market after graduation and also during their studies. In this 
respect, Austrian stakeholders diagnosed a lack of specialised language courses.
3.4.4  The Situation of Destitute CEE Migrants: A “Special 
Challenge”
Though in quantitative terms they make up very small groups, beggars and home-
less CEE migrants are in the focus of a lot of public and political discussions in all 
of the urban regions explored. Basically, there are two different, albeit overlapping, 
groups which have in common that they are (1) excluded from access to all central 
dimensions and that they (2) have been assessed as a group facing as well as causing 
problems and thus represent a challenge for the receiving systems. Beggars, mostly 
of Roma descent, often lead their own structured lives and do not access night shel-
ters etc. Both groups are concentrated in the core cities, where homeless find shel-
ters and where begging is feasible in shopping streets with many passers-by, for 
example.
Welfare provision and return counselling remains a constant task in the receiving 
cities, and the health care system is overburdened with homeless EU citizens lack-
ing health insurance. Stakeholders have elaborated on the lack of supportive facili-
ties for homeless persons including easier and cheaper access to housing. 
Neighbourhood consequences of CEE migration were also largely associated with 
beggars and homeless CEE citizens. The visibility of these groups may increase 
generalised negative attitudes on migration from CEE as such.
The “catch 22” of being a homeless EU-citizen in Western Europe has been 
described for Sweden (compare Zelano et  al. 2015) but this description can be 
expanded to all urban regions: Without a social security number, they have difficul-
ties opening a bank account and getting formal employment. As they need to earn a 
living, they are more likely to work in the informal labour market, where there is a 
lack of transparency and an increased risk of exploitation. Moreover, homelessness 
and social marginalisation also creates a spiral of effects stretching beyond the obvi-
ous ones. In order to be entitled to assistance, the jobseeker must regularly visit the 
employment agency and account for the efforts made to get a job. Therefore, staying 
in the job-seeking process requires an address, or at least a reliable contact point, 
where they can be reached by the agency. Without a way to get in touch with the 
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jobseeker, the employment agency cannot fulfil the controls required, and the job-
seeker is excluded from the process. The uncertainty of not having a place to live 
also hampers the educational attainment of accompanying children. In the worst 
case, this marginalisation will be inherited by the next generation.
3.5  The Crucial Interface: Access to Information 
and Individual Language Skills
There are two comprehensive factors shaping the effects described so far as explan-
atory variables that need to be discussed in more detail: access to information and 
individual language skills. Across urban regions and the various types of migration, 
stakeholders have emphasised a lack of information about specificities of the labour 
market, the situation regarding housing but also in the fields of registration, social 
security and education. CEE migrants definitely need more and better information, 
and the stakeholders suggest a clear need for improving routines and facilitating 
information flows. First of all, it would benefit the migrants themselves: Easy access 
to information on registration, on how the social security system works, on the 
labour and housing market as well as on the school system is necessary to manoeu-
vre within the receiving society in general. There are several factors that explain 
why CEE migrants lack proper information, the most important one being a lack of 
language skills, since oftentimes in-depth information is only available in the local 
language. Second, information on the specificities of the labour market or regarding 
social security, for example, has been reported to be contradicting when addressing 
different institutions and often causes confusion as to which rules actually apply. 
Third, there is some indication that CEE migrants rely on the information they get 
from family and friends rather than from official channels, which has been dis-
cussed in relation with a generalized avoidance of official authorities. Last but not 
least, Dutch experts elaborated on a certain interest of some employers to keep 
temporary workers uninformed, which is a clear sign of discrimination and intimi-
dation (compare van Ostaijen et al. 2015).
However, an increase in information would also benefit the authorities and soci-
ety at large, since it improves supervision, which in turn minimises the scope for 
criminal activities such as labour exploitation (compare Zelano et al. 2015). There 
also seems to be a need for better information before migrants actually decide to 
move. In the case of the Netherlands and Austria some stakeholders argued that dif-
ferent types of CEE migrants are often not well prepared and may have unrealistic 
expectations (for example, regarding chances on the labour market or the availabil-
ity of housing) before actually starting their migration process.
Individual language skills were seen as the second prerequisite to success in 
every-day-life as well as in the working sphere. Lacking language skills hinder CEE 
migrants from getting adequate information, with the exception of knowledge work-
ers, for whom English may suffice. However, language acquisition is a matter of 
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length of stay: It may not be worthwhile for short-term migrants like seasonal work-
ers but is seen as absolutely necessary for all migrants staying for a longer period of 
time or permanently. Not all types of migrants have easy access to language courses 
or are encouraged to learn the new language in the receiving urban regions. Access 
to language courses may be a problem in more rural areas in particular, and funding 
appears to be insufficient in all urban regions. There is also a clear need for more 
job-related language courses as well as evening courses that meet the needs of 
working CEE migrants.
3.6  Conclusion
Taking a comparative look at different types of migrants from CEE revealed enor-
mous differences between them in terms of access to and provision of local 
resources, the respective trajectories and positions as well as the barriers they are 
facing. Knowledge workers and students as the least problematized categories are 
comparatively better off or, in other words, they have rarely been mentioned by the 
stakeholders and thus seem to be capable of navigating the different parts of the 
system with comparative ease. In contrast, many manual workers, entrepreneurs 
and domestic helpers face de-qualification, competition, wage dumping and exploi-
tation with the disadvantages progressively intensifying in informal employment. 
This furthermore goes hand in hand with a complete lack of social security and, 
generally speaking, more barriers in accessing all other central domains. Finally, we 
saw that the most vulnerable groups – beggars and homeless persons – find them-
selves completely excluded and have been defined by the stakeholders as a “special 
challenge” for the urban regions. The present approach, offering a more nuanced 
perspective on intra-European movement, proves that the triple-win scenario pro-
moted by the EU (Favell 2008: 705) does not entirely hold true. Migrants may be 
among the “winners” in terms of higher wages but the circumstances under which 
they are working and living in Western European urban regions are oftentimes 
rather unfavourable.
Furthermore, a detailed look at the implications in various domains for different 
types of migrants (see also Reeger and Enengel 2015) quickly reveals that these are 
often interrelated and that each type of migration has its own “chain of implica-
tions”. For some types of migrants, these linkages may result in a vicious cycle that 
is difficult to escape, and many of these have a domino effect of implications that 
multiply their effects due to their chained patterns.
Some of the stories that have been told by the stakeholders regarding the implica-
tions in various domains and their chained patterns obviously also apply to migrants 
from outside of the EU and not just to mobile EU-citizens enjoying their freedom of 
movement. This leads to the conclusion that having the same rights as nationals and 
being treated like them legally does not necessarily result in positive outcomes, as 
has been shown in previous studies on CEE migration (e.g. Favell 2009; Ciupijus 
2011; MacKenzie and Forde 2009; Sabater 2015). Yes, EU citizens are free to live 
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and work wherever they want to but they may still face obstacles and be in need of 
help and guidance at least at the beginning of their stay, especially in terms of the 
“crucial interface”: sufficient, pinpoint information, and opportunities to learn the 
language in case they intend to stay longer. This is where they do not differ from 
third country nationals. But contrary to them, they are, at least up to now, often not 
subject to integration policies due to the principle of non-discrimination of EU citi-
zens, which may have some unfortunate effects. As indicated by the experts, they 
are often not covered by specific integration efforts and programmes and lack finan-
cial support on the EU, the national, and the local level.
The stakeholders’ tasks regarding and their engagement with CEE migrants and 
their narratives concerning consequences for them in the urban regions show a lot 
of similarities and differences that can be defined and framed along several lines. 
Some of these variations are related to spatial differences, namely to distance and 
proximity between origin and destination and the resulting structure and extent of 
CEE migration. In the Austrian urban regions, which are the closest to the CEE 
countries, display the highest shares of CEE migrants, offer the most pronounced 
variety in types of migrants’ projects and share a long common (migration) history, 
stakeholders drew a nuanced picture of both positive and negative outcomes of 
intra-European movement for both the individual migrants and the cities and their 
economies. In Sweden, being further away and experiencing comparatively less 
CEE immigration, though transitional provisions were not applied, stakeholders 
also had a differentiated view on various types of CEE migration with the general 
conclusion being that the vast majority integrates well and contributes to both econ-
omy and society, which was also argued by Austrian stakeholders. In the Dutch 
case, stakeholders elaborated mostly on temporary migrants with a low socio- 
economic status, thus to some extent neglecting issues regarding long-term migrants, 
though they are present in both of the Dutch urban regions as well. On this level of 
comparison it thus became obvious, that urban consequences are to some extent 
determined by the national level with urban regions in the same country displaying 
a lot of similarities. There are two further explanations: 1) The national level plays 
a crucial role in the basic design of governance in the domains explored. The func-
tioning of the labour market, the welfare system and the school system and the rules 
applied are to a large extent top down with only slight regional and local variations. 
Matters of the housing market and societal participation on the other hand are more 
in the area of responsibility of the local level. 2) As shown above, the stakeholder- 
based approach revealed a kind of “national narrative” when it comes to distinct 
aspects of CEE migration and its consequences as experts engaged in this field are 
connected through local and national networks active in various domains and share 
their views and experiences.
Another notion – again from a spatial perspective – is that differences in conse-
quences occur rather within than between urban regions in the same national con-
text, as was illustrated by Dutch and Austrian stakeholders pointing to the importance 
of future research on the spatial specificities of CEE migration in urban and rural 
areas. Cities seem to be better suited to welcoming newcomers and providing them 
with an adequate infrastructure and diverse offers. On the one hand, they are 
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 attractive to all types of CEE migration also regarding existing migrant networks, 
on the other hand, they appear to be limited to influencing domains like housing and 
community cohesion. They cannot steer immigration as such, matters of the labour 
market or registration, which are designed on the national level, nor social security 
in the broad sense. More rural municipalities on the outskirts of urban regions are 
often less well prepared and equipped for catering to the needs of mobile EU citi-
zens due to their smaller population size and due to having less experience with 
immigration.
The present analysis of the obverse and reverse side of free movement proves 
that there are problem areas to be considered and challenges to be solved when it 
comes to intra-European movement. These problems and challenges are mostly felt 
on the local level of urban regions as cities are and will continue to be migration 
magnets for all migrants irrespective of their origin, among them EU citizens. The 
ever-growing migration-related diversity puts new socio-political challenges that 
need to be resolved urgently. For many CEE migrants, transitions into the local 
fabric work smoothly, as the interviewees argued, but still there is a lot to be done 
in terms of policy responses. The sheer multitude of negative implications in single 
domains as well as their interconnectedness leads to the expectation that there are 
not many structured governance approaches – at least not on the local level of urban 
regions – to the implications of CEE migration, but rather ad-hoc arrangements and 
reactions instead of proactive procedures. Chap. 7 will discuss, whether this assump-
tion is correct or whether it can be rejected.
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Chapter 4
Liquid Migration and Its Consequences 
for Local Integration Policies
Godfried Engbersen
4.1  Introduction
This chapter addresses the notion of ‘liquid migration’ in relation to intra-European 
movement. Does intra-European movement challenge our conventional understand-
ing of temporary versus permanent intra-European migration? And what does this 
mean in terms of the central dilemma of ‘mobility’ versus ‘integration’?
The EU enlargements of 2004 and 2007 led to an unexpected scale of labour 
mobility within the enlarged EU (mainly from Poland, the Baltic States, Romania, 
Bulgaria and Slovakia) (Black et al. 2010). Within the 10 years following the 2004 
EU enlargement, the total number of nationals from the new member states residing 
in the ‘old’ member states increased more than fivefold, from 1.1 million in 2004 to 
6.1 million in 2014. This is a total net inflow of 5 million migrants from Central 
Europe (Fihel et al. 2015), most of whom went to the UK, Ireland, Germany, Austria, 
Italy, Spain, the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands.
The EU expansion is an interesting case, not just because it resulted – in absolute 
numbers – in a substantial increase in migration from specific East European to 
specific West European countries, but also for the nature of the new labour migra-
tion (Krings et al. 2013). Favell (2008: 701) has claimed that the East-West migra-
tion associated with the EU enlargement process has resulted in “the emergence of 
a new migration system in Europe” that forces us to rethink standard theories and 
conceptions on immigration, integration and citizenship, as these are mainly tied up 
with post-colonial, guest worker and asylum migration. In my own work I have 
previously proposed that this new migration system can be described as ‘liquid 
migration’ (Engbersen 2013; Engbersen and Snel 2013). The main feature of liquid 
migration is its temporary, flexible and unpredictable character, with workers 
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‘trying their luck’ in different European labour markets before settling or moving 
on or moving home. One consequence of liquid migration is that many intra-European 
labour migrants only partially and temporarily integrate in the destination countries.
My analysis also led to the position that many destination locations were insuf-
ficiently equipped to deal with these patterns of liquid migration (Engbersen 2013). 
Despite experiences with temporary labour migration in West European countries 
(particularly with seasonal labour) and with intra- European movement (especially 
between the original EU member states), many cities and regions did not seem 
capable of responding adequately to the structural temporariness associated with 
liquid migration (Grzymała-Kazłowska 2005).
The introduction of the concept of liquid migration has met various objections, 
for instance that the extent of temporary and unpredictable intra-European 
movement was being overestimated. After all, there are also patterns of settlement 
migration in West European countries. A second objection concerned the local 
consequences of intra-European movement. Do any serious consequences actually 
occur at the local level, or are unwelcome consequences restricted to very specific 
groups and very specific problems?
In this Chap. 1 shall explore the nature of intra- European movement and the 
relevance of the concept of liquid migration, confronted with the IMAGINATION 
findings. I will also consider the consequences of intra- European movement for 
local integration policy. The chapter is structured as follows. First I will describe 
the features of liquid migration and the impact thereof at the local level. Next, I 
confront these features with the typology of intra- European movement as developed 
in Chap. 1 and with the findings on local consequences (Reeger, Chap. 3). I conclude 
with a discussion of liquid migration.
4.2  Liquid Migration and its Local Consequences
4.2.1  Liquid Migration as an Ideal Type
The concept of liquid migration is an ideal type. Ideal types draw attention to the 
typical features of a specific phenomenon, in order to build a picture of its key char-
acteristics (Ringer 1997). An ideal type is a conceptual construct in order to unveil 
and explain social phenomena. Ideal types are, in the famous words of Max Weber 
(2002: 55) “constructed concepts endowed with a degree of consistency, seldom 
found in actual history.”.1
The concept of liquid migration was formulated to capture the nature of intra 
EU-mobility, especially after the EU enlargements of 2004 and 2007. A key  principle 
1 This quotation is from Max Weber’s (2002: 55) The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. 
He continues as follows: “Precisely because of the impossibility of drawing sharp boundaries in 
historical reality, our only hope of identifying the particular effects of these religious ideas must 
come through an investigation of their most consistent (or “ideal”) forms.”
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underlying the concept of liquid migration is that migration forms an intrinsic part 
of wider social transformations within origin and destination countries in Europe. 
These transformations are related to several institutional changes:
• The transition by former communist countries to liberal democracies, giving citi-
zens more freedom to migrate;
• The expansion of the European Union in 2004 and 2007 and the abolishment of 
internal borders;
• The increase in flexible, temporary and uncertain labour in many OECD and 
West European countries. Non-standard work, such as temporary work, part- 
time work and self-employment account for about a third of total employment in 
OECD countries. Since the mid-1990s, more than half of all job creation was in 
the form of non-standard work (OECD 2015);
• The individualisation of family relations, offering more freedom to individual 
members (especially the children) to go their own way (Beck and Beck- 
Gernsheim 2002);
• Technological changes, especially the growth of social media, which have facili-
tated new and unconventional means of finding potential migration destinations 
(Dekker and Engbersen 2014).
Furthermore, the EU is characterised by substantial inequalities between the 
member states, particularly between the old and new member states, making migra-
tion an attractive option for many. Obviously, the concept of liquid migration was 
inspired by Zygmunt Bauman’s work (1999; 2003; 2005; 2007) on liquid moder-
nity. Central to the notion of liquidity is the transformation of “solid” institutions 
(class, family, labour, community, neighbourhood, welfare state and nation state) 
into to more flexible and loose institutions. These institutions lose their power to 
interconnect individual choices and collective projects. They become less solid and 
less predictable, and in the melting pot of modern society, they lose their compelling 
and self-evident character.2 As Bauman (2005: 1) notes:
Liquid modern is a society in which the conditions under which its members act change 
faster than it takes the ways of acting to consolidate into habits and routines. Liquidity of 
life and that of society feed and reinvigorate each other. Liquid life, just like liquid modern 
society, cannot keep its shape or stay on course for long.
These insights are relevant to understanding contemporary patterns of labour 
mobility in Europe. Migration has always been strongly embedded in rather strong 
and stable institutions (the family, local community and local labour markets, 
and the nation state (Portes 1995; Boyd and Nowak 2013; Goldin et al. 2011). 
The transformation of these institutions, together with advanced communications 
technologies and the disappearance of internal borders due to the EU enlargements, 
2 Bauman (2007: 6) writes in Liquid Modernity: ‘The solids whose turn has come to be thrown into 
the melting pot and which are in the process of being melted at the present time, the time of fluid 
modernity, are the bonds which interlock individual choices in collective projects and actions – the 
patterns of communication and co-ordination between individually conducted life policies on the 
one hand and political actions of human collectivities on the other.’
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has changed migration patterns in post-industrial societies and has made migration 
more flexible, and less visible and predictable.
In earlier publications on the nature of CEE labour mobility I highlighted six 
dimensions (Engbersen 2013; Engbersen and Snel 2013) (see Overview 4.1). The 
first dimension is the temporality of a stay abroad. Migrants do not settle perma-
nently, but move back and forth from their origin country to receiving countries 
(circular migration), operate in in-between situations that are neither wholly tempo-
rary nor wholly permanent, or move to multiple destination countries. Their stays 
abroad may differ from migrant to migrant and from group to group. Some stay 
briefly (for example seasonal workers), others will opt for a medium long stay or a 
longer-term stay (for example highly skilled workers). The temporal nature of resi-
dence often goes hand in hand with non-registration, which contributes to the invis-
ibility of liquid migration.
A second dimension is that liquid migration is predominantly labour migration. 
Student migration may be seen as a minor supplement to this labour migration 
(short term labour migration is sometimes the true motive behind forms of student 
migration) (Ivancheva 2007).
A third dimension is that liquid migration is a regular form of migration. Mobile 
EU citizens formally have the same rights and duties as the native citizens in the 
destination Member State, and they should not be treated differently in comparison 
to the native citizens. However, before 2014 many EU migrants needed a work per-
mit in order to access the labour market. Without such a work permit they could 
become irregular workers. This transition period, in which restrictions were imposed 
on workers from the A-8 and A-2 countries, ended on 1 January 2014.
A fourth dimension of liquid migration is that intra-European movement has 
become more unpredictable. Some categories of labour migrants work and reside in 
well-established destination countries (such as Germany), while others travel to 
new destinations countries such as the UK but also to Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, 
Overview 4.1 The characteristics of liquid migration 
1 Settlement Temporality of migration and stay
Invisibility of stay (non-registration)
Temporal migration
Economic integration in 
destination country
2 Type of 
migration
Labour and student migration Labour migrants
Student migrants
3 Status Legal residential status Regular labour migration
Temporary work permit holders
4 Destination No predestined receiving country Multiple receiving countries
New receiving countries
5 Family Individualised life strategy (limited 
family obligations)
Individualised forms of 
migration
First generation pattern
6 Migratory 
habitus
Intentional unpredictability No fixed migration aspirations
Open options
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Norway and the Netherlands (Fihel et al. 2015). A crucial aspect of intra-European 
movement is that it partly ignores the political and economic factors that shaped 
migration flows in the past.
A fifth dimension concerns the role of family. International migration has always 
been stimulated and facilitated by networks of family (Tilly 1990; Massey et  al. 
2005; Palloni et al. 2001; Massey et al. 2005; Epstein 2008). Households develop 
strategies to maximise the household income. These classical forms of migration 
rely on the solidarity between generations and on extended family patterns. However, 
next to this classical pattern, new patterns are emerging that are much more indi-
vidualised. Family ties have become looser and more fragile, not only in West 
European societies but also in Central and Eastern European societies.
A sixth dimension is that the social position of migrants and the migration field 
in which they strategically operate, generates a specific migratory habitus of ‘inten-
tional unpredictability’. This is especially true for young single migrants (Eade 
et  al. 2007). This migratory habitus expresses the more individualistic ethos of 
migrants who are less bound by family obligations and also less constrained by 
borders and local labour markets than previous generations of migrants. Among the 
more highly educated migrants, the desire to experience a metropolitan lifestyle 
may also play a role (Drinkwater and Garapich 2015).
The concept of liquid migration has met with some criticism. First, there is the 
question whether it actually represents a new phenomenon, or whether, instead, it’s 
a matter of old wine in new bottles? (Penninx, Chap. 5). Temporary, short-term, 
seasonal and circular forms of migration are nothing new. They have occurred 
throughout (European) history (Moch 1992) and are particularly visible in migra-
tion flows in Africa and China, but also between Mexico and the US (Chapman and 
Prothero 1983/84; Massey et  al. 2005). Worth mentioning here is the work by 
Okolski (2012) on incomplete migration, which was an important phenomenon in 
post-war Poland, before the EU expansion. Incomplete migration concerns the 
trans-national circularity of people, on the one hand seeking employment and on the 
other pursuing a household risk minimisation strategy.
Second, the concept seems to pay little attention to the dynamics of migration, 
culminating in settlement migration. Thus, Friberg (2012) shows that the labour 
migration from Poland to Norway displays various phases, from circulation to trans-
national commuting and finally to settlement. On the other hand, Recci (2015) draws 
attention, not so much to the dynamics of intra- European movement but to the co-
existence of old and new patterns of migration. This position is more in line with my 
own work on the heterogeneity of EU labour migration (Engbersen et al. 2013).
Third, the notions of the free-moving lifestyle and the migratory habitus of 
intentional unpredictability are questioned. Most mobile workers are in search of a 
possibility to settle down and live grounded, secure and stable lives (Bygnes and 
Erdal 2017). This observation  – based on an analysis of the future narratives of 
Polish and Spanish migrants in Norway – is partly supported by the work by King 
et al. (2015) into the position of highly educated young adults from the Baltic states 
in the city of London. The researchers confirm the relevance of the concept of liquid 
migration for its acknowledgement of aspects such as self-development, life style, 
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metropolitan culture and the open-ended character of migration (King 2017). Yet 
they also point to “a young adult transition or a process of adult ‘becoming’ (hence, 
not yet complete) - from an individualised life style, with few family obligations, to 
a life- stage which combines thoughts on family formation with a possible return to 
the home country.” To what extent a return ever materialises is an open question, but 
a longing for a more secure and stable social life is also found among Baltic gradu-
ates. Yet as King et al. note (2015: 2): “Where a stable home will be, however, is 
often not very clear in migrants’ mind.” Incidentally, it applies for all groups that a 
stable job with a decent income and ‘normal’ working life conditions are seen as 
important ingredients of a grounded life or stable home, in either the origin or the 
destination country.
The critical comments concerning the concept of liquid migration relate to the 
theme of structure and agency. However, liquid migration does not entail that 
migrants are free to choose the life they want and that they have a natural inclination 
towards the adventurous life. Liquid migration instead implies that keeping your 
options open is a rational attitude developed by intra-European mobile citizens in 
response to the institutional uncertainties and opportunities that they encounter. 
This pertains especially to uncertainties and opportunities in the labour market. 
Many mobile workers have temporary jobs and work below their actual educational 
qualifications in European countries, but they also have limited opportunities in the 
labour markets of their origin countries (Nowicka 2012; Verwiebe et  al. 2014; 
Voitchovsky 2014; McCollum and Findlay (2015). This contributes to a liquid life: 
“lived under conditions of constant uncertainty” (Bauman 2005:2). Nevertheless, 
there are differences concerning the extent to which individuals have different 
options to choose from. Some individuals can afford to take more risks and to 
develop an adventurous lifestyle, for example graduates who are supported by 
wealthy parents or highly skilled workers who wish to gain experience working 
abroad. Low educated labour migrants who must depend on (temporary) work, 
offered by temporary work agencies (and who may have to sustain a family), are not 
as free to pursue an adventurous life style and to aspire to a rich cultural life. Their 
main concern is to find a reliable job with decent wages.
The question now is what insights the IMAGINATION project has produced 
with respect to the theme of liquid migration. We will address this question below, 
after we look into a related conceptual question, that is the implications of liquid 
migration for (local) integration policies.
4.2.2  Inplications of Liquid Migration for Local Integration 
Policies
In the introduction we cited Favell’s claim (2008) that we need to rethink standard 
theories on immigration and integration as they are strongly related to post-colonial, 
guest worker and asylum migration. In Europe, integration policy has mainly 
focused on third-country nationals (TCNs) who settle in West European countries, 
such as (former) guest workers and the following family migrants, post-colonial 
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migrants and asylum migrants. Intra-European movement was never part of the 
domain of integration, also because of the small size of intra-European mobility.
With the EU enlargements, intra-European mobility has become a dominant phe-
nomenon; in part due to the increasing size it. Specific countries and cities are 
receiving significant numbers of mobile EU citizens, without being adequately 
equipped to do so (Black et al. 2010). Besides, intra-European mobility challenges 
established integration policies due to its unpredictable and dynamic nature. 
Accordingly, we see that the arrival of large numbers of labour migrants is produc-
ing specific social problems for urban regions, for instance with regard to housing 
but also in the areas of registration, education and health care (see Chap. 3).
However, the gravity of these problems is assessed differently in the countries 
affected. In some European cities  – such as Rotterdam and The Hague in the 
Netherlands  – policy makers use strong metaphors (e.g. “a tsunami of Polish 
migrants”) to focus attention on issues of housing and disorder in neighbourhood. But 
in other European cities that also faced a substantial influx of mobile EU citizens, the 
political idiom is more moderate. Nonetheless, cities like Antwerp, Berlin, Brussels, 
Dublin, Ghent, London, Oslo, and Manchester also report problems of housing and 
homelessness (Broadway 2011; Garapich 2011; Crellen 2010; Mostowska 2011).
Furthermore, in many European cities a debate is ongoing whether an integration 
policy ought to be pursued for specific categories of mobile EU citizens (Van 
Puymbroeck et al. 2011; Engbersen et al. 2017). Various considerations play a role 
here. On the one hand, policy makers wish to prevent that the arrival of mobile 
European citizens causes problems for settled citizens. On the other hand, they incor-
porate a timeline in respect of integration policy for mobile EU citizens. Thus, cities 
are developing language facilities for mobile workers who have taken up residence for 
the longer term. In sum: the co-existence of old and new forms of mobility – expressed 
in new forms of temporality – raises new questions for cities and local authorities. For 
this theme, too, it is important to examine the IMAGINATION findings.
4.3  Liquid Migration in the Light of the IMAGINATON 
Findings
How does the concept of liquid migration relate to the empirical findings of the 
IMAGINATION project, especially to the typology (see Chap. 1), and to integration 
issues encountered at the local level (see Chap. 3)?
4.3.1  On the Concept of Liquid Migration
When we apply the concept of concept liquid to the IMAGINATION data we see:
• the centrality of temporality: many CEE persons are working and residing tem-
porarily in West-European urban regions or are in an in-between position;
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• the dominance of labour migration as the main motive of intra EU movement;
• the importance of being an EU citizen that enables to cross borders in a regular 
way. However, some categories are not able to get access to regular labour and 
housing markets and rely on informal institutions (informal economy, informal 
housing markets and migrant networks);
• the changing nature of intra EU-movement. In the post second world period, 
there has been (temporal and circular) labour and asylum migration from specific 
Central and Eastern European countries to Austria, but this was less the case in 
the Netherlands and Sweden. The EU Enlargements created new migration 
corridors, and resulted in substantial migration flows from new origin regions 
of CEE countries to urban regions in Austria, Sweden and the Netherlands. 
The scale of these migration flows was not foreseen.
• the effects of the individualization process in family relations. Many temporary 
migrants are working in West-European urban regions to support a family back 
home, but we also see young couples and singles (students) who do not have 
these traditional obligations. They are taking care of themselves without having 
specific family responsibilities.
• the unpredictability of migrant’s behaviour, especially in the big cities. One sim-
ple indicator of this unpredictability is that many CEE migrants do not register, 
making policies of registration one of the top priorities of local policies.
However, the key dimension of the concept of liquid migration is the temporal 
nature of movement. As we have seen, The IMAGINATION typology (TOMs) is 
based on two dimensions: socio-economic status and a temporal dimension (see 
Fig. 1.1 in Chap. 1). The concept of liquid migration mainly pertains to the left-hand 
side of Fig. 1.1 and on in-between situations, between temporariness and 
settlement.
To understand the dynamics of intra EU-movement, we should also incorporate 
a temporal dimension on the vertical axis. Unfortunately, the IMAGINATION data 
does not offer this longitudinal option. There are clear indications that settlement 
migration, circular or a return to the home country relate also to the (in-)ability to 
achieve a stable socio-economic position. To achieve this position often requires 
social mobility and this takes time (e.g. going from informal worker to a regular 
worker or from student to highly skilled), but finding a stable job with decent wages 
is more important. For this is what enables them to settle in the expensive European 
cities. Yet this goal is out of reach for many entrepreneurs, manual workers, persons 
working in private households, sex workers, trafficked persons, students and 
beggars. Moreover, many in these categories lack access to social security, so that 
they lack the financial resources to support a sustainable residence. For these cate-
gories, circular migration or temporary labour mobility offers better opportuni-
ties to achieve their aims and targets. The IMAGINATION project shows clearly 
that new routines of circular migration have evolved in Europe, with manual workers 
in Austria, the Netherlands and Sweden taking seasonal jobs mainly in the agricultural 
sector. In Austria, circular migration of mainly women appears to be a dominant 
pattern in the care sector for the elderly.
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Still, we also see categories of migrants with marginal labour market positions 
managing to settle (Ciupijus 2010; Fox et al. 2014). This category has been typified 
as a ‘new informal urban lower class’ or as the ‘precariat’ (cf. Standing 2011; 
Savage 2015), which is settling in urban areas and is managing to survive through 
access to informal institutions of work and housing (and to migrant networks). 
These informal institutions are typical of big cities like Vienna, Rotterdam, The 
Hague, Stockholm and Istanbul (Saunders 2010).
The concept of liquid migration was formulated in relation to the EU’s eastern 
enlargements, and one of the defining characteristics is its legal character. EU citi-
ziens are free to move to other members-states, and have full rights to residence, 
work and study. This is often not the case with the CEE-Turkey migration corridors. 
The Edirne and Istanbul areas have seen a gradual increase of migration from 
Central and Eastern Europe. This migration includes labour migrants as well as 
students. However, espcially, the CEE-Istanbul corridor is characterised by substan-
tial irregular migration (see Chap. 12). But due to an implicit policy of toleration 
irregular migrants are rather free to engage in back and forth migration and develop 
liquid patterns of migration that have a resemblance with intra-European movement 
patterns. To conclude: the IMAGINATION findings particularly reveal a heteroge-
neity in forms of movement. Intra EU-movement includes all forms of migration: 
from very temporary to settlement. There are no clear, unambiguous processes. 
Temporary mobility does not necessarily culminate in permanent settlement. 
Circular mobility does not carry on perpetually. And temporary mobility is not nec-
essarily coupled to circular mobility; there are also forms of once-only or twice- 
only mobility. Different patterns also occur simultaneously.
The concept of liquid migration does not cover the whole field of labour mobility 
within the EU. It relates to patterns of temporary and in-between patterns of mobility. 
The IMAGINATION project offers a further understanding of new temporalities of 
migration  – circular, temporary, seasonal and short-term  – and of the underlying 
institutional factors driving these temporalities. It also shows how the migratory hab-
itus of keeping options open is a rational response to structural constraints and 
opportunities.
4.3.2  On Liquid Migration and Local Integration Policies
The consequences of these diverse temporalities of mobility for local integration 
policy are described in Chap. 3. Although there are differences between urban 
regions, the following policies issues are encountered:
• The issue of registration, particularly keeping track of workers that stay 
temporarily;
• Providing adequate housing, both for those who settle permanently and those 
who stay (very) briefly. Most workers do not have access to public housing and 
rely on the private housing sectors, where (abusive) landlords may charge exces-
4 Liquid Migration and Its Consequences for Local Integration Policies
72
sive rental prices. A new phenomenon for many cities is the need to realise 
short- stay facilities for temporary and circular labour migrants;
• Preventing homelessness and forms of public nuisance as a result of overcrowded 
housing. Homelessness is partly an inevitable consequence of temporary labour 
and temporary accommodation, as to lose one’s job means to lose one’s housing. 
Various European cities are now developing voluntary return programmes;
• Education and language acquisition, for both adults and young children. Cities 
may experience a sudden influx of new school pupils (especially in primary 
school). Making sure that labour migrants’ children do enrol in schools and don’t 
drop out of schools is an important issue.
• Access to health care and claims on social assistance and other public provisions. 
Some mobile EU citizens lack health care insurance, and rely on NGO’s often 
supported by central and local state policies (Fermin 2016). Besides, there are 
concerns about growing claims on local social assistance schemes.
The extent to which such issues occur varies from city to city. The IMAGINATION 
project reveals that in cities like Vienna and Stockholm, the intra-European mobility 
is not treated or portrayed as a problem as much as in cities like The Hague and 
Rotterdam (Reeger and Enengel 2015). The project also reveals that it is crucial for 
cities like Vienna, Stockholm, The Hague and Rotterdam to monitor the new tempo-
ralities of intra-European mobility in order to develop effective measures regarding 
registration, housing, education, health care and public order. It requires a flexible 
structure to cope with temporary, short-term and circular migration (especially in 
the sphere of housing), but also with middle long-term mobility that is related to the 
in-between category of mobile EU citizens (between temporality and settlement).
4.4  Conclusions
This chapter has confronted the concept of liquid migration with the findings of 
the IMAGINATION project. This confrontation reveals that liquid migration per-
tains to a part of intra EU-mobility. It focuses on the complex temporalities of 
intra- European movement – circular, temporary, seasonal, short-term – associ-
ated with various social groups. These temporalities have been described previ-
ously in migration literature, for instance in the European migration literature on 
the mobile nineteenth century and in post-war literature on guest workers. One 
new aspect is that migration movements have become more individualised and 
less predictable, and that new migration destinations are more easily found. The 
increased opportunities for free movement, the availability of strategically 
important knowledge (thanks to social media), the reduced costs of travel and the 
greater role of international recruitment agencies facilitate finding new and mul-
tiple destinations more quickly.
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A second aspect of the concept of liquid migration is that it acknowledges the 
institutional changes that create opportunities and impose restrictions on (potential) 
mobile EU citizens. The EU expansion with its principle of freedom of movement 
has brought more freedom to migrate, but other institutional changes have created 
more uncertainties: the growth of non-standard labour, structural unemployment, 
individualisation of family relations and welfare state retrenchment. Liquid migra-
tion can be seen as a product of these institutional changes.
The consequences of intra-European movement are apparent in specific regions, 
as the results of IMAGINATION show. These findings indicate that part of the 
mobile EU citizens easily find their way in the new destination locations (e.g. in 
family households or in highly skilled jobs), but that some problems do occur. The 
complex temporalities raise questions about the relevance of contemporary integra-
tion policies and compel cities to develop new approaches for the integration of 
intra-European mobile citizens.
The local policies and governance strategies described in this study seem to 
develop along three lines: (1) Prevention: prevent that natives and established citi-
zens (including migrants) are confronted with the influx of intra-European mobile 
workers in a negative manner. This implies providing for an adequate (flexible) 
infrastructure of housing, education and health care. This can help prevent unwel-
come effects of intra-European movement such as overcrowded neighbourhoods, 
houses and schools, homelessness and health risks. (2) Non-discrimination and 
equal treatment: prevent that intra-European mobile workers are exploited and 
treated unequally. In this regard, local authorities do have some authority to coun-
ter and control abusive landlords, but hardly any authority to counter unfair treat-
ment and exploitation in the domain of work, as this is a national policy domain. 
The same applies for policy that should prevent EU mobile workers of unfairly 
competing with established citizens by being much cheaper; (3) Incorporation: 
developing programmes targeting EU mobile workers who remain for extended 
periods or who repeatedly return. Since these are EU citizens, mandatory pro-
grammes cannot offer a solution here. Many cities have begun offering voluntary 
integration programmes, and language courses in particular have proved to be 
popular.
To maintain public support for intra-European movement, it is essential that 
these three policy lines are developed further. Local authorities cannot do so wholly 
on their own, but must be able to rely on the support of the state government and 
of the EU.
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Chapter 5
Old Wine in New Bottles? Comparing 
the Post-War Guest Worker Migration 
and the Post 1989 Migration from  
CEE- Countries to EU-Member Countries
Rinus Penninx
5.1  Introduction
In the absence of a substantial theory for international migration that would enable 
to predict how a migration movement would develop, researchers and policymakers 
have often used migration movements in the past in comparison with those in the 
present time as a predictive instrument. In this light, the movement of workers from 
ten Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries to European Union member 
states in Western and Southern Europe (henceforth the CEES system) after 1990 is 
often compared to the post-war Guest Worker System (henceforth GWS). In policy 
circles such an approach is often called: lessons learned from the past.
This approach of using comparison-based predictions is based on the assumption 
that the units compared are indeed of the same nature. In this case, the first question 
is whether the two movements that we compare are in point of fact two cross-border 
labour migration systems that follow the same mechanisms and happened under 
similar conditions. We will turn to this question in the next section, where I will 
outline the contours of the two labour migration systems to establish comparability 
in a broader sense.
For a detailed comparison of the two cases, which will follow in Sect. 5.3 of this 
chapter, we need a more refined analytical instrument. To establish such an instru-
ment, I draw on the literature on migration theory and, more specifically, on migra-
tion systems theory (Fawcett 1989). This literature refers to three sets of factors that 
are essential for the emergence and continuation of migration systems. The first set 
implies that there need to be push and pull factors for labour migration to emerge. 
Push and pull factors encourage individuals to move from one place to another. 
Economists measure these factors in general terms like wage differentials and work 
opportunities, where low wages locally act as a push factor and higher wages 
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 elsewhere as a pull factor; high unemployment rates and decreasing job opportuni-
ties act as a push factor and the availability of work elsewhere as a pull factor. These 
factors are necessary conditions for a labour migration system to emerge. But they 
are not sufficient in and of itself: their mere existence does not lead to migration and 
not in all cases.
The second set of factors specifies how individuals  – existing in the above- 
mentioned economic circumstances – are actually brought into a labour migration 
system: candidates for migration have to be aware of their own economic situation 
and of alternatives elsewhere; there have to be networks – often of emigrants that 
went before them – that help new migrants, as well as intermediaries and facilitators 
that take away barriers and thus trigger and sustain movements. In well-established 
labour migration systems such informational and facilitating functions become 
institutionalised in recruitment systems that involve sending and receiving states, 
employers and trade unions, employment agencies, et cetera.
The third set of factors refers to regulatory systems of international migration in 
the countries of origin as well as in the countries of destination. The countries of 
origin have to allow the exit of citizens on principle (non-exit was rule in communist 
countries behind the Iron Curtain up until 1989) and in actual practice (e.g. by giv-
ing out passports). They may even facilitate labour migration by assisting in recruit-
ment. Countries of destination, for their part, have policies that ‘control and regulate’ 
labour inflows: targets or quota may be established for selective groups of workers, 
as well as for their duration of stay and the conditions of their work set.
These three sets of factors will be described and compared for both labour migra-
tion systems. This will enable us to establish if the two systems differ, and on what 
points and with what consequences.
5.2  The Contours of Two Labour Migration Systems
5.2.1  The Guest Worker Labour Migration System: 1955–1974
In the immediate aftermath of World War II, Europe had to ‘resettle’ some 20 mil-
lion people on the newly established political map (Bonifazi et al. 2008: 113). Apart 
from these significant internal movements, Europe was predominantly an emigra-
tion continent at that time: pre-war emigration to classical destinations like the 
USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Latin America was resumed in North 
Western European countries.
This situation started to change in the mid-1950s. Emigration decreased and 
immigration gained importance, in the form of temporary labour migration. The 
economic reconstruction after the war was so successful in several Western and 
North Western European countries that their labour markets needed more workers 
than available. Particularly unskilled and low-skilled workers were sought for 
labour-intensive Fordist production processes, such as mining and manufacturing. 
Some Western European countries, such as Switzerland, Luxembourg, Belgium and 
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France, resumed pre-war labour immigration to fill the vacancies at the lower end of 
their labour markets. For the Federal Republic of Germany, Austria, the Netherlands 
and Sweden this experience of being attractive for migrant workers was a relatively 
new concept.
From the mid-1950s on, a labour migration system was built up gradually, 
attracting workers from the nearest countries in the south – Italy, Spain, Greece and 
Portugal – and the east – until 1961 from East Germany and following the closing 
of the Iron Curtain from Yugoslavia (Van Mol and de Valk 2015: 32/33). In the 
1960s the system expanded to include Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Turkey. While 
growing, it also became more organised: rules, conditions and procedures were 
agreed upon in bilateral agreements between the recruiting and sending countries 
and institutional arrangements and policies were elaborated, both in the sending and 
in the receiving countries.
The framing of this labour migration as a temporary solution for labour market 
shortages and the designation of the workers as ‘temporary guests’ are important 
characteristics of GWS.  All destination countries defined themselves as ‘non- 
immigration countries’ and stressed the temporary nature of the work contracts. The 
label ‘guest worker’ openly expressed such expectations. The migrants also saw 
their work and stay in Europe as temporary. When the number of temporary workers 
that returned home during the economic recession of 1966–67 turned out to be 
rather limited, the response of European countries was to develop stricter rules for 
entrance and access to the labour market (issuing fewer permits) and to start a dis-
cussion on the rotation principle to increase the return. Nevertheless, those of the 
‘temporary workers’ who stayed and brought their families grew larger and the resi-
dent immigrant population accumulated over the course of time.
The exact number of migrant workers who were involved in this GWS system is 
difficult to establish. Estimates of the numbers of individuals that left Italy, Spain, 
Greece, and Portugal alone between 1950 and 1970 vary from 7 to 10 million 
(Okolski 2012: 33). The number of migrants from Yugoslavia, Turkey and North 
Africa who travelled to Western Europe for work is probably equally large, or 
maybe slightly less so because their migration movement started somewhat later. 
When looking at the whole period, most of the workers returned, yet a significant 
foreign labour force was built up: Cohen estimates that at the end of the period, in 
1974, the FRG counted 2.2 million foreign workers; France 1.9 million; Switzerland 
1.0 million; Belgium 0.22 million, and the Netherlands 0.12 million (Cohen 1987: 
111–112).
In the early 1970s the limits of the growth of the Fordist industrial economies 
became manifest and the need to restructure North Western European economies 
was evident. The first oil crisis of 1973 sped up this restructuring: the closing of 
certain sectors like mining, the relocation of other labour intensive sectors to low- 
wage countries and the automation of still other sectors led to a fall in demand for 
low-skilled work and thus for migrant workers. Switzerland (1970) and Sweden 
(1972) were the first countries to install an immigration stop for workers, followed 
by the FRG (1973), the Benelux countries and France in 1974 (Van Mol and de Valk 
2015: 35).
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By the mid-1970s GWS as a system of rotating workers had ceased to exist. The 
halted recruitment and the various policies to promote the return of migrant workers 
had specific effects for the different immigrant groups. Migrant workers from 
Southern European countries did return to their countries of origin more often, 
while those from the Maghreb countries and Turkey did significantly less so. Quite 
the contrary happened: they started to bring their families to Europe whenever pos-
sible. In the FRG, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and France populations from 
North Africa and Turkey grew significantly under the policy category of ‘family 
reunification’ and ‘family formation’ in the second half of the 1970s and in the 
1980s.
5.2.2  Migration from CEE Countries to EU Member 
Countries: 1989 – Present
The collapse of the Iron Curtain in 1989 and the subsequent opening up of the bor-
ders for exit induced significant new migration flows from Central and East 
European (CEE) countries that took various forms and different directions (Black 
et al. 2010; Okolski 2012; Glorius et al. 2013). First there was a migration corridor 
to the ‘old immigration countries’ in North Western Europe, in which two forms of 
movements took place: that of well-organised legal, albeit limited, bilateral pro-
grammes for temporary employment in Germany and other North-Western European 
countries (Glorius et al. 2013: 7/8) on the one hand, and short-term irregular circular 
migration – within the bounds of tourist visa – on the other hand. A second migra-
tion corridor was one of mostly irregular flows to the new immigration countries in 
the South: Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal. These were popular destinations for 
migrant workers from Romania, Ukraine, Albania and Bulgaria, because they had 
easy entry and tolerated irregular residence and clandestine work (Engbersen et al. 
2010a, b: 8 ff). Estimates suggest that a net migration outflow of around 3.2 million 
took place from the ten CEE states via the two migration corridors between 1989 
and 2004 (Engbersen et al. 2010a: 9).
The accession of ten new members to the European Union in 2004 marked the 
beginning of another new era. Eight of these were CEE countries that had been part 
of the communist bloc: Poland, the three Baltic States, Slovakia, Slovenia, the 
Czech Republic and Hungary (the A8). Three years later, in 2007, Bulgaria and 
Romania (the A2) also joined the EU. The effect of these accessions was twofold: 
on the one hand the migration that had taken place from the ten CEE countries to 
Western and Southern Europe since 1989 was redefined as EU-internal mobility and 
legalised under the new regime. On the other hand, the new regime reinforced 
migration flows from some new member states, particularly Poland, Romania and 
Bulgaria, to member states in the Western part of the EU whose labour markets 
attracted workers.
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The EU15 countries responded differently to the accessions: the UK, Ireland, 
Sweden and Norway (the latter country is not an EU member, but is part of the 
European Economic Area) opened up their borders immediately in May 2004. Other 
countries – often backed up by national trade unions – opted for a transition period 
of five years in which access of workers of the ten accessory countries to the labour 
market was subject to permits. Some countries even opted for an additional two 
years extension. These national policies of immediate or delayed free access have 
shaped intra-European movement significantly.
In terms of flow, Van Mol and De Valk (2015: 43–49) show, first of all, that the 
scale of intra-European movement increased significantly in the period 2004–08. In 
2008 alone, nearly two million EU-citizens moved within the EU (Eurostat 2011), 
Polish and Romanian migrants making up the bulk of it. Net flows of intra- European 
migration (immigration minus emigration) amounted to nearly 1.2 million in 2008 
(Dhéret et al. 2013: 10). For the whole period and calculated in absolute numbers, 
Polish migration (primarily to and from Germany and the UK) makes up for the larg-
est share, followed by Romanian migration (primarily to and from Italy and Spain).
As a result migrant populations of the A8 and A2 countries, particularly from 
Poland and Romania, grew significantly in all of the EU15 member states: while the 
immigrant population with A8 and A2 origin in the EU15 states amounted to 
approximately 1.9 million in 2004, this population had grown to 5.2 million in 2010 
(SVR 2013: 51). The case of Poland, having the largest emigration of all CEE coun-
tries in absolute terms, reflects this growth: the number of Polish citizens residing in 
other EU countries rose from 451,000 in May 2002 to 1,860,000 by the end of 2007; 
of which 690,000 lived in the UK, 490,000  in Germany and 200,000  in Ireland 
(Fihel and Okolski 2009: 189).
During the economic crisis of 2009–10 net inflows were reduced from 1.2 mil-
lion to some 300,000. For CEE migration this meant that the migration corridors to 
the West and to the South were both affected: net emigration was low or negative 
and immigrant populations in destination countries were somewhat stabilised. After 
2010, when the crisis in Southern Europe continued but Northern countries were 
much less affected, the southern corridor continued to have negative or low net 
flows (Spain became an emigration country again: Arango 2016), but flows in the 
western corridor recovered (Dhéret et al. 2013: 10). However, the CEES system as 
a whole had ceased to grow.
5.3  Comparing Two Labour Migration Systems
The brief outlines of the GWS and the CEES do indeed suggest that these systems 
have some common characteristics that make them comparable at face value. The 
two systems connect sending countries that have less developed economies, redun-
dant labour and low wages, with receiving countries that have developed econo-
mies, labour shortages and attractive wages. The flow sizes of the two systems are 
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also significantly alike (both involving millions of workers), although the CEES 
system was somewhat smaller than the GWS system. And in terms of length of time 
there is similarity as well: the GWS system covered 2.5 to 3 decades before it 
stopped as a labour migration system; the CEES system, starting in 1990, until the 
present day also covers a period of 2.5 decades.
Accepting this comparability at first glance, I will analyse and compare the three 
sets of factors that are essential for the emergence and continuation of migration 
systems in more detail: economic development, differences in wages, and (un-)
employment in origin and destination countries; systems of information, networks, 
intermediaries and organisations that mobilise and steer the migration movements, 
and the national regulatory systems of sending and receiving countries and their 
differential effects.
5.3.1  The Development of Economic Push and Pull Factors
The starting point in both labour migration systems has been a significant difference 
in economic development and concomitant wage and employment differentials. 
First we will compare the economic development of the most important countries 
involved in the two labour migration systems,1 using Gross Domestic Product per 
Capita (ERS International Macro-economic data set that starts in 19692) as a rough 
indicator of development: see Table 5.1.
In 1969, Morocco had the lowest GDP within the GWS system, only 5.3 per cent 
of the GDP of its major country of destination: France. In 1969 the Turkish GDP 
was 20.2 per cent of that of Germany, the most important country of destination for 
Turkish workers. The Southern European countries did have better statistics than 
Morocco and Turkey in that same year, although the numbers varied considerably: 
Portugal had the lowest GDP, while Italy had reached the highest level of GDP of 
the Southern European countries (see also Akgündüz 2008: 18 and Rist 1978: 102).
When it comes to other indicators such as unemployment or the activity rate of 
the population, the data are not truly comparable because they measure different 
factors in the various countries, but the literature suggests that unemployment 
(including hidden unemployment) was high in countries like Turkey (Akgündüz 
2008; Abadan-Unat et al. 1976) and Morocco, while this was much less the case in 
the more developed economies of the Southern European countries such as Italy. 
This smaller potential of migrant workers in the Southern European countries made 
the official recruitment of guest workers shift to Morocco and Turkey in the late 
1960s.
1 Ideally, the average GDP of all countries of destination would be the best quantity to measure: the 
EU15 average for the CEES system. For the GWS, such data were not available. The next best 
comparison was the GDP of the largest destination country: the FRG for Turkish migration, and 
France for migration from Morocco.
2 At www.ers.usda.gov
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At the receiving end of the GWS, the North Western European countries had 
recovered from the economic recession of 1966–67 and unemployment was lower 
than ever and labour shortages were unprecedented. The period 1968–73 became 
the summit of the GWS system: official recruitment following strict rules had 
become the dominant way of migrating and Turkey and the Maghreb countries were 
by now the most important countries of origin.
By 1974, at the end of the GWS system, the relative differences in GDP of 
Morocco and Turkey had not changed as compared to 1969. By contrast, the 
Southern European countries had improved their figures significantly, Italy having 
a GDP that was as almost as high as that of Germany: 93 per cent. The gap between 
Morocco and Turkey and the destination countries was clearly of a different order 
than the gaps between the countries in Southern Europe and their destination 
countries.
Thus, the movement of workers stopped around 1974 by the sudden disappear-
ance of the demand for labour in destination countries, which was followed by a 
recruitment stop and policy measures to stimulate return. At that moment the push 
factors (expressed as relative GDP figures) in Morocco and Turkey were equally 
strong as five years before. In the Southern European countries, however, they had 
become less compelling. This explains the different reactions of migrant  populations 
after the recruitment stop: fewer migrants from Morocco and Turkey returned than 
migrants from Southern European countries.
If we compare such relative figures of the GWS system with those in the CEES 
system (using the average EU15 GDP for destination countries), we see that the 
Table 5.1 Gross domestic product per Capita in GWS and CEES origin and destination countries: 
absolute in US $ and relative (1969–2014). Source: ERS International macro-economic data set at 
www.ers.usda.gov
Country (/Destin.) 1969 % 1974 % 1990 % 2004 % 2014 %
Morocco (/France) 1001 5,3 1110 4,7 1766 2351 3175 7,7
Turkey (/FRG) 3912 20,2 4417 20,0 6194 8258 11,104 24,9
Portugal (/France) 7182 37,8 10,840 45,6 16,790 21,795 20,613
Greece (/FRG) 12,061 62,3 15,741 71,3 19,456 28,288 22,929
Spain (/France) 12,847 67,7 16,771 70,6 22,190 30,451 29,224
Italy (/FRG) 16,354 84,4 20,537 93,0 30,857 36,439 33,008
FRG 19,374 22,081 32,345 38,641 44,554
France 18,987 23,759 32,742 39,998 41,196
EU15 17,362 21,273 30,070 38,076 39,351
EU28 14,497 17,660 24,863 31,937 33,888
Slovenia (/EU15) 8420 48,5 9540 15,558 51,7 21,051 55,3 24,016 61,0
Czech Rep. (/EU15) 8109 46,7 9283 13,980 46,5 16,831 44,2 19,953 50,7
Estonia (/EU15) 6768 39,0 7441 9187 30,6 13,473 35,4 17,997 45,7
Hungary (/EU15) 5267 30,3 6921 9952 33,1 12,428 32,6 13,787 35,0
Romania (/EU15) 3887 22,4 4307 5599 18,6 6174 16,2 8200 20,8
Poland (/EU15) 3795 21,9 4241 5925 19,7 9487 24,9 13,854 35,2
Bulgaria (/EU15) 2695 15,5 2897 4045 13,5 5206 13,7 7093 18,0
5 Old Wine in New Bottles? Comparing the Post-War Guest Worker Migration…
84
relative differences between Bulgaria, Romania and Poland in 1990 compare to 
Turkey in the GWS system in 1969 to a certain extent; the figures for Slovenia and 
the Czech Republic in 1990 are somewhere between those of Portugal and Greece 
in 1969, but below the figures for Spain and Italy in that same year.
Between 1990 and 2004, these relative gaps did not change for Bulgaria and 
Romania: these countries still had the lowest GDP of the CEE countries in 2004. 
But the relative difference of Poland (25.5 per cent) had changed in a positive way. 
At the other end of the spectrum, Slovenia and the Czech Republic had the highest 
GDP.
Ten years later, in 2014, Bulgaria, Romania and Poland still had the lowest GDP 
of the CEE countries, but the relative differences had diminished, particularly for 
Poland (35.2 per cent). Slovenia and the Czech Republic had the highest GDP: 61.0 
and 50.7 per cent respectively of the average GDP of EU15 countries. (For compa-
rable data in the literature, but with slightly different indicators, see: Galgóczi et al. 
(2009: 8 ff) and Dhéret et al. (2013: 17 ff) on all CEE countries; on Hungary see 
Hars 2009; on Romania see Potot 2010; on Bulgaria see Markova 2010).
These figures make clear that within the GWS and CEES systems there were 
significant differences between the countries of origin: the relative figures of 
Bulgaria, Romania and Poland were low (meaning wide gaps) and compare well 
with those of Turkey between 1969–1974 (though Poland did improve significantly 
over the course of time). The differences between Slovenia’s and the Czech 
Republic’s GDP with the average GDP of EU15 countries at the other end are rela-
tively small and quite comparable with the Southern European countries in the 
GWS system between 1969 and 1974.
The significant GDP differences above are “translated into significant income 
differentials, which were clearly an important pull factor for EU-10 nationals” 
(Galgóczi et al. 2009: 10). By contrast, unemployment seems to be a relatively less 
important driver for movement in these countries, as unemployment rates were 
more or less in line with the EU average of 9.2 per cent, Poland being the exception 
with an unemployment rate of 17.9 per cent in 2005. However, Poland reduced its 
unemployment from 19.1 in 2004 to 7.1 per cent in 2008.
In the receiving countries, complementary observations on pull factors indicate 
that these operated quite differently within the two migration corridors of the CEES 
system. In the North Western European countries unemployment was relatively 
high in the 1990s and labour shortages appeared in specific sectors, for which bilat-
eral labour migration programmes were organised. At the same time, these specific 
labour shortages, specifically in agriculture and horticulture, were filled by irregular 
short-term work on tourist visa. The migration corridor to the Southern countries, 
however, was of a different nature: migrants moved irregularly, attracted by work 
opportunities in the informal sector of the economies of the Southern European 
countries. The pull factor here was not so much the low unemployment and high 
wages, but the comparatively easy way to enter a country, find (informal) work and 
earn a (relatively low) wage. The accession of the A8 and A2 countries in 2004 and 
2007 in point of fact regularised the irregular work and residence situation of CEE 
migrants if that had not happened by amnesties before.
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After the accession of the CEE countries, some countries in the north-west 
migration corridor allowed full access in 2004 and argued that very low unemploy-
ment and a great demand for mainly unskilled and low-skilled labour were the rea-
son. This was particularly the case for the UK, Ireland and Norway that became the 
new target countries of the CEES system. (Sweden also opened its borders immedi-
ately, but had a relatively high unemployment and attracted much less CEE 
migrants). Other countries like Austria, Germany and the Netherlands, having rela-
tively high unemployment rates, chose for transitional arrangements in order to pro-
tect their labour markets. Even more countries chose for transitional arrangements 
in 2007 when Bulgaria and Romania became EU-members.
The 2009 economic crisis changed the balance of push and pull factors com-
pletely. In the destination countries, the first crisis of 2009–10 hit both the west and 
south migration corridors of the CEES system; unemployment increased and the 
demand for workers fell. Inflow of foreign workers decreased and return grew. After 
2010 the situation changed again: some north western countries, Germany particu-
larly, emerged from the crisis and attracted CEE migrants again, albeit on a more 
modest scale than before. This was in sharp contrast with the countries in the south 
where economic crisis deepened, leading to huge unemployment numbers and an 
increasing emigration of both native and immigrant workers (Arango 2016).
This was the mirror image of the perspective of the emigration countries where 
“outflows from Poland decreased substantially (...) after 2008, when better domestic 
employment rates were recorded at the same time as the deterioration of the eco-
nomic situation in receiving countries such as Ireland” (Dhéret et al. (2013: 17). 
Other indicators of labour market drivers had also converged significantly between 
2004 and 2007: In Poland for example, wage differentials increased from 21.5 to 
25.4 per cent in EUR at exchange rate (with average EU15); employment rose from 
51.2 to 57.0 per cent and unemployment decreased from 17.9 to 9.6 per cent. These 
observations make Galgóczi et al. (2009: 11) conclude that “differences in overall 
labour market performance, initially substantial, have shown remarkable conver-
gence between A8 and EU15 countries”. This is surely the case, but on balance it 
seems fair to conclude that the strong changes in the CEES system since 2008 have 
been caused more by pull factors falling away than by decreasing push factors.
5.3.2  The Organisation and Selectivity of Labour Migration
How were individuals – in situations where the economic conditions of push and 
pull are fulfilled – drawn into a labour migration system. How were supply of and 
demand for work brought together? What did the organisation of labour migration 
mean for those who moved when, under what conditions and with what strategy?
In the case of the GWS system, the literature suggests that there were two main 
ways of getting into the system. The first was based on informal networks between 
individuals in sending and receiving countries through which information was 
passed on possibilities to work elsewhere; people in such networks received and 
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supported new arrivals and mediated in finding work. There is an abundance of 
descriptions in the literature of the ‘pioneers’ who came ‘spontaneously’ (i.e. with-
out a prior invitation for work), found work (and received a work and a residence 
permit) and started to bring over kin and fellow countrymen on request of their 
employer, leading to strong concentrations of workers from the same villages and 
regions in certain cities in receiving countries on the aggregate level (see Abadan- 
Unat et al. 1976 and Den Exter 1993 for Turks in the Netherlands and Engelbrektsson 
1978 for Turks in Gothenburg, Sweden). From a broader perspective, it also tells us 
that earlier migrations from certain regions in sending countries, such as pre-war 
labour migration from Southern Europe to Switzerland, France and Belgium could 
easily be revived on the basis of networks stemming from these earlier migrations.
The second way of entering the system was through the institutionalised system 
of labour recruitment. This system involved strong governmental participation of 
both sending and receiving countries through bilateral agreements on how and 
under what conditions workers would be recruited. It might even imply – as in the 
case of Turkey – that sending countries registered candidates and selected them to 
be sent to recruitment offices of destination countries. For those who were selected, 
special cheap worker passports were issued. It also implied approval of demands for 
recruitment by governments of receiving countries. For the selected workers con-
tracts, work and residence permits were pre-arranged.
The Turkish case (Abadan-Unat et  al. 1976; Akgündüz 2008) shows how the 
originally spontaneous character of migration through informal networks was grad-
ually incorporated in the official system through the so-called ‘nominative con-
tracts’ (through which an employer could officially recruit a certain person whom 
he knew through workers he already employed). Nevertheless, the official system 
did not replace the spontaneous migration completely, because the waiting list for 
official recruitment in Turkey grew so long that the chances to be recruited became 
slim. Going as a ‘tourist’ and using the informal system thus remained in place so 
long as there were lenient policies to get a work and residence permit in destination 
countries. However, in the late 1960s such policies became stricter, thereby creating 
the phenomenon of illegal work (no work permit) and illegal workers (no residence 
permit) for the first time.
The organisation of migration as described above had consequences for the 
selection of migrants involved. Migration originally started in cities, but spread to 
rural areas later; in Morocco and Turkey this was also a consequence of the sending 
governments’ policy. In general, the work for which guest workers were sought was 
production work in well-regulated industrial sectors for which no or limited skills 
were needed. In general, male workers were sought and recruited; female workers 
only in special cases for specific work. Official recruiters in Turkey and Morocco 
preferred married men, who were looked upon as more responsible than unmarried 
youngsters. Spontaneous migration could lead to over-qualification, particularly 
when migrants were pushed out of their country for reasons other than work but 
used the guest worker status to leave, such as those who fled the authoritarian 
regimes of Salazar, Franco or the Greek colonels in the 1960s and early 1970s. 
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The official recruitment system, however, did not lead to large-scale placement of 
workers below their qualification level.
The development of the organisation of labour migration is different in the case 
of the movements from CEE countries to Western and Southern Europe and thus the 
selection of movers differs. When the exit opportunity opened in CEE countries 
after 1989, certain specific groups could and did use historical links to move. This 
was the case with certain regions in the CEE countries with German-speaking peo-
ple who had either migrated from Germany in the past or had other ties with 
Germany. (Germany’s Aussiedler return policy made it possible for some people of 
such regions, particularly in Poland, to come to Germany before 1989). Most 
migrants, however, had to find new routes or destinations without historical ties to 
guide and support them.
The movements of such new migrants from CEE countries in the period of 1989 
to 2004 have followed distinctive patterns within the two migration corridors, when 
it comes to the question of how the migration was organised. In the first corridor of 
movements to Western European countries, destination countries put in place strict 
regulated labour recruitment programmes, mostly for temporary or seasonal work. 
Germany developed such migrant workers’ programmes, particularly for workers 
from Poland, but other countries too, like France, Belgium and Switzerland; later 
Spain,3 Greece, Norway and the Netherlands also introduced specific bilateral pro-
grammes to facilitate temporary labour migration, often for the purposes of seasonal 
work (Engbersen et al. 2010a: 8 Glorius et al. 2013: 7/8). This pattern of regulated 
programmes resembled the official recruitment and deployment of guest workers 
two decades earlier.
Within this first corridor a less formal, partially legal and mostly unregistered 
way of work migration was practised as well, as described by Fihel and Grabowska- 
Lusinska (2014: 23):
“Institutional barriers introduced (...) by key receiving countries located in Western Europe 
and North America imposed a specific pattern of mobility on Polish nationals: migration 
comprised repetitive, short stays abroad that coincided with seasonal and temporary 
employment of migrants in agriculture, construction or domestic services (...). In order to 
not exceed the three-month (non-visa) stay in Western European countries, Polish nationals 
temporarily returned home only to re-embark, soon afterwards or following a short lag, 
depending on economic circumstances, on another trip abroad”. This has been named 
‘incomplete migration’ by Okolski (2001).
In the second corridor of movements, to the Southern European countries, migra-
tion took an entirely different form: irregular flows. Italy, Spain, Portugal and 
Greece had become attractive not only to returning emigrants in the 1980s, but also 
to migrants from Eastern Europe in the 1990s. The large informal sector (agricul-
ture, building, tourism and domestic work) and the labour-intensive manufacturing 
3 For Spain and Greece these state-led labour migration programmes have been only a small part of 
the total CEE labour immigration; by far most labour migrants followed the irregular pattern; see 
below.
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sector of their economies attracted many migrants from Romania, Ukraine, Albania 
and Bulgaria (King et  al. 1997; Peixoto et  al. 2012). These flows resembled the 
spontaneous migration of the GWS system in its first phase: informal networks 
providing information and support and building up chains between regions of origin 
and destinations. Lenient admission regimes made it easy to enter the southern des-
tination countries. Frequent and massive regularisations legalised most of these 
migrants over the course of time. In addition to informal networks, intermediaries 
and agencies in the private sector developed to connect the demand and supply. 
State regulation and control were nearly absent, apart from the small quota for 
recruitment (see above).
The accession to the EU of eight CEE countries in 2004 and of Bulgaria and 
Romania in 2007 changed the patterns outlined above significantly. First of all, it 
legalised the migrant populations that had reached the EU15 countries in irregular 
ways before, particularly in the southern countries. Secondly, it created new flows 
to those EU15 members that opened their borders without transitional arrangements 
within a short time. The pull factor of low unemployment and ample opportunities 
for work (until the economic crisis in 2009) in the UK, Ireland and Norway particu-
larly attracted many workers from CEE countries. In this new context of great 
demand for workers, the absence of restrictions on entrance and access to the labour 
market and a neo-liberal political climate of deregulation, private agencies quickly 
found a new market of connecting demand and supply; they mushroomed “and 
made a lot of money” (Jones 2014).
Flows to EU15 countries that had opted for transitional arrangements for the 
introduction of free movement of workers also increased after 2004, notwithstand-
ing the delayed free movement. The population of Polish workers in the FRG and 
the Netherlands, for example, increased significantly between 2004 and 2008. 
Newcomers often used alternative strategies to circumvent the limitations to free 
movement, such as coming as self-employed entrepreneurs or being sent as posted 
workers (in both cases using the freedom of service provision in the EU: see 
Galgóczi and Leschke 2015: 8). In such cases, the social networks of the resident 
immigrant population and the infrastructure of intermediaries and work agencies 
were used to employ posted and self-employed workers.
Literature on the consequences of the way migration was organised in the CEES 
system is ever growing and it poses the following questions: who moved, with what 
motivation and strategy, and with what intentions for the future. Our central ques-
tion remains: what makes the movements in the CEES system different from those 
in the GWS system?
The first element of difference is the less prominent – and sometimes even com-
pletely absent – roles of state control and regulation on the one and the significance 
of private- or market-driven intermediaries and work agencies (including smugglers 
and traffickers in some circumstances) on the other hand. The latter organise the 
connection between supply and demand, often resulting in less protected ways of 
labour migration or work mobility. In comparison with the GWS system only a 
small portion of CEE labour migration went through official, state-led or controlled 
programmes that not only connected supply and demand, but also clearly regulated 
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legal statuses, work conditions and remuneration – on a par with local conditions for 
natives. The CEES has a multitude of legal statuses (including a large portion who 
lack a legal status at least temporarily), many of these imply a great vulnerability on 
the routes toward and on the new labour markets. In CEES private intermediaries 
(who are sometimes illegal) and agencies operating in both sending and receiving 
countries discovered a profitable market. These agencies played an important role, 
not only in connecting supply and demand, but also in actively recruiting workers. 
Furthermore the work that they offered more often than not was located in new and 
(for workers) less protected segments of the labour market.
Such a system is attractive and profitable for candidate migrants in a different 
way than GWS. The GWS system was more demand-driven in its organisation and 
future employers recruited selected workers under conditions that implied more 
protective elements: for workers there was less choice, but relatively more certainty 
and protection. In the CEES system, there seemed to be more options and alterna-
tives for workers, but the options were less certain and unprotected. The selectivity 
among the candidates in the CEES system is therefore based on the question of who 
sees advantages in work abroad that is temporary and uncertain, and how does a 
choice for such work fit into the migrant’s plan for the future.
That leads to another characteristic of CEE migration, namely the multitude of 
(labour market) strategies that migrant workers follow. For example, Glorius et al. 
(2013: 315 ff) mention ‘target earners’ and ‘circular migrants’ that seem to fit within 
the concept of temporary labour migration, but they also find ‘career seekers’, stu-
dents and young (often urbanized) educated migrants (‘adventure seekers’ or ‘drift-
ers’) whose migration trajectory is different and unpredictable.
According to Fihel and Grabowska-Lusinska (2014: 23), characteristics of 
incomplete migration and the unpredictability of migrant decisions to remain in a 
host country, return home or move to another country are also valid after 2004, as is 
the uncertainty of the meaning of return. This uncertainty is reflected in the various 
strategies that migrants have, such as a) reconciling employment opportunities in 
Poland and abroad; b) giving up jobs in Poland to work abroad temporarily; c) 
replacing inactivity in Poland with work abroad; d) starting a business at home after 
migration (Fihel and Grabowska-Lusinska 2014: 28–30).
The typologies above are based on the labour market perspective of the country 
of origin. Engbersen et al. (2013) made a typology of migrants in which strong or 
weak ties with the countries of origin and destination are combined and they have 
come up with four types: circular migrants; bi-national migrants; footloose migrants 
and settlement migrants. All four types can be found, although sometimes in unex-
pected combination with, for example education.
This hints at yet another characteristic of CEE migrants: their level of education. 
In literature we have found that also students and professionals participated in the 
temporary and seasonal work programmes before 2004. After 2004, the average 
educational level of movers seems to have increased: “An important new trend of 
post-2004 labour mobility is the fact that migrants from low-wage countries [within 
the EU] generally have comparably high educational profiles, also in relation to 
nationals in the receiving countries” (Galgóczi and Leschke 2015: 8–23).
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The high educational levels combined with labour markets that offer low-skilled 
jobs lead to the claim that “skills/occupation mismatch is an important characteris-
tic of post-2004/2007 intra-EU migration; this claim has been substantiated by the 
current sectoral distribution of migrant labour, which focuses overwhelmingly on 
sectors that do not require a higher education” (Galgóczi and Leschke 2015: 8–23).
Researchers looking at the aggregate flows and at the motivations and strategies 
of the migrants involved have stressed that east-west labour migration in Europe “is 
becoming increasingly diverse, fluid and sub-regionalised in nature (Napierala and 
Trevena 2010).” Engbersen et  al. (2010a: 11 ff) have coined the concept ‘liquid 
migration’ for such diverse and unpredictable migrations (see also Engbersen in 
Chap. 4 of this volume).
5.3.3  National and EU Systems of Regulating Cross-Border 
Migration and Mobility
In the preceding two sections, states and their regulatory systems have been alluded 
to several times. In this paragraph we will look explicitly at state regulatory systems 
of international migration and see whether they have played a different role in the 
GWS and CEES migration systems.
When the demand for migrant workers emerged in the 1950s and 1960s, they 
were defined as foreigners, or foreign workers, from the point of view of the migra-
tion regulatory system. Apart from Switzerland, that had a stricter policy of old, 
most North Western European countries had simple and lenient admission proce-
dures in the beginning. Migrant workers came ‘spontaneously’, as tourists; if they 
found work they would be given a work permit. Having a work permit would enable 
them to get a residence permit. After the economic recession of 1966/67 however, 
most destination countries started to apply more control to the system of admission. 
In the Netherlands, for example, permission for legal entrance and a residence per-
mit had to be arranged with a Dutch Embassy or Consulate in the country of origin 
before arrival in the Netherlands since 1969. Introducing this new system of control 
also made it possible to implement the actual labour migration stops between 1972 
and 1974. In the second half of the 1970s these stricter policies for residence and 
work permits, combined with the stop on labour migration, led to the emergence of 
undocumented migrants and the call for regularisations.
Within the legal regulatory system described above, the state (i.c. the ministry 
responsible for employment) gradually built an institutional system for recruitment 
and deployment of workers from abroad: bilateral agreements between recruiting 
and sending countries were concluded in which rules, conditions and procedures 
were established. Institutional arrangements and policies were elaborated at the 
sending and the receiving side. Turkey gave emigration a place in its national 
 economic planning, for example, and developed a registration system for candidate 
migrant workers and proposed selected candidates to foreign recruitment offices 
(Akgündüz 2008). At the receiving end, recruitment procedures were developed by 
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state agencies and implemented by recruitment or immigration offices. In countries 
where trade unions had acquired strong positions in tripartite socio-economic 
decision- making, such as Austria, the FRG, the Netherlands and Sweden, labour 
unions were actively involved in controlling and setting the conditions for recruit-
ment and employment of these migrant workers (Penninx and Roosblad 2000; Rist 
1978).
The regulatory system of the CEES system saw a completely different develop-
ment than that of the GWS system. In the early 1990s the legal infrastructure still 
resembled the one that was in place towards the end of the GWS system. On the one 
hand, CEE countries of origin had opened the exit option for its citizens after the fall 
of the Iron Curtain (which before had been open only for migrant workers from 
Yugoslavia in the GWS system). On the other hand, European Community coun-
tries (totalling 12 in 1990) theoretically installed the same restrictive immigration 
policies for third-country nationals (TCNs) that had been developed in the destina-
tion countries of the former GWS system: new EC members, like Greece, Spain and 
Portugal, had created similar legal regulatory systems as part of the requirements to 
become an EU member: the acquis.
However, under this formally unitary legal system, two quite different imple-
mentation regimes developed within the European Community and later the EU 
(Doomernik and Bruquetas-Callejo 2015: 61ff). The first is the North Western 
European regime that had developed from an initially open ‘guest worker system’ 
in the 1960s towards an increasingly controlled, restrictive and selective admission 
policy for foreign workers after 1974. CEE labour migration to these countries 
under this regime in the period 1990–2004 took the form of specific but limited 
labour immigration programmes on the one hand, and short-term circular labour on 
tourist visa and irregular work migration on the other.
The second implementation regime in that same period was established in the 
Southern European countries (see chapters on Italy and Spain in Zincone et  al. 
2011). In the words of Doomernik and Bruquetas-Callejo (2015: 61), this regime is 
characterized “by a predominance of labour and family migration, scarcity of asy-
lum seekers, illegality as an endemic feature, and the combination of restrictive 
admission and citizenship policies with frequent amnesties.” Under this regime 
labour migrants were mainly attracted and absorbed by the informal economy. The 
state is not an actor in the regulation of migration, while private intermediaries and 
agencies play an important role in the organisation.
In previous analyses of labour migration policies in Europe, states were the basic 
units for analysis, workers were defined as international migrants who cross state 
borders and states had the sovereign right to decide whether foreign workers are 
allowed to reside and work there. Over the course of time, however, a completely 
different legal regime for mobility has been developed for and within a supra- 
national unit in Europe: the European Union (Penninx 2014). Its predecessors, the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC, since 1951), the European Economic 
Community (EEC, since 1968), and the European Community (EC, since 1985) had 
gradually created an area in which former international migration between member 
states was actually transformed into internal migration and mobility. This process 
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was finalised in the European Union (EU, since 1993) that gave all citizens (and 
long-term legally residing TCNs) complete freedom of movement and the freedom 
to work in all member states.
This new intra-European movement regime was in place when the EU expanded 
from 15 members (since 1995) to 25 members in 2004, to 27 in 2007 and to 28 in 
2013, when Croatia joined the EU. Although many EU15 member states delayed 
free access of citizens to the labour market of these new members for some years, 
by 2014 the freedom to work had been realised in all 28 EU-countries, except 
Croatia. This changed the basics of the regulatory system and the role of states in 
migration and mobility in general, and of labour migration systems in particular. In 
the economy-driven ideology of the EU, the national labour markets of all EU coun-
tries have merged into a single market where market mechanisms and agencies are 
supposed to do their work without the hindrance of borders and of national authori-
ties and legislations. International migration has become internal mobility: an eco-
nomically profitable and desirable situation. Ideally, it means that individual citizens 
have an unlimited choice – on principle – to go and work elsewhere in the EU for 
whatever reason, with whatever intention to stay or return; and employers, agencies 
and intermediaries, in turn, are working in an open competitive market, unhindered 
by protective state or national labour market regulations.
In actual practice, however, the picture is somewhat different: the unrestricted 
choice for the worker should be put in the perspective of the greater precariousness 
of the work on offer (as compared between the CEES and the GWS). At the same 
time, the absence of national restrictions to open, intra-European competition is 
resisted vehemently by trade unions and sometimes even national governments. 
Using national protective systems they want to defend equality of workers against 
‘social dumping’, such as the posting of workers under foreign rules, outsourcing 
work to agencies or the use of ‘bogus self-employed entrepreneurs’.
All in all, it is clear that the principles, regulations and practical mechanisms of 
free movement of workers in deregulated and segmented labour markets are quite 
different from the ones that governed the Guest Worker System. The outcomes in 
terms of the nature and direction of flows, of who participates in the movement with 
which motivation and which strategy, and where participants in the movement ulti-
mately end up are bound to be different.
This fundamental difference between the GWS and CEES systems, in terms of 
state regulation also had consequences for the cities and towns in which migrants 
came to work. The strong involvement of the state and social partners in the regula-
tion and control of guest workers deployment implied an employers’ and state 
responsibility for the housing of recruited workers. Big companies often built resi-
dential accommodation (sometimes on the premises of the work place) or hired 
these elsewhere, and the national state could take the initiative to build special resi-
dences within national building plans, as was the case in the Netherlands in the 
1970s. Furthermore, the state subsidised social and welfare work for guest workers, 
in the Dutch case for example through a network of regional Foundations for 
Assistance to Foreign Workers and its umbrella organisation LSBBW (later NCB). 
In the case of migrant workers from CEE countries, particularly after 2004, employ-
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ers or the state did not take on such responsibilities. Cities and towns had to deal 
with the housing and social demands of these migrant workers, using their own 
services and budgets. Claims of local governments on state budgets for costs of such 
services to CEE migrants have been to no avail generally speaking.
5.4  Conclusion
At face value, the guest worker migration system of 1955–1974 and the migration 
system from CEE countries to EU15 countries in the period 1990–2015 do have 
some basic resemblances: both entail a number of sending countries with econo-
mies and labour markets that push workers to go elsewhere. These countries are 
connected to a number receiving countries that have healthy economies and (selec-
tive) labour market shortages that pull workers. In both the GWS system and the 
CEES system millions of workers have been involved, often including periods of 
work that were followed by a definitive return. The time frame of 2.5 decades in 
both systems also led to resident immigrant populations of not only workers in 
receiving countries, partially settling immigrants.
Comparing economic and labour market factors that form a necessary condition 
for the emergence and continuation of labour migration systems in more detail, we 
see a strong resemblance again. The differential development gaps (measured in 
GDP per capita) between sending and receiving countries in both systems during 
and at the end of both systems are strikingly similar. Even the differentiation of 
countries at the sending side is comparable: in the GWS system Turkey compares 
with Poland, Romania and Bulgaria in the CEES, as they are all countries with a 
GDP per capita of around 20% of the destination countries. The Southern European 
countries within the GWS also had comparable gap figures as the better-performing 
countries in the CEES like Slovenia and the Czech Republic. Other indicators, such 
as unemployment and activity rate, suggest a comparability of the two systems as 
well. The ending of the GWS system in 1974 and the end of the growth of the CEES 
system in 2009 are not so much caused by changes at the push side (with decreasing 
GDP- and wage differentials) in sending countries, as by a sudden disappearance of 
pull factors in destination countries during the economic crises starting in 1974 and 
2008 respectively.
Nevertheless, when comparing the organisation of the migration movements in 
combination with the legal regulatory framework and state policies regarding labour 
migration, we see very different regimes of regulating labour migration, going 
together with very different forms of the practical organisation of flows. The GWS 
had started as a movement of workers moving along informal networks that con-
nected workers and future employers in a context in which the spontaneous arrival 
could be legalised easily and under regular conditions of the labour market. In the 
course of time, this labour migration became institutionalised, implying a state- 
led – often tripartite – decision-making on recruitment and on conditions for regular 
work and residence. That system was also able to canalize to a great extent the 
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informal system through nominative recruitment. It could imply involvement of the 
sending state in recruitment, regulation and protection, as was the case in Turkey. 
Private intermediaries and work agencies were virtually absent in this institution-
alised system.
In the CEES system both the legal context and the organisation were different. In 
the first period of 1990 to 2004 there were at least three quite different ways of par-
ticipating in labour migration: in the North Western European corridor there were 
(limited) formalised labour migration programmes that resembled the official 
recruitment of the GWS system, but the bulk of labour migration consisted of the 
quasi-legal short-term and repeated work visits that was coined incomplete migra-
tion. Private market intermediaries and work agencies (both legal and illegal) played 
an important role in these movements. In the southern migration corridor, move-
ments took the form of irregular labour migration through informal channels, and 
became increasingly organised and assisted by (illegal) intermediaries and agen-
cies, without involvement, consent or cooperation of authorities in destination coun-
tries. This labour migration mainly served the informal and low-wage sectors of the 
economies in the south.
After the accession of CEE states in 2004 and 2007, the legal context changed 
drastically in the sense that legal barriers for movement gradually disappeared. In 
the new free mobility market, connecting the supply of workers in CEE countries 
with a growing demand for flexible work in the booming neo-liberal economies of 
the west and south, was a profitable activity for intermediaries and work agencies. 
Regulation and control of movement by national authorities was supposed to be 
absent after transitional periods (but even before that time), even when migrant 
workers’ protection became endangered by new practices of deploying foreign 
workers by posting or so-called self-employment. This heyday of the CEES ended 
abruptly in 2009 by the economic crisis.
The literature documents the differential effects of the new legal framework and 
the different organisation that came with it: who was selected, who made himself 
available as a migrant in the system, and how did migrants use that system for their 
short and long-term future? The GWS generally brought in low-skilled, predomi-
nantly male migrants for certain periods for regular jobs at the lower end of the 
formal labour market for relatively well-protected contract work. In the CEES the 
regular organised labour migration programmes were a minor part of the movement 
and only in the first phase. In the first phase, until 2004, most of the movement was 
irregular – in the sense that a pre-organised legal frame was absent – and not offi-
cially organised – in the sense that demand and supply was connected through infor-
mal networks or (often irregular) private intermediaries and agencies. The actual 
work obtained was often irregular, less protected and certain, and low paid.
Such different opportunities have obviously attracted different candidates who 
could fit these opportunities to their varied migration strategies. Women participated 
much more than in GWS. The age variation is larger. Migrants in CEES turn out to 
be relatively well educated, but work below their skills. These trends seem to be 
reinforced after 2004, when the legal barriers obstructing labour mobility had disap-
peared. The result is an increasingly heterogeneous movement of people who use 
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temporary, uncertain work in the west or south as a means of exploring how their 
future might look and where it could happen. It is certainly not a labour migration 
system as the one defined in the literature: not only the new bottles of the CEES are 
different from the older ones of the GWS, the wine tastes different as well.
The outcome, where these mobile people of the CEES will end up establishing 
themselves is rather unpredictable. The ones who are successful in their new places 
of residence will probably be inclined to stay. But who knows the percentage of 
successful migrants (basically those that find a steady job corresponding with the 
skill level and ambition of the migrant and better than staying in their home coun-
try)? In the North Western European countries and economies, chances of success 
do not appear to be any better now than they were for guest workers in the past. In 
the crisis-ridden Southern European countries, chances seem even slimmer. One 
basic difference with the GWS system is that none of the CEE migrants will stay in 
destination countries because a return home would make it impossible to depart 
anew. Free mobility within the EU will prevent that unexpected outcome of strict 
regulation (for Turks and Moroccans) after the end of the GWS system in 1974.
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Chapter 6
Governance of the Free Movement 
of Workers and Persons at the European 
Level
Karin Zelano
6.1  Introduction
A Brussels correspondent allegedly described the general impression of the EU as 
‘an animal that lives in Brussels’. Given that most EU regulations are implemented 
at national and subnational levels of government, it may be tempting to discard the 
metaphor as a misconception. But it is not entirely false. Governance, in the sense 
of negotiations and decisions guiding implementation, does take place in the corri-
dors and conference rooms in Brussels. This chapter describes and analyses gover-
nance processes at the EU level in matters that relate to the free movement of 
workers and persons (hereafter free movement).
During the past 10 years, the European Union1 has introduced open and flexible 
modes of governance that diverge from the more traditional top-down steering. 
More than any other idea, the term multilevel governance has come to represent that 
change. Overall, there seems to be an emerging consensus about the desirability of 
multilevel governance and increased partnership in EU policy making (e.g. van den 
Brande 2014).
Prima facie, to increase cooperation may seem like a straightforward strategy 
to facilitate member state collaboration where legislation is neither possible nor 
desired. Yet the institutional structure of the EU suggests the opposite. Inclusive 
multilevel governance is set out to take place in those policy areas where the EU 
does not enjoy full competence. At the same time, the shared competence is in 
itself the result of explicit member state and/ or EC preferences. Among the 
reasons for wanting to keep a policy area under national competence may be 
specific national interests or a general preference for customised solutions. 
1 The terms ‘the European Union’ and ‘the EU’ will be used interchangeably throughout the 
chapter.
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To summarise,  competence is more likely to be shared in policy areas where 
member states, for one reason or another, perceive the stakes to be high. Issues 
relating to the free movement of labour and persons across the EU are prime 
examples of such matters. This is particularly so after the accession of countries 
in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).
Before the first Eastern accession in 2004, statements about the need to protect 
national welfare systems came thick and fast in the western and northern parts of the 
EU (Council of the European Union 2015; Doyle et al. 2006; EC 2016; European 
Commission 2014b). At the same time, the Eastern and Central European member 
states were eager to join the inner market. The enlargements generated new labour 
mobility patterns within the EU, predominantly running from East to West (European 
Committee of the Regions 2015a). As a result, regions and cities in host member 
states faced a series of social and economic consequences (Reeger and Enengel 
2015). In parallel to diverging perspectives at the European and national levels 
about, for example, labour market standards and wage levels, insufficient political 
and socio-economic institutions obstruct a satisfactory compliance of the free move-
ment regulatory regime (European Commission 2010; Svetlozar 2009). Nevertheless, 
the free movement of persons is a European reality. In 2013, more than 7 million 
European citizens lived and worked in another member state and over one million 
European citizens crossed the border to work in a neighbouring country every day 
(Your Europe 2015).
The free movement of workers and people relates to policy areas of exclusive EU 
competence and policy areas that are dominated by an outspoken ideal of multi-
level, non-hierarchical governance. The combination creates a multifaceted arena 
for governance solutions at the European level. In addition, several policy areas are 
of a politically delicate nature. Potential gains and losses for the involved parties are 
likely to influence governance outcomes.
This chapter provides a picture of how governance of this free movement is con-
structed, managed and negotiated at the European level. The aim is to supplement 
the previous chapters focusing on governance in European urban regions. A first 
section presents the data collection and methodology applied. Then follows a pre-
sentation of the primary tool of analysis (a modified version of the typology used in 
Chap. 5) and the foundational theoretical assumptions. The empirical results are 
analysed in two sections. The first categorises governance structures from what 
emerged in the data as major thematic areas. A subordinate, second empirical part 
zooms in on the formal and informal interactions taking place within governance 
structures. This part investigates the working methods of the European Commission,2 
the Permanent Representations of host member states (PR) and to some extent, the 
Committee of the Regions (CoR). A final paragraph summarises the main results 
and discusses the present and future role of the EU level in free movement 
governance.
2 The terms the European Commission, the Commission and the EC will be used interchangeably 
throughout the chapter.
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6.1.1  Methodology and Data
The chapter uses the term free movement governance at the EU level. The concept 
refers to the general exercise of authority within the multilevel institutional struc-
ture of the European Union, namely taking place in the relations and regulations 
within which institutions, public, private or both, operate (based on Lynn 2012).
The data analysed consist of ten in-depth interviews and written materials. 
Interview respondents were officials at the EU level working either in the European 
Commission or at national permanent representations. The selection of member 
state representations includes countries that have experienced a significant inflow of 
mobile EU citizens since 2004. In that capacity these member states are considered 
central to governance relating to the urban implications of free movement. The 
interviews took place during 2015 and were subsequently recorded and transcribed. 
Table 6.1 provides an overview of expert respondents:
The actors included in the analysis were chosen on the basis of their position 
in the formal structures of free movement governance. Member states have a 
formalised position in the legislative structure of the EU, namely via Comité des 
représentants permanents (COREPER). In addition, the permanent representations 
are thought to function as the extension of national governments into the corridors 
of Brussels. The European Commission in turn is expected to use the permanent 
representations as channels to national administrations. In addition to the interview-
ees, two other actors were also included. European Regional and local governments 
are primarily represented through the Committee of the Regions (CoR), while the 
European Parliament is the voice of the EU’s’ citizens. Indisputably, each one of 
those actors has a strong interest in the processes relating to free movement. 
However, depending on whether one takes a neo-functionalist or more intergov-
ernmentalist approach to European integration, the relative power of the involved 
parties varies.
Further data sources consist of official documents from the EU institutions them-
selves: e.g. legislative acts, press releases, reports and opinions. The data also 
include the program declarations and mission letters of the two most recent 
Presidents of the European Commission, as well as open letters to the Commission 
from member states with regards to the free movement under discussion.
Table 6.1 In-depth interview respondentsa
Permanent Representations to the EU (PR) European Commission
Permanent Representation of Austria to the EU (1) DG Internal Market and Services (1)
Permanent Representation of the Netherlands to the 
EU (1)
DG Internal Market and Services (2)
Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU (1) DG Employment, Social Affairs and 
Inclusion (1)
Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU (1) DG Employment, Social Affairs and 
Inclusion (2)
DG Justice and Consumers (2)
aThe number within () refers to the number of respondents present during the interview
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6.2  Governance Modes at the EU Level
This first empirical section (categorisation) is structured using a typology of gover-
nance modes. The typology departs from the one introduced in Chap. 5, being mod-
erated to suit the European focus of this chapter.
The point of departure is an institutional setting comprising of four possible gov-
ernance levels: the EU, national, regional and local. The actors may be public (e.g. 
governments or administrative bodies), ‘civil’ (e.g. parties, NGOs, interest groups, 
social partners, media, knowledge actors, etcetera) and private (e.g. businesses). 
The typology distinguishes between four governance modes: (1) Horizontal gover-
nance, (2) Top-down governance, (3) Multiple level governance and (4) Multi-level 
governance. Theoretically, all four might or might not involve actors at the EU level. 
Since this chapter specifically centres on the EU level, the typology presented in 
Table 6.2 is slightly different compared to that used in project reports and Chap. 5.
Horizontal governance is characterised by engagement and participation among 
actors at one single institutional level. In this chapter, this translates as a formal and/ 
or informal engagement by actors at the EU level. Top-down governance is charac-
terised by a hierarchical relationship in which the highest level involved (in this case 
the EU level) controls the actions of actors on other involved levels. A governance 
setting is only to be regarded as top-down governance if the EU level can impose 
solutions on the lower levels involved. In multiple-level governance the EU and 
actors on other levels enjoy a close to equal relationship. As shown by Table 6.2, 
no more than three levels can be involved in this third type. If all four levels 
are involved, the governance is a case of multi-level governance. In multilevel 
1. Horizontal governance EU EU EU EU
2. Top-down governance
3. Multiple level 
governance
EU National
EU EU EU EU EU EU EU EU Regional
National National National National Regional Regional Local EU Local
Regional Local Regional Local EU National Regional
Local EU Regional Local
4. Multilevel governance EU National Regional Local
EU National Local
Table 6.2 Modes of EU governance of intra EU mobility (Source: Modified version of typology 
in Chap. 5)
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governance, there is a more or less equal engagement, participation and prerogative 
among all four governance levels. The data collection and analysis include formal 
as well as informal processes of governance.
6.2.1  Results
Formal EU institutions, member states, organised interests as well as EU citizens 
participate in governance of free movement at the European level. At a rough esti-
mate, these processes involve about 33,000 employees in the European Commission, 
almost as many lobbyists, diplomats at 28 permanent representations and a staff of 
approximately 8000  in the European Parliament (European Commission 2015f; 
Traynor 2014). The involvement of various institutions and players also varies 
throughout the process.
To begin with, the European Commission has the prerogative of formulating the 
political priorities of the EU. Independently of whether one considers the European 
Commission to be simply at the service of the member states or able to pursue its 
own agenda, the EC indisputably has an important role in the management and 
enforcement of EU law (for a comprehensive discussion see Chap. 9 by Balch). 
When taking office, the new President-elect of the Commission presents the priori-
ties for the years to come and provides each Commissioner with a mission letter. 
The political priorities of the two most recent Commissions constitute a point of 
departure for the forthcoming analysis. These, as the priorities of the Commission, 
form the overarching setting within which European bureaucrats and diplomats 
operate.3
Similar themes have dominated the free movement agenda under the two recent 
European Commissions: the need for increased intra-EU mobility of workers, regu-
lated professions and students, the social and economic implications of that mobil-
ity and the implementation of the Posted Workers Directive.
The second Barroso Commission took office in 2009. The free movement of 
persons was evoked under the wider goals of ‘Developing new sources of sustain-
able growth and social cohesion’ and ‘Advancing a people’s Europe’. The first 
mainly referred to facilitating consumers, but mentions social progress and solidar-
ity. The second area, including efforts to advance a people’s Europe, establishes 
that: ‘Citizens today should not find that they still face obstacles when they move 
across borders within the EU’ and adds that mobility for young people is a special 
priority. Barroso also called for ‘a new, much stronger focus on the social dimension 
in Europe, at all levels of government’ (Barroso 2009). In the portfolio specific mis-
sion statements, Barroso is more concrete and identifies a number of priorities.
The subsequent European Commission took office in 2014, headed by President 
Juncker. Free movement was discussed within the political priorities presented to 
the EP under the headline ‘An Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic 
3 Since 2009, the year of the second Barroso Commission.
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Change’. A specific section of the statement was dedicated to ‘A Deeper and Fairer 
Internal Market with a Strengthened Industrial Base’ and the free movement of 
workers explicitly mentioned. Juncker also promised to ‘ensure that the Posting of 
Workers Directive is strictly implemented and I will initiate a targeted review of this 
Directive to ensure that social dumping has no place in the European Union’. The 
right of national governments to fight fraud was also acknowledged in the speech 
(Juncker 2014).
There are some noteworthy differences. President Juncker’s political programme 
explicitly mentions the free movement of citizens and workers as well as fair labour 
markets. Unlike Barroso, Juncker’s agenda highlights the right of member states to 
fight abuse and fraud in welfare systems and labour markets. The Juncker 
Commission further announced an upcoming ‘Mobility package’ in 2015. The 
package consisted of a communication on labour mobility, a targeted revision of the 
posted workers directive and a revision of regulations on social security coordina-
tion (European Commission 2015a).
The various issues evoked by the European Commission are managed coopera-
tively within the institutional structure of the EU. Depending on the character of the 
issue at hand, different tools and mechanisms are available. This empirical section 
has described selected governance modes available to stakeholders. The following 
section goes on to categorise governance relating to the free movement of persons, 
by form and theme.
6.2.2  By Governance Form
6.2.2.1  Primary and Secondary Law
EU law provides the legislative structure of the European project, divided into ‘pri-
mary’ and ‘secondary’ law. Primary law refers in particular to the Treaties and is the 
basis for all EU action. Secondary law derives from the Treaties and includes regu-
lations, directives and decisions. The most common way to legislate in the EU is via 
the so called ‘ordinary decision-making procedure’, a legislative process where the 
European Parliament approves EU legislation together with the Council of the 
European Union (Europa.eu 2015). All of these measures can rather straightfor-
wardly be classified as top-down governance. The criteria for top-down governance 
set out earlier are fulfilled in the implementation of both primary and secondary law. 
The EU has the ultimate responsibility and authority to enforce the measures 
decided. It is equally true that the formulation of legislative acts includes elements 
of multiple level governance too, namely through the co-legislative role of the 
Council of Ministers, representing the member states. Although we will see later 
that there are relationships between the local and the European level, the law pri-
marily concerns the EU institutions and national governments (who in turn might 
communicate with lower institutional levels). This is illustrated in Table 6.3.
K. Zelano
107
6.2.2.2  Soft Law
In contrast, so called ‘soft law’ is based on the mutual trust between member states. 
The Social Dialogue and Open method of Coordination are both examples of such 
soft law mechanisms. The Open method of Coordination (OMC) is a form of inter-
governmental policy-making that does not result in binding EU legislative measures 
and it does not require EU countries to introduce or amend their laws (EUR-Lex 
2015). As expressed in the White paper on governance from 2001, the OMC is ‘a 
way of encouraging cooperation, the exchange of best practice and adding value at 
a European level where there is little scope for legislative solutions’ (European 
Commission 2001). The Social Dialogue was developed as a way of ensuring that 
the single market would have a ‘social dimension’ and brings together EU institu-
tions and the social partners (European Commission 2015h). Two advisory policy 
committees are linked to the soft law cooperation: the Social protection committee 
(SPC) and the Employment committee (EMCO) (European Commission 2015b, i). 
These modes of steering are best classified as multiple level governance, as shown 
in Table 6.4.
6.2.2.3  EU Pilot
Another mechanism used to solve issues without formal court procedures is EU 
Pilot. Based on a website, the Commission and Member States may share informa-
tion on particular cases and in this way give member states a chance to comply 
voluntarily (European Commission 2015c). The first step in a formal process is a 
letter of formal notice, followed by a reasoned opinion. As a last resort, the 
Commission initiates an action against the member state before the court (Interview 
with DG Internal Market and Services, 2015). The resolution rate is 75% (cases 
closed, following national governments’ satisfactory responses, as a percentage of 
all cases). Issues relating to the Internal Market make up 12 per cent of all errands 
Implementation
Top - down governance
Legislative process 
Multiple level governance
EU EU 
National National
Table 6.3 EU primary and 
secondary law
Multiple level governance
EU
National
Table 6.4 EU ‘soft law’
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(European Commission 2015c). EU Pilot is interesting in terms of governance 
typologies. The sharing of information and the focus on non-judiciary conflict solu-
tions hints at regarding this as a multiple governance mode. However, the fact that 
the EU level owns the initiative, as well as the power to play the trump card of going 
to court, means that it technically qualifies as a top-down mode of governance 
(Table 6.5).
6.2.3  By Governance Theme
There now follows a categorisation of governance in areas that respondents high-
lighted as important themes within free movement governance: free movement of 
persons and workers, posting of workers and social security coordination.
6.2.3.1  Free Movement of Persons and Workers
Within the Commission, labour mobility is primarily handled within the portfolio of 
employment and social security coordination, monitoring the application of EU law 
in member states. As put by one of the respondents, the problem facing a well- 
functioning free movement of labour is not so much inefficient regulations, as the 
matter of implementation (Interview with DG Employment, Social Affairs and 
Inclusion, 2015). Respondents from the Commission, as well as diplomats at the 
permanent representations, stressed the need to address implementation gaps, rather 
than circumvent free movement:
...we see it (free movement) as a core value; we see also, however, that there are issues 
concerning abuse and with social systems and we want them to be discussed. We really 
want no taboos here, but to have an open exchange and ask that problems are addressed as 
far as possible
Interview with Permanent Representation, 2015
The legislation confers every EU citizen with the right to go to another member 
state for work purposes, to stay in this member state, to stay after the end of the 
work relationship, to bring his or her family with him or her and to have equal 
access to social tax and balances. A recent alteration to the free movement frame-
work came into being in 2014 and addressed information deficits in the labour mar-
Top - down governance
EU
National
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ket. The reality is that employers, public authorities and sometimes also EU workers 
themselves, are simply not aware of the content of EU laws.
There are two statutory committees under Regulation 492/2011: the Advisory 
Committee and the Technical Committee. The Advisory Committee on Free 
Movement of Workers is made up of representatives of member states and social 
partners, while the Technical Committee includes representatives from the member 
states. These committees meet approximately twice a year. In addition, DG JUST 
operates an expert group in which people from competent ministries, i.e. those deal-
ing with free movement, meet regularly in Brussels, 3–4 times a year. This group is 
not written into the treaties but emerged in response to the court ruling of Metock 
(Interview with DG Justice and Consumers: Union Citizenship Rights and Free 
movement, 2015; European Commission 2014a).
Since the Treaty of Lisbon came into force, it is also possible for citizens to 
mobilise in order to raise awareness about a specific issue at the European level by 
means of the European Citizens’ Initiative. As of the time of the data collection, an 
example relating to the free movement of labour was entitled, Fair Transport 
Europe – equal treatment for all transport workers. As the title suggests, the initia-
tive demands action to guarantee equal working conditions in the transport sector, a 
business exposed to intra-EU competition (Fair Transport Europe 2015).
On the practical, operational level of free movement of workers, EURES is 
important. EURES is a free of charge online portal providing information on living 
and working conditions in all participating countries in 25 languages, and registers 
4 million visits per month (Becker 2015) (Table 6.6).
6.2.3.2  Posting of Workers
In the interviews, respondents working with postings within the EU repeatedly 
brought up Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework 
of the provision of services as the central piece of legislation. The directive specifies 
Secondary Law 
(Directive 2004/28/EC)
European Citizens’ 
Initiative 
Statutory 
committees 
Top-down 
governance
Multiple 
level 
governance
Top-Down 
governance
Multiple level 
governance
EU EU EU EU
National National European Public National level
Table 6.6 Governance modes of free movement of persons and workers
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which employment conditions apply to workers temporarily posted in a member 
state other than the one where they are residing. The Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) has interpreted the directive in four rulings, known as ‘the Laval 
quartet’. Together, the cases have set the European framework for the practice of 
collective bargaining. In a briefing about the consequences of the Laval quartet, the 
European Parliament summarises the judgements as follows: (1) Collective action 
may be a restriction of economic freedoms. (2) Collective action is a fundamental 
right. (3) The Posting of Workers Directive is a ceiling (not a minimum) (Malmberg 
2010). The directive has been discussed since 2004 but has become even more 
salient since the Juncker Commission announced a planned revision. Member states 
have since mobilised to influence the work of the Commission. During the course of 
2015, the Commission received two letters concerning the posting of workers in the 
internal market. The groups of signatures represented both receiving member states 
and sending member states (Table 6.7).
In what might be seen as a reaction to the lack of sensitie ear that traditional top- 
down governance signals, member states organised to make the European 
Commission listen to their objections. In June 2015, seven countries (Sweden, 
Netherlands, Germany, Austria, France, Luxemburg and Belgium) addressed 
Commissioner Thyssen with regards to the planned review of the posted workers 
directive. The aim was to ‘to stop the race to the bottom in social protection for 
workers’ (Hundstoffer et  al. 2015). The Dutch government initiated the call and 
declared fair worker mobility one of the political priorities during the presidency in 
2016 (Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment 2015). Also in 2015, a group of 
new member states (Latvia, Romania, Poland, Slovak Republic, Lithuania, Hungary, 
Estonia, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic) in the CEE region also wrote to the 
Commissioner. They expressed their concerns about the attempts to alter the free 
movement regime:
It is important to emphasise that pay rate differences existing among Member States do not 
constitute an unfair competition where the freedom to provide services is concerned and 
there should be no obstacle for service providers to profit from a competitive advantage 
resulting from the differences between the national rates of pay, an advantage which was 
safeguarded so far by EU law, including especially case law developed by the Court of 
Justice of the European Union.
Letter to Commissioner Thyssen from Kalfin et al. 2015
Directive 96/71/EC 
Top-down governance
EU
National
Table 6.7 Posting of workers
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During the interviews, it became clear that the posting of workers was a political 
priority of the permanent representations, most explicitly so for Sweden and the 
Netherlands.
To be active on the EU level and push for good working conditions in the internal market is 
a priority for the current government in particular. (…) I mean, that is a very clear priority: 
to avoid social dumping.
Interview with Permanent Representation, 2015
6.2.3.3  Social Security Coordination
Social security coordination within the EU is a rather complex matter, as social 
security systems remain a national competence and vary widely across the EU. To 
manage the coordination, member states have agreed on four basic principles to 
guide implementation:
 1) EU citizens are covered by the legislation of one country at a time and national 
authorities decide which one.
 2) The principle of equal treatment or non-discrimination applies, meaning that EU 
citizens have the same rights and obligations as the nationals of the country in 
which they are covered.
 3) Previous periods of insurance, work or residence in other countries are taken into 
account when claiming a benefit.
 4) A ‘principle of exportability’ guarantees that cash benefits from one country can 
be received also by beneficiaries living abroad (European Commission 2015d).
The Juncker ‘mobility package’ includes a revision of the existing regulations on 
social security coordination and the outcome of that revision it not yet known. What 
we do know is that social security coordination is a politically delicate issue. As put 
by one of the national bureaucrats:
This issue of social tourism always…, it’s always there, smouldering under the surface.
Interview with Permanent Representation, 2015
The Administrative Commission for the Coordination of Social Security Systems 
gathers member state representatives, to meet a number of times per year. The 
Commission is responsible for dealing with administrative matters, questions of 
interpretation arising from the provisions of regulations on social security coordina-
tion and for promoting and developing collaboration between EU countries 
(Interview with DG Employment, Social Affairs, and Inclusion, 2015; European 
Commission 2015e). There is FreSsco (Free movement of workers and Social secu-
rity coordination) −  a network of independent experts funded by the European 
Commission and a third group of statistical experts working to improve the  available 
data on stocks and flows of EU citizens residing and/or working in another EU 
Member State/EFTA country (European Commission 2015g) (Table 6.8).
The categorisation of governance modes per form and theme indicates a pattern. 
Areas where the EU enjoys formal competence are mostly managed by means of 
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top-down governance, whereas multiple and horizontal level governance dominate 
in policy areas where the EU lacks such formal competence. Several modes of gov-
ernance thus coexist in free movement management at the EU level. The next step 
in the analysis takes a close-up look at the interactions taking place within the exist-
ing governance structures.
6.2.4  Governance Interactions
The interaction between the Commission and member states looks different depend-
ing on which issue is being discussed. Some matters are solved by means of soft 
law, some through SOLVIT, while others might generate a legislative initiative. This 
section describes the interactions taking place within the three modes of governance 
identified in the previous section.
Member states and European institutions interact at the European level within 
horizontal and multiple models of governance. Interaction also takes place within 
top-down governance. A hierarchical structure does not exclude interaction between 
levels. It simply implies an unequal distribution of power.
The interviews revealed how preferences and agendas varied between gover-
nance stakeholders. Respondents within the European Commission expressed an 
overarching ambition to ‘make the free movement work’. Representatives of 
national, regional and local governments in Brussels worked with the explicit aim to 
influence developments in the preferred direction of their principals. As a result, the 
EC and representatives of national, regional and local governments operate in a 
context of shifting alliances. Agendas would sometimes conflict, and sometimes 
coincide.
6.2.4.1  Regions and Municipalities at the EU Level
Free movement in general and labour mobility in particular, have been increasingly 
salient in national and European debates about the long-term sustainability of intra-
 EU mobility. Member states impatient for reform have repeatedly turned directly to 
Administrative Commission FreSsco Expert group on statistics
Multiple level governance Horizontal governance Horizontal governance
EU EU EU
National
Table 6.8 Social security coordination
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the European Commission to insist on certain measures instead of following 
standard procedures within the Council structures. Several respondents mentioned 
‘the letter’ during the interviews. This referred to an open letter from the Ministers 
of the Interior in Austria, Germany, Netherlands and the UK, sent to the president 
of the European Council for Justice and Home Affairs, Mr. Shatter (IE). The gov-
ernments called for increased attention to the local consequences of free movement 
(Interview with DG Justice and Consumers: Union Citizenship Rights and Free 
movement, 2015; Interview with Permanent Representation, 2015). In response, the 
Commission published several reports to address the issues raised, and also organ-
ised the ‘Conference of mayors on the impact of intra-EU mobility of EU citizens 
at local level’ together with the Committee of the Regions (CoR). Over 200 partici-
pants attended the conference, where local and regional authorities were invited to 
make their concerns heard and discuss possible solutions (e.g. European Committee 
of the Regions 2014). The CoR has stressed the role of local and regional authorities 
in the everyday governance of free movement and practical implementation of EU 
citizenship on several occasions (Centre for Strategy and Evaluation Services 
(CSES) 2012). The overarching legal framework of free movement has not been 
altered as a consequence of the protests. However, the horizontal relations engen-
dered have resulted in some improvements in the communication between the 
European Commission, member states and local authorities regarding the imple-
mentation of existing rules. In addition to arranging the conference, the Commission 
has issued handbooks and encouraged intensified exchange of information in gen-
eral (Interview with Permanent Representation, 2015). Commission respondents 
acknowledged such initiatives were necessary, as intra-EU mobility often has more 
tangible implications at the local rather than at the national level:
It’s not really the member states that are being confronted with urban problems, it is the 
cities. So, we show them that we take interest in what the people on the ground actually do 
and try to see how we can accommodate them, rather than those complaining member 
states, you know, who are not the real persons taking care of the problems on the ground.
Interview with DG Justice and Consumers: Union Citizenship Rights and Free 
Movement 2015.
Another strategy was to participate in the ‘Open Days’; an annual four-day con-
ference hosted by the CoR. In 2015, the Commission experienced high interest in 
and positive feedback to a workshop on inclusion of mobile EU citizens and the EU 
funds that can be used for those purposes (Interview DG Justice and Consumers: 
Union Citizenship Rights and Free movement, 2015; European Committee of the 
Regions 2015b).
According to the Commission, it is sometimes hard to find the optimal way of 
interaction between the European and local level. Nevertheless, the European 
Commission meets regularly with the Committee of the Regions at desk officer 
level. Recently, the Committee communicated its position to the Commission in the 
process leading up to the launching of the labour mobility package (European 
Committee of the Regions 2015a). Within the CoR, the Commission coordinates the 
work relating to the movement for Social Policy, Education, Employment, Research 
and Culture (SEDEC).
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In terms of governance modes, the CoR operates at the European level, while at 
the same time representing lower levels of government, insinuating a multiple level 
component. However, as the organisation is active on the European level and cannot 
be assigned to a single specific local or regional context, the governance mode is 
better thought of as horizontal.
6.2.4.2  The Role of Permanent Representations to the EU
Interview respondents representing the European Commission and the permanent 
representations (PR) are in regular contact with each other. Both clusters differenti-
ated between formal and informal relations between member state representations 
and the EC.
The formal relationships include various expert committees organised by the 
Commission and formal questions from the Commission regarding implementation 
of EU law. Various forms of informal interactions overlap and complement these 
formal platforms. Interactions between the permanent representations and the 
European Commission (EC) served one or several of the following purposes.
• To get information from the EC
• To pass on information about the preferences and positions of their own member 
state to the EC
• To circumvent initiation of a formal infringement procedure, i.e. by informing 
about practices or planned reforms.
• To form alliances with like-minded member states
Three of these relate to communication between the European Commission and 
the PRs. The fourth purpose concerns instead bilateral relations between like- 
minded member states.
Retrieval of information from the European Commission emerged as the domi-
nant task of PRs. The quote below describes this:
The most common game in Brussels is trying to figure out what the Commission will do 
and when.
Interview with Permanent Representation, 2015
At the other end of the relationship, EU bureaucrats explained that they are in 
touch with member states on a daily basis and regularly receive e-mails from 
national representatives (Interview with DG Internal Market and Services, 2015). 
The task of keeping up communication seems to be more central to permanent 
representations than to the Commission. Most officials within the Commission 
mentioned other Directorate Generals (DGs) as their main point of contact. 
Nevertheless, information flows in both directions as explained by one member 
state representative:
(…) the Commission is interested in listening to our input in order for their proposals to be 
well received, they don’t want to present a proposal that no one wants on the table.
Interview with Permanent Representation, 2015
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Another interview respondent said it was very much up to the PRs to keep them-
selves informed about what the European Commission is doing (Interview with 
Permanent Representation, 2015). There were many ways of doing so, and these 
varied from individual to individual. Personal networks were considered an advan-
tage. As an example, some respondents mentioned how former experience in the 
Commission could be a way to get access to information.
As a [nationality of respondent] in the Commission, after a while I felt that I was expected 
to, like, be the link to [member state of origin] and provide [member state of origin] with 
information from the Commission. In a similar way, I am now expected to kind of use [staff 
of same nationality] or whoever it might be to provide me and, in the long run the Ministry 
back home, with information.
Interview with Permanent Representation, 2015
The informality of those relations contributes to making information access 
unpredictable. The informal nature also contributes to the perception that the kind 
of information accessible is rather ad hoc. The two quotes below illustrate this view:
Yes. I mean, I could definitely call them, or if there are questions I will write them an e- mail 
and ask ‘Could you tell me?’. Of course, that depends if there are any new developments 
within the Commission, … if these are not yet decided, then they probably wouldn’t tell me, 
(It depends) if it’s still part of discussions and if they are, anyway, open issues.
Interview with Permanent Representation, 2015
It is not obvious that they [the Commission] are happy to share proposals and these things 
before they have passed through their hierarchy and it [the hierarchy] is after all rather 
strict. (…) with sharing drafts and these things, but the Commission also has an interest in 
presenting things that the member states want.
Interview with Permanent Representation, 2015.
Another factor mentioned as influencing access to information is the length of 
EU membership. Member states with longer experience in Brussels were consid-
ered better at extracting information from the Commission. One respondent said 
that:
I still think we [member state] have more to learn from those member states that really 
always know what is going to come, [that] are at the forefront.
Interview with Permanent Representation, 2015
A second objective of the interaction between the European Commission and the 
national embassies is to communicate national priorities regarding specific matters 
to the EC. This is considered particularly important in the consultation phase lead-
ing up to a proposal from the Commission. At the time of the interviews (2015), the 
announced Junker mobility package was in that phase. One respondent used it to 
exemplify how the permanent representations might go about their work during the 
phase of consultation:
When it [the announcement of the mobility package] is approaching we will try to meet 
with the Commission and say ‘these are the things we have in mind’ and so on. And meet 
with other member states we know have the same agenda.
Interview with Permanent Representation, 2015
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Similar to interactions designed to retrieve information, interactions aiming to 
convene national preference are characterised by informality. The quotes below 
confirm that both sides share that view:
It’s really very easy, very informal. They [ministry in capital of MS] might call me and say 
‘Hey, could you ask either the Commission, or could you probably ask other member states 
how they are doing different things? ´
Interview with Permanent Representation, 2015
Then member states, individually of course, approach the Commission on different levels. 
There is the Commissioner, the presidents and then the services, to discuss these issues in 
more detail. And yes, there are some member states, of course, where this is a more pressing 
issue, which require more meetings, more information and which send us more 
comments.
Interview with DG Employment, Social Affairs, and Inclusion, 2015
Several respondents mentioned how the European Commission is not always 
open to absorb information about member state preferences. Although invited to 
comment on the agenda of an expert committee for example, permanent representa-
tions perceive that the possibility of them influencing the outcome is limited. This 
was explained by reference to the diverging interests of PRs and the EC.  Issues 
relating to the implementation of the free movement directive are likely to be highly 
relevant for member states. On such issues, member states naturally ask for access 
and influence. At the same time, as one respondent said, the Commission has little 
interest in acknowledging problems relating to implementation:
If you are the player watching over the treaties, as the Commission is; the motor of integra-
tion and everything, of course you try to keep it low key, while the others will ask to put 
these issues on the agenda more often and to discuss them. So, it’s always of course, a pool 
of negotiation and a bit of strategy as well. It’s natural.
Interview with Permanent Representation, 2015
This disinterest naturally causes frustration on behalf of member states. 
Sometimes, it even seemed to trigger more proactive behaviour vis-à-vis the 
EC. Both the European Commission respondents and the national diplomats men-
tioned an open letter signed by five member states that was sent to the Commission 
in 2013. The letter was a consequence of a situation where the Commission was 
perceived as ignoring member state preferences for too long. As one respondent 
said, the letter was sent after years of raising concerns about the local consequences 
of free movement:
(…) the letter then raised huge political concerns and, you know, caused many reactions by 
the media and the press that went probably much further than the intention of the letter. 
Because the intention of the letter was simply to say “Look, we have issues and we want to 
address them, we want to talk about them and it’s definitely not directed against any specific 
groups, it’s not directed against free movement”.
Interview with Permanent Representation 7, 2015
European Commission respondents also brought up the aforementioned letter 
when asked if member states actively try to influence the actions and priorities of 
the EC:
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Like the letter. It can happen. It was a blunt way to do it. But of course, you get lobbied by 
member states for this or that but it’s not our day to day experience.
Interview with DG Justice and Consumers: Union Citizenship Rights and Free move-
ment, 2015
A third type of interaction between national representations to the EU and the 
European Commission is contact designed to circumvent the initiation of a formal 
infringement procedure against individual member states. Permanent representa-
tions do so by, for example, informing Commissioners about practices and planned 
reforms in the domestic arena. Notably, there was a shared preference across institu-
tions for solving problems informally, or at least, outside formal infringement 
procedures.
The preference for avoiding costly court proceedings has been institutionalised 
in the mechanism of SOLVIT. SOLVIT is managed from within the Commission 
and operated via an online database with national centres in each of the member 
states. The overarching purpose is to help ‘people who move around Europe for 
work, study, business, etc. and encounter problems with public authorities which 
may not apply EU legislation correctly’ (European Commission 2015j). SOLVIT 
works on the basis of mutual trust and the common willingness to solve problems 
resulting from cross border activity. Consequently, SOLVIT experts provide advice 
and mediate between parties that are willing to solve the matter without initiating a 
formal infringement procedure. As explained below, there are cases where such 
common ground is missing and a mechanism like SOLVIT reaches its limits:
When something is politically sensitive, then it also starts to become much more difficult to 
have an informal solution. (…) For example, we had a Danish- Dutch case; it was on sailing 
licenses in the sea and was already at the level of Ambassadors talking to each other. The 
Ambassador in Denmark and the Ambassador in the Netherlands would go to the minis-
tries, so the ministers would already have discussed it. The complainant also complained to 
SOLVIT, but the thing was already in the newspapers etcetera and then the SOLVIT centre 
just said ‘I can’t do anything here, because it’s already at such a high level’. And then the 
authority will only change if he gets the instruction from the minister or whatever.
Interview with DG Internal Market and Services, 2015.
Other, less institutionalised ways of solving problems outside the court room 
were also mentioned. Similar to the respondent quoted, several respondents dis-
cussed this:
Before you get a formal notice, normally you have informal proceedings (…) Sometimes 
you also meet and ... It depends. In some areas, also sometimes some commission represen-
tative would ask you as well, also at my level, they would come and say ‘How is it done?’ 
and ‘Are you sure this completely corresponds?’ But there is always this before [a formal 
notice].
Interview with Permanent Representation, 2015
Both the European Commission and PRs used informal contacts to avoid formal 
infringement processes. They do so either by explaining the reason for a specific 
practice or informing the Commission about upcoming changes in a criticised prac-
tice. This kind of contact could emerge as a response to a direct question from the 
Commission or as a proactive response on behalf of the PRs.
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The Commission might have raised an issue about the implementation of a Directive in 
[member state] and indicated that this might come up and become an infringement proce-
dure, but then you try to solve a lot by explaining how this is done and what is in the pipe-
line within the [national] legislative process to see whether this really has to become an 
infringement procedure.
Interview with Permanent Representation, 2015
In some areas, also sometimes some Commission representative would ask you as well, 
also at my level, they would come and say ‘How is it done?’ and ‘Are you sure this com-
pletely corresponds?’. And then you become aware that there might be some internal inves-
tigation or whatever. But there is always this before.
Interview with Permanent Representation, 2015
Prior to [an EU pilot] it is in our interest to provide the Commission with as much informa-
tion as possible …‘all this work is coming up in [member state] and might change the leg-
islation, making the issue that you are raising a non-issue in a years' time, is it then really 
relevant to initiate an infringement procedure that will require a lot of work and resources?…’
Interview with Permanent Representation, 2015
Respondents within the European Commission also confirmed that this could be 
the purpose of information exchanges between themselves and member states:
So first we ask them to explain their system and then we show the problems. We ask them 
also to change it.
Interview with DG Internal Market and Services, 2015
I mean, if there is a practical problem, we do not act. If we have 50 cases which concern the 
same aspect, we could ask the member state ‘what are you doing?’
Interview with DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, 2015
Fourth, the permanent representations emphasised the strategic benefit of meet-
ing with like-minded member states before meeting in consultative bodies or in the 
Council working groups. They explained that while constellations may shift between 
issues they remained quite stable once established. As an example, the UK and 
Sweden were known to often represent opposite positions in aspects relating to the 
exportability of social benefits but shared the same position in discussions about 
how to facilitate the mobility of regulated professions (Interview with DG Internal 
Market and Services, 2015; Interview with Permanent Representation, 2015) 
According to one of the respondents:
I think it’s an interesting development anyway at the EU level, that you have these kinds of 
like-minded member states meeting, like-minded groups (…). I think during my time, it has 
become probably more frequent, more regular, in a way.
Interview with Permanent Representation, 2015
Connections with individual members of the European Parliament (MEP) may 
also serve as a way to channel national preferences. In addition to revising legisla-
tion and authoring reports, individual parliamentarians (MEPs), have the opportu-
nity to ask the President of the European Council, the Council, the Commission or 
the Vice-President of the Commission /High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy written or oral questions. Each Member may submit a 
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maximum of five questions per month (European Parliament, 2015). Among the 
Commission staff, parliamentary questions appeared as the most frequent form of 
interaction with the European parliament (e.g. interview with DG Employment, 
Social Affairs and Inclusion, 2015). The permanent representations stated that they 
had more regular contact with MEPs of their own member state than with other 
parliamentarians. Sweden has a way of keeping in touch with Swedish MEPs by 
means of regular, organised breakfast meetings with the objective of mutual 
exchange of information between Swedes working with EU affairs in Brussels 
(Interview with Permanent Representation, 2015). Rather than being central, influ-
encing via individual MEPs is considered a complement to other ways of commu-
nicating national preferences.
In conclusion, the everyday governance of Brussels stakeholders seems domi-
nated by horizontal and multiple level governance. In the context of the EU, the 
distinction between the two types is sometimes difficult to discern. The most clear- 
cut example of horizontal governance is when European institutions, for example, 
the European Parliament and the European Commission work together. When the 
Committee of the Regions, permanent representations and social partner organisa-
tions are involved, the distinction between the multiple and horizontal governance 
modes gets blurred. More specifically, this is the case when organisations represent-
ing various sub-European levels work together with EU institutions at the European 
level. The Committee of the Regions and the Permanent Representations are both 
examples of such hybrids.
Within governance structures stakeholders interact by means of formal and 
informal communication. Respondents emphasised informal interactions as being 
extremely important. It also became evident that the European Commission has an 
informational advantage vis-à-vis the permanent representations. The PRs have to 
influence or get access to the European Commission through informal relations, 
rather than the other way around. The European Commission relies more on formal 
means to pass on information, for example through the Council working groups.
6.3  Conclusion
Within the IMAGINATION project, results show that that while CEE migration has 
the potential to involve governance actions at all administrative and political levels, 
the EU level is often absent on the ground. The areas of prevention of human traf-
ficking, crime and to some extent employment and labour mobility via EURES 
were noteworthy exceptions (See project report Zelano et al. 2016). The findings 
presented in this chapter substantiate those claims. Free movement governance is 
primarily an affair of top-down, multiple level and horizontal modes of governance. 
The top-down mode of governance has been challenged by member states, most 
dramatically when frustrated member states have let their discontent be known by 
means of open letters to the Commission. This rather unconventional way of protest 
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signals a bottom-up demand for more inclusive governance. This was also some-
thing that respondents within the European Commission openly acknowledged.
Overall, the European Commission was aware of the importance of acknowledg-
ing and addressing the needs of local and regional stakeholders in order to safeguard 
the functioning of the free movement of labour and people. The IMAGINATION 
case studies however, indicate that this awareness does not trickle down to the local 
and regional levels.
According to European Commission respondents, there are few established ways 
of working directly with lower levels of government. The EC tries to address this 
gap by edited handbooks or interactive databases. But such initiatives alone cannot 
solve the multitude of implications resulting from intra-EU mobility.
Theoretically, the Committee of the Regions (CoR) is the primary tool for inter-
action between local and regional governments and the European Commission. The 
CoR was mentioned in this respect by stakeholders at the national level as well as 
higher ranked bureaucrats in the urban regions. In contrast, barely any street level 
bureaucrats, for example, outreach social workers, mentioned the CoR as an actor 
with a potential role in solving the challenges at hand. This indicates the distance 
between the local level bureaucrat and the CoR offices in Brussels negotiations.
The results reveal the gap between European and local levels in free movement 
governance. The gap should theoretically be addressed and minimised by the repre-
sentative mechanism of the CoR. This does not seem to be the case empirically. 
Instead, complementary, direct links are emerging between the local level and the 
European Commission. Similarly, the work by the national representations does not 
seem to trickle down to the local level back home. The interactions between the 
national and the European level in Brussels seem to be well established and effec-
tive, as does the reporting back to national governments. However, the information 
flow appears to stop there and does not result in any domestic ripples at sub-national 
levels of government.
Provided that the EU wants to encourage multilevel governance, cooperation and 
the exchange of best practice, there are reasons for the European Commission to 
continue on the path chosen, more specifically to develop tools and platforms for 
interaction and cooperation with local and regional levels of governance. Such ini-
tiatives should exist alongside existing structures and serve as a complement rather 
than a substitute. Such complementary interaction may possibly have a better 
chance of addressing urgent matters relating to, for example, practical implementa-
tion and interpretation of specific paragraphs in EU law. By the same token, it is 
recommendable that the European Commission open up ways in which regional and 
local levels may interact directly with them. To some extent such mechanisms are 
already in place through European Social Fund (ESF) project grants and confer-
ences at the EU level. However, this could be developed through more long-term 
interactions with local stakeholders and improved information exchange. Such a 
strategy would also offer a way for regional and local entities to move forward in 
cases where their preferences and political priorities differs or even clash with those 
at the national level.
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6.4  Final Remarks
The findings in this chapter offer theoretical as well as empirical insights. 
Theoretically, the data may be used to inform the typology of governance modes. To 
start with, multilevel governance is unlikely in a governance setting as complex and 
diverse as the EU of today. In some areas, such as the inner market, conflicting 
interests seem to have generated top-down modes of governance out of necessity. In 
other cases, where politicisation is high or where member states share competence 
with the EC, multiple level governance seems to be more common. The involve-
ment of multiple levels takes place in Brussels, at the European level. This inter-
twined and overlapping system, where, as an example, local governments are 
represented in the Committee of the Regions, makes it hard to discern a strict line 
between multiple level and horizontal governance.
The results also offer empirical insight. Political, legislative and bureaucratic 
processes run parallel in the governance of free movement. Focus and measures at 
the European level are influenced by increasing political concerns in  local and 
national contexts. These, in turn, are predominantly communicated via the national 
permanent representations to the EC. The European Parliament, individual MEPs, 
the European Committee of the Regions and social partners also serve as channels 
for information to the EU level. To some extent, member states and local authorities 
have been successful in their efforts to make the European Commission address 
gaps in free movement governance. The announced revisions in the areas of posting 
and social security coordination, as well as the innovative formats developed, for 
example, e-learning tools, databases, facilitating information exchange and grants, 
indicates that the European Commission realises the need for all levels to strive 
towards the same goal.
The results give free movement advocates some reason for optimism. Both the 
member states and other key actors seem to be in favour of the free movement of 
people, at least in theory. The challenge for those convinced that the advantages of 
free movement surpass the downsides is to turn that support into well-functioning 
practices on the ground.
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Chapter 7
The Multi-Level Governance of Intra EU 
Movement
Gregg Bucken-Knapp, Jonas Hinnfors, Andrea Spehar, and Karin Zelano
7.1  Introduction
Free movement management is a challenge that emerged in a multi-level context, 
with policies developed at one level having unclear implications for actors working 
at other levels, and with questions of authority and competencies remaining highly 
uncertain. Broader issues of national and local contexts, as well as traditional insti-
tutional practices, all lay the groundwork for the need of clearly articulated gover-
nance solutions. As is clear from previous chapters, the flows of CEE migrants, as 
well as the social consequences of their presence in urban regions that are often 
unequipped in both policy and administrative terms, has led to substantial chal-
lenges for actors at all levels of government, both public and private, when it comes 
to free movement management.
In this chapter, we identify the specific governance patterns that have emerged in 
terms of free movement management. Our argument is that while free movement 
management may have emerged in a multi-level context, there is a surprising lack 
of multi-level governance when it comes to policy and administrative responses. Put 
bluntly, the governance measures that have been opted for in each of the four nations 
and eight cities display strikingly little in the way of multi-level governance. Rather, 
for the policy domains that have been most salient in each setting, we see that the 
governance solutions that have been institutionalized primarily represent either 
horizontal, top-down, or multiple-level modes of governance. Quite simply, with 
rare exceptions, the governance modes that have been adopted are not governance 
modes that meaningfully involve the EU. These empirical findings suggest that a 
political challenge that would have all the hallmarks of an opportunity for vertical 
governance networks to emerge is, at the end of the day, largely being resolved by 
actors at local levels.
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7.2  Mapping Free Movement Management: From the Multi- 
Level Governance Literature to Modes of Governance
On one level, it is unsurprising to consider the case of free movement manage-
ment in urban regions against the backdrop of the broad multi-level governance 
approach. In general, the broad multi-level governance literature posits that there 
is a multiplicity of actors present from the EU, national, regional and local levels, 
who engage in what can be regarded as a process of negotiation, deliberation and 
implementation that is more or less continuous (Schmitter and Kim 2005). The 
relationship among actors at these four levels is one where there is substantive 
engagement of those involved, not merely presence, and where engagement 
allows for the possibility of genuine mutual influence, but also facilitates and 
mutual dependency as various policy-making activities become intertwined with 
one another (Stephenson 2013).
After all, the challenge associated with developing and implementing the tools to 
successfully manage free movement can be thought of as occurring in a clear-multi- 
level context. In a stylized nutshell, the principle of free movement of people within 
the EU often creates substantial challenges for urban actors (both public and pri-
vate) who find their efforts to “solve” the issue difficult by a lack of clear policies at 
both the national and local level for addressing the issue. Coupled to this, CEE 
migrant integration within EU member states is regularly characterized by ambigu-
ous lines of authority as to which actors have (or even want) responsibility for for-
mulating and implementing policies. As such, given the multi-level context of the 
challenges associated with free movement management, one might suspect that it is 
a prime candidate for a governance solution that is fittingly multi-level in response. 
Indeed, some authors within the multi-level governance literature, as well as actors 
in the public sphere – in particular the EU itself – have worked from an assumption 
that multi-level governance is, by default, a desirable outcome where the problem 
context can be framed as multi-level in nature. Such excessively positive portrayals 
of multi-level governance have been called into question by scholars over the past 
decades, with arguments being made that multi-level governance has the potential 
to compromise democracy (Guy Peters and Pierre 2004), in essence undermining 
the principles of traditional government through facilitating for the establishment of 
self-organizing and self-regulating networks apart from traditional governing insti-
tutions (Harlow & Rawlings 2007).
However, as a number of studies focusing on urban administrative responses to 
the challenges of immigration have shown, the complexity of a multi-level system 
entailing many policy processes might not result in effective multi-level coordination 
at all. Rather, a broad variety of governance responses are possible, with the possibil-
ity that actors at any one level could play the decisive role in formulating and coordi-
nating policy and administrative measures, or even, that no patterns of coordination 
might emerge. (Bowen 2007; Joppke 2007; Ostaijen et al. 2016; Duyvendak and 
Scholten 2012; Scholten 2012).
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Clearly then, a response of multi-level governance to the challenge of free move-
ment management is one possible outcome, but it should not be assumed to be the 
only or most likely governance result, solely because of the multi-level context in 
which actors find themselves embedded. What then are the other possible alterna-
tives that might emerge?
In this chapter, we employ a typology of governance approaches that capture the 
full range of possible responses from the various public and private actors who are 
faced with developing responses to the challenges of free movement management. 
This typology of governance responses is comprised of the following four modes: 
horizontal governance, top-down governance and multiple-level governance and 
multi-level governance. We envision an overall governance setting comprised of 
four possible levels: the EU, national, regional and local. The actors inhabiting these 
levels may be either public (governments or administrative bodies) or those from 
the broader polity (parties, NGOs, interest groups, social partners, media, knowl-
edge actors, etc.). This typology is more fully developed in the introductory chapter 
of this book, but we provide readers who might make use of this chapter in isolation 
from the others with a sufficiently detailed overview.
Horizontal governance is characterized by an engagement and participation 
among actors at only one level seeking to resolve free movement management chal-
lenges. While these actors may need to work within the confines of formal policy 
established at another governance level (most notably in the case of horizontal gov-
ernance at either the local or regional level, who often must coordinate their activi-
ties against the backdrop of certain national policy mandates), formal and informal 
engagement is solely limited to one level of actors.
Top-down governance is characterized by a hierarchical relationship in which the 
highest level involved steers the overall governance response for actors from all 
other involved layers. In order for there to be a top-down governance response to the 
challenge of free movement management, there must be at least two levels involved, 
though these levels do not necessarily need to be adjacent. For example, in a setting 
where only actors at the national and local level are involved in developing free 
movement management measures, it can only be regarded as top-down governance 
if the national level has the ability impose solutions on local actors who are also 
involved in the deliberation process.
By contrast, bottom-up governance is characterized by a hierarchical relation-
ship in which the lowest level involved steers the overall governance response for 
actors from all other involved layers. In order for there to be a bottom-up gover-
nance response to the challenge of free movement management, there must be at 
least two levels involved, though these levels do not necessarily need to be adjacent. 
For example, we witness bottom-up governance if the local level has the ability to 
impose solutions on regional or national – level actors who are also involved in the 
deliberation process.
However, it is imperative to stress that central to either top-down or bottom-up 
governance is the presence of a mutual collaborate relationship among actors at dif-
ferent levels, which is a necessary condition of governance. Lacking such a collab-
orative relationship, what may appear at first glance to be either top-down or 
7 The Multi-Level Governance of Intra EU Movement
128
bottom-up modes of governance is, in fact, a form of policy learning, in which 
actors at various levels simply adopt the governance solution developed horizon-
tally at some other level, without any substantive engagement among these levels in 
constructing the specific governance response. We return to this point in the conclu-
sion, highlighting the manner in which the repeated presence of horizontal gover-
nance at the local level across our cases ought not to be misinterpreted as evidence 
in support of bottom-up governance.
Multiple-level governance is characterized by a more or less equal relationship 
in terms of engagement and participation for actors at those levels involved in the 
process of responding to the challenges of free movement management. In order for 
there to be multiple-level governance, there must be at least two levels involved, 
though these levels do not necessarily need to be adjacent. However, as will be 
explained shortly, no more than three levels can be involved. For example, a setting 
where actors from national, regional and local levels are involved in developing free 
movement management measures can be regarded as multiple-level governance if 
there is a more or less equal relationship among actors from these different levels.
Lastly, there is multi-level governance in the traditional way that is understood in 
the literature: a situation where there is a more or less equal relationship in terms of 
engagements and participation among all four levels – including the EU level - as 
they seek to formulate responses to the challenges of free movement management.
As we turn to the major policy areas that have been the focus of free movement 
management responses in each of our four cases, we will see that multi-level gover-
nance, the one that has received the most attention in the literature, is that which is 
primarily lacking. Rather, the governance modes that are opted for in each of the 
major policy areas have exclusively been top-down, multiple, or horizontal in 
nature. It is only when we look beyond the key components addressed in each case 
responses that we see clear evidence of a multi-level governance response.
Following this, we intend to shift the theoretical discussion to matters of gover-
nance approaches more broadly, calling attention to the explanatory utility associ-
ated with network approaches (Curry 2015), as well as to horizontal, vertical and 
diagonal approaches (Torfing et al. 2012). We will stress the manner in which this 
combined literature highlights the importance of governance approaches as venues 
for interaction among actors at a variety of levels and within a variety of organiza-
tions – both state and civil society. The aim is to set the stage for a characterization 
of governance approaches that we regard as analytically straightforward for captur-
ing the full range of possible governance relationships that can exist among and 
across levels: multi-level governance in the standard sense of the term within the 
literature: a largely equal relationship in terms of engagement and participation 
among actors at all four levels; top down governance, in which there is a hierarchi-
cal relationship steered by the highest involved level and directed downwards; a 
multiple level governance, in which there is an equal relationship in terms of 
engagement and participation among only those levels involved; and a horizontal 
governance approach, in which engagement and participation among actors at the 
same level can be observed (Zelano et al. 2016a, b).
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The analysis that follows maps the policy measures taken in the different policy 
domains for which CEE migration have implications (socio-economic, socio- 
cultural and legal-political), characterizing them in accordance with the typology 
presented above. In order to reconstruct urban governance approaches, we have first 
mapped the relevant stakeholders. This was done by each country team for the two 
selected urban regions per country. Following the identification of relevant actors, a 
reconstruction was made of (a) their practices and measures with regard to CEE 
migrants and (b) the rationale behind these practices and measures. This was 
achieved through interviews as well as both primary and secondary document anal-
ysis. As such, the methodological strategy has allowed us to capture both formal 
policy responses as found in texts and the governance approaches that can be wit-
nessed in actual practice.
7.3  Austria: Mostly Multiple-Level Governance, but Also 
Horizontal1
The predominant area in terms of the Austrian case and specific areas focused on 
developing policy instruments for free movement management at the urban level is 
that of the labour market. While a variety of instruments are evident in this sphere, 
they are united by the fact that they by and large do not consist of measures consist-
ing of multi-level governance type responses. In general, these responses can be 
characterized as instances of multiple-level governance, reflecting the degree to 
which there has been a strong presence of the national level in those cases where 
legislation has been central to the response, and also the degree to which national 
responses have been mirrored by related activity at the local level.
The 2011 Anti-Wage Dumping Law, introduced by the Federal Ministry of 
Labour, Social affairs and Consumer Protection (BMASK) represents a multiple- 
level approach response to the integration of CEE migrants. This legislation, 
stemmed from concerns over the wage gap between the Austrian labour market and 
that of new EU member countries. In 2015, the law was amended so that violations 
were dealt with as matters of administrative and not civil law, with the result being 
the emergence of new networks to manage and make sense of the law’s require-
ments. Such networks took shape at the local level, for example in Vienna, where 
the Chamber of Labour serves as a source of information and a point of coordina-
tion for the various units in the city administration whose work with the law on a 
regular basis.
Multiple-level governance responses also tend to be characteristic for the variety 
of measures intended to deal with the phenomenon of CEE migrant de-qualification 
upon relocating to Austria and seeking opportunities on the labour market. Similar 
to the measures dealing with the prevention of wage-dumping, the efforts targeting 
1 Please note that the  empirical data for  this and  the  following country sections is based 
on the IMAGINATION projects country reports regarding Urban Governance.
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migrant de-qualification see BMASK assuming a central role. One example of this 
are the four Contact Points for the Recognition and Assessment of Qualifications 
Obtained Abroad (AST), established in 2013. These contacts points serve as regional 
centres that offer guidance and counselling in a variety of languages, free of charge, 
for those seeking to have the foreign qualifications validated. Yet, what makes these 
regional contact points examples of a multiple-level governance response is not 
their location across various regions of Austria, but rather the actors who are charged 
with running the centres themselves. Rather than this being under the direct aus-
pices of BMASK, these four contact points are managed by both NGOs and local 
administrative actors, resulting in an initiative that has seen state, civil society and 
local public actors collaborate to deliver services to CEE migrants requiring help 
with validation of foreign qualifications. A similar multiple-level governance 
response addressing CEE migrant de-qualification is the Network for the Recognition 
of Qualifications, established by the Austrian Integration Fund, which brings 
together social partners and professionals to discuss specific measures that could be 
introduced to improve the process of validating foreign qualifications, and also pro-
viding an information platform for cities and regions seeking relevant information 
about the validation process.
Taken jointly, these examples hammer home the prevalence of a clear pattern: in 
devising solutions to address the labour market challenges associated with free 
movement management, there exists primarily close working relationship between 
national and local level – initiatives developed at one level find mirrored counter-
parts at the others, and there is substantial interaction between the two levels in 
addressing how labour market challenges are to be resolved within urban areas.
By contrast, the other key area of free movement management in Austria – hous-
ing – is characterized exclusively by horizontal governance, taking place primarily 
at the local level. Yet, this difference from the area of labour market is not simply in 
terms of the mode of governance. Rather, the focus on housing at the local level in 
Austria is characterized by measures that are not policy-specific in nature, nor are 
they exclusively targeted at CEE migrants. For example, in the Austrian capital, the 
housing situation for migrants, especially those who might be characterized as eco-
nomically vulnerable, is made challenging by the fact that social housing is only 
available to those who have been permanently resident in Vienna for two years and 
who are in possession of a registration certificate. Horizontal governance measures 
at the local level that seek to respond to this challenge more generally include the 
“Immigrant Fund” which can quickly provides low-threshold housing for migrants, 
assuming they possess the requisite security deposit, or the short-term housing mea-
sure KuWo, which provides the homeless ill with a place to recover following being 
discharged from the hospital. In both instances, the actors involved in these mea-
sures represent may of the key organizational players at the local level, including 
social partners, NGOs, and the city of Vienna itself. When it comes to measures that 
are EU-migrant specific, two in particular stand out: the Centre for Homeless EU 
Citizens (Zweite Gruft) and the night shelter for male EU citizens “VinziPort”. 
While both represent horizontal-level responses to deal with the problem of housing 
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for vulnerable EU migrants, the NGO Zweite Gruft has an even broader mandate, 
with activities not just cantered around housing, but also providing mediation for 
EU migrants who need assistance when engaging with various public authorities.
As such, the governance network that has taken shape in this other primary area 
of free movement management is circumscribed to actors at the local level. A rich 
illustration of programs and policy initiatives all serve to underscore that, while 
there is substantial policy activity, it does not involve engagement among actors 
from different levels. Housing is acted upon solely in local terms.
7.4  The Netherlands: Business as Usual: Local Level 
Horizontal and Multiple Level Governance Approaches
In the absence of any multilevel governance approaches in the Dutch case, what do 
we find? Primarily, free movement management has been met with horizontal and 
multiple level governance approaches. Housing issues, labour market consider-
ations and question about civic registration were the three primary policy areas 
which triggered extensive governance responses by Dutch policymakers. Moreover, 
these were soon defined as ‘CEE issues’ in the sense that administrators and politi-
cians regarded them as meriting special treatment compared to how housing, labour 
market and registration were normally dealt with. Governance actors have defined 
housing, labour market and registration as areas where CEE migration has created 
new challenges as parts of it tends to be temporary and circular. The approach taken 
by the officials was in many cases that of trying to minimize problems that Dutch 
citizens expressed about CEE immigrants. To some extent this particular angle was 
a result of the long established Dutch type of corporatism, which is built on active 
inclusion of all recognized and organized communities in society. As CEE migrants 
have not developed any strong communities the Dutch institutional logic contrib-
uted to excluding them.
Other issue areas never seem to have evolved into CEE issues as such but have 
rather been funnelled by the administrative-political actors into already existing 
general policies. Examples of these were health care and education.
While the overall governance responses in the two Dutch case regions have been 
remarkably similar, there are still substantial variations inside each region. To some 
extent these differences have had to do with differences regarding different social 
consequences in different geographical areas.
A general observation is the fact that several policies and approaches began as 
municipality projects. In most instances, issues regarding CEE migration became 
evident at the local level, in the sense that immigrants literally encountered housing 
and employment problems in a certain city or village rather than in a government 
Ministry. Local level officials simply had to deal with issues arising at their door-
step. Later, local officials developed horizontal approaches by involving various 
local stakeholders – such as civil society, other Dutch municipalities and cities in 
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neighbouring countries. In some cases regional and national level officials have 
stepped in as well.
A key aspect is whether policymakers have been able to fit CEE issues into exist-
ing local, regional or national level governance structures. Housing is normally 
dealt with at the local municipal level. Thus, a range of city policies ensued includ-
ing a gradual development of horizontal cooperation between cities and other local 
level actors. However, since the Dutch Ministry of Internal Affairs and Social Affairs 
is responsible for overseeing the housing, labour market and registration areas some 
policies were developed at the national level as well. As a consequence, the gover-
nance responses have had elements of both local horizontal and multiple level 
features.
Housing remains an exceptionally pressing issue. Both the selected Dutch 
regions have been very active to combat various forms of housing problems such as 
abusive and non-compliant landlords. One particular concern has been to prevent 
two kinds of overcrowding: in flats and in neighbourhoods. A flurry of city initia-
tives have followed and in some cases elements of the local solutions have been 
picked up nationally and made into national law. However, these processes have 
rarely developed into mutually reciprocal systems of cooperation but there are 
exceptions, e.g. the ‘Approach to attack slum landlords’ (an agreement between 
municipalities and the Ministry of Internal Affairs). Thus, the overall governance 
approach in this regard has been local level horizontal with some elements of mul-
tiple level governance.
Dutch governance responses regarding labour market aspects have had a strong 
horizontal governance character. Rotterdam and the Hague have developed ties with 
each other and with other local level institutions such as by signing special agree-
ments (‘Covenants’) to control fraud and mala fide employment arrangements.
To a lesser extent, an element of multiple level governance exists as well. Indeed, 
municipalities have collaborated to put labour migration on the national level 
agenda. The national government has increasingly been involved in issuing work 
permits and has introduced new legislation aimed at combatting wage dumping and 
at improving working conditions. Moreover, the national government has tried to 
coordinate actions against social dumping and other negative labour market aspects. 
While government ministers have been quite active, their efforts have mostly 
resulted in an element of coordinated agenda setting actions in a number of EU 
countries. Open letters have been written, op-ed articles have been published and 
conferences have been organized but little in terms of horizontal national level poli-
cies as such has been developed.
The general pattern of the Dutch case then, is that while local level responses 
may dominate, there are also clear instances of multiple-level strategies intended to 
assist in the management of free movement challenges. In the areas considered most 
salient for devising governance responses, networks and actions that are multi-level 
in nature are, by and large, lacking.
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7.5  The Case of Turkey: Top Down
The governance approach in Turkey regarding CEE migration can best be summa-
rized as top down. However, while Turkey is a unified state with a strongly state 
centred structure a multitude of laws and legislations contribute to inconsistent poli-
cies. Immigration policies are covered by jurisdictionally complex and fragmented 
legal orders. Due to this non established character, central authorities begin to 
develop their own policies, which sometimes clash with those of other central 
authorities. The result is an ad hoc, vague governance approach within an overall 
top down setting. Primarily immigration policies have been focusing on labour mar-
ket and registration issues, while social security, health care access and housing 
issues have been more peripheral.
Within the overarching format, some differences exist between Edirne and 
Istanbul. Primarily these differences are down to differences regarding two aspects: 
the character of the migrants and the situation of the cities in a wider Turkish con-
text. The bulk of Edirne’s migrants are in fact well established CEE migrants (most 
of Turkish ethnic descent) of high socio-economic status. Istanbul on the other hand 
has become a major centre for Syrian refugees. Moreover, migration policies regard-
ing Edirne are influenced by special border security considerations. As a conse-
quence few specific CEE migrant policies have been developed in Edirne. Giant 
Istanbul attracts many immigrants. The various labour market regulations devel-
oped for immigrants do not differ between different migrant types. As with most 
policies policy coordination between different parts of the central authority struc-
ture has proved to be difficult although some data indicate efforts to strengthen and 
streamline central authority.
Some policy domains are absent or almost absent. For instance, very few poli-
cies have been developed regarding housing apart from some shelter provision in 
Edirne and some facilities regarding children in Istanbul. This absence reflects a 
traditional attention on labour market and registration aspects in relation to immi-
gration. However, there appears to be a growing awareness among policymakers 
and other stakeholders that education, social security, healthcare and integration 
need more attention. To some extent the policy vacuum may disappear as a result 
of the heavy increase in Syrian migration. Since most of the existing policies so far 
have not differed between immigrant groups any development may well then affect 
CEE migrants as well.
Future developments will probably rely on which party or coalition of parties 
will hold the national majority. So far, the governance of migration has been clearly 
dependent on politics. The governance approaches have not been solidly institution-
alised and have been subject to frequent changes. Moreover, although registration 
has been a primary domain on which policies have been developed this has not 
meant that a well-coordinated and systematic system has emerged. A bewildering 
array of rules, legislations and concept exist. Moreover, due to political and other 
tensions among policymakers even basic concepts such as ‘asylum seeker’,  ‘refugee’ 
and ‘migrant’ have not become unequivocally defined even inside the top state level.
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As such, given the nature of Turkish political institutions, it is perhaps the easiest 
case in which governance patters can be identified. Even the most cursory review of 
policies and networks suggests that there is an exceptionally close correspondence 
between, on the one hand, the institutional logic of the Turkish political system and 
the resulting top-down manner in which all aspects of managing migrant integration 
are constructed.
7.6  Sweden: Horizontal and Top-Down Predominate
Comparing the governance responses across the urban regions in Gothenburg and 
Stockholm, the group of destitute, often unregistered CEE citizens and beggars 
were at the centre of debates and governance responses. Homelessness of CEE citi-
zens, most of them beggars from Bulgaria and Rumania, was one of the critical 
issues that required local governance responses. An institutional obstacle encoun-
tered by homeless EU citizens is their exclusion from the ‘shelter guarantee’ nor-
mally offered by Swedish municipalities. Since EU citizens are excluded from the 
shelter guarantee a local horizontal governance approach emerged to deal with the 
issue. The help and support for homeless EU/CEE citizens is offered through 
churches and charities, through formalized partnership with municipalities. The 
development of tighter and more frequent relations between the municipal level and 
the voluntary sector is a sign of new governance patterns set in motion by the novel 
social implications. Recent developments have also seen central authorities evicting 
homeless people who have set up temporary tent camps on private property. When 
faced with an increasing number of cases concerning illegal settlements, the 
Swedish Enforcement Agency ordered the regional units to contribute to a central, 
statistical record and initiated a project to harmonize local practices. Thus, while the 
governance approach regarding homeless CEE citizens is more or less local and 
horizontal there are some elements of top down activities as well.
Issues related to social security/help and registration of CEE EU citizens were 
also highly relevant for particular governance responses. These are two policy areas 
characterised by inconsistent practices, and bureaucratic uncertainty. Relevant doc-
uments and interviews show that Swedish municipalities seem to be at a loss about 
how to treat EU citizens who are living in Sweden and who are in need of social 
support. The municipal administrations find it difficult to decide whether an EU 
individual should be granted right of residence, which is in turn related to whether 
the individual can be granted social support on the same terms as Swedish citizens. 
A recurring theme has thus been for municipalities to call for clearer national guide-
lines regarding administrative procedure. In this area, we can observe development 
towards multiple governance approach. In an attempt to meet the demands of con-
fused and uncoordinated local authorities, the Swedish Association of Local 
Authorities and Regions (SALAR) put together a handbook, including among other 
things, guidelines on how to assess applications for economic assistance by EU citi-
zens. The National Board of Health and Welfare has also published a handbook, 
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about how the national and the EU rules are to be interpreted by municipalities. In 
January 2015 the government appointed a national coordinator to improve the situ-
ation for the many EU migrants who are begging on the streets in Sweden. The role 
of the national coordinator is to work closely with, and gather information from, 
different national and international voluntary organisations and municipalities in 
order to improve the way they work together.
Similarly to the issue of social support, the registration procedure of EU citizens 
was subject to inconsistencies. In Sweden, EU citizens on short term contracts (or 
self-employed) can apply for a so-called Co-ordination Number 
(Samordningsnummer). In 2010 the Swedish Unemployment Insurance Board (a 
Government audit agency) highlighted inadequacies concerning the Jobseeking 
Agencies’ EU citizen Co-ordination Number procedures. These citizens were 
unable to receive jobseeker-employer matching support from the Jobseeking 
Agencies on equal terms with Swedish citizens. However, it was not until spring 
2013, when the issue was brought to the agenda by Swedish media that Swedish 
Jobseeking agencies promised to act in order to deal with the irregularities. To deal 
with this specific problem a national horizontal governance approach was estab-
lished. The Swedish Tax Agency cooperates with other major national public agen-
cies, e.g. the Employment Agency, and the Social Insurance Agency. Twice a year, 
and when needed, the Tax Agency and the Migration Board organise coordinating 
meetings, and keep in touch on a regular basis between the meetings. The Tax 
Agency also meets the National Board of Trade, the Social Insurance Agency, the 
Employment Agency and the Swedish Council for Higher Education about twice a 
year.
The blurred line between formal and informal employment create challenges in 
the receiving urban regions with informal work showing consequences such as 
wage related discrimination, exploitation, inferior working conditions and margin-
alisation. Here we can observe a governance mixture with some top down features 
and an element of national horizontal governance involving trade union and busi-
ness sector cooperation. An issue addressed outside the reach of local public admin-
istrations, is the issue of posted workers from the CEE. Employers and trade unions 
disagree about the scope, and the implications posting brings to the Swedish labour 
market. Both have contact with public authorities at the national level. The four 
committees commissioned by the government to deal with various aspects of the 
posting of workers, are also an example of a top down approach. The presence of 
CEE workers has changed the context in which trade unions operate. They call for 
tighter regulations, better control and a revision of Lex Laval. Stockholm is also 
home to “the union centre for undocumented workers” a meeting point where 
undocumented migrant workers can get information and help they are in a conflict 
with employers. The centre is managed on a voluntary basis by the three major trade 
union confederations: Swedish Confederation of Trade Unions (LO), The Swedish 
Confederation of Professional Employees (TCO) and Swedish Confederation of 
Professional Associations (SACO). Similar to their Stockholm equivalent, the 
Building Workers Union in Gothenburg has adjusted to the new context: they now 
have a Polish speaking ombudsman, and occasionally offer evening courses in trade 
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union history in Polish, and have added courses to their education program specifi-
cally aiming to reduce xenophobic attitudes and racism among members. Another 
example is how the local branch have facilitated enrolment for non-residents, by 
e.g. accepting cash payments.
On balance then, Sweden proves to be yet another case where multi-level gover-
nance is largely lacking when it comes to the primary issues areas in which actors 
seek to manage the effects of free movement. No single response dominates, as in 
the other EU-member state cases, and the policies show that various forms of hori-
zontal governance are central to the management efforts. Yet, such a characteriza-
tion needs to be tempered by an awareness of those responses that suggest both 
multiple-level and top down forms of governance.
7.7  Multilevel Governance
It is abundantly clear that CEE free movement is a policy field with multilevel polit-
ical system repercussions. The effective implementation of the EU free movement 
law in the EU Member States and exercising EU free movement rights have not 
been straightforward. The complexity of a free movement challenge has meant that 
many policy processes did not involve effective multilevel coordination which 
would indicate a relationship or participation of all three or four levels of govern-
ment (European, national, regional and local) in the development of policies, laws 
or legislation on CEE migration. Instead, traditional models of top-down coordina-
tion and localist models have been the most common governance response.
There are however some specific issues that have been handled by applying 
multi-level governance approach. One such issue is the governance of human traf-
ficking prevention in Sweden and Austria where EU citizens recruited for prostitu-
tion come primarily from the CEE countries. There is formal, institutionalised 
interaction, horizontally and vertically, within an identified, specific policy area. 
The cooperation ranges from the international organ Interpol, to the operating units 
in the urban regions, via Europol, police authorities in CEE member states, the 
National Support Against Prostitution and Human Trafficking, and the regional 
coordinators. There is a clear regulatory setting and policies are jointly formulated. 
Another example is the multi-level governance approach to deal with Roma CEE 
free movers. In Sweden the Network for Roma EU citizens was established. The 
network connects stakeholders from all over Sweden, public and private as well as 
nongovernmental, and is well established in both the CEE region and the EU institu-
tions. Based on the EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies up to 
2020, the Federal Chancellery has adopted an Austrian version in order to ensure 
Roma inclusion in various domains. From 2012 until 2015, a total of 13 network 
meetings have taken place including various actors from national and local govern-
ments to NGOs and Roma organisations (ATAT-2-3). These meetings aim to encour-
age an institutionalised dialogue in order to establish Roma specific objectives on 
the administrative level and to enhance cooperation.
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The fact that the free movement is a policy field where the competences are 
shared in the multilevel setting showed more in the concrete policy processes than 
in the established governance approaches. The complexity of the free movement 
implies that the policy authority is located at different levels, and leaving open the 
possibility of unclear chains of command and a lack of audit leading to the situation 
where actors expect other actors to take the lead. For example, in the Swedish case 
the local policy makers required national (or EU) directives in order to handle issues 
such as registration, begging and homelessness. In the Dutch case, the Minister of 
Social Affairs and Employment (Asscher) published an opinion article entitled: 
‘Code Orange for free labour mobility within the EU’ to raise European awareness 
on this topic. He put priority on bilateral collaboration with Poland, Romania, 
Bulgaria and Croatia (and also on EU lobbying), raising issues like irregular labour 
contracts and mala fide temporary labour agencies, the adequate provision of infor-
mation to and equal treatment of border workers. In Sweden, government represen-
tatives initiated collaboration between Romanian and Bulgarian politicians, civil 
servants and civil society representatives in order to discuss the challenges related 
to Roma beggars in Sweden. The focus was to ensure that these persons would have 
other solutions than to come to Sweden to beg. Beside horizontal engagement with 
other member states, the lobbying related to the free movement of CEE citizens was 
also directed towards the EU itself. For example, in April 2013, four Ministers – 
representing Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom – wrote a 
joint letter to the European Commission. In that letter they asked for attention to the 
need for EU citizens to undergo civic integration, and to consider tightening free 
movers’ rights to social security and to fight fraud and systematic abuse in connec-
tion with the freedom of movement more effectively.
7.8  Conclusions
In spite of a multilevel setting, not much has emerged in terms of multilevel gover-
nance approaches. The EU level is more or less absent. Curry suggests in his contri-
bution to this volume that it can be seen as troubling that little awareness exists 
among actors involved in free movement management as to why genuine multi- 
level governance could accomplish, were it to be implemented. Indeed, not just 
from a policy standpoint, but also from a scholarly perspective, it would be illumi-
nating to hear from those with formal competencies in this issue why the normative 
preference for multi-level governance represents an actual virtue. Yet, before we can 
ask – either normatively or theoretically – “why multi-level governance”, we need 
to hammer home that, in this instance, there is essentially no multi-level gover-
nance, and then lay the groundwork for understanding why this is this case. Instead, 
what stands out is that many of the issues connected with CEE migration appear at 
the local level and are dealt with at the local level. Although local level municipali-
ties and cities may sometimes seek for financial or legal support from the national 
level a more immediate governance response has been to develop horizontal ties and 
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networks at the local level. As such, the local level responses in this chapter should 
not be interpreted as representing a bottom-up model of governance. While local 
horizontal governance networks have taken the lead in structuring governance 
responses to free movement management, the governance networks have chiefly 
been that – horizontal. While coordinated responses are indeed also characteristic of 
the responses in in several of our cases – most notably in the form of multiple-level 
governance, these cannot be characterized as instances wherein the “bottom” level 
was decisive. As Curry notes in Chap. 8 of this book, the relationship between local 
and national levels can best be defined as complex. Hands on solutions involving 
local actors are rife. However, a distinct feature of the comparison between different 
cases is that different traditions about constitutional logics set their marks on CEE 
governance responses as well. Among the selected cases, Turkey is the odd one out 
in the sense that Turkey is not an EU member and does not apply any regulation 
about free movement. In Turkey CEE migration governance does not seem to differ 
much from what is to be expected given normal Turkish top down procedures. 
Austrian officials resort to regular Austrian corporatism involving tripartite arrange-
ment whereas Sweden and the Netherlands are mixed cases.
CEE migration concerns a number of policy domains but primarily issues that 
have to do with basic needs dominate: housing, employment, social security. These 
can be found in all our cases but the governance responses differ to some extent. 
Inside each domain a number of policy areas dwell and policymakers sometimes 
differ regarding on which policy areas they have put their attention. While housing 
is a concern everywhere, Swedish governance actors have been more focused on 
homelessness than on other housing concerns. The opposite focus can be found 
among Dutch policymakers. While policies for shelters exist the main concern has 
been about abusive landlords and about neighbourhood disturbances and to prevent 
figures of immigrants to exceed certain levels on particular housing estates. Similar 
differences exist regarding labour market policies. Austrian authorities have put a 
lot of emphasis on how to avoid nostrification and to help migrants gain necessary 
educational diplomas. This has not been a major concern in neither the Netherlands 
nor in Sweden. At this juncture, we will not speculate on why these governance 
approach differences occur, as within the scope of this project, there is not sufficient 
data to reach conclusive statements as to causality. This however, does not preclude 
us from engaging in the time-honoured pastime of academics: informed speculation 
with the intent of suggesting possible causal relationships that can be more closely 
examined with supplemental data in the future. It is clear that depending on the 
policy area, different institutional logics apply in different countries (and sometimes 
in different regions within the same country), and different historical traits regard-
ing the relationship between government and migration have also developed. 
Moreover, the character of the CEE migration flows may differ. For instance, the 
Netherlands have a huge agricultural sector, which attracts large numbers of sea-
sonal workers. Vienna in Austria attracts large number of commuters from neigh-
bouring countries with which there are historical ties as well. This suggests to us 
that a fruitful strategy for grappling with issues of causality would be one that con-
tinues to be multi-disciplinary in nature. Indeed, as historical institutionalists, we 
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argue for – if not the primacy of institutional relationships in shaping governance 
outcomes  – then at least that they will rank among the most important factors. 
However, the cases examined here suggest that the historical experience of the local 
and national communities with migration also have much to tell us, and we would 
consider it beneficial for subsequent analysis to factor in the manner in which col-
lective memories regarding migration are articulated in manners that are often path 
dependent – at both the organizational level within the public sector, but also out-
side of the public sector, most notable from the media.
Finally, our emphasis on variation in flows and types of CEE migrants suggests 
that not only does continued work need to be done on mapping flows of CEE 
migrants  – and especially ensuring comparable data  – but that scholars with an 
interest in free movement management consider how flows and types are made 
salient in various societal discourses, and how such discourses are then invoked 
when policy and administrative measures are adopted. Such analyses might also 
consider the way in which CEE migrants were problematized during the debates 
over the implementation of transitional arrangements in the early 2000s. As Sweden 
is the only one of the three not to have made use of transitional arrangements, and 
as the Swedish responses do not vary substantially from those of Austria or the 
Netherlands, there is little to suggest that the presence of transitional arrangements 
exercised causal influence on subsequent governance responses. Yet, this does not 
exclude the possibility that debates over transitional arrangements left their mark on 
the way in which governance actors have continued to formulate the challenges 
associated with free movement management and the related policy, programmatic 
and administrative tools that have been adopted.
The question remains as to whether an institutional effect is that CEE migration 
is treated much as any form of migration or as a separate ‘EU mobility’ case. 
Obviously, the fact that CEE migrants are EU citizens affects any governance 
response. Still, a number of Austrian governance responses do not seem to separate 
between CEE migrants and other migrants, this is particularly evident regarding 
labour market policies. Swedish officials on the other hand have a wide range of 
well-established policies that apply to third country nationals while the governance 
of CEE migrants often seems to fall between two stools.
For decision makers, we conclude with following observation: If those with 
broad discretion over free movement management  – whether at the EU level or 
among the member states – wish to see the EU involved more via multi-level gov-
ernance approaches or otherwise, a number of institutional changes will be neces-
sary to consider. One route to go about this would be to create strong policy tools at 
the EU level concerning housing, labour market and social security. When applied, 
these tools would create incentives for governance approaches that would involve 
the EU level; thus multi-level governance responses might develop.
Along an alternative route, some kind of powerful EU legislation would have to 
emerge. This legislation would have to set clear and unequivocal steering standards, 
including strong audit institutions, regarding how the member states treat CEE 
migrants, or indeed EU migrants generally.
Both alternative routes would entail a stronger supranational approach.
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Chapter 8
Intra-European Movement: Multi-Level 
or Mismatched Governance?
Dion Curry
8.1  Introduction
The case of intra-European movement raises significant debate about multi-level 
governance (MLG). In analytical terms, it asks how multi-level governance of intra- 
European movement actually is, what actors are involved and how? In normative 
terms, it considers whether intra-European movement can be seen as ‘successful’ 
multi-level governance. Intra-European movement is an area that faces both issue 
complexity and institutional complexity (Stephenson 2013, pp. 817) and as such, the 
governance arrangements are often correspondingly complex. This chapter will 
attempt to locate the case of intra-European movement within the broader literature 
on multi-level governance and try to draw out lessons for understanding MLG as a 
practical, analytical and normative concept. This is relevant to both the understand-
ing of intra-European movement and the understanding of MLG. On the one hand, 
additional cases help to support or refute the robustness of our conceptualisation of 
multi-level governance; on the other hand, MLG as a concept can help us to under-
stand the entanglement of a complex issue that cuts across political and policy 
bounds. The chapter will first develop a framework of multi-level governance that 
can be applied to intra-European movement. Then, the structural, relational and 
policy factors that affect MLG will be explored in the context of this specific case. 
The final section will try to craft some answers about what intra-European movement 
policy can tell us about multi-level governance, and vice versa.
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8.2  MLG as a Concept
As discussed in the introductory chapter, intra-European movement faces difficul-
ties in conceptualising the ideas of both mobility and migration. However, this dif-
ficulty also extends to the concept of governance between and within political 
levels. Multi-level governance was first coined by Gary Marks as a way of explain-
ing structural funding processes in the European Union (Marks 1993). Originally, 
MLG aimed to provide an alternative and somewhat middle-ground theory to 
European integration that avoided both the state-centric nature of intergovernmen-
talism and the federalism (or federalism light) espoused by supranationalism and 
neofunctionalism. MLG was conceived as a means of explaining how actors at dif-
ferent political levels work together to create and implement policies in areas with 
less clear-cut jurisdictional bounds than traditional policy. Two different types of 
MLG were identified. Type I MLG systems resemble federal-type structures, with 
non-intersecting, general purpose jurisdictions, clear spheres of authority and well- 
defined levels. In contrast, Type II MLG, a somewhat ‘newer’ governance form, is 
distinguished by overlapping, policy-focussed jurisdictions operating at shifting 
numbers of levels that are more flexible and inevitably messier than traditional 
federal- type multi-level structures.
While MLG was initially used as a way of analysing EU-level processes, it has 
since broadened out to include regional (e.g. Bache and Andreou 2011) and state- 
level analyses both within and outside the EU (e.g. Horak and Young 2012) as well 
as bottom-up examinations of the roles of local and urban governments (Grisel and 
van de Waart 2011; Zapata-Barrero et  al. 2017; Zerbinati 2012). This includes 
expansion into functional uses, where the concept was applied in new policy areas 
or country studies (Stephenson 2013, p. 822) and even development of the concept 
as a way of identifying a normative ‘good’ form of governance (European 
Commission 2001; Committee of the Regions 2009). This creates the danger of 
conceptual stretching (Sartori 1970) or the creation of a ‘container concept’ that 
tries to be everything to everyone (Van Geertsom 2011, p. 169), but new research 
attempts to ‘travel’ the concept without reducing its precision or clarity. This has 
resulted in competing visions of how to study and explain multi-level governance 
(see, among others, Bache and Flinders 2004; Conzelmann and Smith 2008; Curry 
2015; Hooghe and Marks 2003; Jordan 2001; Kohler-Koch and Larat 2009; Littoz- 
Monnet 2010; Piattoni 2010; Scharpf 1997). These refinements of the concept also 
raise new issues regarding MLG and its practical effects, including questions of 
scope (can MLG be applied outside of Europe, or to international relations?), aca-
demic rigour (is MLG a theory or just an organising framework?) and legitimacy 
and accountability (who is ultimately responsible when multiple elected and 
unelected actors at different levels are involved in crafting and delivering policy?).
The broadening and deepening of the concept in turn led to new attempts to cat-
egorise different modes of governance (see, for example, Grisel and van de Waart 
2011; Howlett et al. 2009; Curry 2015; March and Olsen 1996; Offe 2006; Scharpf 
1991; Treib et  al. 2007; Weaver and Rockman 1993). These all offer their own 
strengths and weaknesses, trying to strike a balance between comprehensiveness 
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and elegance, general applicability and specific nuance. This chapter takes a slightly 
different approach and focuses on the factors that go into assessing the nature of 
multi-level governance. When governance plays out at multiple levels, attempts at 
coordination can face several difficulties that manifest themselves in structural, 
relational and policy ways. Complex institutional structures can lead to fragmentary 
policy-making. Relationally, hierarchy may make coordination difficult as actors 
compete for power. Finally, different actors may have competing, conflicting or 
shifting policy interests and goals (Taȿan-Kok and Vranken 2011, pp. 16–17). These 
structural, relational and policy processes map onto Hooghe and Marks’ typology of 
MLG, but provide a more granular way of analysing the factors influencing MLG.
The three categories of processes can be mutually reinforcing, contradictory or 
separate. Institutional structures and actor relations will have an impact on what 
policy options are open. The realities of policy-making and specific policy areas 
will, in turn, affect how actors work together and use institutional structures to 
develop policy. If these three factors are mutually reinforcing, structures that are 
supportive of MLG-type processes will develop. This will give actors more room to 
manoeuvre in shaping policy outcomes in a multi-level manner, actors may utilise 
structures in a way that supports multi-level solutions, and/or policies may lend 
themselves to solutions that make use of structures and relations in a multi-level 
way. If these processes are not mutually reinforcing, they can result in governance 
mismatch, which can take two forms. When these processes operate in contradic-
tory fashion, disjointed governance can result, where actors, institutions and poli-
cies operate at cross purposes (Curry 2015). When these processes operate 
separately, you find cases of decoupled governance, where there is little coordina-
tion between actors, institutions and processes (Scholten 2013). Structures, rela-
tions and policy can be further broken down into 6 sub-categories (see Table 8.1).
It is important to remember that these factors are not binary and operate on a 
spectrum. In addition, they do not operate discretely, and often complement or 
amplify each other. Structural/institutional factors that affect the nature of multi- 
level governance can be grouped into two categories. First, there may be a rigid or 
flexible institutional structure in which actors operate. Rigid structures may be bind-
ing on the actors involved, which is often, but not always, tied to the threat (or not) 
of sanctions for inaction (or negative action). Conversely, these structures may take 
a flexible, non-binding, ‘soft law’ form that is more responsive to contextual and 
policy-specific factors. Second, the jurisdictions that make up the ‘multi-levelness’ 
of the policy area may be general purpose (normally geographical or cultural enti-
ties that exist across policy areas) or specific to that particular policy, an increas-
ingly common configuration in EU settings. These two broad categories combine to 
create the institutional milieu in which governance exists, a spectrum where there 
can be clear lines of authority (in rigidly structure, general purpose jurisdictions), or 
one with indistinct lines of authority (flexible, policy specific approaches), and any 
variation in between.
Relational factors are ones that affect how actors – whether governmental, quasi- 
governmental or non-governmental  - interact with each other both within and 
between levels. Again, there are two broad categories of relational factors. First, 
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relations may either be hierarchical with a clear chain of command, or be more 
heterarchical networks in which actors work more collaboratively. In areas where 
higher governmental levels have binding power, processes will be more likely to 
operate in a hierarchical manner, whereas heterarchical processes can originate 
where strong urban/local levels exist, or where urban/local levels assert themselves 
in areas left undeveloped by higher levels. In hierarchical, top down relationships, 
policy decisions are downloaded by decision makers at higher levels of government 
to be implemented by lower levels of government. Heterarchical relations allow for 
more two-way permeation of policy ideas, where processes may originate at lower 
levels and permeate upwards. Somewhere in between the two, lower levels of gov-
ernment may ‘upload’ information to decision-makers at higher levels of govern-
ment (Güntner 2011). While not a truly heterarchical process, as decision-making is 
not shared between all actors, uploading does allow for more input from actors at 
lower levels. Second, these relations may be highly formalised and standardised or 
may take a more fluid, informal or ad hoc approach. This stability or fluidity can 
operate in terms of context, policy response, actors involved or other factors. The 
spectrum of relations can vary from a highly inclusive one marked by heterarchy 
and fluid, informal policy responses, to an exclusive one marked by hierarchy and 
stable, formal relations between actors.
Finally, policy factors affecting MLG can be grouped into two categories. First, 
policy responses may be discrete and compartmentalised, where issues are treated 
separately with clear lines of demarcation. Conversely, a holistic approach treats 
each issue as part of a larger whole covering a broader policy area. Coordination is 
required for both approaches, but for different reasons. Discrete policy responses 
Table 8.1 Multi-Level Governance Processes in Intra-European movement
Type I multi-level 
governance
Structural 
factors
Type II multi-level 
governance
Rigid institutional 
structure
↔ Flexible 
institutional 
structure
Multi-purpose 
jurisdictions
↔ Policy-specific 
jurisdictions
Relational 
factors
Hierarchical 
relations
↔ Heterarchical 
relations
Formalised 
relations
↔ Informal relations
Policy 
factors
Discrete policy 
responses
↔ Holistic policy 
responses
Uniform policy 
issue
↔ Complex policy 
issue
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require coordination in order to clarify and delegate roles and responsibilities within 
specific issues, whereas holistic responses require coordination to ensure harmoni-
sation across disparate issues. A lack of coordination can develop either between 
levels (for instance, with different governmental levels having different policies on 
an issue), within levels (where, for example, governmental and non-governmental 
actors may have different roles, policy goals and approaches) or over time. The level 
of coordination may also be tied to whether competence over that policy issue is 
exclusive or shared, and whether those creating the policy are the same as those 
implementing the policy. Finally, uncoordinated responses may develop when the 
policy issue is contested, either through new or unclear jurisdictional bounds or 
through attempts by actors to either take over or relinquish ownership and control of 
the policy. Second, the policy itself may be complex and cross-cutting or uniform, 
discrete and straightforward. Complex policies are ones that may deal with cross- 
cutting policy problems, have incomplete, contradictory or changing solutions, or 
have many possible options with no clear-cut ‘best’. Policy approaches are then 
found on a spectrum from chaotic (uncoordinated, contested, complex and non-state 
controlled), to controlled (coordinated, uncontested, straightforward, state- 
controlled policy).
To relate this back to Hooghe and Marks’ initial typology, governance that 
mainly hews to the left side of Table 8.1 can be seen as mutually reinforcing in a 
way indicative of Type I MLG, whereas governance that fits on the right side is 
mutually reinforcing in a way closer to Type II MLG. Governance responses may in 
turn target structural, relational or policy factors. This can result in various gover-
nance outcomes depending on how complete the change is in the three identified 
factors. There is little question that intra-European movement policy operates (and 
has operated for some time) at multiple levels, but this can still take several different 
forms. For example, shifts in the locus of power, such as to urban levels, may not 
actually improve the policy’s ‘multi-levelness’ in a governance sense. In other 
words, EU-level principles of free movement may not necessarily result in true 
multi-level governance and instead be an incomplete solution where a new EU-level 
policy approach is bolted onto an existing state- or urban/local-level governance 
solution. If there is no change in structural, relational or policy factors, the status 
quo will obviously ensue. If there is a change in only some of the factors, it may 
result in governance mismatch  – either decoupled governance, where the levels 
operate more or less independently, or disjointed governance, where different levels 
may operate at cross purposes. A true multi-level governance response therefore 
must encompass complementary, mutually supporting shifts in all three factors. 
This results in three possibilities for the EU and member states’ policy responses to 
intra-European movement:
P1: Structural, relational and policy factors are clearly demarcated and distinct 
across and within levels, indicating no multi-level governance.
P2: Structural, relational and policy factors are misaligned across and within 
levels, thus indicating there is governance mismatch, which may take two 
forms. Contradictory governance responses on the three spectrums indicate 
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disjointed governance, while independent, non-reinforcing responses indi-
cate decoupled governance.
P3: Structural, relational and policy factors are interdependent, mutually rein-
forcing and complementary across and within levels, resulting in multi-level 
governance.
The chapter now explores these governance possibilities more thoroughly by 
turning to an examination of the multi-level governance processes at play in intra- 
European movement, drawing on the cases examined in this book. In addition, the 
case of Turkey is used as a comparison and counterpoint to look at how third- country 
migration is treated within EU countries, its relation to intra-European movement 
and its effects on governance.
8.3  Structural Processes
8.3.1  Rigid Versus Flexible Institutional Structures
As a policy issue, intra-European movement is subject to EU-level directives, with 
member states required to abide by the EU’s free movement rules. In addition, once 
clear jurisdiction over migration is established within member states, these arrange-
ments remain relatively stable over time (see the chapter by  Zelano). However, 
intra-European movement is inextricably linked to issues of migrant integration. 
This issue is largely non-binding and flexible in nature and often takes place at the 
urban/local level, which plays a significant role in many of the case countries, at 
times even without significant member-state support. Overall, there was mainly evi-
dence of a flexible and fluid structural approach to dealing with migrant issues, in a 
way that corresponds to Hooghe and Marks’ Type II MLG. This is largely due to the 
nature of intra-European movement and the temporary nature of much of the move-
ment. The EU’s free movement requirement, coupled with the Schengen agreement, 
only seems to have an effect on rigidity in terms of the legally binding macro-policy 
considerations of migration. The day-to-day policy approaches were more left up to 
the member states, who in turn often involved or delegated certain responsibilities 
to urban/local and regional levels, which created a more flexible approach.
An example of this flexibility is the agreements between Polish and Dutch gov-
ernmental and non-governmental bodies to facilitate movement of labour between 
the two countries and reasonable treatment of these migrants. Central governmental 
bodies such as the Polish National Labour Inspectorate and the Dutch Arbeidsinspectie 
work together on employment regulation and worker complaints with NGOs such as 
FairWork, who aim to protect migrant workers’ rights (see Kindler’s chapter). 
However, this institutional flexibility has not necessarily increased responsiveness, as 
many of the case countries still struggle in providing services to short-term migrants. 
In addition, flexible structures can have a deleterious effect on coordination. This 
flexibility was also evident external to the EU in Turkey, where migration as a policy 
concern is less institutionalised, with a comprehensive Law of Foreigners and 
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International Protection only coming into force in 2015 (see Chap. 11 in this book 
by Korci Korfali and Acar). Indeed, the need to institutionalise governance processes 
to improve coordination is noted elsewhere in this book (see Zelano et al.).
8.3.2  Multi-Purpose Versus Policy-Specific Jurisdictions
The issue of jurisdiction is a complicated one for European movement. While tradi-
tional governmental levels are clearly evident in establishing the bounds of the pol-
icy, the ways in which these levels operate are more specific to the policy area alone, 
with fluidity and policy specificity in how migrant integration is addressed. 
Requirements for free movement of labour are binding on EU member states and 
follow traditional, general purpose jurisdictional lines emanating down from the EU 
to member states. However, those member states then take different approaches to 
developing more policy-specific structures to meet the needs of migrants. Therefore, 
policy specificity largely depends on what aspect of the policy one is considering. 
While intra-European movement follows more multi-purpose jurisdictional lines, 
migrant integration is largely carried out in a more policy-specific jurisdictional 
capacity, often at the urban/local level.
The interplay between intra-European movement requirements and subsequent 
questions of integration has created some governance tensions between the inher-
ently multi-level nature of international migration and the nation state-specific 
issues of labour markets. These difficulties are different for receiving countries that 
face an overabundance of labour supply and sending countries that may face a brain 
drain and a decline in the labour force. The problem of sending countries is particu-
larly evident in Poland, where a large proportion of the population has emigrated 
from Poland to other EU countries. Poland then requires specific responses to deal 
with job shortages in regions hard hit by this emigration. This involved, ironically, 
opening up in-migration from Eastern Partnership countries such as Ukraine (see 
the chapter by Kindler). While general intra-European movement requirements are 
undertaken at an EU level, the high variability in member state responses to these 
requirements marks this case as one that has many policy-specific jurisdictional 
aspects. It is an area where member states have ceded power over their (intra- 
European) migration policies to the higher EU governmental level, but its close 
connection to migrant integration issues, which mostly takes place at the urban/
local level, gives this high policy specificity.
8.4  Relational Processes
8.4.1  Hierarchical Versus Heterarchical Relations
Both hierarchical and heterarchical processes are evident in the case of intra- 
European movement. The EU must contend with a complex and contingent vertical 
structure of governance in all policy areas. This may take the form of (1) 
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administrative regionalisation where regions are subordinate to the central govern-
ment, such as in Greece and Portugal; (2) regionalisation through existing urban/
local authorities, such as in the Netherlands and Ireland; (3) regional decentralisa-
tion in countries such as the United Kingdom, Sweden and the Czech Republic; (4) 
regional autonomy in Spain and Italy; or (5) federal cases such as Austria, Germany 
and Belgium (ESPON 2005, p. 296). However, these categories are contested and 
may change over time (ESPON 2005, p. 285; Tosics 2011a, p. 28). In addition to 
different national-regional governance structures, nation states may also deal with 
local governments and urban conurbations in different ways. This can be affected by 
the rate of growth of urban areas, structural differences between countries and 
whether countries have explicit urban policies or not (Tosics 2011b, pp. 36–39).
Given the wide variety of both national-regional and national-urban/local (or 
regional-urban/local) structures in place, any study of vertical governance structures 
must take into account (1) how many intermediary levels exist; (2) how strong these 
levels are; and (3) to what extent the levels are integrated (Tosics 2011a, p. 27). The 
case of intra-European movement displays both numerous and strong levels involved 
in the policy, with EU directives providing a clear hierarchical structure in which 
both urban/local governments and member states must operate according to those 
directives. Whereas migration displays clear hierarchy, with the EU controlling the 
process, integration, housing and often social policy are treated more heterarchi-
cally, involving multiple actors with little to no hierarchical control from higher 
governmental levels. Within nation states, there was also variance on how hierarchi-
cally controlled integration was and how much it involved other levels – mainly the 
urban/local actors –in delivering policies related to migration. It was often unclear 
who had control over migrant integration, and which level might wish to take on 
such a responsibility. Accordingly, in many countries, infrastructure for supporting 
integration was seen as somewhat lacking (see chapter by Zelano et al.).
While the overarching policy on migration may be hierarchical and top down, 
urban levels have still been able to craft bottom-up solutions to issues of integration 
where there has been a gap in policy-making from higher levels. Restrictions placed 
on new member states, as seen in Austria and the Netherlands for 2004 and 2007 
accession countries, represent a clearly hierarchical process in regard to intra- 
European movement. These restrictions had some initial effects on mobility and 
migration patterns, temporarily limiting formal employment, although not necessar-
ily stemming the flow of CEE citizens. The effects of these restrictions on the num-
ber of migrants in the long term (especially after the transitional period lapsed) were 
minimal, but one of the biggest effects was in legalising pre-existing migration cor-
ridors and formalising labour positions and social security. Countries such as the 
United Kingdom and Sweden did not exercise this hierarchical control over migra-
tion and instead waived transition periods for 2004 accession countries. Initially, 
this had some effect on patterns of movement in the UK, with an influx of Polish 
immigrants following the 2004 accession, but Sweden saw no visible impact on the 
number of Polish migrants (see Kindler’s chapter). However, the lack of hierarchi-
cal control in imposing migration restrictions ended up placing more of the onus for 
action on lower levels of government (see Chap. 2 by Sert) and resulted in a some-
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what more bottom-up approach to addressing migration issues. The Dutch case also 
provides an example of a more heterarchical approach to developing policy options, 
albeit in a slightly more limited fashion than in Sweden. In the Netherlands, city 
initiatives such as the ‘approach to attack slum landlords’ were initially developed 
at the urban level. In a process that is perhaps more akin to uploading or policy 
learning than true multi-level governance, the national level then adopted this policy 
for broader usage (see Zelano et al. in this book). This did not necessarily involve 
true MLG in terms of a partnership between levels, but it did indicate policy diffu-
sion upwards.
Both Sweden and the Netherlands have precedents in other policy areas for 
utilising more heterarchical approaches to developing multi-level policy responses. 
Green investment programmes in Sweden provide an example of this. The central 
government provided funding for green initiatives, but it was the urban/local levels 
that developed the programmes and strategies for improving ecologically sustain-
able development and reducing emissions. This also required the urban/local levels 
of government to work horizontally with other actors in order to deliver effective 
policies, as an explicit goal of these programmes was the development of local net-
works involving governmental and non-governmental actors (Kelder 2011, pp. 150–
156). The policy approach had significant multi-level components, although it did 
not involve the EU. It did, however, involved numerous state and non-state actors at 
local, regional and national levels.
Other policy case studies in the Netherlands also point to a complex relationship 
between urban/local and national levels. For instance, an initiative to create health-
ier neighbourhoods in disadvantaged areas was undertaken jointly by urban/local 
and national levels starting in 2007. The former Ministry for Housing, Planning and 
the Environment, along with municipalities, housing corporations and other minis-
tries created a Wijkenaanpak (neighbourhood policy) to address health issues in the 
areas. The project was truly multi-level, drawing on (limited) European Social 
Funds but mainly spearheaded by national and urban/local levels. Activities were 
coordinated centrally but undertaken locally, with most of the funding also originat-
ing from local sources. Semi-public, non-governmental and private actors were 
involved, as were citizens of the neighbourhoods in question. The actual concrete 
plans were largely bottom-up processes driven by the municipality, as they were 
expected to set their own goals and approaches. These arrangements also had a 
cross-regional components, with major urban conurbations (Amsterdam, the Hague, 
Rotterdam and Utrecht) banding together to establish a regional agreement to 
address health inequalities (van de Waart 2011, pp. 130–136). This initiative was 
seen as successful for two main reasons. First, the role of leadership was key, with 
the Ministry of Public Health, Welfare and Sports playing a central role in both 
persuading the central government to develop this initiative and in convincing 
urban/local levels to take part. Second, local levels were given significant autonomy 
in how they implemented this policy, allowing them to tailor the policy to meet 
specific neighbourhood needs. Some parallels can be seen in the migrant integration 
case, particularly in regard to the central role played by urban authorities.
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8.4.2  Formal Versus Informal Relations
Some types of formal, institutionalised relationships between actors usually exist in 
both hierarchical and heterarchical actor networks. Intra-European movement initia-
tives that originated from the top down often had in-built mechanisms for ensuring 
adequate communication and coordination of urban-level responses as well. For 
example, the Swedish Enforcement Agency centralised statistical capacity and initia-
tives to harmonise urban/local practices in terms of illegal migrant settlements (see 
Zelano et al.). There were political apparatuses in place to ensure communication 
between levels, although these were not always used effectively by all actors and 
more fluid, informal contacts seemed to be used more regularly. In fact, formalised 
conduits for interaction between the EU (Commission) and urban levels were identi-
fied as being lacking (see Zelano’s chapter). Looking from the EU level, communica-
tion between EU and member states on migration issues was seen as strong (often 
daily) in general terms, but members of the Commission were more likely to interact 
most with other DGs within the Commission, rather than member state representa-
tives. Likewise, interaction between member states was more likely to occur first 
outside of traditional EU structures before moving to consultative bodies or council 
working groups, with evidence that this trend was increasing over time (see Zelano). 
These indicate a general lack of formalised connections between levels.
More positively, this informality in relations extended to ways of developing 
consensus, at least in the early policy development stages. Actors were less likely to 
rely on overly formal procedures such as court challenges and instead focus on less 
structured ways to come to agreement on policy approaches. However, this infor-
mality also required a focus on lower-level policy action; once issues became too 
high up the political ladder, the efficacy of these informal relational solutions was 
greatly reduced (see Zelano). This difficulty when issues travel further up the gov-
ernance levels is evident in research in other policy areas. While urban/local levels 
may participate in various governance processes in a wide variety of policy areas, 
there is a difference between participation or involvement and true influence or 
governance (see, for example, Blom-Hansen 2005; Stephenson 2013, p. 822; Bache 
2008; Curry 2015, p. 181).
This also appears to be true in the case of intra-European movement, where there 
was strong urban involvement in the policy but less indication that policies around 
free movement were changed as a result of such initiatives involving the urban level 
(see Zelano). However, again there was more evidence of urban government effects 
on migrant integration. There, the prominent role of the urban level had an effect on 
the shape and formality of relations between levels. As mentioned above, many 
decisions about integration of migrants and their associated housing, social and 
welfare needs take place at the urban level, sometimes even without significant 
member state support. This creates dynamic responses to address policy problems 
while also bypassing or disrupting more stable, formalised relational networks 
between levels. In fact, intra-European movement policy shows signs of disinterme-
diation - ‘level-skipping’ or cutting out the middleman – with the increasing role of 
local levels, especially urban areas, in shaping migration policy. Within member 
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states, regional levels are sometimes passed over with local and national levels 
working together on policy solutions. Austrian policies illustrate a clear case of this 
type of disintermediation, with many policies involving national and urban/local 
levels whilst skipping the Länder (see Zelano et al.).
National levels themselves may also be informally skipped. The ‘Conference of 
mayors on the impact of intra-European movement of EU citizens at local level’ is 
a strong example of this type of disintermediation. The conference was organised at 
the EU level and brought together local actors to discuss the impact of migration 
and policy options available in the area while mainly bypassing the nation state 
level. The conference provided a forum separate from the national level where these 
issues could be discussed. However, in general there was not clear coordination 
between urban/local levels and the EU level, with the EU failing to engage signifi-
cantly with the urban/local levels in integrating migrants. This disintermediation 
and the flexible approach to policy solutions identified above do not necessarily 
restrict the true multi-levelness of a policy area and may in fact aid it. However, the 
flexibility afforded by disintermediation does not extend to all aspects of migration 
policy. This flexibility is especially necessary for seasonal and circular forms of 
migration, where governance networks might need to be more flexible than in situ-
ations of permanent migration. However, this flexibility in which levels are involved 
is not always evident in practice. The relative stability of actor networks dealing 
with the broad issues of migration somewhat reduced the responsiveness of policy 
approaches to targeting specific migrant groups.
8.5  Policy Factors Affecting MLG in Migration Policy
8.5.1  Discrete Versus Holistic Policy Responses
Structural and relational factors come together to create a policy setting that either 
addresses broad policy issues in a holistic manner, or divides them into discrete sub- 
issues. In most if not all the case countries there was a clear divide between a) intra- 
European movement as a legal requirement, which was mainly addressed at the EU 
level; b) intra-European movement as a labour-market and social policy issue, which 
mainly took place at the member state level; and c) intra-European movement as a 
question of integration, which often took place at the urban/local or regional level. 
This is a clear indication of the broad policy issue of intra-European movement being 
treated as a group of responses to smaller, discrete policy issues. The issue then 
becomes a question of how these discrete policy issues were coordinated.
Most cases examined in this book were marked by a lack of vertical coordina-
tion between governance levels, but there were clearer examples of horizontal 
coordination between actors within levels. While migration policy is a central state 
concern, it does involve non-state actors in delivering services to migrant commu-
nities. The Austrian case shows clear coordination between state and non-state 
actors. In that case, horizontal integration is more evident in housing policy, cen-
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tred on the local level and involving non-state actors in a significant way (see 
Zelano et al.). In policy areas such as home care, horizontal coordination is evi-
denced by the role played by private actors in delivering services, with agencies 
occupying a central position in placing EU migrant care workers with Austrian 
families. These migrants play a key role in this policy area, as few Austrians work 
in 24-hour care. At the same time, in order to ensure coordination this service is 
highly regulated from the centre and the agencies themselves guarantee (at least in 
some cases) that working conditions are met (see the chapter by Drbohlav and 
Pavelkova). This horizontal coordination of state regulation and protection and 
non-state provision through agencies was similar in the case of Polish migrants to 
Sweden (see Kindler). In both cases, non-state actors play a key role but still oper-
ate within the confines set by the state, thus increasing horizontal coordination.
In the Netherlands, urban actors have coordinated horizontally within their level 
to develop policies to address issues related to free movement. As in Austria, this has 
taken the form of including non-state actors in the policy process and in developing 
initiatives across regions, such as the partnership between Rotterdam and The Hague 
in creating arrangements to control fraud and mala fide employment arrangements 
(see Zelano et al.). Sweden provides a third case of horizontal coordination, as urban 
levels bring in non-public sector actors (in this case, religious institutions and chari-
ties) to address gaps in national policy with regard to housing (see Zelano et al.). 
Horizontal coordination is increasingly necessary in the Swedish case, especially 
where urban/local levels play a central role in addressing migration issues, which 
creates the need for more horizontal coordination between local levels of government 
who often face similar pressures and opportunities with regard to migration.
This horizontality is not limited to the local levels and also takes place to a more 
limited extent across member states. For instance, the Dutch government has worked 
in coordinating with other member states to set the agenda on migration issues and 
bring action in the area of wage dumping and other negative labour market practices 
(see Zelano et al.). However, despite the Dutch efforts this agenda-setting has not 
always resulted in coordinated national-level policies between member states. 
Looking outside of the EU, Turkey was in many ways an outlier to this tendency 
towards horizontal rather than vertical coordination. Turkish policy was exemplified 
by its top-down nature on specific policy issues, but this was not matched by hori-
zontal coordination to bring the disparate strands of migration policy together. The 
lack of coordination at the urban/local level hampered the effectiveness of Turkey’s 
migration policies and created the danger of mismatch between the actions of the 
central government and the urban/local levels (see Korci Korfali and Acar).
8.5.2  Complex Versus Uniform Policy Issues
Migration policy is also a complex policy as it is an essentially contested issue with 
often contradictory satisficing options. In addition, as has previously been shown in 
this chapter, different levels may not always work closely together and policy 
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responses may conflict or misalign. These factors create a complex environment 
that cuts across numerous policy areas, has multiple policy options and solutions, 
and has a constantly shifting policy context. Despite the EU’s binding power over 
issues of intra-European movement, the issue remains significantly contested with 
multiple ‘solutions’ and no clear cut answer. Recent negotiations with the United 
Kingdom about migration and free movement post-Brexit are illustrative of its con-
tested nature. The attempted renegotiation of UK membership revolved (inter alia) 
around issues related to EU migration, such as limiting EU migrants’ claims to 
benefits (European Council 2016), and the ongoing Brexit negotiations paint intra- 
European movement as a key source of disagreement (Mason and Duval Smith 
2016). In addition, although intra-EU and external migration are treated separately, 
they are inextricably linked in many of the policy debates, as well as being held 
together in issues such as migrant integration.
The cross-cutting nature of intra-European movement creates additional dangers 
of governance mismatch, with the most noticeable cross-cutting issue being the 
interplay between migration and integration. While EU-level processes are on 
firmer, more binding footing in regard to the economic aspects of migration, the 
social issues that are part of migrant integration remain more member state-driven 
(see Zelano). In addition, the focus of the issue may shift depending on the stage of 
the policy process, with different aspects (and actor configurations) being more 
important during policy design than during implementation (see Zelano). As well as 
the danger of mismatch between levels, this raises the likelihood of mismatch within 
the policy area itself, for instance between social and economic issues. Related to 
this, EU movement contains both new policy issues that need to be addressed – in 
the form of, for example, specific integration issues that have developed since the 
2004 accession – and pre-existing policies where new migration pressures need to 
be incorporated, such as health and education (see Zelano et al.). Migration patterns 
can exacerbate existing social, demographic, employment and other issues, which 
in turn create separate governance issues that may only be tangentially related to the 
governance of migration itself. And, in some cases, instead of developing true cross- 
cutting policies, the approach may be more fragmentary. For instance, outside of the 
EU in Turkey, while migration-orientated approaches may be evident in certain 
policy issues such as labour market controls and registration, there is less develop-
ment in other related areas such as housing (see Zelano et al.).
8.6  Intra-European Movement: Multi-Level or Mismatched 
Governance?
While governance processes always operate on a spectrum and no policy area will 
fit perfectly into one or the other types of MLG, certain tendencies in structure, rela-
tions and policy can be identified for intra-European movement. In terms of struc-
ture, intra-European movement most closely resembled Type II MLG, with flexible 
institutional structures and policy-specific jurisdictions to address the issue. The 
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situation is more complex in terms of relational and policy factors. Relationally, 
clear hierarchies exist in intra-European movement, with the EU having clear legal 
authority. While issues of migrant integration may be more heterarchical in that 
urban/local levels are more centrally involved, this participation is either at the 
behest of the central member state government or due to a gap created by policy 
inaction at higher levels, thus operating in a ‘shadow of hierarchy’ (Héritier and 
Lehmkuhl 2008). At the same time, these relationships are not highly formalised, 
with more informal and fluid relationships often taking precedence. In terms of 
policy factors, intra-European movement is clearly regarded as a collection of dis-
crete policy issues, with ‘integration’ treated differently from other migration issues 
such as labour market controls. However, it is also a complex policy issue with 
multiple facets and degrees of contestation.
To put this in perspective of the possibilities outlined at the beginning of this 
chapter, intra-European movement has, to a large extent, required some augmenta-
tion of governance processes to a) recognise the central legal role played by the EU 
in this area; and b) accommodate the multi-faceted and inter-related social and 
labour policies affected by migration. This has resulted in some shift of structural, 
relational or policy factors, meaning the status quo of traditional governance pro-
cesses (P1) is not simply maintained. At the same time, there has been an uneven 
shift in how structures, relations and policy processes have adapted to the specific 
realities of intra-European movement, meaning that true MLG (P3) has also not 
been attained. The combination of hierarchical, often informal relations and a com-
plex policy environment that nonetheless treats sub-issues as discrete silos creates 
governance mismatch in the nature of MLG in intra-European movement, affirming 
P2, as shown in Table 8.2.
Table 8.2 Multi-Level Governance Processes in intra-European movement
Type I multi-level 
governance
Structural 
factors
Type II multi-level 
governance
Rigid institutional 
structure
↔ Flexible 
institutional 
structure
Multi-purpose 
jurisdictions
↔ Policy-specific 
jurisdictions
Relational 
factors
Hierarchical 
relations
↔ Heterarchical 
relations
Formalised 
relations
↔ Informal relations
Policy 
factors
Discrete policy 
responses
↔ Holistic policy 
responses
Uniform policy 
issue
↔ Complex policy 
issue
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The cases examined in this book reveals migration and mobility policies to 
undoubtedly take place across multiple levels, even if all levels are not involved at 
all times. In terms of governance processes, relational factors appear to play a more 
predominant role in shaping migration policy than structural factors. In fact, the 
lack of institutional capacity was identified as an impediment in some cases. In the 
Netherlands, these relational factors allowed for innovative policy approaches, such 
as a bottom-up approach to integration driven by the urban/local level. This approach 
falls more in line with a true multi-level approach, as policy actions permeated 
upwards instead of simply travelling downwards, although it was still ultimately 
driven by a willingness at the central (national) level to adopt urban/local policy 
initiatives more broadly. The evolving nature of this approach highlights the need 
for more and wider research to build on existing literature examining governance 
networks over time (see, for example, Kapucu and Garayev 2012; Lowndes and 
Skelcher 2002; Jack et al. 2008). The strong presence of the urban/local level in this 
policy area further emphasises the need to consider MLG from two angles - both 
from the perspective of the decision-makers and from the perspective of the imple-
menters by utilising a backward-mapping approach (Lipsky 1980). This approach 
starts from the perspective of the implementer and works back to the top to see 
whether the implementers’ outcomes match with the initial goals of the policy 
(Elmore 1979–1980, p. 604). This can highlight any governance mismatch that is 
evident between the actors involved at various stages of the policy process.
Governance mismatch can have a significant impact on the efficacy of multi- 
level arrangements and was evident in the case of intra-European movement. While 
there are some successful examples of intra-European movement governance pro-
cesses that approach true multi-levelness, significant parts of the policy display 
either decoupled or disjointed governance. The relative lack of EU-level coordina-
tion indicates governance decoupling between EU and member state levels. Again, 
this is partly the result of the unique supra-national powers of the EU, but it also 
creates the risk of a clear split between EU and member state goals. In a related case 
to this, that tension is already evident in the rifts between the EU-level response to 
Syrian refugees and member states that are firmly opposed to quotas imposed at the 
EU level. Within member states, there were clear cases of disjointed governance. 
Urban/local levels often drove policy initiatives, but these bottom-up responses 
lacked the coordinating powers of higher governmental levels, again limiting the 
true multi-levelness of these approaches and creating a misalignment of policy 
goals between levels.
Partly, this governance mismatch may result from the unique nature of intra- 
European movement policy. While many policy issues are contested as different 
actors and levels try to gain (or maintain) control over issues, migration also con-
tains policy problems that are contested in terms of actors trying to give up control 
over these issues. Movement flows are controlled by the EU (for intra-EU ‘mobil-
ity’) or nation states (for non-EU migration). In contrast, issues of migrant integra-
tion are often ignored or left to urban/local levels to address. The split between 
decision-making and implementation has created often leaderless policy approaches, 
and while true MLG supports and indeed often calls for a networked, heterarchical 
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approach to governance, in reality the lack of leadership can create deadlock or 
inaction. Chapters 6 and 7 point to a surprising lack of EU involvement on migra-
tion issues, despite the free movement directive coming from that level. This results 
in a fragmented and uncoordinated policy approach that creates governance mis-
match between urban/local and regional approaches as well as between member 
states. In many ways these processes can be seen as incomplete MLG (with only 
some levels involved) or ‘MLG-light’. These variations display many characteris-
tics of MLG – multiple levels are involved, non-governmental actors can play a key 
role and policies may be relatively fluid and responsive – but remain incomplete in 
either the number of levels included or the structural, relational and policy processes 
that can support a multi-level governance frame.
8.7  Conclusions
This chapter provides a thorough study of a policy case that highlights the fine- 
grained capacity of the concept of multi-level governance to analyse policy pro-
cesses. In addition, it increases the robustness of MLG as a concept by travelling it 
into a new policy area with its own unique governance framework. Analytically, this 
research points to the need for a more nuanced understanding of the various struc-
tural, relational and policy factors that shape multi-level governance. Practically, 
intra-European movement provides a deep and rich case to test the robustness of 
MLG as a way of understanding real-world processes. In particular, the work raises 
questions about the need to consider partial multi-levelness, where only certain lev-
els are included in the policy process, and partial governance, where policies may 
operate over several levels but maintain traditional structures of power and decision- 
making. Finally, the case of intra-European movement shows the importance of 
context in determining the mode of multi-level governance that best fits a particular 
situation. Some examples in the case countries do point to relatively successful or 
‘true’ MLG that encompasses both the multi-level and governance components of 
the term. However, in general the distinct lack of EU involvement beyond the direc-
tives on free movement point to an incomplete or mismatched case of MLG that 
does not fit neatly into Hooghe and Marks’ typology.
In many ways, intra-European movement represents both the promise and the 
disappointment of multi-level governance as a normative ideal. Different examples 
presented in this book highlight the flexibility and responsiveness of some policy 
initiatives, innovative ways of including non-governmental actors and the possibil-
ity of bottom-up initiatives permeating upwards. However, this is often welded on 
to a more traditional, state-centric structural system that can create governance mis-
match where actors are not always able to respond in a way that fully meets policy 
needs. Ultimately, the range of initiatives presented herein highlight the reality that 
there is no ‘right’ answer to dealing with complex, multi-level policy issues. While 
different permutations of structural, relational and policy factors can result in suc-
cessful or unsuccessful cases of MLG, all three broad factors must be mutually 
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complementary to avoid governance mismatch. Importantly, variations in any of 
these factors also require a concurrent shift in the other two in order to avoid dis-
jointed or decoupled governance. However, the exact shift necessary in the other 
two areas is not always readily apparent.
Several characteristics of the type of MLG present in intra-European movement 
are worth highlighting in conclusion. First, disintermediation, where certain gov-
ernment levels may be skipped, was relatively common in the policy area, espe-
cially in terms of migrant integration, with urban/local levels addressing the issue 
directly without national-level input. Second, coordination between political levels 
was noticeably absent in many of the case countries. Instead, policy actors (mainly 
at the urban/local level) were more likely to coordinate horizontally within their 
level, developing new and less formal relations with non-typical actors, such as 
NGOs, housing associations and charities. Perhaps the most interesting addition to 
the understanding of multi-level governance presented by the case of intra- European 
movement is the need to separate out multi-level contexts from multi-level gover-
nance. There is no doubt that intra-European movement operates in a multi-level 
context, as multiple levels are necessarily involved. However, this does not neces-
sarily equate with multi-level governance, as shown in this chapter and others (see 
Hinnfors). Care must be taken in the study of MLG to distinguish between policies 
that merely operate in a multi-level context and those that operate as multi-level 
governance, and the indicators developed in this chapter can hopefully act as a start-
ing point for assessing MLG.
Intra-European movement policy also highlights several possible ways forward 
for MLG literature. First, it illustrates the importance of a bottom-up understanding 
of policy in explaining governance processes, one that takes into account implemen-
tation as well as decision-making. There is great flexibility in how multi-levelness 
is manifested, with bottom-up processes often equal to, or even superseding, top- 
down policy responses. In the case of migration, this was evident in the actors them-
selves and the central role played by the urban/local level in dealing with a policy 
that is ostensibly international by nature. The relationship between levels also 
extended both ways, at least in a limited fashion. Central governments shaped what 
urban and other local governments were and were not able to do, and in turn urban/
local governments uploaded new policy options to the centre. While this power was 
‘soft’ in nature, as local levels could not force higher levels to act, it is an important 
finding nonetheless as it illustrates the strength of persuasive policy approaches and 
policy uploading. Related to this, the change in context and situations related to 
intra-European movement in countries such as Sweden, the UK and Poland illus-
trate the need for greater and more systematic examination of multi-level gover-
nance processes over time.
Several final lessons on MLG can be drawn from this research. Other works have 
highlighted the importance of common and shared objectives between actors, coor-
dinated strategies and actions and clear monitoring and evaluation of processes in 
ensuring that MLG is truly ‘multi-level governance’ (Van Geertsom 2011, p. 170). 
In dealing with international policy issues such as migration, cross-national (instead 
of, or in addition to, supranational) approaches to policy problems are often neces-
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sary. Cases examined in this book, such as the Czech-Austrian, Polish-Dutch and 
(involving migration from outside the EU) Bulgarian-Turkish migration corridors, 
show that migration still often has a significant geographical component, with 
migrants moving to different countries but remaining relatively close to home. This 
could lead to the development of bilateral agreements at a regional level to facilitate 
easier and more effective migrant integration across shared borders. While improv-
ing coordination, common objectives and policy responses from all levels represent 
some good practice examples of achieving true multi-level governance, these are 
often easier said than done and do not represent overly helpful or concrete strategies 
for developing or changing specific MLG processes. By breaking the issue down 
into relational, structural and policy factors, this research shows the centrality of 
actor relations in crafting policy solutions, and also the necessity of having struc-
tural factors to protect these relations. More troublingly, there does not seem to be 
as much consideration of what multi-level governance processes are attempting to 
accomplish at a policy level. Successful MLG requires more consideration of what 
the point of these multi-level processes is intended to be and how it relates to a spe-
cific policy context. Even more importantly, careful consideration must be given to 
the interplay between the structural, relational and policy considerations at play. 
Whether these multi-level governance processes are intended as an indicator of 
power relations, a tool of coordination, a tool of participation and influence, or 
something else will have an effect on what form the governance processes should 
take, and how successful they are in meeting those goals.
References
Bache, I. (2008). Europeanization and multilevel governance: Cohesion policy in the European 
Union and Britain. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
Bache, I., & Andreou, G. (Eds.). (2011). Cohesion policy and multi-level governance in South East 
Europe. Oxford: Routledge.
Bache, I., & Flinders, M. (2004). Multi-Level governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Blom-Hansen, J.  (2005). Principals, agents, and the implementation of EU cohesion policy. 
Journal of European Public Policy, 6(2), 624–648.
Committee of the Regions (2009). The White Paper on Multi-Level Governance. Available at 
http://cor.europa.eu/en/activities/governance/Documents/mlg-white-paper/0387_inside-en-
last.pdf. Accessed 28 Feb 2016.
Conzelmann, T., & Smith, R. (Eds.). (2008). Multi-level governance in the European Union: 
Taking stock and looking ahead. Baden Baden: Nomos.
Curry, D. (2015). Network approaches to multi-level governance: Structures, relations and 
understanding power between levels. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Elmore, R. (1979-1980). Backward mapping: Implementation research and policy decisions. 
Political Sciences Quarterly, 94, 601–616.
ESPON. (2005). Project 3.2: Spatial Scenarios and Orientations in Relation to the ESDP and 
Cohesion Policy  – Second Interim Report, Part 1. Available at http://www.espon.eu/export/
sites/default/Documents/Projects/ESPON2006Projects/CoordinatingCrossThematicProjects/
Scenarios/2.ir_3.2-full.pdf. Accessed 29 Feb 2016.
D. Curry
159
European Commission (2001). European governance: A white paper. COM (2001) 428, Brussels: 
European Commission.
European Council. (2016). European Council meeting (18 and 19 February 2016) – Conclusions. 
Available at http://docs.dpaq.de/10395-0216-euco-conclusions.pdf. Accessed 04 May 2016.
Grisel, M., & van de Waart, F. (2011). Multilevel urban governance or the art of working together. 
Amsterdam: European Urban Knowledge Network.
Güntner, S. (2011). Urban development and European forms of MLG.  In M.  Grisel & F. van 
de Waart (Eds.), Multilevel urban governance or the art of working together (pp.  17–25). 
Amsterdam: European Urban Knowledge Network.
Héritier, A., & Lehmkuhl, D. (2008). The shadow of hierarchy and new modes of governance. 
Journal of Public Policy, 28(1), 1–17.
Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2003). Unraveling the central state, but how? Types of multi-level gov-
ernance. American Political Science Review, 97, 233–243.
Horak, M., & Young, R. (Eds.). (2012). Sites of governance: Multilevel governance and policy 
making in Canada’s big cities. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
Howlett, M., Rayner, J., & Tollefson, C. (2009). From government to governance in Forest plan-
ning? Lessons from the case of the British great bear rainforest initiative. Forest Policy and 
Economics, 11, 383–391.
Jack, S., Drakopoulou Dodd, S., & Anderson, A. (2008). Change and the development of entre-
preneurial networks over time: A processual perspective. Entrepreneurship & Regional 
Development, 20(2), 125–159.
Jordan, A. (2001). The European Union: An evolving system of multi-level governance…or gov-
ernment? Policy and Politics, 29(2), 193–208.
Kapucu, N., & Garayev, V. (2012). Designing, managing, and sustaining functionally collaborative 
emergency management networks. American Review of Public Administration, 43(3), 312–330.
Kelder, T. (2011). Green investment programmes in Sweden: 1+1 can be 3. In M. Grisel & F. van 
de Waart (Eds.), Multilevel urban governance or the art of working together (pp. 150–156). 
Amsterdam: European Urban Knowledge Network.
Kohler-Koch, B., & Larat, F. (Eds.). (2009). European multi-level governance: Contrasting images 
in national research. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Lipsky, M. (1980). Street-level bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the individual in public services. 
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
Littoz-Monnet, A. (2010). Dynamic multi-level governance – bringing the study of multi-level 
interactions into the theorising of European integration, available at http://eiop.or.at/eiop/
pdf/2010-001.pdf. Accessed 28 Feb 2016.
Lowndes, V., & Skelcher, C. (2002). The dynamics of multi-organizational partnerships: An analysis 
of changing modes of governance. Public Administration, 76(2), 313–333.
March, J., & Olsen, J. (1996). Institutional perspectives on political institutions. Governance, 9, 
247–264.
Marks, G. (1993). Structural policy and multi-level governance in the EC.  In A.  Cafruny & 
G. Rosenthal (Eds.), The state of the European Community: The Maastricht debate and beyond 
(pp. 391–411). Lynne Rienner: Boulder.
Mason, R. and Duval Smith, A. (2016). Theresa May takes Brexit’s immigration message to eastern 
Europe, The Guardian, 28 July, available at http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jul/28/
theresa-may-on-brexit-tour-of-eastern-europe. Accessed 01 Aug 2016.
Offe, C. (2006). Political institutions and social power: Conceptual explorations. In I. Shapiro, 
S.  Skowronek, & D.  Galvin (Eds.), Rethinking political institutions: The art of the state 
(pp. 9–31). New York: New York University Press.
Piattoni, S. (2010). The theory of multi-level governance: Conceptual, empirical and normative 
challenges. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sartori, G. (1970). Concept misinformation in comparative politics. American Political Science 
Review, 64, 21.
8 Intra-European Movement: Multi-Level or Mismatched Governance?
160
Scharpf, F. (1991). Political institutions, decision styles, and policy choices. In R.  Czada & 
A. Windhoff-Heritier (Eds.), Political choice: Institutions, rules and the limits of rationality 
(pp. 53–86). Frankfurt: Campus Verlag.
Scharpf, F. (1997). Introduction: The problem-solving capacity of multi-level governance. Journal 
of European Public Policy, 4(4), 520–538.
Scholten, P. (2013). Agenda dynamics and the multi-level governance of intractable policy con-
troversies: The case of migrant integration policies in the Netherlands. Policy Sciences, 46, 
217–236.
Stephenson, P. (2013). Twenty years of multi-level governance: “Where does it come from? What 
is it? Where is it going?”. Journal of European Public Policy, 20, 817–837.
Taȿan-Kok, T., & Vranken, J.  (2011). Handbook for multilevel urban governance in Europe. 
Amsterdam: European Urban Knowledge Network.
Tosics, I. (2011a). Multilevel government systems in urban areas. In M.  Grisels & F. van de 
Waart (Eds.), Multilevel governance or the art of working together (pp. 26–35). Amsterdam: 
European Urban Knowledge Network.
Tosics, I. (2011b). Urban development and urban policies in EU member states. In M. Grisels 
& F. van de Waart (Eds.), Multilevel governance or the art of working together (pp. 36–44). 
Amsterdam: European Urban Knowledge Network.
Treib, O., Bähr, H., & Falkner, G. (2007). Modes of governance – Towards a conceptual clarifica-
tion. Journal of European Public Policy, 14, 1–20.
van de Waart, F. (2011). The healthy Neighbourhood experiment: A multilevel venture. In 
M. Grisels & F. van de Waart (Eds.), Multilevel governance or the art of working together 
(pp. 130–136). Amsterdam: European Urban Knowledge Network.
Van Geertsom, J. (2011). Postscript: The need for a common European method of multilevel urban 
governance. In M. Grisel & F. van de Waart (Eds.), Multilevel urban governance or the art of 
working together (pp. 169–170). Amsterdam: European Urban Knowledge Network.
Weaver, R., & Rockman, B. (Eds.). (1993). Do institutions matter? Government capabilities in the 
United States and abroad. Washington: Brookings Institute.
Zapata-Barrero, R., Caponio, T., & Scholten, P. (2017). Theorizing the “Local Turn” in a multi- 
level governance framework of analysis: A case study in immigrant policies. International 
Review of Administrative Sciences, 83(2), 241–246.
Zerbinati, S. (2012). Multi-Leve governance and EU structural funds: An entrepreneurial local 
government perspective. Local Government Studies, 38(5), 577–597.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, 
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate 
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and 
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative 
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not 
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by 
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from 
the copyright holder.
D. Curry
161© The Author(s) 2018 
P. Scholten, M. van Ostaijen (eds.), Between Mobility and Migration, IMISCOE 
Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77991-1_9
Chapter 9
The Politics of Intra-European Movement
Alex Balch
9.1  Introduction: Intra-European Movement in an Era 
of Crisis
One need only consider the referendum that took place in Switzerland in 2014 on 
‘mass-immigration’ and the referendum on membership of the EU in the United 
Kingdom (UK) in 2016 to understand the significance of free movement. The topic 
stalks the present and future of European integration and has become central to rela-
tions between European states. It is no exaggeration to state that the context sur-
rounding the European politics of mobility in the twenty-first century is one of 
heightened tension and a gathering sense of uncertainty and crisis surrounding the 
future prospects for freedom of movement (Guild et al. 2015). This might perhaps 
have surprised those drafting the early treaties who saw free movement as a neces-
sary and relatively unproblematic cornerstone of regional integration. This chapter 
will explore and analyse the politicisation of free movement, offering a conceptuali-
sation of these politics as an interaction, or dialectical conversation, between two 
competing languages or ‘frames’ through which intra-European movement is con-
ceptualised: solidarity and hospitality.
Aside from the theatrics of European Council meetings, and high stakes of 
national referenda, a key indicator of an increasing politicisation is the sensitivity 
and importance attached to what kind of language one uses to describe the interna-
tional movement of persons within the European Union (see van Ostaijen 2016). 
The apparently pedantic insistence of the EU institutions to use the terms ‘mobile 
EU citizen’ and ‘mobility’ rather than migrant or migration is in fact an essential 
part of policy. It relates directly to the privileged status of European citizens within 
a formal system that guarantees free movement – they are supposed to be spared the 
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label of ‘immigrant’. By contrast, the continued use of the language of immigration, 
alongside reference to (Eastern) European migrant or migration – particularly by 
older EU Member States – is revealing of political pressures to limit, dismantle or 
weaken the institution of free movement. The implications of this discursive battle 
over intra-European movement are thus much more than simply in terms of the 
choice of words. They reflect a competition between different political philosophies 
over intra-European movement that have inevitably influenced EU-level law and 
policy and have concrete impacts.
Although one can point to a gradual extension of rights to free movement along 
the course of European integration, the politics of intra-European movement have 
led to a series of decisions that are associated with negative short and long-term 
socio-economic impacts for certain Europeans. For example, transitional restric-
tions targeting the citizens of new member states in the first decade of the twenty- 
first century have had particular affects on these groups and their position in the 
European labour market (Currie 2007; Recchi 2015: 18). Despite the language of 
equality there is a distinct possibility that the EU’s free movement regime has cre-
ated denizens alongside permanent legacies, structures, inequalities and hierarchies 
within European citizenship. In addition to this there have been important ramifica-
tions from what could be described as an accelerated politicisation – or ‘rollback’ - 
from the principle of free movement following the 2004 and 2007 enlargements. 
There is also the noticeable shift in the direction of travel with respect to the EU’s 
political economy away from ‘social Europe’ and towards a more neoliberal settle-
ment. This can be traced to the Laval ruling in 2007 which was seen as a setback to 
the principle of equal treatment for workers, in favour of the rights of businesses and 
employers (to pay wages to workers from the newer Member States at a lower rate). 
There are now numerous and prominent examples where free movement has become 
central to some of the core dilemmas in European politics. Perhaps the best example 
is the case of France’s expulsion of European citizens on the basis of racial profiling 
in 2010 which brought direct confrontation between a founding Member State and 
the European Commission as ‘Guardian of the Treaties’. The affair brought under 
close scrutiny the basis upon which there could be any truth to the claims that inte-
gration was creating a ‘Europe of rights and values’ (Balch et al. 2014).
9.2  Explaining the Politics of Free Movement
Can existing theories of immigration politics or European integration offer an expla-
nation for this politicisation of free movement? As with the topic of immigration 
more generally (Hollifield and Wong 2015), the politics of intra-European move-
ment has only recently garnered significant interest from political studies scholars. 
Before that research tended to focus on efforts to develop a common immigration 
and asylum policy for non-EU citizens. Scholars largely internalised the EU’s con-
ceptual separation of intra-European movement from extra-EU migration - some-
thing reflected in the institutional set-up of the EU. The increasing relevance of the 
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EU in matters of immigration (of non-EU citizens) post the treaties of Amsterdam, 
and particularly Lisbon, generated a number of interesting areas of research around 
immigration and Europeanisation (Faist and Ette 2007), and the emerging political 
economy of migration in the EU (Menz 2010). Studies have looked at how policy-
making over immigration in Europe has changed since 2000 in a more ‘liberal’ or 
economic-interests basis, through, for example, the role of experts and expertise 
(Balch 2010), the significance of ‘strange bedfellows’, and ‘unholy alliances’ 
between political parties (Berga and Spehara 2013).
Considering the variation in the experiences of intra-European movement - and 
the national interests at play - across the North, South, East and West of the EU, it 
would theoretically be possible to generalise about different camps likely to be for 
or against further integration in this area. However, crude divisions into ‘sending’ 
and ‘receiving’ states are unlikely to remain permanent, as we have seen previously 
in the cases of Spain, Italy and Greece. A more fruitful approach might be to con-
sider the relative fundamental ways in which intra-European movement is concep-
tualised by different actors in the European space, i.e. not reading off solely on the 
basis of national economic interests. This recognises the fact that narrow economic 
interests are likely to oscillate considerably depending upon a host of factors. For 
example, alliances between Member States and with the EU institutions over the 
issue and over time are likely to be dynamic and involve shifting coalitions of con-
venience. At any given time intra-European movement can be used by in an expand-
ing economy to balance the books (Balch 2010) or in an instrumental way to 
reconfigure national policy systems (Paul 2013). The role of urban areas in this 
developing politics is also likely to vary. Europe is home to cities with greater and 
lesser influence both within and outside their national borders. While only relatively 
few are placed in the league of ‘global cities’ (Sassen 2005), many still feature the 
polarisation of primary and secondary labour markets, a growing dependency upon 
mobile workers, and reliance on cross-border, city-to-city, networks and transac-
tions partly catalysed by Europeanisation (Favell 2008).
One way to understand the politics of intra-European movement might be to link 
the different positions of national/EU actors on free movement with broader under-
standings around the process of integration – represented by the ‘ideal-type’ theo-
ries of neofunctionalism or liberal intergovernmentalism. This line of thinking 
might predict that supranational institutions will seek ever-deeper integration over 
free movement, while national/intergovernmental fora would be more cautious, see-
ing cooperation as contingent upon the higher priority of national interests (see, e.g. 
Wiener and Diez 2009). While this might be a somewhat out-dated conceptual divi-
sion, it does map neatly on the migration/mobility distinction as it has developed 
institutionally. There is evidence that free movement of European citizens is seen as 
primarily driven by neo-functional/supranational forces while immigration (of 
third-country nationals) is characterised as something more intergovernmental. 
According to Boswell and Geddes, thinking on mobility in the EU is informed by 
two rival ‘paradigms’: “a liberal, free-trade-oriented paradigm emphasising the eco-
nomic benefits of free movement; and a more state-centric, restrictive paradigm 
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premised on concerns about the impact of migration and mobility on the state’s 
capacity to allocate socio-economic and political resources” (2011: 191).
Such a division provides a useful starting point or meta-narrative but it side-steps 
the previous point that states should logically be expected to swing between more 
expansive and more restrictive phases vis-à-vis intra-European movement. It could 
also be accused of betraying a normative slant, or bias against restrictive/communi-
tarian arguments. One side is presented as relying upon a rational, economically 
beneficial, project (to further freedom of movement) while the suggestion is that the 
other is driven (less rationally) by ideology – populism, or nationalism – or perhaps 
more charitably, an ‘interior ministry logic’ pre-conditioned to resist the expansion 
of transnational rights (Bresso 2014). It is certainly the case that the principle of free 
movement is often defended in terms of economic efficiency and increasing produc-
tivity (e.g. the importance of increased mobility in the ‘Europe 2020’ strategy), but 
this in turn can be traced to an ideological framework. The next sections briefly 
sketch out the ways in which the ideas of solidarity and hospitality operate to con-
struct and deconstruct arguments over free movement in the European space, before 
using these ideas to analyse the politicisation of intra-European movement in the 
twenty-first century.
9.3  Solidarity and Free Movement as Foundational
The importance of different frames for understanding a political issue become 
increasingly salient when a policy field is more contested (Schoen and Rein 1994). 
They help political actors to ‘define problems’, ‘diagnose causes’, ‘make moral 
judgements’ and ‘suggest remedies’ (Entman 1993). They are not always visible or 
recognised; they can be somewhat hidden – underlying and pre-conditioning our 
response to contemporary issues - pushing ‘particular definitions and interpretations 
of political issues’ in public debates (Shah et al. 2002). For the first of these, much 
as in the mythical story of Europa the virginal Phoenician princess, the ‘founding 
principle’ of free movement, and associated elements (non-discrimination, the 
Schengen area) is presented as something pure and beautiful, but fragile and vulner-
able. Thus the deep concerns when Member States apparently prioritize national 
border control over ‘solidarity’ with other Member States, or betray the ‘spirit’ of 
Schengen (Carrera et al. 2011). From this perspective protecting the system of free 
movement has become synonymous with sustaining the European project or even 
the very ‘idea’ of Europe; its existence constantly under threat from populist and 
Euro-sceptic politicians and publics; the purity of the founding principles at risk of 
compromise and erosion via the illiberal forces that they wish to unleash (e.g. 
Bresso 2014).
This way of thinking effectively raises the stakes by entangling free movement 
with the whole question of the European project  - the politics of free movement 
framed as a ‘bell-weather’ for the wider politics of European integration. This presents 
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the issue as somehow connected at the affective or emotional level to the very 
construction of the EU. Accounts of the development of EU free movement are 
framed within the narrative of the wider story of the development of European inte-
gration. So, these might point to a long history of obstacles and hurdles overcome, 
accomplishments made and rights won with the vision of frictionless mobility as an 
end-point, each step towards this end-point celebrated or marked as a moment of 
achievement.
The Treaty of Rome and the inclusion of the free movement of workers as one of 
the four ‘freedoms’ is the fundamental reference point, and the year 1968 emerges 
as an important watershed in the narrative (see, e.g. McMahon 2015). This was the 
point signifying an end to the first phase of the work post-Rome to actually establish 
free movement. It was at this point that the developing European polity had removed 
many of the restrictions on the movement of workers (through Regulation 1612/68). 
It also coincidentally came at the end of the first ‘golden age’ of European integra-
tion; after which, as we know, stagnation and intergovernmentalism came to domi-
nate the European project in the 1970s. Neo-functionalism no longer appeared to 
explain the dynamics of European integration, but the return to a more cooperative 
phase in the 1980s demonstrated a kind of ‘dialectical functionalism’ where stagna-
tion eventually acted as a spur to further integration (Corbey 1995).
The considerable political capital invested in completing the single market in the 
late 1980s led to further moves to enhance freedom of movement within the 
EU. This effort opened up the next ‘golden age’ in European integration, and vari-
ous extensions to rights of free movement in the 1990s. The timing of these exten-
sions, and the associated creation of European citizenship, took place at the same 
time as Europe was faced with new political challenges following the fall of the 
Berlin Wall. Undoubtedly the high-point of this second golden-age (or at least the 
beginning of the end) is signified by the milestone Directive 2004/38 which pro-
vided permanent residence rights for long-term EU movers and formalised what had 
been hitherto established through ECJ case-law. However, despite the apparent 
inevitability of 2004/38, there are plenty of examples of obstacles and hurdles along 
the way meaning that ‘true’ free movement is still far from the reality (Zelano – this 
book Chap. 4). These include significant resistance in the 1990s when attempts fol-
lowing Maastricht to go further on freedom of movement were thwarted by coun-
tries such as Britain and Denmark  – e.g. Portugal’s doomed ‘European Citizens 
Charter’. The Amsterdam Treaty also contributed little to the expansion of free 
movement rights.
So, on closer inspection of the history of freedom of movement reveals that it has 
actually been a case of one step forward, one step back. Another example is with the 
introduction of more ‘supranational’ forms of decisionmaking in this area following 
the Treaties of Nice (2001) and Lisbon (2007). It could be argued that this means 
greater accountability and legitimacy for policymaking in the EU (e.g. Kaunert 
et al. 2013), but this needs to be weighed against the French and Dutch rejection of 
EU constitutionalism and the limited reforms of Lisbon. This can hardly be said to 
have ushered in a third ‘golden age’ even if the incremental institutional changes 
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might have lessened the iron grip of the EU’s intergovernmental institutions 
who prefer policies affecting migrant rights be made ‘behind gilded doors’ 
(Guiraudon 1997).
9.4  The Enduring Metaphor of Hospitality
Competing with this is an alternative liberal communitarian frame of social justice 
where control of non-citizens is closely associated with the maintenance of the 
nation-state (Walzer 1983). This is the idea of immigration as hospitality: a para-
digm that requires that the welcome of the other is always conditional; a metaphor 
that has become so embedded that we often forget it is a metaphor (Rosello 2002). 
From the very first immigration systems the idea of hospitality has endured and 
allowed states to make sense and justify the expansion of controls on international 
movement (Balch 2016). In the context of liberal democratic states, the presence of 
non-citizens creates dilemmas around community, membership and principles such 
as equality and universality (Dauvergne 1999). This situation has led to the develop-
ment of a range of different arguments within the liberal tradition to ‘resolve’ these 
dilemmas - justifying or accounting for the priority of citizens, and the exclusion of 
non-citizens – e.g. on the basis of economic, security or cultural well-being of the 
state (Bader 2005). The success of these kinds of arguments has been based on the 
ability for state actors to equate the arrival of newcomers with threats to the state as 
nation or community. Talking about immigration, as Sayad puts it, means thinking 
about the state and that it is ‘the state that is thinking about itself when it is thinking 
about immigration’” (Sayad 2010: 166)
Ideas about hospitality, while referring to the state, have a deeply transnational 
resonance, travelling across Europe from receiving to sending states, West to East, 
North to South. The same arguments justifying controls on any international move-
ment - including intra-European movement and refugees - are shared, copied and 
repeated across the region (Balabanova and Balch 2010). One of the most potent 
examples is in the notion that immigration should be controlled on the basis of 
domestic social justice. This argues that immigration threatens the state because 
immigrants will naturally deplete scarce welfare resources and must therefore be 
controlled for the public good. A debate which emerged in the US in the 1990s. 
Milton Friedman (1997) famously remarked in an interview that ‘it’s just obvious 
that you can’t have free immigration and a welfare state’. The US economist Borjas 
also argued that ‘welfare programs will probably attract persons who qualify for 
subsidies and repel persons who have to pay for them. A strong magnet effect, com-
bined with an ineffective border control policy, can literally break the bank’ Borjas 
(1999: 114). The connection between these arguments and the enlargement of the 
EU into countries with much lower income levels in the 2000s led to similar argu-
ments about the ‘end of the welfare state’ for Europe (Sinn 2002).
This, it is argued creates a ‘progressive dilemma’ for those on the left, because 
while they might be in favour of universal rights and equal treatment, the spectre of 
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immigration threatens all the protections and support previously established via the 
welfare state (Goodhart 2004). However, these arguments are based on a series of 
myths about the impacts of immigration. They rest upon an underlying assumption 
that immigration is partly driven by a desire to take advantage of generous welfare 
systems in destination countries. Research into the behaviour of intra-EU migrants 
has challenged this ‘welfare magnet’ hypothesis. The evidence would suggest that 
newcomers from other EU member states tend to be less likely (than host-country 
nationals) to avail themselves of welfare benefits and public services (Eurofound 
2015). Indeed, this suggests a need for additional support for EU mobile citizens 
who often find themselves at a disadvantage both in the job market and in terms of 
societal integration.
The metaphor of hospitality allows states to frame European citizenship and free 
movement not only as undermining domestic social justice, but as an opportunity to 
launch political attacks that work in the interests of those seeking to assert the power 
and identity of the state. This is one of the reasons why hospitality has remained the 
dominant frame within which discussions of immigration take place (Balch 2016). 
As Doty (2003) points out, the positioning of politicians regarding the restriction 
immigration can be linked logically with state-building strategies. The focus, and 
insistence on, immigration control as a central task of government, is itself an act of 
statecraft, produces further demands for a (national) centralisation and extension of 
governmental powers (Ibid). In stark contrast with this restrictive impulse, it is 
through the aggressive removal of restrictions and greater levels of free movement 
that the EU gains some of its scarce and valuable sources of popular support, espe-
cially from younger European citizens (Recchi 2015). Central to both sides is the 
struggle over nothing less than the legitimate exercise of political power: the risks 
and rewards are therefore high.
Solidarity and hospitality emerge as very useful and powerful ideational weap-
ons. They underpin the politics, and the language, that frame intra-European move-
ment, but neither is entirely consistent with either the history of integration in this 
area, or the actual experience and governance of European mobility. On the one 
hand, the achievement of freedom of movement through European integration is 
radical - it demands states recognize the ‘rightful presence’ of other European citi-
zens in their territory. As such it actively challenges the ubiquitous conceptualisa-
tion of immigration as ‘hospitality’ (for a local example of this, see Squire and 
Darling 2013). Yet on the other, notwithstanding the discourse of rights there are 
serious doubts over the EU’s cosmopolitan credentials (Brown 2014). Concerns 
include the treatment of certain (‘new’ or Central/Eastern) European citizens when 
they choose to exercise free movement. While the right to move is considered the 
main benefit of European citizenship the lived reality of workers from the ex- 
Communist regimes has not always been a positive experience (IOM 1998; EPRS 
2014). Also, despite the progressive removal of physical and bureaucratic barriers to 
movement for certain groups of persons, countervailing restrictions and obstacles to 
movement remain remarkably resilient (and tend to be extended) when it comes to 
the movement of other, non-EU, citizens.
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9.5  The Politicisation of Intra-European Movement 
in the Twenty-First Century
How have these competing ideas featured in the developing political story around 
intra-European movement? One paradox is that the local level has emerged as cen-
tral to arguments about impacts even though city-regions have found that ‘their role 
in European policy-making is limited if not irrelevant’ (Perulli 2012). Research into 
the political economy of managed migration tends to ignore the urban level, prefer-
ring to consider the role of non-state actors or organised interests such as employ-
ers’ groups (Freeman 2006, Menz 2010). This next section explores the politicisation 
of this topic, and how the urban level has featured, by focusing on the key contem-
porary battles over the ‘prize’ of free movement – both real and symbolic – in the 
twenty-first century, looking at the instruments and strategies of the EU and its 
Member States.
The power and penetration of ideas about hospitality become apparent when we 
consider how political conflicts over intra-European movement have developed. In 
discussions around internal movement within the EU by European citizens, connec-
tions with other forms of international movement constantly emerge. This is because 
free movement is applicable to parts of Europe’s periphery (e.g. Norway, 
Switzerland), highly relevant to others (e.g. new and aspiring members) and non-
 EU migration is simply impossible to separate in the debate – it represents the wider 
migratory environment in which such discussions take place. The political changes 
that took place in North Africa in 2010/2011 and the ensuing conflicts in Syria/Iraq 
provide a backdrop of pressure and crisis that politicians can present as existential 
threat. They raise the prospect of large-scale immigration from outside Europe and 
put pressure on the trust and solidarity between states that have reduced border 
checks. One response has been a wave of states threatening Schengen suspensions 
which directly affects freedom of movement for all European citizens. In 2011 the 
Franco-Italian affair saw France re-introduce border checks in response to Italy’s 
deal with Tunisia that resulted in the issuance of residence permits to people who 
had arrived previously. Then, weeks later, there was the reaction of Denmark, rein-
stating controls on its border with Germany and Sweden, citing a rise in ‘trans- 
border crime’. This prompted serious concerns about an absence of solidarity 
between Member States, the threat to freedom of movement, and a ‘race’ away from 
‘the principles of proportionality, solidarity, accountability and fundamental rights’ 
(Carrera et al. 2011).
These concerns proved to be accurate when in 2015–2016 the migrant crisis was 
blamed by a long list of states for temporarily reintroducing border checks (via the 
invocation of Article 25 of the Schengen Borders Code1). Coupled with the actions 
by Hungary to raise its borders with Croatia and Serbia, and the launching of 
infringement proceedings against the same country over its asylum arrangements 
1 Allows Schengen states to ‘exceptionally and immediately reintroduce border control[s] at inter-
nal borders’ when ‘urgent action’ is needed
A. Balch
169
(EC 2015), the sense of crisis at the EU level became palpable. This was well articu-
lated in the ‘State of the Union’ speech given in Strasbourg by the European 
Commission president, Jean-Claude Juncker. He complained about the behaviour of 
the Member States to restrict freedom of movement within the EU and appealed 
emotionally for this to be reversed, referring to memories of the Second World War 
and arguing that ‘walls and fences have no place in an EU Member State’ (Juncker 
2015).
It is interesting to note that in 2016 national politicians such as Austria’s then- 
Chancellor Werner Faymann justified the reintroduction of external border controls 
as the only way to save Schengen, and by extension, the EU. One analysis could be 
that the system as a whole has demonstrated its flexibility, and that despite the 
developments since 2010 intra-European movement of European citizens is rela-
tively unaffected. The actions of the Member States mostly followed the rules set 
out in the Schengen Borders Code (SBC) and so one could argue that reports of 
Schengen’s demise are somewhat exaggerated (Guild et  al. 2015). There is an 
assumption that the aim is to restrict extra-EU migration rather than intra-European 
movement. However, it is in this context of uncertainty and fear over migration 
flows from outside the EU that certain Member States have been making the argu-
ment that intra-European movement is adding to the ‘burden’ at the local level, in 
certain parts of the EU. The long Schengen crisis of 2010–2016 was a period when 
transitional restrictions for some Eastern Europeans were being lifted across the 
Union. There is also the issue of the highly public attempts by Switzerland and the 
UK to re-negotiate free movement rules in favour of enhanced national autonomy. 
The Swiss case took two years to resolve, but in late 2016 an agreement was reached 
by a joint committee. It demonstrated that by withholding some of the benefits 
attached to Switzerland’s relationship with the EU (participation in EU programmes 
such as Horizon 2020 and Erasmus) pressure could be applied to maintain free 
movement (Maurice 2016).
As part of preparations for the UK’s referendum on EU membership that coun-
try’s government made explicit moves to revisit and potentially reconfigure intra- 
European movement and modify some of the core elements of freedom of movement. 
The UK’s demands echoed those outlined in a letter sent to the Council presidency 
by four countries in 2013 and revolve around access to welfare and public services 
by other European citizens. This restrictive tone regarding intra-European move-
ment has been coupled with an increased eagerness on the part of the same Member 
States to identify and punish those who ‘abuse’ the system (Eurofound 2015).
The deal eventually struck by the UK with its European partners in early 2016 
proved insufficient to win the referendum for Cameron, but in the process it opened 
up the possibility for changes to the EU citizens’ Directive, the EU Regulation on 
free movement of workers, and the Regulation on social security (Peers 2016). The 
referendum debate also saw the issue of Turkey’s prospective membership of the 
EU raised, taking advantage of the ongoing negotiations with that country around 
the relocation of refugees. A ‘Leave’ campaign poster warned that 76 million 
Turkish citizens would soon enjoy free movement, despite the slim prospects of 
Turkey’s membership.
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While the UK’s referendum result meant that changes to intra-European move-
ment were no longer guaranteed to go ahead they have been placed on the negotiat-
ing table in any future political wrangling over free movement. They may not have 
represented a wholesale revision, and they would not have required treaty amend-
ment, but they did represent a perceptible shift in the politics of intra-European 
movement. They effectively offered up the possibility that a greater level of condi-
tionality could be re-inserted into the rules on freedom of movement. They empha-
sised one more time that the welcome of other European citizens remains 
fundamentally conditional, and ultimately that the principle of free movement 
would always be trumped by the powers of states to restrict and intervene in order 
to control intra-European movement.
Post the financial crash there have been a series of cases where Schengen States 
have re-introduced border checks, EU states have increased border controls, and 
demands have been made for greater recognition and mitigation of the impacts of 
intra-European movement. These moves have gained considerable media attention 
because the stakes have been perceived as heightened due to the context of a general 
crisis of legitimacy faced by the EU (Longo and Murray 2015). They are also quali-
tatively different from other examples since the 1990s where increased checks were 
regularly brought in by Member States, e.g. during significant political meetings or 
large sporting events (see EC 2010b: Annex I).
As one of the core tenets of integration, the EU has developed a number of instru-
ments, methods or ‘weapons’ to embed, protect, strengthen and even encourage free 
movement and intra-European movement. Recchi (2015) draws on Lowi to catego-
rise these into three main types. The first are ‘constituent’ and include the construc-
tion of European citizenship and monetary union which aim to dissolve barriers 
through the fabric of treaties and institutional arrangements. The second are ‘regula-
tory’ and include directives on free movement and other practical steps such as the 
mutual recognition of qualifications between member states. Finally there are ‘dis-
tributive’ policies which include the creation of mobility grants and schemes such 
as Erasmus that encourage greater intra-European movement.
Of these strategies it is probably the first, backed up by a doctrine of the primacy 
of EU law and the interpretation of the treaties (where there are of course expansive 
declarations on the principle of free movement) that has been most successful in 
enabling the idea of free movement to be pushed forward, via judgements of the 
ECJ. The key principles established through ECJ case-law up to 2004/38 include (a) 
non-discrimination and equality of treatment; (b) recognition of all insurance peri-
ods independently of the country of employment; (c) exportability of acquired 
rights; and (d) application of the law of the country of employment (lex loci laboris) 
(Ferrera 2005, 100–4). However, it is notable that the ECJ ‘won’ these rights for 
individuals rather than them being established via a more recognizable democratic 
process. Boswell and Geddes argue that this top-down process of establishing rules 
on free movement, notwithstanding the ‘high-flown’ rhetoric on citizenship from 
the Commission, has resulted in less penetration among the EU’s residents – hardly 
impacting upon the conception of political membership as something national 
(Geddes and Boswell 2011: 190). Plus the public appeal of free movement has been 
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somewhat damaged following rulings such as the Laval case2 where the politics of 
judicialisation have taken a decidedly neoliberal turn. These and other judgments 
have led some to accuse the court of prioritizing market freedoms over the protec-
tion of workers rights (Dølvik and Visser 2009).
Turning to the Member States, what have been the main options in terms of 
responding to the EU’s developing rules on free movement? How have they been 
able to claim ‘ownership’ and victory for their citizens? How successfully have dif-
ferent Member States pushed their interests? How well have they been able to react 
or adjust? Although the principles underpinning free movement are a sine qua non 
of EU membership, the Member States actually have significant scope and latitude. 
This is because the EU is neither able or willing to opt for a strongly supranational 
system of governance in this area. Not only would such an approach be politically 
impossible, it runs contrary to the concept of subsidiarity.
For those aspiring and new member states where the possibility of exercising the 
right of free movement is popular, the EU emerges as a powerful actor: a gatekeeper 
to membership and a system that imposes (but also limits the effect and duration of) 
transitional arrangements and other obstacles. Of course the EU institutions only 
develop policies in areas where a competence is established or agreed. The only 
possibility of seriously altering this balance would be through treaty change, which 
seems unlikely but not out of the question. More feasible is the option of reaching 
some kind of EU-wide agreement to restrict or limit the application of free move-
ment and thereby control intra-European movement, which would naturally mean 
negotiation via the Council. This was the kind of settlement arrived at over the 
2004/2007 enlargements, with the imposition of transitional arrangements for citi-
zens of those new member states. This emerged as a compromise in the negotiations 
around the 2003 Act of Accession when the language used to justify restrictions 
referred to the ‘potential to seriously disturb the labour markets in the Member 
States’ (EC 2001: (2). This was a decision taken against available research that sug-
gested such arrangements would have little long-term impact on migration patterns, 
leading most observers to argue that the issue was made on the basis of a political 
rather than social or economic logic (Lang 2007). The inability for the UK and oth-
ers to secure significant limitations on free movement rights after the 2004/2007 
enlargements could reflect the shifting balance of negotiating power within the 
Council, where studies have shown that smaller states can be surprisingly effective 
(Golub 2012).
In terms of post-hoc reactions, when there is an apparent clash or conflict between 
national arrangements and ECJ judgements, there are a number of options beyond 
straightforward compliance/non-compliance. These include the more difficult tactic 
of trying to shift the future direction of integration at the EU level or the more prag-
matic method of re-regulating at the national level in order to ‘contain’ domestic 
impacts (Blauberger 2012). In addition, there is considerable scope for ‘grey’ com-
pliance – even where there is apparently clear guidance for Member States about 
how they should treat mobile EU citizens, there is the question of interpretation. For 
2 C-341/05, December 2007
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example, the language inserted in the Directive 2004/38 creates a distinction 
between ‘genuine’ free movement as opposed to its ‘abuse’ without offering any 
concrete definitions of what would constitute either. This matters because the 
Directive requires the provision of social welfare and protection only for those who 
‘genuinely’ make use of free movement, and allows for Member States to put in 
place safeguards against ‘abuse’ and the prospect of ‘unreasonable burdens’ on their 
welfare systems. All of this can naturally be defined and decided upon in the national 
interest, however narrowly the government of the day chooses to understand that, 
and notwithstanding the prospect of a future ECJ judgement that policies are incom-
patible with EU law.
Outside the Commission, Council and ECJ there are of course other venues in 
the EU sphere that have become battlegrounds for the politics of free movement. 
The European Parliament has tended to echo the Commission’s fierce defence of the 
principle of free movement – issuing statements against national political leaders 
calling for the right to be changed or restricted (EP 2014), or questioning the con-
tinued imposition of checks in the Schengen zone (EP 2017). The increase in the 
powers of the EP post-Lisbon and the widespread success of Eurosceptic parties in 
the 2014 elections opens up the possibility that this normative position could be 
challenged. However, the new populist MEPs initially failed to create formal group-
ings within the parliament, although they have since attempted to change attitudes, 
put pressure on mainstream parties, and obstruct parliamentary proceedings (Grabbe 
and Groot 2014: 38).
9.6  Impacts and the Role of Local and Urban Spaces
The local level – urban areas, cities, city-regions – has emerged as an important ter-
rain for all sides in the political struggles over free movement (Nicholls and 
Uitermark 2016). This is because, as Bucken-Knapp et al. (2018) demonstrate, there 
has been a general absence of policies at either national or local levels to manage the 
impacts of free movement. This policy vacuum has eventually led to multiple actors 
jumping in to promote their own preferred solution. In the case of certain national 
governments, it opened the way for local impacts to serve wider arguments against 
the principle of free movement. Notable in this context was the intervention of April 
2013 with a joint letter to the European Council Presidency from Austria, Germany, 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. This underlined their belief that freedom 
of movement was not an unconditional right, and claimed that ‘a number of munici-
palities, towns and cities in various Member States are under a considerable strain’ 
and that intra-European movement ‘burdens the host societies with considerable 
additional costs, in particular caused by the provision of schooling, health care and 
adequate accommodation.’ The letter also went on to assert that ‘a significant num-
ber of new immigrants draw social assistance in the host countries, frequently with-
out a genuine entitlement, burdening the host countries' social welfare systems.’ 
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(Mikl-Leitner et al. 2013 The letter then demanded a veritable array of legal and 
non-legal actions to be drawn up including EU funding and sanctions (Ibid).
The immediate response of European Parliament and European Commission was 
both defensive and dismissive. Hannes Svoboda (from the Progressive Alliance of 
Socialist and Democrats in the European Parliament) opposed the proposals and 
Cecilia Malmström (then-Home Affairs Commissioner) complained of the equation 
of immigration with mobility which she declared like comparing ‘apples and 
oranges’ (see Hansen 2015). The eventual, rather more measured, formal response 
from the Commission was a Communication conceding increasing mobility caused 
‘challenges for local communities’ (EC 2013: (3). In contrast to the escalatory lan-
guage of the joint letter, proposals to address the absence of policies or clear priori-
ties for governance at the local level consisted of a series of concrete actions. There 
were attempts to limit and and clarify definitions for social security ‘abuse’ and 
‘fraud’ and also discussion of ‘errors’ by officials and citizens in making and pro-
cessing claims (EC 2013: 9). The help offered to local authorities to meet these 
challenges came in the shape of training and exchange of best practice, with funding 
for social inclusion through the European Social Fund (ESF) for ‘marginalised 
communities, in particular Roma’ (ibid. 11). However, the Communication empha-
sised the joint responsibility of the EU and Member States to counter negative pub-
lic perceptions of intra-European movement that were ‘not based on facts’ (EC 
2013: 13). Perhaps unsurprisingly considering the ‘top-down’ way in which it has 
been constructed (Geddes and Boswell 2011: 190) a survey of sub-national authori-
ties found little awareness of the rules around European Citizenship at the local 
level (CSES 2012). There is little evidence that any special measures have been put 
in place by Member States to improve social inclusion at the local level. Inclusion 
policies towards European citizens, such as they exist, tend to rely on services or 
institutions dedicated to all foreign citizens (Ernst and Young 2014). For the 
European Commission here is a problem of not enough Europe, or of obstacles to 
freedom of movement - a situation where the benefits of European citizenship need 
to be better communicated or implemented.
The Commission strategy has been to concede as little as possible with regards 
to conditions or changes to the core principles of freedom of movement. The 
response to the 2013 letter was technical in character – much of the communication 
was dedicated to clarifying and re-stating the rules – followed by the commission-
ing of expertise and consultations to produce additional knowledge and support to 
counter the Member States’ claims. A 2010 EU Citizenship Report identified a 
‘gap’ between the ‘rules and the reality’ faced by European citizens ‘particularly in 
cross-border situations’, and called on local authorities to promote European citi-
zenship (EC 2010a). The Committee of the Regions (Europe’s assembly of local 
and regional representatives) suggested that local and regional authorities could 
place pressure on their national governments to remove obstacles to implementa-
tion, and as a means of ‘eliminating the EU’s democratic deficit’ (CoR 2011). The 
EU’s other consultative bodies such as the European Economic and Social 
Committee (EESC) likewise are better set up to feed in problems of non-integration, 
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where published opinions match closely with Commission priorities to expand free 
movement, rather than as a conduit for concerns over that movement’s impacts.
A study carried out for the European Commission on the local impacts of free 
movement concluded that ‘the overall evidence’ on the impacts of intra-European 
movement ‘suggests that this situation is not placing major issues and burdens on 
the local communities or local public services’ (Ernst and Young 2014: (4). The 
research looked at how six European cities (Barcelona, Dublin, Hamburg, Lille, 
Prague and Turin) dealt with the issue and among its key findings were that more 
should be done to facilitate intra-European movement because ‘practical and legal 
obstacles continue to limit the effective exercise of free movement rights’ (Ibid: 6).
Notwithstanding the publication of such research backing up the Commission 
position on intra-European movement and ‘welfare tourism’, the gap between the 
positions outlined in the 2013 letter and its response persists and continues to re- 
surface. A good example is provided by the long negotiation carried out by the UK 
government in preparation for its 2016 referendum on membership of the EU. One 
of Prime Minister Cameron’s four demands for a ‘re-negotiated’ settlement included 
provisions to limit access to in-work welfare benefits for European citizens exercis-
ing their right to freedom of movement. Cameron pointedly ignored the plea made 
by the Commission in its Communication and exaggerated both the problems of 
mobile EU citizens abusing the benefits system, and the idea that welfare acted as a 
‘magnet’ for further migration. His meetings with other European leaders provided 
a useful snapshot of the European politics around freedom of movement. They cer-
tainly proved that the letter of 2013 was not indicative of a gathering consensus over 
‘welfare tourism’. Instead, the negotiations were instructive of the complexity of 
political negotiation around intra-European movement. Cameron’s tour of Europe 
confirmed that every Member State has its own interests and concerns vis-à-vis 
European free movement its challenges. Germany’s Merkel was happy to join with 
UK complaints about welfare ‘abuses’ but was keen to defend the principle of free 
movement and non-discrimination against Cameron’s wider demands (Mason and 
Oltermann 2014). For sending countries like Poland there was the obvious interest 
in protecting large numbers of their citizens working abroad (Krajewski and James 
2016). Ultimately, the eventual deal, complete with a ‘safeguard’ for ‘exceptional 
inflows’ of European citizens and further declarations on welfare ‘abuse’ (EUCO 
2016) proved insufficient for the UK government to secure its favoured result in the 
2016 referendum. Subsequent statements regarding the ‘Brexit’ negotiations have 
indicated that UK politicians are willing to relinquish membership of the Single 
Market to escape any obligations regarding free movement (May 2017).
9.7  Analysis and Conclusions
The topic of intra-European movement can be connected to an increasingly long- 
term crisis of political legitimacy in the EU and among European liberal democra-
cies. Politics is a battle of ideas, and in conflicts over intra-European movement 
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each side will naturally seek to use the topic to maximise their legitimacy and sym-
bolic resources. As we have seen, the principle of free movement and increased 
levels of intra-European movement shifts patterns of legitimacy and support for 
political authority at different levels, albeit by alternative routes. In the case of 
nation-states this can be via in the form of resistance to supranational rule-making 
and demands for conditionality on the part of those receiving newcomers, or alter-
natively for the protection of rights already won for those whose nationals reside 
elsewhere in the EU. For the former, the battle over free movement has become a 
convenient way to assert national identity and the right to welcome through the 
language of hospitality. This speaks to populist demands for a re-assertion national 
political control and acts as a proxy for age-old arguments about state sovereignty. 
For those seeking to enlarge support for European integration, free movement can 
become central to demonstrating common European values and the politico-cultural 
benefits of European integration (ibid: 188) (see Pioneur Project - Rother and Nebe 
2009).
This chapter has demonstrated how the contemporary struggles over this topic in 
the European space presents puzzles for all sides. One of these revolves around the 
obvious difficulties, tensions and/or incongruity in creating and sustaining a parallel 
regional politics of intra-European movement (based on one of the ‘four freedoms’ 
of the 1957 Treat of Rome) alongside one of immigration (the ‘common immigra-
tion policy’ promised by the Lisbon Treaty). This conceptual separation has clearly 
not been entirely absorbed at all levels. The very idea of a policy framework target-
ing intra-EU ‘mobility’ rests on a set of assumptions regarding the ability of politi-
cal actors at the sub-EU level to successfully separate one kind of international 
movement from, inter alia, non-EU, irregular, asylum-seeking, or family-related 
migration. This raises the question of whether, and to what extent, the politics of 
intra-European movement can - at the EU, national and sub-national levels - really 
be characterised as something distinct or ‘new’ when compared with the usual busi-
ness of (national) immigration politics and policy-making.
Another puzzle is at the local level – where the outcomes and consequences of 
intra-European movement are actually experienced. A key benefit of the project of 
which this book is an output is its focus on the urban setting and the specificities of 
CEE migration. This chapter problematized the assumption that politics around free 
movement can ever be ‘resolved’. The topic reveals the limits and boundaries of 
European integration, the way in which international movement remains a key 
battle- ground for competing interests and ideas in the European political space. One 
of the observations has been that, despite the apparent ‘flattening’ of difference 
through transnational rights, structure and hierarchy can become re-imposed at the 
nation-state level because of the dominance of a paradigm of hospitality, e.g. 
through transitional arrangements and the discourse of welfare chauvinism. This is 
crucial because we know that notions of fairness and justice remain central to the 
struggle for legitimacy by political actors. As Zelano (2018) points out, the 
Commission has more recently demonstrated a greater willingness to talk of 
fraud around free movement, implicitly moving towards the language of hospitality. 
This concession to the language of fairness, implying an abuse of states ‘generous’ 
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 benefits, has been adopted in the absence of evidence that such a problem is 
significant.
The local has become the site of tensions between a purportedly progressive 
establishment and expansion of principles and rights for European citizens to move, 
live and work in other EU countries (e.g. through the ECJ) and arguments about 
impacts that result from mobility – the people and places that experience or ‘deal’ 
with it. Sub-national political units have become the battleground where this plays 
out, while they are often emasculated in terms of a lack of policy tools to govern and 
manage free movement. A key question is then how the urban implications can 
become incorporated into the politics of intra-European movement. As is explained 
elsewhere in this book, there are consequences that can be traced to a relative 
absence of a prominent or coherent policy agenda at the EU level which incorpo-
rates a narrative of impacts, or the urban implications of mobility. These conse-
quences include the development of ad-hoc arrangements that for some have failed 
to address the consequences of the ‘big-bang’ enlargements of 2004/2007. These 
characteristics are especially notable if we pause to consider the central role which 
the urban environment plays in immigration patterns, where cities are known to be 
‘a major factor in shaping the trajectories and effects of immigration’ (Nicholls and 
Uitermark 2016: 878). As scholars have demonstrated, there is a politics of venue- 
shopping where the EU is convenient for actors to avoid national constraints 
(Guiraudon 2000), but it is also convenient for governments to apportion blame 
where there is policy failure.
The case of intra-European movement demonstrates the complex, and some-
times unequal, outcomes of subsidiarity. The absence of a supranational governance 
system emphasises the central role that national governments maintain in European 
decision-making and in the interpretation and implementation of European rules. In 
this context we find that references and claims about the local and urban level from 
all sides are more instrumental than based on evidence - or on any genuine reflection 
of sub-national claims. Indeed, the discussion as it has developed at the European 
level tells us relatively little about the actual impacts of intra-European movement 
at the local level; rather it says more about the politics underlying the articulation of 
deliberative processes in the EU. These politics have real effects for European citi-
zens. The result of conflicts and compromise over intra-European movement has 
been to construct a kind of social denizenship for mobile European citizens by those 
Member States that have been the main receivers of this kind of movement. The 
problems with the political claims based on ideas of solidarity or hospitality is they 
simply serve as convenient conceptual short-cuts in the debate over free movement, 
enlargement and labour market effects. They have political consequences and may 
not accurately reflect the migratory reality of intra-European movement - deliber-
ately exaggerating some features while obscuring others. The balance reflects the 
continued dominance of the national paradigm, with myths such as the Polish 
plumber or Romanian strawberry picker tending to operate in the service of national 
interests (Sobis et al. 2015).
Returning to the opening point in this chapter about language, the vocabulary 
used to discuss these issues - ‘migration’ as opposed to ‘mobility’ - can be clearly 
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linked to competing paradigms for understanding freedom of movement, its impacts, 
sustainability and future in policy terms. We should be aware in discussions of 
uncritically following the divisions set by state actors and be fully conscious of the 
ways that policy decisions affect EU and non-EU citizens, and their subjection to 
regimes of mobility and migration respectively. Otherwise we risk creating the spu-
rious impression that, at least at the EU level, the question of who should be allowed 
to move between EU states, and on what basis, is – or can ever be – finally settled 
in political terms.
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Chapter 10
Poland’s Perspective on the Intra-European 
Movement of Poles. Implications 
and Governance Responses
Marta Kindler
10.1  Introduction
To understand the consequences of intra-European movement for Poland we have to 
be aware of several political and socio-economic developments, which have shaped 
its scale and character. The main (geo)political occurrences, the falling apart of the 
Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, allowed Poland to transform from a com-
munist to a democratic system. It has changed from a country with strictly con-
trolled outflows to one with borders open to migration. The possibility of free 
movement for Poles has increased even further with Poland joining the European 
Union (EU) and the Schengen Area (Anacka and Okólski 2014). As a result, Poles 
in the EU turned from so-called ‘third-country nationals’, whose movement is con-
trolled, to freely moving EU citizens. The UK, followed by Ireland and Sweden, 
declared that they would not apply transitional arrangements and provided Poles 
with full access to their labour markets immediately after Poland’s EU accession in 
2004. By 2011 the last EU countries (Germany and Austria) opened up their labour 
markets to Poles. This means that Poles can work officially in all of the countries in 
the Schengen Area. According to the European Commission’s terminology they are 
no longer ‘labour migrants’, but ‘mobile workers’. The absence of these ‘mobile 
workers’ is for Poland a governance concern. Poland’s Migration Policy,1 approved 
by the Polish government in 2012, is a strategic document that sets out the general 
direction of activities that aim to ‘minimize negative effects of emigration’ by 
focusing on systemic solutions, especially concerning assistance to returnees, and 
monitoring the impact of emigration on Poland (in particular its social conse-
quences) (MI 2012).
1 The current Polish government has rejected this document in March 2017, calling for a new 
migration policy doctrine. No new document has been delivered by May 2018.
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The key economic and social developments, which have shaped the character of 
the intra-European movement of Poles, are a result of Poland’s change from a cen-
tralised economy to a capitalist market economy. Since the early 1990s the country 
has witnessed structural unemployment, growing discrepancies in wages and unsta-
ble working conditions. Social aspects, such as a growing number of youth with 
higher education and more intense participation of women in the labour market 
(Augustyn 2010) increased the dynamics of labour market changes. Of crucial 
importance here are the different paste and level of economic development of 
Poland’s regions, resulting in a growing polarisation – with some regions flourish-
ing, while others being close to economic recession and the rate of unemployment 
being very diversified across the country (Anacka and Okólski 2014).2 Overall, the 
average monthly salary in Poland is considerably lower than in other EU member 
states.3 The significant differences between wage levels in Poland and other EU 
member states, combined with access to relatively cheap transport, a better knowl-
edge of English than 20 years ago, and awareness of a large group of Poles ‘out 
there’ (potentially to fall back in case of need), made moving from a small town in 
Poland to London more attractive as a destination than moving to Warsaw, Poland’s 
capital.4
Finally, we need to underline that the consequences of intra-European movement 
are not limited to EU countries. The possibility of intra-European movement for 
Poles, was accompanied by restrictions for migrants wanting to enter Poland. The 
liberal approach to foreigners entering Poland since the 1990s has slowly been cur-
tailed with Poland’s process of joining the EU. Visas for third country-nationals, 
among them  Ukrainians, the main migrant group in Poland, were introduced in 
2003, just before Poland’s accession to the EU, and a more complex visa system 
was introduced upon Poland’s joining the Schengen Area in 2007.5
The aim of this chapter is to provide, as part of the European research project 
‘IMAGINATION’, the perspective of the migrant sending countries on intra- 
European movement. The chapter characterizes the migration corridors between 
Poland and urban regions in countries, which are the focus of this book, Austria, the 
2 In 2014, the overall unemployment rate for Poland was 11.7 per cent, but in the Warmia-Masuria 
region, for example, it was 18.4 percent, while in Warsaw, the capital it was 4.6 per cent. Apart 
from the few “winners of transformation”, majority experienced ambivalent changes, with the situ-
ation of many people worsened. 7.4 per cent of the Polish population, around 2.8 million, lives 
below the subsistence minimum (CSO 2015).
3 Equivalent to approximately 887 Euro net (3783.46 PLN) in 2014. http://stat.gov.pl/sygnalne/
komunikaty-i-obwieszczenia/18,2015,kategoria.html
4 In the 1990s Poland experienced a decline in internal migration from rural to urban areas due to 
labour market restrictions, increase in costs of living (rise in real estate prices and rental rates). In 
the year 2000 those moving from cities to rural areas outnumbered rural to urban migrants 
(Zborowski et al. 2012).
5 Since June 2017, Ukrainian citizens can enter the EU for tourist purposes without a visa, on the 
basis of a bio-metric passport (in April 2017 approx. 3 million Ukrainians owned such passports). 
This visa-free migration does not affect regular labour migrants, however it may have an impact on 
irregular migration flows.
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Netherlands and Sweden.6 It concentrates on the Dutch-Polish corridor for three 
main reasons. First, the post-2004 movement of Poles was the largest to the 
Netherlands from the three respective countries. Second, the sending regions repre-
sent those with the highest intensity of outflow from Poland and are the places of 
origin of Poles who engaged in pre- and/or post-2004 movement. Third, it provides 
important examples of regional and trans-national migration governance. The chap-
ter analyses the implications of intra-European movement of Poles for Poland, and 
in particular for sending urban regions to the Netherlands. It also reflects upon the 
link between the EU freedom of movement and the migration of third-country 
nationals to Poland.
10.2  “Let’s go West!” CEE Migration Corridors 
from Poland: Characteristics and Institutional Context
10.2.1  Scale and Regions of Origin
Poland has had a long history of emigration and a significant track of increased 
temporary migration after its systemic transition in 1989. However, the post-EU 
accession brought an increase in scale difficult to ignore. While, according to 2002 
census data, 2 percent of Poland’s population were emigrants (786, 000 persons), 
the 2011 census data shows a 154 percent (sic!) (over 1.2 million) increase (for 
comparison of pre- and post-enlargement data see Chap. 2). Over 80 percent of 
these migrants stayed in European Union countries (CSO 2013).7 Annual CSO esti-
mates show that the stock of temporary migrants abroad has stabilized at 2 million 
people (6.6 percent of the total population), which is a significant number of absen-
tees in particular regions. There is little evidence of returns of post-EU accession 
migrants. The substantial return migration to Poland, which was especially felt dur-
ing the economic crisis of 2008–09, consisted mainly of migrants who have left 
Poland before 2004 and who returned to regions “with relatively long traditions of 
emigration and not necessarily the ones with strong pull factors” (Kaczmarczyk & 
Lesińska 2012:30).
According to the 2011 population census, Poles involved in intra-European 
movement originated mainly from Śląskie, Małopolskie, Dolnośląskie and 
Podkarpackie region (South-Western and Southern Poland) (see Fig.  10.1). The 
leading regions for intensity of outflows as compared to the number of inhabitants 
were Opolskie in Southern, Podlaskie in Eastern and Podkarpackie in South-Eastern 
6 Regarding the case of Turkey as a CEE migrants destination in the IMAGINATION project, apart 
from pre-1989 migration of Poles, contemporary migration is of incidental character.
7 Among the “traditional” emigration destination countries for Poles are the United States, Canada 
and Australia. The United States, with the inflow of 255 thousand Polish emigrants between 1990 
and 2005, was for a long time the main destination country. However, it has lost its position after 
2004 to the UK and Germany (Fiń 2014; Kaczmarczyk 2010).
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Poland (see Fig.  10.1, emigration rate). In terms of pre- and post-enlargement 
changes we can note that Dolnośląskie region has outnumbered Małopolskie in 
terms of people leaving. In addition, while for years the Opolskie region was in the 
lead and it continues to be among significant sending regions, migration from this 
region decreased (Grabowska-Lusińska & Okólski 2009).8 In light of implications 
to be discussed, it is important to keep in mind that Opolskie and Podlaskie regions 
have the lowest number of inhabitants in Poland. Małopolskie and Podkarpackie 
regions are also no demographic strongholds. Opolskie, Podlaskie and Podkarpackie 
regions are for the most part economically underdeveloped areas with large agricul-
tural sectors and declining industrial sectors (Kaczmarczyk 2012). Śląskie, Opolskie 
and Dolnośląskie regions, which are set near Poland’s western border, also repre-
8 The long history of international migration from Poland is among others present in the region of 
Małopolska, which has an over 100 years’ long tradition of emigration to the United States.
Fig. 10.1 Emigration from provinces in Poland, 2011
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sent the ‘traditional’ pattern of Polish migration based on ethnic ties and kinship, 
primarily to Germany (CSO 2013; Kaczmarczyk 2014). However, the intra- 
European movement involved also the participation of regions, which before 2004 
played a marginal role as regions of migrants origin. It meant that the differences 
between the intensity of out-migration from particular regions in Poland has 
decreased (Grabowska-Lusińska & Okólski 2009, see Fig. 10.1).
It is worth noting that Poland is slowly transforming into a net immigration 
country. From the 1990s to 2005 the registered permanent emigration exceeded 
immigration, reaching its peak in 2006. Emigration remained high in the subsequent 
two years due to the already mentioned rapid growth of out-migration connected 
with EU accession. However, a visible increase in immigration is visible since 2007 
and combined with a decrease in emigration, both flows equalised (Grzymała-
Kazłowska 2013).
10.2.2  Intra-European Movement Corridors 
and Characteristics of Migrants
According to the 2011 population census, the four main EU destination countries 
for Poles were: the United Kingdom, Ireland, Germany and the Netherlands.9 
Table 10.1 shows the dynamics and changing patterns of the movement of Poles. We 
can trace the significant change occurred with the mass migration to the British Iles. 
2007 was the peak year, with 2.3 million persons (6.6 percent of the population) 
abroad. Much smaller increases than those observed in the early post-accession 
years were recorded in the years 2011 to 2013. These changes were mostly due to 
an increase in the number of emigrants to Germany and the United Kingdom.
From the countries, which are the focus of the book, apart from the already men-
tioned Netherlands, which is among the main destination countries, in the case of 
Austria the most significant increase occurs between 2004 and 2007, with a substan-
tial decrease due to the economic crisis in 2008. Fluctuations occur between 2011 
and 2012, but the scale of migration in general is not that high. Sweden shows a 
steady increase, with no decrease due to the economic crisis (for comparison of data 
for Austria, the Netherlands and Sweden see Chap. 2).
Analysing the estimates of ‘temporary migrants’ from the perspective of the 
opening of labour markets to Polish nationals, there is a clear impact caused by the 
lack of transitional arrangements in accessing the labour market by Poles in the case 
of the UK, Ireland (access in 2004) and the Netherlands (access in 2007) and no 
visible impact in the case of Sweden (access in 2004) and in the case of Austria 
(access in 2011) (see also Chap. 2; for an in-depth analysis of the role of transitional 
9 According to the Polish 2011 Census data, the United States had the third highest number of 
Polish residents who stayed abroad for over three months (219 thousand). Among the other “tradi-
tional” destination countries, 48 thousand Polish residents stayed in Canada and 14 thousand in 
Australia.
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arrangements see (Fihel et al. 2015). As Fihel and co-authors write (2015) the pri-
mary drivers of migration were labour demand and such factors as migration net-
works and socio-cultural factors (including language). The impact of transitional 
arrangements (or their lack), although, as noted above, visible in the case of some 
countries, was less important. For example, the stable increase of Poles staying 
temporarily abroad in the Netherlands between 2004 and 2006, as well as the 
increase in 2007, apart from the impact of transitional arrangements, could be 
explained as a combination of the characteristics of migration from the Opolskie 
region (traditional sending region), the structure of the Dutch labour market and the 
role of recruitment (employment) agencies. The stable increase in the case of Austria 
between 2004 and 2006 may be due to the existence of migrant networks. Meanwhile, 
the lack of drastic increase in Sweden may be due to the low demand for foreign 
workers as a result of ‘social control’ mechanisms (trade unions and employer 
agreements), where wages are fixed at a high level, which may make employing a 
foreigner less profitable. Here the employment agencies direct the flows of qualified 
manpower to specific industries where migrant workers are in demand. In addition, 
in the case of Sweden and other Scandinavian countries ‘posted worker’ arrange-
ments10 are common. Another barrier to a sudden increase in the case of Sweden are 
socio-cultural factors, such as language.
As mentioned, the employment (recruitment) agencies play an important role in 
forming the migration corridor between Poland and some of the EU countries. The 
fact that they match employer and employee, and prepare prospective employees to 
take up work abroad is mostly relevant to non-English speaking countries (Napierała 
& Fiałkowska 2013). For example, agencies from Sweden organise language 
courses for new employees, often sharing the costs with employers. Research shows 
that courses were offered in French, German, English, Swedish, Dutch or Norwegian 
(Napierała & Fiałkowska 2013). Employers anticipate that investments made in 
future employees will pay off when they start working. It is also an opportunity for 
workers to improve their skills and employability.
Who were those Poles who engaged in mobility after 2004? According to the 
CMR/BAEL database from 2004–2006 almost two-thirds of post-accession 
migrants are men. Four regions, among them Opolskie and Śląskie, are an exception 
to this masculinisation of migration. Meanwhile, 2011 Census data shows already a 
54% share of women among all emigrants (CSO 2013). Migrants involved in intra- 
European movement are also younger (on average below 30 years old) when com-
pared to pre-2004 migrants. Here again four regions, among them Opolskie, are 
exceptions, with the migrants being older (Grabowska-Lusińska & Okólski 2009). 
The 2011 Census data shows that women migrate at a younger age then men. 
However, an important share constitute also women over 60  years old (possibly 
elderly-care workers or grandmothers proving care for their grandchildren) 
(Ślusarczyk & Slany 2016). Post-accession migrants are also relatively well edu-
cated, with the share of those with higher education having increased and those with 
10 A posted worker is employed in one EU Member State but sent by his/her employer on a tempo-
rary basis to carry out his work in another Member State.
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primary education – decreased. According to the 2011 Census data women engaged 
in the post-2004 movement were better educated than men, with also a smaller share 
of women then men with primary vocational education. The share of migrants origi-
nating from towns with over 100 thousand inhabitants has increased. However, still 
the majority of migrants originated from villages (Grabowska-Lusińska & Okólski 
2009). Unfortunately the available data tells us little about the socio-economic sta-
tus of these migrants. From regional studies we know that many of those young 
migrants were graduates with no labour market experience. They were also rather 
childless. However, the proportion of accompanying dependents (under 14) has 
been growing over the past few years, which may be a sign of temporary migration 
changing into more long-term or even settlement migration (Kaczmarczyk 2013; 
CSO 2013). No mass migration of highly qualified labour was noted at that time, 
although in some professions, such as anaesthetists, the outflow was significant 
(Wiśniewski & Duszczyk 2007) (for information on types of Central and Eastern 
European migrants see Chap. 3). However, the socio-demographic diversity of this 
group points to high selectivity and suggests heterogeneity in terms of socio- 
economic status of Poles engaged in intra-European movement (see Chap. 1 in this 
volume).
As the CMR/BAEL data-base from 2004–2006 shows, the United Kingdom and 
Ireland are the main recipients of a large share of the young (not exceeding 28 years), 
relatively well educated post-accession migrants, who originate often from urban 
areas and frequently from regions which previously were not sending migrants 
abroad. 26 percent in Ireland and 22.5 percent in the UK of Poles had tertiary educa-
tion. Meanwhile, intra-European movement from Poland to Germany and the 
Netherlands is characterised by the participation of a different type of migrant: over 
40 years old, with vocational education and originating from rural areas (Grabowska- 
Lusińska & Okólski 2009, Kaczmarczyk 2010). Among migrants to the Netherlands 
only 4 percent had tertiary education. The two types of migrants in EU destination 
countries were present before 2004, however accession to the EU has changed the 
proportion of these in favour of younger, better educated, male migrants.
It is worth shortly outlining the particularities of the migration corridors, which 
are the focus of this book, these are: Austria, Sweden and the Netherlands (see also 
Chap. 2). The main regions of origin of Poles migrating to Austria are Małopolskie, 
Dolnośląskie and Podkarpackie, closely followed by the Śląskie and Mazowieckie 
regions. The first four regions of migrant origin are geographically concentrated, all 
located in the south, spatially the closest for travel to Austria. In Małopolskie, in the 
case of migrants going to Austria urban areas dominated as places of migrant origin 
(Bieńkowska et  al. 2010b). The average length of stay abroad of Dolnośląskie 
region inhabitants was two years. 57 percent of migrants from Małopolskie region 
stayed 25  months or longer in Austria. However, the Małopolskie region study 
shows also that over 28 percent of those who stayed in Austria were short-term 
migrants (between 3 and 12 months) (Bieńkowska et al. 2009, 2010b). Thus, the 
general trend is rather long-term migration, although the scale of short-term 
migrants should not be ignored.
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In the case of Sweden, the majority of Poles originated from the 
Zachodniopomorskie, Pomorskie and Mazowieckie regions (see Fig.  10.1). The 
first two regions are located in the north, neighbouring with Sweden across the 
Baltic Sea. When looking at the share of migrants to Sweden as compared to the 
total number of migrants from the region, Zachodniopomorskie, Mazowieckie and 
Dolnośląskie have the most (CSO 2013). As in the case of Austria, Poland’s EU 
accession has not significantly impacted migration from Poland to Sweden. Migrant 
networks play a role, with Sweden having already had a large Polish diaspora before 
2004 (Gerdes & Wadensjö 2013). The role of recruitment agencies is also signifi-
cant, as is the demand for highly skilled migrants originating mainly from urban 
regions. The recruitment agencies are to a large extent responsible also for the selec-
tivity of migration, with a predominance of young women in post-accession migra-
tion to Sweden.
As we will later on focus also on the regional implications of the Poland- 
Netherlands corridor, the description of this corridor is more detailed. In case of the 
Netherlands, Poles have migrated there long before Poland’s accession to the 
European Union. The autochthon population (having German roots) from the 
Opolskie region has a long history of labour migration primarily based on dual 
Polish-German citizenship (Walaszek 2007, Jończy 2014, CSO 2013, Kaczmarczyk 
2013, Chap 2). The 2002 population census showed 10,000 Poles staying temporar-
ily in the Netherlands. The scale of post-2004 migration from Poland has com-
pletely taken by surprise Netherland’s policy-makers, who were expecting 
approximately 20,000 persons arriving. The 2011 census shows a ten-fold increase 
to the data from 2002, with over 105, 000 Poles staying there temporarily.
The migrants to the Netherlands originate mainly from Southwestern Poland 
(see Fig. 10.1). The Opolskie region borders with the Czech Republic. It is known 
both for its history of emigration and the intensity of outflows. According to Jończy 
(2014) approximately 9 thousand persons are permanently absent for already sev-
eral years from the Opolskie region, which he coins as a new type of post-accession 
“suspended migration” (the total estimate for the region of those suspended 
migrants  – i.e. those who have emigrated, but did not deregister  - is 100,000). 
Estimates of unregistered emigration (permanent and labour) in the population of 
Opolskie region (total of 1013 thousand) were equal to 200 thousand persons by the 
end of 2011 (Jończy 2014). The informal channel of recruitment that developed in 
the past between Opolskie and the Netherlands was cemented and further developed 
by recruitment agencies in the 1990s, providing access to the non-autochthon popu-
lation of the region, which dominated post-accession migration.11
Apart from the already mentioned Opolskie, also Śląskie and Dolnośląskie dom-
inate as sending regions (see Fig. 10.1). The Śląskie region borders with the Czech 
11 In a study of labour demand based on the activity of private intermediary (placement) agencies 
in the Opolskie region, 57 per cent of the 67 agencies surveyed (a total of 71 agencies were as 
identified as functioning in the region) were companies with Dutch capital (Duczmal et al. 2008). 
Over 40 per cent of these agencies were based in the city of Opole, 28 per cent in the opolskie 
county and 15 per cent in the kędzierzyn-koźle county.
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Republic and Slovakia and is a traditional emigration region like Opolskie. This 
spatial closeness and existence of migrant networks are important explanations for 
the reasons for migration from this area, as in terms of economic indicators the 
region is doing well.12 At least one member of over 7 percent (120,931) of house-
holds went abroad for over three months between 2004 and 2011. From these, 
approximately 10 percent (12093) chose the Netherlands as their destination 
(Bieńkowska et al. 2011).
The Dolnośląskie region is placed at the border with Germany and the Czech 
Republic. In Dolnośląskie there is a great internal discrepancy in regard to unem-
ployment rates with the highest rate equal to 25.9 percent (wałbrzyski poviat) and 
the lowest to 4.2 percent (wrocławski poviat).13 These differences meant that the 
region was at the bottom end among regions in Poland in regard to the stability of 
the functioning of the labour market. However, thanks to the EU accession it became 
one of the fastest developing regions. Still the systemic transformations were so 
dramatic that the level of employment has not reached yet the levels from 1999.14 
Between 2004 and 2007, 6 percent (12012) of all 182,000 migrants from the 
Dolnośląskie region headed for the Netherlands (Bieńkowska et al. 2009).
Almost 90 percent of Poles staying in the Netherlands fall into the category of 
labour migrant and a significant share constitute short-term migrants (3–12 months) 
(CSO 2013). The 2011 population census data also shows that short-term migration 
(3–12 months) is certainly more significant in the case of the Netherlands, than it is 
for Sweden or Austria. This is linked to both the larger scale and the more seasonal 
character of labour migration to this country. Migration to the Netherlands was 
feminized until Poland’s EU accession and the post-accession migration brought an 
increase of male migrants (Kaczmarczyk et al. 2012).
10.3  Implications of Post-2004 Migration for Poland
Post-enlargement migration from Poland is characterised by a greater variety of 
forms then post 1989 migration, including the tendency to stay longer and even 
settle abroad (see also Chap. 2). The population outflow due to intra-European 
movement has already had enormous consequences for the intensification of depop-
ulation15 at regional and local level, especially for cities (Zborowski et  al. 2012; 
Spórna et al. 2016). This is due to the fact that particular regions in Poland are clearly 
‘migrant-sending regions’ and due to the selectivity of migration, with particular 
12 http://www.mg.gov.pl/files/upload/8436/RoG20150820_ost.pdf
13 http://wroclaw.stat.gov.pl/publikacje-i-foldery/inne-opracowania/raport-o-sytuacji-spoleczno-
gospodarczej-wojewodztwa-dolnoslaskiego-w-2014-r-,1,3.html
14 http://www.umwd.dolnyslask.pl/fileadmin/user_upload/Rozwoj_regionalny/SRWD/poprawio-
nySWOTwtorek1.pdf
15 Depopulation is understood as the phenomenon of statistical long-term population loss (Spórna 
et al. 2016)
M. Kindler
193
groups more inclined to migrate. As a result of migration population, ageing intensi-
fies. The young age of migrants has caused the birth rate to fall in Poland by approx-
imately 10 percent (Fihel & Solga 2014). This, together with the number of children 
born abroad, influences the changing population structure of Poland as a whole and 
of particular regions. Assuming no return of post-accession migration, the birth rate 
will fall by another 10 percent and by 2035 the population structure will be a chal-
lenge to the labour market with a decrease in those of working age (KBM PAN 
2014).
Focusing on the migrant sending regions to the Netherlands, Śląskie and Opolskie 
(traditional emigration regions) have to cope with consequences of depopulation 
(accompanied by low birth rates and an ageing population) (KBM PAN 2014; for 
information on consequences for receiving regions see Chap. 3). A number of towns 
in these regions can be classified as “shrinking cities”, among them in the Katowice 
conurbation (total of 33 cities) in Śląskie and small urban centres in Opolskie 
(Zborowski et al. 2012; Spórna et al. 2016). The most difficult situation is in the 
Opolskie region. As was already mentioned, according to estimates approximately 
one-third of the regions’ population have left the region over the past 35  years 
(Jończy 2014). The rate of emigration for this region is 10 times higher than the 
average rate for Poland, and the region’s birth rate is the lowest in the country. 
Depopulation has had a negative impact on development in over 70 percent of the 
Opolskie region’s counties. This is primarily due to the migration of young and 
entrepreneurial inhabitants. One in every five people aged 20–30 has left the region 
(Jończy 2014; Solga 2013). Jończy (2014) writes that emigration abroad is accom-
panied by the internal exodus of young people to large urban centres, especially to 
the city of Wrocław, both to study and to find work. As a result of all of these factors 
population ageing in this region is especially acute, with the regional government 
having established a special demographic area.16
The depopulation of the region, particularly visible in rural areas and in smaller 
cities, is accompanied by the reduction of infrastructure. Schools, kindergartens, 
and nurseries are being closed down, the number of local associations, sports clubs 
and voluntary fire brigades decreases, bus and train connections cease to exist 
(Jończy 2014, Solga 2013). This is not only the result of emigration, but it also 
becomes its additional cause, decreasing the region’s attractiveness as a place to live 
and thus making it even more prone to depopulation and emigration (Jończy 2014).
Since 1990s, the process of depopulation affected all cities of the Śląsk region. 
In the years 1990–2013, the Katowice conurbation depopulation process concerned 
32 out of 37 municipalities, characterised by urban shrinkage of some cities, with a 
large number of young people under 35 migrating to other cities and abroad. For 
example, the city of Bytom has lost practically all of its economic base - it has cur-
rently only one coal mine operating (out of 6 mines in the 1980s) and companies 
related to the fuel and clothing industries have been closed or moved to other cities. 
Approximately 8 percent of flats are uninhabited (Spórna et al. 2016).
16 http://ssd.opolskie.pl/page/
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Researchers analysing the impact of the post-accession migration on families in 
the Opolskie region, using a normative and blaming phraseology, claim that non- 
autochthon (Silesian) population is less masculinised and thus causes more often 
what has been called ‘full euro-orphanage’ (both parents working abroad and chil-
dren remaining in Poland) (Jończy 2014).17 Authorities point out the substantial 
financial strain caused by the combination of migrant workers paying taxes abroad 
and not contributing to the local budget, while at the same time expecting local 
institutions to educate their children and to care for their elderly parents. As Solga 
notes (2013) after 2004 there has been a clear increase in expenditure on elderly 
care for migrant families in 39 percent of the counties in the Opolskie region. The 
counties have to cover the full costs of home-based care or social assistance pro-
vided to elderly members of migrant families, as it is often difficult to find evidence 
of the real income of those working abroad (Solga 2013).
Depopulation is linked also to lack of labour force at the regional labour markets. 
25 percent of the gminas (administrative communities) in Opolskie experience a 
deficit of labour supply due to the migration of specialists and qualified workers 
(Solga 2013). The potential impact of post-2004 returnees on the regional labour 
markets is not yet known, as was noted earlier it seems that those who have returned 
are pre- enlargement migrants. However, the post-2004 migrants may not fill the 
gaps. As was stated before post-accession migrants to the Netherlands are predomi-
nantly temporary labour migrants, who are rather older and with vocational educa-
tion. Thus, these are not the type of returnees that local and regional authorities wish 
for (Solga 2013). Also among the returnees to Śląskie region in the period 2004–
2011, the majority did not have a proof for the new qualifications and skills they 
gained abroad (Bieńkowska et  al. 2011). As a result the unemployment rate can 
actually rise.
When it comes to the macro-economic implications, the post-2004 migration 
resulted in a decrease in the unemployment rate in Poland to below 10 per cent in 
2007 and a general improvement in economic indexes. However, these can be attrib-
uted also to other factors such as a better economic climate or wider structural 
changes. Has migration had a positive impact on the level of unemployment in the 
regional labour markets as claimed in the “crowding-out” hypothesis (Grabowska- 
Lusińska & Okólski 2009)? The hypothesis states that the people from peripheral 
regions with low financial capital an oversupply of labour move. In Opolskie the 
decrease of the unemployment rate in the years 2004–2008 is clearly visible. The 
Western part of the region was much more affected by a decrease of unemployment 
due to migration, as it was until the enlargement characterised by 2–3 times higher 
rates of unemployment then in the rest of the region (Jończy 2014). Similarly, 
migration abroad played one of the key roles as drivers of unemployment decrease 
in cities in the Katowice conurbation (Śląsk province) (Spórna et al. 2016). However, 
17 As Walczak (2014) rightly notes, although there may be negative consequences to leaving the 
socialisation and upbringing of one’s child to a (non-parent) family member, such a state cannot be 
equated with the condition of an orphan, since the parents are very much present via phone or other 
means of communication.
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since 2008 the impact has declined, with a number of migrants deciding to settle 
abroad and the purchasing power and the possibility for investments (due to the 
strengthening of the Polish currency) of the returnees having declined. A number of 
autochthons decided to return, which on the one hand resulted in partial economic 
revival, while on the other hand (combined with the macro-economic crisis) meant 
an increase in unemployment rates.
Also what should be noted from macro-economic implications is that for the past 
20 years remittances have played a growing role in the Polish economy, increasing 
from 0.5 to 1.5 per cent of GDP in the years 1995–2011, with a peak of 2.5 per cent 
of GDP in 2006–07. Remittances have contributed to the growth of real disposable 
income and to an increase in household consumption contributing a further 0.1 per-
centage points to GDP from 4.3 to 4.4 per cent (Barbone et  al. 2012). As Luca 
Barbone and other authors write: ‘The value and share of remittances in GDP 
increased considerably after Poland joined the EU and most European labour mar-
kets opened their doors to Poles. Remittances were also larger than EU transfers 
until 2008.’ Remittances have an enormous effect on macroeconomic aggregates 
(consumption and income). At the level of household budgets, Barbone and other 
authors (2012) showed that: 1) remittances are sent to a relatively small number of 
households in Poland (2.5 percent in 2008) and represent a sizeable portion of their 
incomes; and 2) recipients of remittances are mainly from small towns and rural 
areas rather than large cities.
Focusing on the Poland-Netherlands corridor remittances in the Opolskie region 
were appraised at PLN 6 billion in 2010 (approx. € 1,5 billion). This huge sum 
accounted for half of the Opolskie inhabitants’ annual disposable income and as a 
result has led the rankings of disposable income among all the regions in Poland 
(Jończy 2014). Data on other regions show that approximately one fourth of 
migrants has sent remittances in a regular fashion. According to data from a study 
(2004–2011) carried out among returnees in Śląsk, 27 percent of returnees have sent 
regular remittances while abroad (the majority a monthly amount between PLN 
1000 and PLN 2500, approx. €250–625). 19 percent sent remittances occasionally. 
What is also of great importance is that among households receiving remittances, 
they were the main source of income for 41 percent and in addition an important 
source of income for 32 percent (Bieńkowska et al. 2011). In general remittances 
were spent on consumption, renovations and buying property (evidence among 
others from Śląskie and Opolskie region) (Bieńkowska et al. 2011; Solga 2013).
It is difficult to find support in data on social remittances, which actually are a 
more long-term effect of migration. This difficulty stems partly from the newness of 
post-accession migration. According to research results from Dolnośląskie and 
Śląskie, return migrants were more open, tolerant and self-assured than before 
migration (Bieńkowska et al. 2010a, 2011). The studies mainly referred to cultural 
capital in the form of learned language and work experience that was regarded as 
valuable (i.e. helped them to find work back in Poland.) Kaczmarczyk (2012:11), 
who analyses Social Diagnosis data, writes that: ‘persons with migration experi-
ences assess their chances on the Polish labour market in a more positive way than 
non-migrants, are more self-confident, open-minded and ready to accept different 
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lifestyles, while at the same time are relatively critical of religious or political 
authorities’. However, he also points to the fact that overall the return migrants do 
share roughly the same characteristics as non-migrants. However, Gawlewicz 
(2015a), who studied how migrants and non-migrants influence each other’s ideas 
regarding sameness and difference in terms of gender, ethnicity, religion and sexual-
ity, shows that although there is a multi-sidedness to the circulation of ideas, 
migrants as ‘experts in migration’ are more often seen by non-migrants as ‘being 
correct’. This circulation of ideas is not determined by the migrants’, but occurs also 
during migration, due to regular contact via Internet and phone. Among the social 
transfers is also a particular language of difference, either that of respect (inclusive 
or ‘politically correct’) or of stigma (essentialist and orientalist understanding of 
difference), with the latter being more often transferred than the former (Gawlewicz 
2015b). The sending regions with a large share of seasonal migrants and temporary 
workers are characterised by a particular migration culture, affecting the rhythm of 
life of local inhabitants. Yet another important aspect is the transformation of atti-
tudes toward ‘traditional’ gender and family roles of post-EU enlargement migrants 
with a belief that more balance in household responsibility is needed. At the same 
time there is resistance towards these changes, with the public discourse on 
 emigration characterised by a normative and blaming phraseology18 (Grabowska & 
Engbersen 2016).
Summarising, financial remittances have a powerful impact on the overall pov-
erty rate and result in a slight decrease in income disparities (Barbone et al. 2012). 
For example, studies from the Opolskie region shows that the opportunity to work 
abroad has improved standards of living (better housing, providing education for 
children) in social groups which before migration were socio-economically margin-
alised (Jończy 2014). Although, the opportunity to earn well relatively quickly 
allowed numerous families to escape social marginalisation, regional authorities in 
general see rather the negative consequences of migration predominating. For 
regional authorities trans-European movement translates into demographic change 
and challenges related to regional development. Even within those regional authori-
ties that, due to long emigration experience, seem to be better prepared for dealing 
with the challenges and facilitating migrants’ return, new counties start to send 
migrants, and demand a response to the consequences from the local authorities. 
Some representatives of the authorities claim the migration of those who belong to 
a labour oversupply (young graduates) and the return of migrants with new skills 
and capital as positive implications. Even the positive aspect of remittances with 
increased consumption and overall improvement of living standards of migrant 
families has another side results in polarised development of regions. The outflow 
of the most entrepreneurial and relatively well educated has demographic, social 
and economic consequences and intensifies this polarisation. Apart from the 
Opolskie region, hardly any of the regional development strategies respond to inter-
national migration issues.
18 For a more detailed discussion see Kindler 2015.
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10.4  EU Mobility and Third-Country Nationals Migration 
as two Sides of the Coin: Poland’s Governance 
Responses
In general, contemporary migration, meaning actually intra-European movement, 
was not until recently among the Polish state’s priorities. The authorities saw their 
obligations as being primarily towards Polonia – to those who had long been settled 
abroad, but especially to Polish ethnic minorities in the countries of the former 
Soviet Union. The Poles abroad who are of greatest interest to representatives of the 
state are those who can ‘stand for Poland’: those working in international organisa-
tions, Polonia leaders, etc. The more challenging migrants – those who are exploited, 
are victims of trafficking or have failed to integrate abroad – were for a long time 
seen as having to bear the burdens of their own migration decisions. However, the 
scale of post-accession migration, its consequences for particular regions in Poland 
in terms of labour shortages and a change in institutional competencies19 resulted in 
the inclusion of post-accession migrants as one of the groups addressed by the dias-
pora policy. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), which has taken over responsi-
bilities for Poles abroad, provides funds to civil society in Poland and abroad, 
supporting both Polonia and contemporary migrants with top-down activities 
(administrative determinants of governance). This funding programme also forces 
the professionalisation of Polonia organisations and a change from state-centric to 
civil society-centric in terms of implementation of activities (although financed 
from the national budget).
In regard to the protection of Poles rights abroad, there is a scarcity of bilateral 
and transnational forms of governance. The migration corridor between Poland and 
the Netherlands is a rare case that provides some examples. The transnational co- 
operation takes place at different levels. When it comes to the country level, such 
institutions as the Polish Social Insurance Institution (ZUS) and the National Labour 
Inspectorate (PIP) send their representatives abroad to organise meetings with 
Polish migrants and opening liaison offices abroad. In addition, in November 2006 
the Polish National Labour Inspectorate (PIP) and its Dutch counterpart 
(Arbeidsinspectie) signed an agreement on co-operation and data exchange that 
covers existing legal regulations, placed workers and workers’ complaints. It is 
clear that those migrants using intermediary agencies get most of their information 
from these agencies, and if inaccurate, or deliberately false, information is provided 
to the potential migrant, they are at increased risk of becoming victims of human 
trafficking. In 2014 the Netherlands’ Embassy in Poland began to develop a regional 
network on labour migration, funded by various authorities in the Netherlands. Its 
principal mission is to engage with local networks, experts and civil society in 
Poland, and to provide pre-departure information for potential migrants. Regarding 
19 Until 2007 the Polish Senate was responsible for Polonia issues and the notion of ‘caring for the 
diaspora’ was present in the discourse. With the MFA taking over responsibilities for Poles abroad 
the discourse shifted to treating the diaspora as a partner.
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multi-level governance, many bottom-up activities are funded or co-funded nation-
ally. There are examples of projects carried out between Polish and Dutch regula-
tory bodies, civil society, local, regional and national authorities aimed at preventing 
exploitation of Polish migrant workers.20 Among the organisations involved in such 
projects are La Strada Poland, the NGO FairWork,21 the Association of Polish 
Women in the Netherlands22 and the Foundation Barka NL.23
Returning to the country-level of governance, in 2008 an Interdepartmental 
Working Group on Return Migration was appointed which developed a programme 
that assumed the government should not try to influence individual migrants’ deci-
sions to return, but rather should provide migrants with necessary information 
enabling them to make an informed decision (Duszczyk et al. 2009). The  programme 
was quite ambitious and consisted of several packages. The main flagship however 
was the information portal POWROTY (returns) launched in 2009. The most sys-
tematic examples from the local (urban) level of governance are regional policy 
solutions concerned with the outcomes of migration in the Opolskie province. In 
2007 the local authority launched the ‘Opolskie – I’m staying here’ project to pro-
mote employment and professional development within the region and thus decrease 
the number of migrants. The programme is also aimed at potential students and 
migrant returnees. Regional office representatives took part in employment fairs in 
numerous European countries to promote returning to the Opolskie region among 
Polish migrants. Information meetings about unemployment benefit and business 
start-up funds were held in countries where Poles were working and planning to 
return. The ‘Opolskie – I’m going to live here’ programme, in place since 2009, 
aims to ameliorate the effects of migration from the region and the resulting depop-
ulation, and to encourage people from other regions by promoting sales of land. The 
demographic impact of migration is regarded as the most significant obstacle to the 
regional development strategy for the years 2012–20.24
However, the absence of a significant number of Poles, combined with a very low 
fertility rate and accelerated ageing of the population (CSO 2013, European 
Migration Network and European Policy Committee, 2011), meant that the share of 
economically active population decreased and the share of economically passive 
population of Poland increased. Counting on returnees did not seem to be sufficient. 
In 2006 the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy stated that labour shortages were 
becoming a serious issue and the government needs to elaborate a ‘method of ensur-
ing a decent amount of highly qualified workers to address the current state of 
affairs within the Polish and the international labour market” (Sejm RP 2006 cited 
in Duszczyk et al. 2010: 69). As a result of these declarations Poland introduced 
already in 2006 a simplified employment scheme for short-term workers from coun-
tries of the Eastern Partnership, including Ukraine. This scheme allowed citizens’ of 
20 For a more detailed discussion on the different forms of governance see Kindler 2015.
21 http://www.fairwork.nu/polska.html
22 http://www.topolki.nl/
23 http://www.barkanl.org/
24 For a more detailed discussion see Kindler 2015.
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Poland’s neighbouring countries to take up employment in agriculture and horticul-
ture without a work permit for a period of three months within six months. It enabled 
farmers to employ foreign workers already in the harvest period of 2006. This regu-
lation was further liberalised in 2009, with today citizens of five countries allowed 
to work for up to six months within a twelve month period without a work permit. 
Although the declarations concerned highly qualified workers, this ordinance 
attracted mainly low skilled workers. Over 1.3 million (96 per cent of all declara-
tions) employer’s declarations was issued to Ukrainian nationals in 2016,, while in 
the first half of 2017 there were 947,917declarations registered to Ukrainian nation-
als showing the significant demand for foreign workforce.25 Since 2009 employers, 
who have employed a foreigner who entered on the basis of the mentioned declara-
tion and work for at least 3 months, can apply for a work permit without the labour 
market test.26 From 2012 to 2014 the regional (voivodship) administrative offices 
issued 12,984 work permits without the labour market test. This constituted 11.14 
per cent of all work permits issued in that period. Further liberalisation of access to 
Poland’s labour market is visible in changes in the procedure for granting work 
permits to foreigners, which was time-consuming and expensive for employers until 
2007. The legal changes starting in 2007 regarding the labour market and promotion 
of employment simplified the process and speeded it up, as well as considerably 
reducing the fees paid by employers when applying for a work permit or for an 
extension of a work permit.
The character of immigration is “island-like” – concerning only certain regions 
in Poland (mainly well prospering and eastern border regions), while in others 
migrants are practically nonexistent. Ukrainian migrants are mainly concentrated in 
large towns and urban centres, with a clear predominance of the Mazowieckie 
region, with the capital, Warsaw (Fihel 2006; Górny and Toruńczyk-Ruiz 2014). 
The Mazowieckie region has the lowest unemployment rate and the highest number 
of those economically active in Poland. The Ukrainian labour migrants, similarly to 
Poles migrating abroad, are on average relatively young (below 40 years old). The 
majority of Ukrainians are relatively well educated, with the greater part having at 
least secondary vocational education (Kaczmarczyk 2015), however the agreement 
on mutual recognition of education (2005) is not de facto applicable, as a lion’s 
share end up in low-skilled or unskilled jobs.
Important to mention is the presence of a segmented labour market, with Poles 
being less and less willing to work in the secondary sector of the labour market for 
a low remuneration. This makes the Ukrainian migrants a complementary labour 
force, with most migrants engaged in seasonal work in agriculture, but also in con-
struction and domestic work, including elderly and child-care. The implications of 
the presence of Ukrainian labour force is especially important for those regions 
where labour market sectors, such as agriculture (for the Mazowieckie, Lubelskie, 
Podkarpackie and Małopolskie regions), play a dominant role. The presence of 
25 Data from the Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Policy https://www.mpips.gov.pl/analizy-i-
raporty/cudzoziemcy-pracujacy-w-polsce-statystyki/
26 A labour market test proves that no Polish worker can perform the duties offered.
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Ukrainian women in the domestic works sector translates also in the possibility for 
Polish women to enter the labour market, and fill-out an important institutional 
care-gap. However, at the same time a petrification of domestic work as ‘women’s 
work’ occurs, with Polish men not engaged (Kindler et al. 2016). Ukrainian migrants 
are also visible in education – as either foreign language teachers working in pro-
vincial schools or as teachers of Russian or Ukrainian language in private language 
schools. In the former case they have a very positive impact on the respective town, 
where it is usually difficult to find Polish teachers for the position (Bieniecki & 
Pawlak 2008).
As some scholars claim budget losses occur due to the unofficial character of 
work (no taxes) and little spending by Ukrainian migrants in Poland (mainly spend-
ing in Ukraine) (Brunarska et al. 2012). However, these budget losses are disput-
able. As a recent study considering different scenarios of the fiscal impact of 
Ukrainian migration shows there might not be any, rather the opposite. As 
Kaczmarczyk writes (2015:28), “Ukrainian immigrants not only do make a positive 
contribution to the Polish public finances but it is higher than in case of the native- 
born”. As the author explains this is a result of the particular forms of labour market 
incorporation, rather than a function of the socio-demographic characteristics of 
Ukrainians migrants. However, at the same time, a complete legalisation of migrants 
from Ukraine in Poland is expected to translate into a significant increase of the tax 
base and extension of the revenue side (Kaczmarczyk 2015). The Polish migration 
policy points among the future needs and recommendations of further action to 
provide novel legal channels for managing labour migration, thus reducing the 
scope for irregular migration and to create a welcoming environment for the settle-
ment of migrants who are perceived to improve significantly the competitiveness of 
the Polish economy. Still, the Polish authorities show no political will to adopt a 
migrant integration policy, with a strategic document prepared by a few dedicated 
administrative officials and experts waiting “in the drawer”. In general, having a 
large group of irregular migrants may mean a marginalised and exploited group that 
the state will have at some point to take responsibility for.
10.5  Conclusions
During the communist era emigration from Poland was closely controlled by the 
state, restricted and politicized, which is reflected in the great value placed by Poles 
on freedom of movement within the EU. This freedom as such is an important factor 
in triggering migration from Poland.
The character of pre- accession migration and intra-European movement did not 
change substantially in the case of Poles. What has changed significantly is the scale 
of temporary labour migration – with a significant increase in the stock of migrants 
in the United Kingdom, Ireland and the Netherlands and gradual but highly selec-
tive increase (with young women dominating) of the migrant stock in the case of 
Sweden. What is also important, there are signs of temporary migration changing 
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into more long-term or even settlement migration. It seems that transitional arrange-
ments as to the opening of labour markets were not of key importance, and social 
factors, such as existing networks and recruitment agencies, as well as cultural fac-
tors, such as language, did play important roles in the formation of the migration 
corridors from Poland.
As at length presented in this chapter, the implications for Poland’s main sending 
regions, range from outright negative such as depopulation, in some cases charac-
terised by the shrinkage of cities, decrease of labour force and increase in intra- 
regional inequalities, to a few positive (among others improved the lot of individual 
families). When it comes to governance responses to those implications we can 
point at the country-level to three main changes in state policies (1) the redefinition 
of policy towards the diaspora by identifying the post-accession migrants as one of 
the addressees, as well as providing support for organisations representing Polonia 
and Poles abroad, (2) liberalisation of access to the labour market for third-country 
nationals, (3) activities facilitating return (both at state and at regional level). The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (MFA) governance towards Poles abroad is clearly ‘in 
the making’. They are attempting to harmonise the very different interests of the 
diverse Polish community abroad. We need to note the changes that occurred after 
the 2015 elections, with the party Law and Justice in power. The current Minister of 
Foreign Affairs has already announced that the Polish Senate will again receive the 
competencies for the Polish diaspora and the emphasis will be yet again on “Polonia 
in the East”. At the local (urban) governance level, bottom-up activities are much 
more ad hoc, but also seem to be more responsive to the specific needs of migrants 
and overall migration implications. However, examples of a systemic form of 
migration governance can be found in the case of Opolskie province.
Poland is  - similarly to the Czech Republic (see Chap. 6) and to Turkey (see 
Chap. 8) – a special case in the ‘IMAGINATION’ research analysis. It is both a 
sending and a receiving country. Poland’s responses towards the entry and work of 
Ukrainian migrants provide evidence how the consequences of free movement are 
not limited to EU territory. Intra-European mobility and migration of third country 
nationals, while treated often as two separate phenomena by policy-makers, are two 
sides of the same coin. For Poland this means a double governance challenge. Apart 
from informing its citizens abroad on the possibilities of return to Poland, they 
responded to the labour demand created partly by Poles leaving by simplifying the 
access to the labour market by Ukrainians. The question remains whether the facili-
tated access to labour markets for Ukrainians really was an answer to the conse-
quences of Poles leaving. Probably to a small extent. It rather was an answer to the 
changes within Polish society and labour market, making the complementarity (in 
the terms of competence) of Ukrainian labour force debatable. Ukrainians take over 
those jobs that Poles are able to do (in terms of competence), but are not willing to 
do due to unfavourable working conditions. Whether these who have previously 
worked in jobs currently occupied by Ukrainians is not clear. Looking at the regions 
from which Poles have emigrated and which experience depopulation do not have, 
most, apart from Opolskie region, a policy actively attracting immigrants (both 
internal and external) to settle. Thus, regional governments do not as of yet use the 
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emigration-immigration nexus for their benefit. Time will tell whether the gover-
nance of third-country nationals will contribute to solving the challenges related to 
consequences of intra-European mobility in Poland.
References
Anacka, M., & Okólski, M. (2014). Migracja z Polski po akcesji do Unii Europejskiej. In 
M.  Lesińska, M.  Okólski, K.  Slany, & B.  Solga (Eds.), Dekada członkostwa Polski w 
UE. Społeczne skutki emigracji Polaków po 2004 roku (pp. 45–70). Warszawa: Wydawnictwa 
Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego.
Augustyn, M. (2010). Opieka długoterminowa w Polsce. Opis, diagnoza, rekomendacje. 9 Availabe 
at: http://rszarf.ips.uw.edu.pl/kierunki/ODzielona.pdf
Barbone, L., Piętka-Kosińska, K. & Topińska, I. (2012). “The Impact of Remittances on Poland’s 
Economy” CASE Network E-briefs. Available at: http://www.case-research.eu/sites/default/
files/publications/2012-12_Barbone.pdf
Bieniecki, M., & Pawlak, M. (2008). Wpływ integracji migrantów na lokalne społeczności. 
Warszawa: Instytut Spraw Publicznych.
Bieńkowska, D., C.  Ulasiński, J.  Szymańska (2009). Migracja powrotna w województwie 
Dolnośląskim. Skala zjawiska, potencjał oraz pogłębiona charakterystyka powracających 
(Return migration in the Dolnośląskie region). Opracowanie w ramach projektu Kierunek 
Śląsk. Centrum Doradztwa Strategicznego: Kraków.
Bieńkowska, D., Ulasiński, C., & Szymańska, J. (2010). Warto Wracać? Strategie zachowań ree-
migrantów i rozwiązania służące wykorzystaniu ich potencjału. Opracowanie w ramach pro-
jektu Kierunek Dolny Śląsk. Kraków: Centrum Doradztwa Strategicznego.
Bieńkowska, D., Ulasiński, C., & Szymańska, J.  (2010b). Powroty z migracji zagranicznych 
do Małopolski. Opracowanie w ramach projektu Kierunek Małopolska. Kraków: Centrum 
Doradztwa Strategicznego.
Bieńkowska, D., Szymańska, J., Ulasiński, C., Gruszka, M., Majka, M., Chodacz, W., Trzaskalski, 
B., & Nowak-Trojnar, N. (2011). Wyjazdy i powroty z emigracji mieszkańców województwa 
śląskiego (Migration and return of the śląskie region inhabitants). Kraków: Wyniki badań. 
Opracowanie w ramach projektu Kierunek Śląsk. Centrum Doradztwa Strategicznego.
Brunarska, Z., M.  Grotte & M.  Lesińska (2012). Migracje obywateli Ukrainy do Polski w 
kontekście rozwoju społeczno-gospodarczego: stan obecny, polityka, transfery pieniężne. 
CMR WP 60/118. Migration Research Centre, University of Warsaw. Available at: http://www.
migracje.uw.edu.pl/publ/2017/
CSO (2013). Migracje zagraniczne ludności. Narodowy Spis Powszechny Ludności i Mieszkań 
2011 (Population migration abroad. National Population Census 2011).Warsaw: Central 
Statistical Office. Available at: http://old.stat.gov.pl/gus/5840_14782_PLK_HTML.htm
CSO (2015). Concise statistical yearbook of Poland 2015, GUS/CSO. Available at: http://stat.gov.
pl/obszary-tematyczne/roczniki-statystyczne/roczniki-statystyczne/maly-rocznik-statystyc-
zny-polski-2015,1,16.html.
Duszczyk, M., Kaczmarczyk, P. & Rusielewicz, A. (2009). Raport z działania grupy roboczej 
ds. migracji powrotnych Polaków (Report of workinggroup on return migration of Poles), 
Kancelaria Prezesa Rady Ministrów. Warszawa.
Duszczyk M., Lesińska, M., Stefańska, R., Szczepański, M., & Szulecka, M (2010). Polityka 
migracyjna w Polsce oraz jej wpływ na napływ i osiedlanie się imigrantów. W: Górny A, 
I. Grabowska-Lusińska, M. Lesinska, M. Okólski. Transformacja nieoczywista. Polska jako 
kraj imigracji, pp. 69–124. Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego. Warszawa.
European Migration Network, European Policy Committee (2011). The 2012 Ageing report: 
Underlying assumptions and projections methodologies, European Economy Series 
M. Kindler
203
Np. 4/2011, Brussels. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/
european_economy/2011/pdf/ee-2011-4_en.pdf
Fihel, A. (2006). Przestrzenny wzorzec osiedlania się cudzoziemców w Polsce. Studia 
Demograficzne, 2, 49–67.
Fihel, A. and Solga, B. (2014). Demograficzne konsekwencje emigracji poakcesyjnej. W: Lesińska 
M., M. Okólski, K. Slany, B. Solga (red.). Dekada członkostwa Polski w UE. Społeczne skutki 
emigracji Polaków po 2004 roku, pp. 87–108. Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego. 
Warszawa.
Fihel, A., Janicka, A., Kaczmarczyk, P. & Nestorowicz, J.  (2015) Free movement of workers 
and transnational arrangements: Lessons from the 2004 and 2007 enlargements”. European 
Commission. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=89&newsId=
2223&furtherNews=yes
Fiń, A. (2014). Współczesna emigracja polska w Stanach Zjednoczonych: liczebność, rozmieszc-
zenie przestrzenne, przyczyny wyjazdów. Studia Migracyjne  – Przegląd Polonijny, nr, 2, 
105–130.
Gawlewicz, A. (2015a). ‘We inspire each other, subconsciously’: The circulation of attitudes 
towards difference between Polish migrants in the UK and their significant others in the send-
ing society. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 41(13), 2215–2234. https://doi.org/10.1
080/1369183X.2015.1045463.
Gawlewicz, A. (2015b, December). Production and Transnational Transfer of the Language of 
Difference: The Effects of Polish Migrants’ Encounters with Superdiversity. Central and 
Eastern European Migration Review, 4(2), 25–42.
Gerdes, Ch. & Wadensjö, E. (2013). Immigration to Sweden from the new EU member states. 
Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies.
Górny, A., & Toruńczyk-Ruiz, S. (2014). Neighbourhood attachment in ethnically diverse areas: 
The role of Interetnic ties. Urban Studies, 51(5), 1000–1018.
Grabowska-Lusińska, I. & Okólski, M. (2009). Emigracja ostatnia? Wydawnictwo Naukowe 
Scholar. Warszawa.
Grzymała-Kazłowska, A. (2013). Migration and socio-demographic processes in central and 
Eastern Europe: Characteristics, specificity and internal differences. Central and Eastern 
European Migration Review, 2(1), 2013. http://www.ceemr.uw.edu.pl/vol-2-no-1-june-2013/
editorial/migration-and-socio-demographic-processes-central-and-eastern-europe.
Jończy, R. (2014). Ekonomiczno-społeczne skutki współczesnych migracji na przykładzie region 
opolskiego. Warszawa: Komitet Badań nad Migracjami Polskiej Akademii Nauk.
Kaczmarczyk, P. (2010). Poakcesyjne migracje Polaków. Próba bilansu, Studia Migracyjne  – 
Przegląd Polonijny, nr, 4, 5–36.
Kaczmarczyk, P. (2012). Matching return migrants’ competencies and labour market needs – the 
case of Polish returnees. Paper prepared for the OECD conference ‘The Economic Impact of 
Emigration in Latvia and the other Baltic Countries: Challenges and Policy Implications’, 17 
December 2012.
Kaczmarczyk, P. & Lesińska, M. (2012). Return Migration, State Policy and Integration of 
Returnees – The case of Poland. In: Isabell Zwania-Rößler & Vanya Ivanova (eds) Welcome 
Home. Challenges and Chances of Return Migration. Transatlantic Forum on Migration and 
Integration. Available at: www.gmfus.org/file/2876/download
Kaczmarczyk (2013) Are immigrants a burden for the state budget? Review paper. European 
University Institute. Italy. Available at:http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/28637/
RSCAS_2013_79.pdf?sequence=1.
Kaczmarczyk, P. (2014) Recent Trends in International Migration to Poland. The 2012 SOPEMI 
Report. Available at: http://www.migracje.uw.edu.pl/publ/2373/
Kaczmarczyk, P. (2015) Burden or Relief? Fiscal Impacts of Recent Ukrainian Migration to 
Poland. IZA, Discussion Paper No. 8779. Bonn. Access at http://ftp.iza.org/dp8779.pdf
Kaczmarczyk, P., Lesińska, M., & Stefańska, R. (2012). Polacy przebywający czasowo w 
Królestwie Niderlandów. Warszawa: Opracowanie. Fundacja Ośrodek Badań nad Migracjami.
10 Poland’s Perspective on the Intra-European Movement of Poles. Implications…
204
KBM PAN (2014). Społeczne skutki poakcesyjnych migracji ludności Polski. Raport Komitetu 
Badań nad Migracjami Polskiej Akademii Nauk.Warszawa.
Kindler, M. (2015) “A closer look at the mobility of poles. Post-accession migration to Austria, 
the Netherlands and Sweden – Its character, its impact on Poland and its governance” Country 
report – Poland. IMAGINATION working paper. Available at: http://project-imagination.net/
publications/country-reports/294-country-report-poland
Kindler, M., Kordasiewicz A. & Szulecka, M. (2016). Care needs and migration for domestic 
work: Ukraine-Poland. International Labour Organization. Geneva. (report).
MI (2012). Polityka migracyjna Polski. Stan obecny i postulowane działania. Warsaw: Ministry 
of Interior.
Napierała, J. & K. Fiałkowska (2013). Mapping the market for employment agencies in Poland. 
In: Jon Horgen Friberg& Line Eldring (eds) Labour migrants from central and Eastern Europe 
in the Nordic countries patterns of migration, working conditions and recruitment practices. 
Nordic Council of Ministers. Denmark. Online: http://norden.diva-portal.org/smash/get/
diva2:702572/FULLTEXT01.pdf
Ślusarczyk, M. & Slany, K. (2016) „Demograficzne i socjologiczne implikacje wyjazdów z Polski. 
Dyskusja na bazie wyników narodowego spisu powszechnego 2011 roku”. Studia Migracyjne- 
Przegląd Polonijny z.1 (159), pp.127–150.
Solga, B. (2013). Miejsce i znaczenie migracji zagranicznych w rozwoju regionalnym (the place 
and meaning of migration abroad for regional development). Opole: Politechnika Opolska.
Spórna T., Kantor-Pietraga, I. & Krzysztofik, R. (2016) „Trajectories of depopulation and urban 
shrinkage in the Katowice conurbation, Poland”, Espace populations societies, 2015/3–2016/1 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/eps.6102.
Walaszek, A. (2007). Migracje Europejczyków 1650 – 1990. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu 
Jagiellońskiego. Kraków.
Walczak B. (2014). Dziecko, rodzina i szkoła wobec migracji rodzicielskich: 10 lat po akcesji do 
Unii Europejskiej. Rzecznik Praw Dziecka. Warsaw: Pedagogium. Available at: http://brpd.
gov.pl/sites/default/files/raport_-_dziecko_rodzina_i_szkola_wobec_migracji_rodziciels-
kich_-_10_lat_po_akcesji_do_unii_europejskiej.pdf
Wiśniewski, J. & Duszczyk, M. (2007). Migracje zarobkowe Polaków po 1 maja 2004. In: L. 
Kolarska-Bobińska (ed.) Emigrować i wracać. Migracje zarobkowe Polaków a polityka 
państwa. Instytut Spraw Publicznych. Warszawa.
Zborowski, Andrzej, Soja, Maria and Anna Łobodzińska (2012) Population trends in Polish cities- 
stagnation, depopulation or shrinkage? Prace Geograficzne, zeszyt 130. Doi….
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, 
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate 
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and 
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative 
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not 
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by 
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from 
the copyright holder.
M. Kindler
205© The Author(s) 2018 
P. Scholten, M. van Ostaijen (eds.), Between Mobility and Migration, IMISCOE 
Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77991-1_11
Chapter 11
Intra-European Movement of Czechs 
with Special Regard to Austria and Care 
Givers (The “MICO” Type - Between 
MIgration and COmmuting)
Dušan Drbohlav and Lenka Pavelková
11.1  Introduction
A new era in the field of European migration came in the late 1980s and the very 
beginning of the 1990s when CEE countries freed themselves from communism 
and started to build their new democratic future. Deep societal (political and eco-
nomic) transition and transformation processes in this region were crowned in 2004 
when 8 CEE countries joined the European Union (EU). New migratory patterns 
typically showed increasing flows correlating with the date of joining the EU how-
ever, these patterns started to evolve only step by step over time.1 In any case, the 
intensity of international migration of CEE citizens both within and outside the EU 
depends on many various factors related to both macro and micro level characteris-
tics of the given country of origin – be it socioeconomic conditions, working oppor-
tunities, living standard, mentality, age, life satisfaction but also experience of 
migration movements and their historical context, existing social networks abroad 
and the “strength” and activities of respective diasporas. On the other hand, condi-
tions in countries of destination matter too (e.g. Fassmann et al. 2014a).
Our goal is to contribute to the topic of intra-European migration while elaborat-
ing more on emigration of Czechs or rather on intra-European migration mobility of 
Czech citizens in general and their migration movements to Austria in particular. 
The emigration or long-term migration of Czechs (by contrast to immigration) and 
related patterns were almost ignored by the academic sphere (see exceptions to this 
trend  – Nešpor 2002; Brouček et  al. 2001; Hrubý, Brouček 2000; Filípek 1999; 
1 There are various studies informing us about migration and mobility to the EU, within the EU 
generally, between individual European regions or even between EU member states (see e. g. 
Okolski 2012; Verwiebe et al. 2014; Kahanec et al. 2014; Fassmann et al. 2014; Favell 2013, 2008; 
O’Reilly 2007; Engbersen et al. 2013; Bahna 2015; Verwiebe et al. 2015).
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Brouček, Grulich 2014; Pařízková 2011; Vavrečková, Hantak 2008; Vavrečková 
et  al. 2000; 2008; Drbohlav, Rákoczyová 2012; Kuchyňková, Ezzeddine 2015). 
Therefore there is not much information we can rely on.
The chapter is structured into four sections. Following this introduction, selected 
available  information about emigration and long-term migration of Czechs is 
presented. Some of the migratory/mobility flow and stock data for Czechs to/in 
Austria are also highlighted. Furthermore, our empirical study on Czech care givers 
in Austria, the topic which has not been much tackled so far, is introduced. The 
conclusion summarizes the most important results. Comments on how the given 
migratory patterns of Czech care givers fit other migratory types known among 
intra-European CEEc migrants are also made.
11.1.1  Emigration and Labour Migration from Czechia 
Abroad – Basic Parametres and Patterns
When dealing with the Czech international migration data, one has to mention that 
the flow as well as the stock emigration data is incomplete. Obviously, data on emi-
gration of Czech citizens from Czechia is underestimated because, although citizens 
are obliged to declare a change of their permanent residence when emigrating 
abroad (leaving the country for a longer period or forever), they often do not follow 
this obligation (Kupiszewska, Nowok 2006, see also Fassmann et al. 2014a, b). In 
fact, the same fact is typical of many other EU countries and their intra-European 
migrations – very often they are not recorded and reported to respective authorities 
(see e.g. Verwiebe et al. 2014).
Despite logical expectations for more intensive international migration move-
ments of Czechs after the Velvet Revolution, Czechs have always been rather reluc-
tant to move. A summary of the most important factors which stand behind the low 
level of emigration (and long-term international migration) from a 1994 quotation 
is still relevant today: “Czechs seem to be firmly rooted in their own country. 
Although there is a tradition of emigration there are factors curbing the numbers of 
those leaving the country. First, there is the not completely unrealistic hope of a bet-
ter tomorrow. Secondly, people always were and more so are tied to their own coun-
try (strong emotional ties to their properties and home than in many other countries). 
Thirdly, there is a heritage of the last forty years during which nearly all aspects of 
“personal activities“ (a very important factor to emigration) were subjugated (… 
this is valid especially for middle-aged and older individuals who also often suffer 
from the lack of knowledge of foreign languages … - new remark). Fourthly, it is 
typical of the Czech mentality in particular not to solve a situation directly and 
drastically“ (Drbohlav 1994: 102; see also Drbohlav, Rákoczyová 2012; Hampl 
et al. 1999 – some of the above aspects can also explain low intensity of internal 
migration in Czechia). Moreover, “fascination with the West” has diminished whilst 
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being transformed into short or very short visits focusing on education, tourism, 
recreation or shopping. In addition, living standards in Czechia vis-à-vis old mem-
ber states have been, albeit slowly, increasing while more working opportunities 
have started to appear.2 Overall, regardless of the gradually less restrictive (intra-
 EU) policies of the old member states as potential destinations, the estimated emi-
gration flow out of Czechia has been perceived as rather low so far (see Vavrečková 
et al. 2000) and its impacts on the society as a whole have been rather small (except 
for a very specific issue of Roma emigration and border zone circular labour migra-
tion at the beginning of the 1990s). Simply expressed, immigration rather than emi-
gration has become an issue in Czechia.3
As Table 11.1 demonstrates Czechia, except for 2013, has recently been gaining 
population via the international migration. The overall immigration has been 
increasing after a drop in 2011 (due to the global crisis) whereas the overall emigra-
tion oscillates between around 6,000 people emigrating in 2011 and 31,000 people 
emigrating in 2013. The emigration of Czechs according to the official statistics 
represents numbers between 2,000 and 4,0004 for a period 2009–2014. The problem 
is that this data is unreliable and many of those who had left the country are not 
taken into account, including migrants moving to other EU countries.
2 Very good economic performance in Czechia was interrupted by the global economic crisis in 
2008, nevertheless, the current economic development of the country measured via GDP growth is 
among the highest in the whole EU (as of the third quarter of 2015 – 4.5%) and is accompanied by 
low inflation rate (0.4% in 2014) and very low unemployment rate (as of October 2015 – 4.8%), 
too - see https://www.czso.cz/.
3 The booming economy (especially in the mid of the 1990s, between 2000 and 2008 and since 
2014 onwards) created strong “pulls” and in some of these periods brought increasing numbers of 
foreign labour force to Czechia: number of immigrants residing in Czechia grew from 78,000 in 
1993 to 254,000 in 2004 and to the current 451,923 (as of December 2014 – see http://www.mvcr.
cz/clanek/cizinci-s-povolenym-pobytem.aspx?q=Y2hudW09MQ%3d%3d)
4 Between 1994 and 2000 registered emigration figures did not exceed 1,300 persons a year (this 
figure includes both foreigners and Czech citizens). After 2000, registered outmigration increased 
mainly due to foreign nationals leaving Czechia while the number of Czech citizens emigrating 
according to official statistics remained very low during the 2000s. Recently (2005–2009) this 
number has been around 2,000 persons (regardless of the change of emigration intensity as a 
whole).
Table 11.1 Immigration to and emigration from Czechia, (flows) 2009–2014
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Immigration 39,973 30,515 22,590 30,298 29,579 41,625
Citizins of Czechia 1,174 2,469 1,917 1,691 1,736 3,135
Emigration 11,629 14,867 5,701 20,005 30,876 19,964
Citizens of Czechia 2,279 2,386 3,233 3,331 3,724 3,910
Overall net migration 28,344 15,648 16,889 10,293 −1,297 21,661
Source: Czech Statistical Office (n.d.)
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Some of the information about Czech emigrants abroad can be taken from the 
EUROSTAT databases about Czech citizens living in other EU member states5 
(stock data). According to this source, the most numerous Czech minorities living 
abroad long-term (data for 2014 or 2013) are in Germany (43,000), Slovakia 
(12,000) Austria (10,000), Spain (9,000) and Switzerland, Italy and Ireland (between 
5,000 and 6,000). As the data proves, there has been a significant increase of the 
given numbers from the 2000s onwards. On the other hand, in comparative perspec-
tive (Czechia vis-à-vis other “emigration countries”) increasing of Czech intra-EU 
migratory mobility is in relative terms rather moderate (see Fassmann et  al. 
2014a, b). If the most recent data is summarized for the EU countries (although 
using the incomplete database, e.g. not including data for France or the United 
Kingdom) there were around 93,000 Czech citizens living in other EU member 
states in 2014. Whereas there is no specific and “robust“ data about their reasons for 
migration, we can deduce that economic motives clearly predominate (see also 
Vavrečková et al. 2000, 2008; Vavrečková 2014).
Table 11.2 (see annex) brings another stock data – data from different sources put 
together by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. This kind of data gives a very 
rough estimate of the Czech citizens employed in the EU and Switzerland between 
2006 and 2014. These estimates indicate that numbers of Czech citizens abroad had 
increased significantly over time reaching around 112,000 in 2014. Since 2008, the 
estimated figures of Czechs employed in Austria have been significantly increasing 
too, with almost 13,000 Czechs in 2014. According to this data source, Austria 
ranks third among the given countries after the United Kindom and Germany where 
some 37,000 and 32,000 (respectively) Czechs might have worked in 2014.
11.1.2  Czechs in Austria
Because of many historical ties, Austria has been a traditional destination for CEE 
migrants for a long time. More specifically, in 2013 Czechs ranked the fourth most 
numerous immigrant (foreign-born) group in Austria among CEE with around 
42,000 people (14.1%)6 (many of them however, had already lived in Austria for 
many decades – see also Fassmann et al. 2014a, b; Reeger, Enengel 2015). Migrants 
from Czechia were also part of temporary, mostly circular and often cross-border 
movements just after the Velvet Revolution, i.e. in the early 1990s (see also sources 
in Verwiebe et al. 2014). This flow continues although it has been diminishing. 
The data from the latest Czech Census 2011 shows that 5,109 Czechs7 acknowl-
edged their regular cross-border commuting to Austria. Majority of them were eco-
5 The data sources are administrative records or national surveys. For some datasets statistical esti-
mation methods are applied, mostly based on census, migration and vital statistics data – see more: 
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do
6 After Romanians, Poles and Hungarians (Fassmann et al. 2014a, b).
7 0.5 million people however, did not answer the respective Census questions at all.
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nomically active people commuting for work, with 46% commuting daily and 26% 
weekly.
As indicated above, between 10,000 and 13,000 “new Czechs” may be currently 
living and/or working in Austria. This is further supported by the data from The 
Public Employment Service Austria (“Arbeitsmarktservice” -  www.ams.at) that 
shows that 12,742 Czechs worked in Austria at the end of 2014 (data based on social 
security payments). These numbers have been growing over time – e.g. in 2009 it 
was only 5,136 migrants. It seems that some of these migrants commute (see above) 
which is why most of them work in federal states bordering with Czechia – Lower 
Austria (4,296) and Upper Austria (2,770). The third most important hub of work-
ing Czechs is in the capital city of Vienna (2,248).
Overall, Austria represents quite an important destination for Czechs. 
Nevertheless, the intensity of migration and commuting of Czechs is, in a compara-
tive perspective, rather low. Based on the above and generally limited information 
which would enable to break down the data by important sociodemographic and 
geographical characteristics, one can only speculate or deduce. There is probably no 
dominating “migration corridor” from Czechia to Austria in terms of migratory 
types, destinations, occupational structure, age and so on. There are rather smaller, 
fragmented “migration/mobility corridors” that respect diversity patterns even 
among one migratory group of Czechs within the intra-EU migration/mobility from 
Czechia to Austria. One may deduce that different Czech migrants and commuters 
move to Austria staying for shorter or longer periods or circulating back and forth. 
Vienna will be the destination for both highly-skilled Czechs often working for 
multinational or international companies (− these will not be as numerous), and 
medium or low-skilled blue-collar workers and small self-employed entrepreneurs 
operating mainly in services, construction, some industrial branches or private 
households. The latter migratory type will also be typical of Austrian regions, towns 
and villages that border or are located close to Czechia where, in addition, seasonal 
migrants and commuters will also be very active. As mentioned above the impact of 
the migration/mobility of Czechs upon Austrian cities and society is rather moder-
ate due to a “dispersed character” of the given phenomena. Accordingly, the same 
moderate effect is apparent in Czechia. Work experience in Austria, be it long or 
short term, now brings additional financial sources for the Czech migrant/commuter 
and their families (via financial remittances) and in some cases an “added 
value” from social remittances. In any case, because of a growing living standard 
this has become a pleasant bonus rather than a necessity for Czech families involved 
in the given migration/mobility. On the same note, the overall impact of Czech 
activities performed in Austria is moderate and does not fundamentally influence 
economy and any sphere of the society.
Respecting the context outlined above we have decided to shed some light on the 
migration of Czech female care givers to Austria. There are several reasons behind 
this strategy: (1) This migratory type has been selected as one of the prominent ones 
within the studied intra-EU mobility, more specifically between the CEE and 
selected old EU member states (see Chap. 2  - by Denis Sert). (2) Through the 
research of this flow, we want to publish an important message about feminization 
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of the migration as pointed out throughout the whole book. Moreover, this type of 
migration deserves a special attention since what we currently know about this 
 phenomenon lags behind due to “blurred realities” that accompany often informal 
organisation, on top of that, encapsulated in a private, family environment. Hence, 
we also contribute to demonstrate the complexity and diversity which are typical for 
the current CEE intra-EU mobility (see e.g. Ostaijen, Scholten  – Chap. 13). (3) 
Though not so robust in quantitative terms now, the given flow has a potential to 
grow since there is an increasing demand on the Austrian side (related to ageing of 
Austrian population – see below). At the same time, it will probably be advanta-
geous for Czech women to make use of these opportunities in Austria in the future 
(higher income). Furthermore, both sides can benefit from historical, cultural and 
geographical proximities.
11.1.3  Czech Care Givers in Austria
Like most European countries, Austria is an ageing country which means that the 
number of elderly people who are often in need of special assistance is increasing. 
This intensive ageing process seems to be a permanent feature of the today’s 
Austrian society (see also UN 2015). Similarly to other European countries, for 
example Italy and Spain, Austria relies on foreign workforce. Unlike Italy and Spain 
however, care workers in Austria usually come from the EU countries (Österle, 
Bauer 2015). Similarly again vis-à-vis to Italy and Spain, taking care of the elderly 
is percieved as a family issue and families tend to care for their elderly at home 
instead of using institutional care (European Commission 2012; Riedel, Kraus 
2010). This broadly used system resides in employing migrant care workers (pre-
dominantly women) in the 24-hour caring system (24-Stunden-Betreuung). It is 
based on rotation of two workers, normally after two weeks. Workers usually live 
with their client/patient for two weeks and are with them round the clock whilst 
having only a short break during the day. After two weeks, they switch with their 
colleague and go home for two weeks. This way, the patient is cared for constantly 
but workers also get some spare time and are free to go to be with their own family 
(Österle, Bauer 2012).
The system started to be used in Austria at the beginning of the 1990s but was 
practiced illegally or semi-legally for a long time. The application of this system has 
also been supported by cash-for-care benefits introduced in 1993. Using such ben-
efits, people in need would get certain financial support without having to prove 
how it was spent (it could be given to family members or to an employed worker) 
(Österle, Bauer 2015; Bahna 2014). Thanks to this system, Austrian families could 
get benefits without having to show any employment contract of their care giver. 
The use of this system had become a widely spread phenomenon and an accepted 
option for Austrian families whilst the government did not proceed with any regula-
tions. It was not until 2006 when several cases of irregular employment of migrant 
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care workers were reported (including families of some political leaders8). Hence, 
care work became a political issue and was part of the election campaign in 2006 
(Österle, Bauer 2012; Riedel, Kraus 2010). As a result, the new government intro-
duced a legal framework for care work in 2007 (in force since 1st January 2008). The 
main law, the Home Care Act (Hausbetreuungsgesetz), was applied. It introduced a 
new profession - personal care workers/givers in private households. Apart from this 
law, foreign care workers in Austria were also exempted from the labour market 
restrictions for workers from the new EU member states. These restrictions were in 
force between 2004 and 2011 (Österle, Bauer 2015). The new legislation specified 
the rules of employment of care workers, giving the list of tasks that should be 
performed, including medical tasks (which must be delegated by a doctor). To make 
the system affordable, the option of self-employment (instead of employment 
contract) was introduced (today, a vast majority of the care workers in Austria 
are self- employed). The legislation also changed the benefit scheme – currently, 
benefits are means-tested and the care workers have to prove their training (mini-
mum of 200  hours) and work experience otherwise the family will not receive, 
according to the law, any financial aid.
Currently, according to available data, most women employed in care work in 
Austria are from Slovakia (56% in 2013) and Romania (30% in 2013) (Österle, 
Bauer 2015). It seems that women from Czechia constitute a less important group 
of care givers in Austria now (see in Bahna 2014). By contrast, in the 1990s, Czech 
women were probably the most numerous group working in the care sector there. 
With improving economic situation of Czechia, however, the care work in Austria is 
for Czechs not such an attractive option anymore and there are fewer women taking 
this path now. It does not mean, nevertheless, that it is not worth studying. Despite 
the decrease, this migration flow does not seem to stop. It is rather getting stabilised 
as an option for women working in care work and health care who need to earn more 
money. Differences in wages and prices between Czechia and Austria have been 
diminishing, nevertheless, in the field of care work, the gap still remains substantial. 
According to the OECD statistics, the average annual wage in Austria was 5.7 times 
higher than in Czechia in 2000, whereas it was still 3.4 times higher in 2014 (OECD 
n.d.).9 Therefore, for nurses and care givers, especially from regions bordering on 
Austria (if necessary, they can return quickly back home), or originating in poorer 
Czech regions and for those with a good knowledge of German language a care 
giver job in Austria remains attractive. Moreover, similar culture and long-term 
good relations between Czechia and Austria makes Czech care givers acceptable in 
Austrian families, thus also supporting sector that to large extent must relay on for-
eign labour force. And, due to the ageing it will need even more such support.10 
8 For instance, mother-in-law of the then prime minister, Wolfgang Schüssel, was cared for by an 
irregular migrant (van Hooren 2008).
9 In 2000, the average annual earnings in Austria were 27,935 Є whereas in Czechia 4,830 Є. In 
2014, it was 39,988 Є and 11,472 Є, respectively (OECD n.d.).
10 Interestingly, unlike in many other EU countries, the ageing process in Austria has so far been 
more of an issue for rural or less urban areas than urban areas (Goll 2010).
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Moreover, just care/domestic workers who are identified within the IMAGINATION 
project as one part of “persons working in private households”, are one of the  current 
important migratory types through which CEE migrants operate in old member 
states and which also has become a target subpopulation to be explored (Scholten, 
van Ostaijen – Introduction).
11.2  Research and Methodology
Our qualitative approach using semi-structured interviews (see e.g. Vargas-Silva 
2012) enables us to describe but also to understand migrants´ behaviour in their 
internally structured richness (Hitchings 2012). Such research activity, when prop-
erly applied, contributes to a more nuanced understanding how migrants experience 
life (in harmony with the concept of everydayness – e.g. Bennett, Watson 2002, in 
general, and “the relevance of studying migration from the perspective of everyday 
matters” - Ho, Hatfield 2011, 707, in particular).
Specifically, to research the care givers´ issue in Austria, we conducted seven 
interviews with Czech women who work in Austria as care workers. Of course, 
since we applied a qualitative research, we cannot make generalizing statements 
based on these seven interviews. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, these inter-
views give us insight into important types of migration and informants’ migration 
strategies. The findings are, indeed, also supported by other research results (see for 
example Kuchyňková, Ezzeddine 2015; Rodrigues et al. 2012).
The interviews were conducted between August and October 2015. Four of the 
interviews were held via Skype with a webcam (in one case, the informant was at 
her home in Vienna, in other cases, the informants were at homes of their patients). 
Three interviews were held in person – one at a Czech home of the informant close 
to Lipno, one in a café in Brno and one in a restaurant in Otrokovice. The informants 
were found through advertisements, Facebook groups, church, Czech schools and 
agencies (partly in Vienna). The agencies turned out to be the most effective way to 
reach care workers. The search for informants was quite difficult – due to the nature 
of the work and constant moving between Czechia and Austria, the care workers do 
not have many ties among themselves. The interviews were designed as semi- 
structured, i.e. with a given structure, but room was left open to informants’ own 
narratives and order in which they answered the questions. The main topics of the 
interviews were structured into the following thematic sections: motivation to start 
and keep working in Austria, working environment, social interaction with families 
where they work and future plans.
All the interviews were held in a very friendly atmosphere and the informants 
seemed to be relatively open about their work. The only exception was Valerie. She 
was worried that somebody will recognise her by her personal data. One of the other 
respondents, Lilia, asked to stop the recording since she realized she will talk about 
her irregular work in Austria before 2008.
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Table 11.3 shows personal characteristics of the informants. Their age oscillates 
between 31 and 64, with more respondents being older than 50. This is in harmony 
with overall picture where 65% of the care workers in 24-hour care in Austria are 
between 41 and 60  years of age (Österle, Bauer 2015). Their length of work in 
Austria also varies a lot, with the longest period of 21 years. Only one of the infor-
mants, Saša, works outside the scheme of 24-hour care. She did such work for a 
shorter period of time and, then, she moved to work in a retirement home. Another 
informant, Martina, does not currently work directly in the 24-hour care system 
either. Martina has worked as a care giver in families for 2 years. Then, she was 
asked by her agency to coordinate other workers. Now she is employed in the office 
of the same agency. Therefore, during the interview, she also shared with us pieces 
of information about the organisation of the system, role of agencies and experience 
of agency’s nurses. The informants work all around Austria. Due to the character of 
the 24-hour care, they change their location in Austria quite often. The only person 
who has not been moving around Austria is again Saša, she is based in Vienna.
11.3  Results of Own Empirical Study
The results are summarized in six main areas: motivation to work in Austria as a 
care giver, working environment, career, social interaction with families, future 
plans and decisive moments. Such structuring can show us why people actually 
decide for a career of a care giver in Austria, what makes them continue such work 
and what are the crucial points and events in this decision making. After going 
through these topics, the comparative perspective is added to the results.
11.3.1  Motivation to Work in Austria as a Care Giver
A poor financial situation of almost all of the informants was behind the motivation 
to start working in the care sector in Austria. Specific reasons vary: three informants 
were at that time alone in Czechia with one or more children, some of them had 
mortgage that they were not able to pay off (either alone or even with a husband). 
Other could not cope with their Czech pension.
“... My motivation to leave was purely financial – we had a mortgage to pay off.”(Jana)
“So I decided to come here and do the same, but for better money.” (Johana)
Only one respondent, Saša, did not leave because of her bad financial situation. 
She left first to Germany and later to Austria because she was upset with conditions 
in Czech hospitals and retirement homes (both for patients and for employees). 
Many times during the interview, she gave examples, as is the following one:
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“... at night, some patients sleep and some not, not like in Czechia, where when you don’t 
sleep, they give you a pill to fall asleep, that is something that doesn’t exist here, it’s our 
work to be here for the people, we are paid for that, that’s something everybody should 
realize.” (Saša)
Moreover, she was young and wanted to gain new experience abroad (she was 25 
at the moment of departure). Currently, Saša is moving to Prague to a new retire-
ment home that is being open by her Austrian company. Therefore, she might find a 
solution how to be back in Czechia while having “Austrian working environment” 
and the type of care she wants to give to her patients. At the same time, her life 
partner is Austrian – which is also the reason why she does not have far-reaching 
plans for the future.
11.3.2  Working Environment
As it was described above, the informants mostly work in the system of 24-hour 
care. In the system, there is a crucial role of agencies which mediate work and 
which also check working conditions that are listed in the Home Care Act. Hence, 
there is a clear list of duties that the care workers are supposed to do – the focus is 
naturally on the patient. Thus, besides direct taking care of the patient duties may 
also include cooking for the patient or other basic domestic work. The extent to 
which domestic chores are done depends on the situation – if the patient needs con-
tinuous care, care workers have to focus exclusively on him/her and they do not do 
other things around the house.
“This is not my own experience, but I know from my colleagues that in the beginning, it was 
terrible, that the relatives really thought that the nurses would do everything, but not now, 
if a patient is in a really serious condition, someone else in the family has to cook, because 
the nurse wouldn’t have time for it.” (Johana)
Table 11.3 Informants´ personal characteristics
Name 
(pseudonym) Age Family situation
Number of 
children
Years of work 
in Austria
Number of patients up 
to now
Saša 36 long-term 
relationship
0 11 x (works in a senior 
home)
Jana 59 married 3 15 15
Johana 54 single 3 6 5
Lilia 57 divorced 2 1,5a 3
Valerie 64 married 2 21 49
Martina 60 married 2 16 x (works more as a 
manager of an agency)
Diana 31 divorced 1 2 4
Notes:aLilia had worked in Austria also before without proper contract, but she did not want to talk 
about it
Therefore, her irregular experience is not included in the length of work in Austria
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Sometimes, the care workers do something extra if they have time. It seems that 
they manage to get extra money for such work. In case of Diana, such work includes 
gardening because her client is doing very well and Diana likes gardening. In any 
case, nobody forces her into it.
“Well, for example, I do some gardening for the lady, I don’t have to, but as I say, I pass 
time like this, because I have to be here anyway. .... as I say, she is almost independent by 
now.” (Diana) (Diana currently takes care of a woman after operation who is getting better 
and she will not need Diana’s assistance soon.)
Naturally, there are families that try to use the workers as maids who do every-
thing, but from what the informants said, the agencies manage to solve such situa-
tions quickly and if they are not able to do so, they exclude these families from their 
services. It seems, as some informants indicated, that such a nice, almost ideal, situ-
ation is typical of Czech and (most) Slovak workers rather than that of workers from 
Romania. Apparently, there are agencies which do not follow the rules so much and 
there are workers from Eastern Slovakia, Romania and some other Eastern Europen 
countries who are, because of their worse economic situation, willing to work in 
worse conditions for much less money, which is, however, not in harmony with 
generally stipulated rules. All the informants seemed to be satisfied with the arrange-
ment of two week non-stop stays in Austria. It gives them time to often go back 
home to see their family (some expressed that they even enjoy a model with these 
short-term separations). At some points, the informants mentioned that something 
in their job is not exactly like it should be, but all more serious issues seemed to be 
solved either by their agencies or by changing the patient, without any big conflict.
“... last time I was for one and half year in one place, but there was a terrible draught, so 
the granny had two rooms, but in one she slept and in the other she was sitting the whole 
time, as we are sitting, TV in front of her, but the TV was on only for news and love stories 
in the afternoon, otherwise nothing, and there was the draught, there was a balcony, when 
I was there, I didn’t even have a bed, so her son came only after three weeks with it, the 
granny would let me lie down in her bed in the afternoon, such conditions I had. And I am 
supposed to have a room and a bed, right.” (Valerie)
“... well, if you have a “lying patient”, the family doesn’t come, then you don’t have your 
two-hour break you should have, you don’t get to go anywhere.” (Diana)
11.3.3  Career
Domestic work is often seen as work without any career possible: be it cleaning or 
caring, it is usually considered as a dead-end job without many prospectives of 
improvement (see, for example, discussion in Triandafyllidou 2013). To some 
extent, findings springing from our interviews supported the fact that care work is 
rather stable over time. At the same time, however, the life stories of our informants 
showed certain improvement over time. The first improvement is definitely legaliza-
tion and stable position of the job compared to the beginning of their careers. The 
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second, and somehow more important for our study, is the improvement of the posi-
tion within the whole care givers sector: the informants mentioned a more stable 
financial situation and more possibilities to choose a location of their next place of 
employment. In the case of Martina, the career moved even further as she started 
working as a manager of other care workers. Saša, who is the only one not working 
in the 24-hour care, got a good job in an Austrian care home that was about to open 
in Czechia. Before that, Saša was in charge of Czech and Slovak staff in her com-
pany. The possibilities of career in care work might be limited, but they are, never-
theless, existing and the position of the informants has been improving over time. 
(Of course, one has to keep in mind that this conclusion is based on our rather lim-
ited sample of informants.)
“So I am at this company, I did management here as well; I was in charge of the care work-
ers in the 24-hour care. Czech and Slovak care workers. Also some workers from Romania 
and Hungary, but minimum... I went to help them, to control their work, I went to the fami-
lies. I had around 80 care workers under me.” (Saša)
11.3.4  Social Interaction with Families Where They Work
Obviously, in the system of 24-hour care, it is hard to fully integrate into the family 
because the workers switch, the patient often lives alone or he/she needs a lot of 
care. Therefore, it is complicated for the nurses to do anything else than being with 
the patient. There are usually some relationships established with the relatives. 
Except for Saša who only worked in a family for a short time, all the informants 
spoke about some families that they stay in touch with or some they particularly 
liked. From their stories, it is clear that sometimes, the care worker does not fit 
completely in the family, whereas in other cases, care workers are treated as family 
members and after leaving the family (mostly because their patient dies), they stay 
in touch. Sometimes, they stay in contact via sending each other a card at Christmas, 
birthday, etc.… They even keep meeting sometimes. Martina talked about some 
Slovak nurses that had “their” Austrian families over for a visit in Slovakia.
“Oh yes, I stayed in touch with them, via e-mail, especially those in Sölden, even though I 
was there just for a short time, I stayed in touch with the daughter-in-aw, also from Aurach. 
I also have a phone number of the lady from Upper Austria, where I was, but I don’t have 
time… simply, to call them, but if it’s Christmas or something, I remember all of them, this 
way, I don’t ask too much, but I send a postcard or an SMS, e-mail. That’s all.” (Johana)
Diana then spoke about the intimacy within the family, that she treats the patient 
and the relatives almost as her own family. She also feels that she is taken as a fam-
ily member. Nevertheless, Diana points out the need to stay little distant, especially 
from the emotions of the relatives of dying patients who, then, might behave badly 
towards the care worker.
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“(The daughter of the patient)... shouted at me, she was so upset, but it wasn’t because of 
me, she just couldn’t bear the situation. .... it is harder to deal with the family and their 
emotions, because working with the patient who is dying, that’s my profession, I do that 
automatically.” (Diana)
In some cases, relatives of the patient tried to tell the nurse how to take care of 
the patient, especially in the beginning of their stay. It mostly seemed to work out 
well after some time when relatives could see that the care worker knew what she 
was doing. Sometimes, however, the agency had to intervene. On the other hand, 
there were also some cases mentioned when the care worker could not reach agree-
ment with the family and she left.
11.3.5  Future Plans
Apart from Saša, who is now moving to Prague with her Austrian company (see 
above), all other informants plan to keep working in Austria at least for some time. 
Financial motives remain strong but it is not any more the most important reason. In 
some cases, informants’ children are already grown up and they do not need that 
much financial support any more and the mortgages have been paid off. Therefore, 
a need to gain extra money is not too urgent. All the informants seem to like their 
work now even though they mention negative sides, too, namely loneliness and dif-
ficulties of the job. Only Jana seems to be quite sad about her job, pointing out how 
lonely she gets, also due to the fact that many of her patients cannot even talk to her. 
She states it quite clearly:
“If I didn’t have to be here, I wouldn’t.” (Jana)
But other respondents appear to enjoy work with elderly and also the 24-hour 
care system:
“... you need to like this work and people, I really like old people... and... I really like help-
ing them, so for me, this is no problem.” (Johana)
“...you know this is also good that you work for two weeks, but then you have two weeks 
off – there is no other occupation where you can have this. And in these two weeks, you 
really have time to have some rest, to organize what you need to organize.” (Diana)
Overall, informants seem to be motivated to stay longer at their current occupa-
tion (see also Vavrečková 2014), more times they mention their age and a retirement 
threshold until which they want to keep working as care givers. Some of them, for 
example Jana, also mention that by now, it would be hard for them to find work in 
Czechia because of their age. Therefore, it is better to keep working in Austria until 
they are retired.
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11.3.6  “Decisive Moments”
As the interviews tell us, it seems that there are some crucial moments that led to the 
decision to work as a care worker in Austria. These are important, turning changes 
in one’s life, such as divorce, mortgage or loss of work, that have left the respon-
dents in financial problems which could not be easily solved via participation in the 
Czech labour market. Therefore, a common reason standing behind the start of 
working in Austria as a care worker is a serious financial situation.11 At the same 
time, the 24-hour care system offers the workers to earn better salaries in Austria, 
but it does not force them to move there completely – they can still spend time at 
home with their families.
“... it’s because I have high expenses and for the house, I was left with a mortgage after the 
divorce. If I was alone, without a child, I would rather work in a hospital, maybe I would 
move here completely, I wouldn’t choose home care.” (Diana)
Secondly, during the time of work in Austria, there is probably one, not explicit, 
moment that is also important. It is resolving the initial financial problems, be it a 
debt or supporting younger children. In more interviews the informants proclaimed 
that currently, the original reason for such work had disappeared – children had 
grown up, the mortgage was paid off, but they still keep working in Austria as they 
did before.
The last common moment is reaching a retirement threshold. Except for Diana 
and Saša, who are in their thirties, the informants talked about retirement as an 
important turning point. Some of them wanted to keep working in Austria until their 
retirement age. Some others had already got Czech pension and keep working 
because they still want to earn more money and save little more for the time when 
they will not be able to work anymore. But even for those who keep working the 
retirement is significant. They know they have some basic income and, therefore, 
they can, for example, work little less, can have longer breaks between patients etc. 
Their retirement gives them extra sense of security despite the fact that the Czech 
pension is not really high.
11.4  Comparative Perspective, “Proving Robust 
Regularities”?
Austria is one of the typical countries benefiting from the work of migrant care 
givers. If we compare it with other countries, we can find some similarities but also 
important differences. Austria is comparable to other countries in the sense that 
its ageing society is in need of care. At the same time, Austrians themselves do 
not want to do such work – there is just around 1% of Austrians working in the 
11 Similarly, Kuchyňková and Ezzeddine (2015) found out that such important moment was a loss 
of work in advanced age and subsequent financial and social difficulties.
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24-hour care system (Österle, Bauer 2015). Therefore, the country relies on 
migrant workers.
The difference from other countries is especially the high degree of regulation 
and also, as mentioned above, the fact that most care workers are from the EU coun-
tries, mostly from Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary. Furthermore, what is 
different from many other countries is that there is a significant role of agencies 
organizing the whole system in Austria (including non-profit organisations). They 
mediate care work and make arrangements for care workers. All these facts were 
clearly indicated in our interviews. Most of our informants (similarly to other care 
workers) have found their work just through agencies and currently, they seem to 
rely on them in all their working arrangements. It seems that from the perspective of 
Czech workers the existence of agencies helps prevent irregular activities in the 
sector.12 The agencies seem to be reliable, stable and well-organized. They also 
seem to provide good means of control of the working environment and treatment 
of their workers. On the other hand, it seems quite possible that those agencies that 
our respondents made use of are those situated higher on the ladder of quality. There 
may be many other agencies which are far from providing such good services. As 
already touched above, conditions might be quite different (worse) for workers 
coming from Romania. But also in their case, the role of agencies will be probably 
rather important. This is something different from other European countries where 
the role of individual workers and his/her social networks prevail in the process of 
finding a job (see e.g. Ungerson 2010; Lutz 2012).
Another issue that is different from the experience of the given field in other 
countries is the problem of discrimination. As studies from some other regions show 
us,13 we can find long stories of discrimination, often connected to ethnic differ-
ences among employers and employees. In this study, only one respondent, Diana, 
mentioned that some of her colleagues were treated badly and that they were told 
they are just “...  stupid Czechs who will do what we say”. Apparently, no other 
demonstrations of discrimination were detected. This can be also due to ethnic and 
cultural similarities between Czechs/Slovaks and Austrians which might prevent 
such discrimination. Nevertheless, it is again worth noting that the situation can be 
quite different for care givers coming from countries further to East, and it would 
definitely deserve more attention.
On the other hand, what resonates with research experience in this field in many 
other countries is an important role of emotions (see for example Hondagneu-Sotelo 
2007; Lutz 2011). All the respondents agreed that care work is highly demanding, 
not so much physically (but also) emotionally. Especially Diana developed her 
thoughts around difficulties of work with family members who might firstly try to 
tell nurses how they should do their work, but who can be often in stress because of 
their mother or father dying and therefore behaving disrespectfully or nervously 
towards their employees. On the other hand, the informants also talked about the 
12 On the other hand, one can deduce that among 29,000 who are estimated in the care sector in 
irregular position in Austria (see in Reeger, Enengel 2015) Czech females will appear too.
13 See for example Hondagneu-Sotelo 2007 and Lutz 2011.
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fact that they like to work with elderly, that it is a rewarding work and it gives them 
satisfaction. Therefore, they realize that the emotions also get back to them, that 
they are there to help somebody in need.
11.5  Concluding Remarks
The intra-European migration currently represents more or less a free migratory 
field. A very simplified proposition is that during the last decade in harmony with 
dominating economic motivations (see e.g. Fassmann et  al. 2014a,  b; Kahanec 
et al. 2014) CEE´ migrants started to move to the west within the continent while 
taking jobs at a secondary labour market – those jobs which are manually rather 
than intellectually demanding (see also in Scholten, van Ostaijen – Introduction; 
Favell 2013).
This fact is however too general and is ramified into many partial migratory 
modes and patterns (different in terms of quantity and also “quality” of the migra-
tory flows and, consequently, stocks) whilst some of them can even go against the 
general proposition described above (e.g. the migration of highly qualified special-
ists). The emigration and long-term migration of Czechs in general and the migra-
tion of Czech care givers to Austria in particular seems to be a “strange type”, 
standing somewhere on the borderline (see discussion on a large variety of the 
mobility/migration along with the overall feminization of the migratory process - 
see in Scholten, van Ostaijen - Introduction). Nevertheless, this type fully corre-
sponds to newly identified trends in intra-European migrations (see e.g. Verwiebe 
et  al. 2014), e.g. differentiation of the causes of and motivations for migration, 
different composition of migration populations as well as new forms of migration 
and, indeed, new sharply polarized roles on the primary versus secondary labour 
markets of immigrant societies (see Favell 2013)  – see in this context also 
Kindler (Chap. 10). 
As for Czechia, labour migration of Czech care workers to Austria has been - in 
accordance with the general patterns of migration - based primarily on economic 
motivation. Since the 1990s, when the economic differences between the two coun-
tries were big, Czech women started to migrate to Austria while finding their places 
mostly in an informal economy of care work. In fact, apart from the “pulls” on the 
Austrian side, factors such as historical relations, adequate knowledge of German 
language and shared culture eased the integration into the Austrian labour market. 
Moreover, after 2011, when Austria fully opened its labour market for Czech work-
ers, new advantages appeared – namely no border controls and no need for special 
work permits. To summarize, the work of Czech women (supplemented by work of 
women from other countires, e.g. from Slovakia - Bahna 2014, 2015) has been an 
important pillar of the care for the elderly in Austria for a long time (Kraler et al. 
2008), benefiting all the involved subjects. Despite the fact that the differences in 
living standards between Austria and Czechia have been diminishing, the wages in 
health care in Czechia remain fairly low. Hence, working in 2-week shifts in a rich 
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nearby Austria still offers Czechs some advantages (e.g. decent money and a pos-
sibility to find another part-time job at home) and some of them permanently “settle 
within mobility” (Fassmann et al 2014a, b). It seems apparent (based on statistics 
and the interviews) however, that over time Czech (and Slovak) women in the care 
work sector in Austria are gradually being replaced by other female workers from 
poorer Eastern parts of Europe (namely Romania  – see also Bahna 2014) who 
accept lower salaries and overall worse conditions. Consequently, although there is 
still a stable migration connection/corridor between Czechia and Austria its strength 
and character have been changing in the last two decades.
There are three main factors that contributed to creating a specific migratory type 
we called “MICO”: geographical closeness (between migrants´ original home and 
destination where the care service is delivered), a repeated and stable short stay and 
return model (usually two weeks in Austria and two weeks in Czechia) and a very 
busy working scheme (not enabling to normally integrate to Austrian society). This 
model lies between migration and commuting and it has, albeit to only a limited 
extent, some transnational features related chiefly to economic domain/integration, 
namely a circulation and remittances. Other activities (taking place when migrants 
stay to work in Austria) within political and sociocultural domains which also 
belong to key forms of migrant transnationalim (e.g. Boccagni 2012) are almost 
non-existent. Importantly, there is a very limited existence of a new, Austrian iden-
tity among these migrants. Accordingly, there is none or a very limited “socializa-
tion pressure” (except for a micro-family level) put on these care givers in the 
destination country. On the other hand, there is no disruption or breakdown of 
social/family relations in their mother country (similarly Bahna 2015; Kuchyňková, 
Ezzeddine 2015). Moreover, based on our interviews it seems that unlike within 
many other migratory types, the position of these care givers (at least within the 
legal/formal labour market) is less vulnerable, exploitative and discriminatory as 
their position is stable and they are well protected by their agencies.
What seems to be obvious however, like within the transnationalism these female 
migrants are trapped in their “myth of return” (we mean a wish to stop the “MICO”) 
and they “tend to settle within mobility” (Fassmann et al. 2014a). They know that 
once “on the move” their benefits are higher than losses. The consequences of the 
arrangements described are positive for them since they make use of the free move-
ment in the Schengen area while benefiting from ongoing differences between 
Czechia and Austria in wages and pensions. The importance of the MICO type is 
even higher when realizing that besides Czech care givers there is also a much more 
numerous group of Slovak care givers who would probably fit in it as well (see 
Bahna 2014, 2015).
Due to harmonizing “push” and “pull” migratory factors between Czechia and 
Austria in this particular care work sector (springing from wider mainly socioeco-
nomic, demographic, historical and geographical settings), we might predict that 
the given flow (creating the Czech-Austrian specific migration corridor) will very 
likely continue in the future whilst having an impact on both Austrian rural areas 
and Vienna and other big cities.
11 Intra-European Movement of Czechs with Special Regard to Austria and Care…
222
11.6  Annex
Table 11.2 Number of Czech citizens being employed in the EU/EEA and Switzerland, 
2006–2014
Country/year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Belgium 1,593 * 617 2,072 2,210 2,921 * * *
Bulgaria * * * 186 10 187 * * 221
Denmark * * * 155 263 * 470 511 421
Estonia * * 7 85 106 121 153 110 *
Finland 11 11 * 135 175 358 408 444 505
France 82 72 96 * 1,163 * * * *
Croatia * * * * * * * * *
Ireland 4,524 12,000 10,230 12,900 12,700 11,960 11,358 10,121 4,256
Iceland 140 120 250 * * * * * 138
Italy 4,115 4,050 4,496 5,801 6,009 6,134 6,250 5,925 5,561
Cyprus * 457 403 354 341 * 404 335 *
Liechtenstein * * 5 17 19 28 * * *
Lithuania * * * * * 7 12 4 5
Latvia * 35 * 125 * * * * *
Luxembourg * * * 209 * * * 824 *
Hungary 118 110 285 261 250 * * * *
Malta 61 66 63 56 77 * * * 219
Germany 12,404 13,579 13,931 14,013 14,341 22,372 23,500 26,893 31,753
The Netherlands 1,394 1,250 2,242 * 2,602 2,854 2,954 2,820 3,170
Norway 210 633 544 486 343 385 * 1,579
Poland 205 164 134 176 1,089 1,183 1,247 1,285 1,950
Portugal * * 212 * * * * * *
Austria 6,680 5,278 5,060 5,136 6,164 7,782 9,802 11,329 12,742
Romania * * 88 15 * * * * *
Greece * * * * * * * * *
Slovakia 1,065 1,241 1,915 2,293 2,830 3,179 * 3,400 2,525
Slovenia 128 141 76 113 111 72 47 52 92
The United 
Kingdom
17,400 30,000 20,000 30,500 24,500 33,000 33,850 29,200 37,100
Spain 2,944 2,800 * 2,370 1,200 * 5,757 1,190 3,517
Sweden 140 232 73 * 1,212 1,249 * 1,320 *
Switzerland 1,440 4,157 1,098 4,809 5,570 * * * 6,219
Total number of 
Czech citizens
54,654 76,396 61,825 82,267 83,285 93,792 96,212 97,342 112,408
*Data not available
Source: Internal materials of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs of the Czech Republic
Data as of December, 31. Data represents only indicative numbers, while possibly putting side by 
side not compatible figures – e.g. on employees versus foreign citizens etc. To sum up, data is inac-
curate and often incompatible; somewhere it suffers from not deregistration or, on the othe hand, 
registration of those who also represent second or third generations; some data was not available, 
somewhere it is only an expert estimate.
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Chapter 12
Migration from Central and Eastern  
Europe to Turkey
Deniz Karcı Korfalı and Tuğba Acar
12.1  Introduction
Until recently, despite the fact that the country had received many immigrants since 
the initial years of the Republic, migration literature treated Turkey as a country of 
emigration. Turkey’s position in the international migration system, and thus, in the 
migration literature, has changed only recently to a country of transit and immigra-
tion. In this regard, the literature on international migration in Turkey is still very 
limited and either focused on mobility of specific groups,1 or on general historical 
trends.2 In this frame, focusing on current trends and implications of Central and 
Eastern European (CEE) migration in Turkey is a novel task. However, as the col-
lection and distribution of international migration data have been generally neglected 
and a large portion of international migration in Turkey is on irregular basis, this is 
a challenging task. In addition to the limited data availability, the heavy internal and 
external migrant population also complicates migration research and blurs the dis-
tinction between the implications of CEE migration and migration in general.
The analysis of the newly established corridors between CEE and Turkey, the 
current migrant categories and finally, the implications of CEE migration require an 
overview of the background on CEE migration to Turkey.3 Following a historical 
background, this chapter will first assess the regular CEE migration by employing 
residence and work permit data along with citizenship statistics. In this respect, 
1 See for example, Danış on Iraqi, 2007, Parla on Bulgarian, 2007, or Eder on Moldovan (2007) 
migrations
2 See for example, İçduygu and Kirişci, 2009
3 In this study, CEE is perceived as a geographical region that includes Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, Albania, 
Belarus, Bosnia Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia and Ukraine.
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the limited data still brings to light the corridors of permanent, student and labor 
migration established between CEE countries and Turkey in addition to patterns of 
gender and education. Next, irregular CEE migration will be addressed. This will be 
followed by region-specific focus on Edirne, which has traditionally received CEE 
migrants and Istanbul, Turkey’s migration hub that includes various types of 
migrants from across the world.4 These two research areas reveal how different CEE 
migrant profiles lead to different implications of CEE migration. The final conclu-
sion and discussion will shed light on the challenges of migration governance dur-
ing Turkey’s transformation to a migrant receiving country.
Within this framework, it should also be noted that the Turkish case can be 
received as a reference case. Unlike Austria, Netherlands and Sweden, here, CEE 
migrants are subject to the general terms for migrants in Turkey within an immigra-
tion regime established distinct from regulations on CEE migration applied by the 
EU members.
12.2  Background on CEE Migration into Turkey
Among the migration trends of the Early Republican Period, the course of CEE 
migration into Turkey, usually categorized as Balkan migrations, was the widest one 
and formed of four origin countries of the time: Bulgaria, Greece, Romania and 
Yugoslavia (Please see Chart 12.1). The Republic of Turkey, in need of human capi-
tal for a homogenous nation state, welcomed migrants of Sunni-Islam origin rather 
than Turkish ethnicity (Kirişci 2006). In 1935, out of an approximate population of 
16 million citizens in Turkey, approximately 110,000 people were of CEE origin 
including Pomaks, Bosnians, Albanians, Bulgarians and Romanians (Çağatay 2007). 
4 These will be explained in further detail in the sections below.
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According to the 1960 Census, Pomaks, Bosnians and Albanians formed the 2‰ of 
Turkey’s population (Dündar 1999).
In the period following the foundation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 until the 
start of the Second World War, more than 800,000 people migrated to Turkey from 
the Balkans. Close to half of the total migrant population constituted of Greek 
migrants (47 percent) followed by Bulgarian (24 percent), Romanian (14 percent) 
and Yugoslavian migrants (13 percent). Migration from the Balkans declined in the 
war years and remained limited to approximately 20,000 migrants most of whom 
were Bulgarians (70 percent) and in much smaller numbers, Romanians (19 per-
cent). During the Cold War, Turkey welcomed a massive wave of 600,000 ethnically 
Turkish Bulgarians due to Bulgaria’s negative policies against its minorities coupled 
with a population of 200,000 Yugoslavian migrants. In spite of this rich variety of 
movements across the border, Bulgarians’ mass migration based on ethnic kin is the 
most studied pattern of CEE migration in Turkey.5
In the current period, ethnic kin migration and migration to find a safe haven 
from repressive communist regimes are replaced by various types of CEE migra-
tion. Turkey’s neo-liberal economic policies after the year 1990 and the growing 
economy resulted in more diverse migration flows from this region to Turkey. Today, 
five main movements of CEE migration into Turkey are (1) high skilled migration 
of professionals, (2) low skilled migration of domestic workers –with both regular 
and irregular status, (3) marriage migration, (4) increasing numbers of student 
migration and finally, (5) trafficked persons –albeit the official numbers from CEE 
seem to be decreasing. Along with the already existing migration flows from 
Bulgaria, Romania and ex-Yugoslavian countries, wider migration corridors from 
countries like Moldova and Poland started becoming significant. Lastly, although 
the numbers of migrants from Baltic Countries are relatively smaller, in the last 
decade migrants from Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia increased four-fold, six-fold 
and ten-fold respectively. Based on the official data, these current trends of CEE 
migration can best be analyzed in two main categories of regular versus irregular 
migration.
12.2.1  Regular CEE Migration into Turkey
Official statistics on current and regular migrants in Turkey are based on residence 
permits and citizenship acquisition. Traditionally, CEE migrants have a large weight 
in the number of total regular migrants in Turkey. The data from the Ministry of 
Interior demonstrates that in the years from 2003 to 2007, around an average of 40 
percent of all regular migrants came from this region (Please see Chart 12.2). In the 
year 2008, however, the CEE migrant population in Turkey dropped to 26 percent. 
Consequently, except a small uptrend in 2011 right after the Eurozone Crisis, the 
weight of regular CEE migrants is in a steady decline. The main reasons behind this 
5 See Parla 2003, 2006
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decline are the Eastern Enlargement of the EU in 2007 and more importantly, the 
faster increase of non-CEE migrants and the shrinking CEE proportion in the 
enlarging population of total migrants in Turkey. To illustrate, between 2008 and 
2012, CEE population in Turkey increased by 2500 migrants, however, as the num-
ber of total regular migrants increased by 100,000, CEE nationals’ proportion in the 
total migrants fell to its lowest levels since the Republic’s foundation (Please see 
Chart 12.3).
Regarding the migration corridors with the CEE countries, the residence permit 
data from the Ministry of Interior demonstrates that Bulgaria has the steadiest 
migration corridor to Turkey while other migration corridors from Serbia and 
Montenegro, Ukraine, Romania and Moldova are also strongly established (Please 
see Figs 12.1 and 12.2). In the early 2000s, the number of regular migrants from 
Serbia and Montenegro, Ukraine, and Romania were lower compared to Bulgarians, 
but they still remained among the top three countries after Bulgaria. In more detail, 
statistics on residence permits that CEE migrants received between 2003 and 2012 
highlight that the yearly residence permit approvals of Bulgarian migrants change 
between 55,000 and 15,000. Still following the second Eastern Enlargement of the 
EU in 2007, the number of regular Bulgarian migrants dropped by more than half. 
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In the period between 2009 and 2012, strong migration corridors were also 
 established with Romania and Poland, following Ukraine and Moldova. Overall, 
Bulgaria, Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, Macedonia, Poland, Albania, Belarus and 
Kosovo are crucial actors in the CEE regular migration scene in Turkey (Please see 
Table 12.1).
A more in-depth analysis of residence permits reveals the complex gender pat-
terns of CEE migration. In spite of the widespread belief that CEE migrants are 
always women, Ministry of Interior’s residence permit data revealed that male 
Fig. 12.1 The proportion 
of stocks of CEE migrants 
in 2003
Fig. 12.2 The proportion 
of stocks of CEE migrants 
in 2008
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migrants reached as high as 75 percent of all regular CEE migrants in 2007. Still, 
even though male CEE migrants are usually the majority in the overall CEE 
 community, an assessment of gender proportions based on origin country uncovers 
the fact that women from Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Romania and Estonia are 
higher than men. Furthermore, although migrants from Moldova, Hungary, Poland 
and the Czech Republic display some mixed trends earlier; they also become female 
dominated after 2007. This contradiction between the overall male domination and 
the country specific female domination can be explained by the heavy weight of 
male migrants from Bulgaria. Since Bulgarian migrants have the largest share in the 
migration corridors between Turkey and the CEE, the male dominance of Bulgarian 
migrants has a balancing effect in terms of gender distribution against the female 
CEE migrants.
In the same data, residence permits based on education may provide some idea 
on CEE students excluding those whose residence is based on their parents’ resi-
dence permits. Overall, approximately five percent of all CEE migrants have 
received residence permits based on education between 2003 and 2012. Along with 
this, CEE students represented 28 to 14 percent of all international students in a 
declining trend at the same period. In the year 2010, the proportion of non-CEE 
migrants in the international student community started increasing. To illustrate, in 
2003, 6000 CEE migrants in this category constituted almost 28 percent of a total of 
22,000 students. In 2012, however, the number of CEE migrants fell only to 4600, 
which now constituted close to 13 percent in a total of 35,000 international students 
in this category. Thus, similar to the residence permit patterns in general, the 
increase of non-CEE migrants and the slight fall in the CEE students decreased the 
CEE weight significantly. Regarding the migration corridors, students from 
Bulgaria, Albania, ex-Yugoslavia including migrants from Kosovo, Serbia and 
Montenegro and Macedonia have established strong student migration corridor with 
Turkey.
Next, employment statistics received from the Ministry of Interior demonstrate 
that CEE migrants, who hold work permits, changing between 2.700 to 5.300, rep-
resent 13 to 19 percent of all migrants who were issued work permits in the period 
between 2003 and 2012. In this population, although the number of female CEE 
migrants usually fell behind the number of males until 2008, their numbers were 
close to equal in 2009 and in 2012, female migrants almost doubled the male work-
ers. Regarding origin countries, the largest labor migration corridor is established 
with Ukraine, followed by strong migration corridors with Bulgaria and Romania, 
and after 2008, with Moldova and Poland. Here, similar to the patterns of CEE stu-
dent migration, CEE migrants with work permits only increased approximately by 
2000 while total work permits increased from 17,000 to 33,000 from 2009 to 2012, 
creating a massive fall in the CEE proportion. Here, the proportion of increase in the 
CEE migrant community is higher than the total increase. Still, in the rapid expan-
sion of the Turkish labor market, the CEE proportion remained limited.
Concerning citizenship acquisitions, as the final data available in relation to reg-
ular migrants, CEE migrants constitute over 40 percent of migrants who acquired 
citizenship in the period between 1989 and 2012. More specifically, in a total of 
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more than 250,000 citizenship acquisitions, approximately 120,000 citizenship 
acquisitions belonged to CEE nationals. Among the citizenship acquisitions of this 
group, Bulgarians constitute approximately 90 percent of all citizenship acquisi-
tions with slightly more than 104,000 citizens, followed by Romanians, Moldovans, 
Macedonians and Ukrainians. Furthermore, as the most common route to acquire 
citizenship is through ethnic kinship, citizenship through marriage with a Turkish 
citizen represents roughly ten percent of all acquisitions. Still, citizenship through 
marriage is widespread among Belarussians, Moldovans and Polish. However, the 
available citizenship statistics do not disclose more detailed information concerning 
the grounds migrants acquired their Turkish citizenship.
12.2.2  Irregular CEE Migration into Turkey
The data available on irregular migration in Turkey is limited to the number of 
apprehensions and human trafficking provided by the Ministry of Interior Affairs. 
To begin with, 30 percent of a total of 50,000 apprehensions based on irregular 
migration in 2003 were of CEE migrants. Almost half of these irregular CEE 
migrants were Moldovans, followed by Romanians (18 percent), Ukrainians (13 
percent) and Bulgarians (six percent) in smaller numbers. With the Eastern 
Enlargements of the EU in 2004 and 2007, CEE apprehensions decreased to 7000 in 
2005 and to 3000 in 2008 and the apprehension of CEE irregular migrants is on a 
general decline. Next, human trafficking statistics demonstrate that only a total of 
1145 cases came to the attention of state authorities between the years 2004 and 
2010. Accordingly, 29 percent of all human trafficking incidents included a CEE 
national with 288 Moldovans, 27 Romanians and 11 Bulgarians in this population. 
Based on these statistics, CEE human trafficking cases display a decreasing pattern 
in Turkey. However, neither the numbers on irregular migration nor human traffick-
ing are realistic for several reasons. Due to its geographical situation, growing econ-
omy and widespread informal labor, Turkey is a major country of transit and 
destination for irregular migration flows. As these factors are coupled with the cur-
rent mass migration of Syrians, the numbers of irregular migrants are visibly and 
substantially higher than the available statistics.
Following this background on regular and irregular CEE migration based on 
official statistics at the national level, an assessment of the diverse range of CEE 
migrant profiles in the specific urban regions Edirne and Istanbul will shed more 
light on this migration type. Due to the lack of statistics on the local level, the source 
of information here is limited to the non-governmental organizations, state authori-
ties and consulate officials. Firstly, in Edirne, permanent, high-skilled CEE migrants 
settled during the Cold War period and CEE university students are the two most 
apparent migrant types. Additionally, while Edirne does not commonly host irregu-
lar CEE migrants, this province is associated with irregular migrants who aim to 
cross the borders to reach Europe. Therefore, it should be noted that CEE migration 
in Edirne is frequently overshadowed by tragic migrant deaths. Secondly, in Istanbul, 
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CEE migration is visible in many categories, including the high skilled migration of 
professionals, low skilled migration of domestic workers with both regular and 
irregular status, marriage migration, increasing numbers of student migration and 
finally, trafficked persons – even though the official numbers from CEE seem to be 
decreasing. Thus, the assessment of these two different CEE migration contexts 
offers a thorough and integral view of CEE migration in Turkey.
12.3  CEE Migration in Edirne and Istanbul
The two research areas under study in this book chapter, Edirne and Istanbul, con-
stitute diverse settings for CEE migration in linkage to their distinct migration his-
tories. Before highlighting the differences in the implications of CEE migration in 
these urban regions, however, it should be noted that migrants’ experiences of inte-
gration in Turkey differ based on three main factors. First, CEE migrants from coun-
tries with long-established migration corridors usually join the regular labor force 
without much difficulty by using their connections with permanent migrants from 
their origin country. Second, the duration of residence in Turkey also has a direct 
effect on CEE migrants’ integration level. In this study, residence in Turkey is cat-
egorized into four terms: Temporary, mid-term and permanent stayers and circular 
migrants.6 The third factor influencing the level of integration is the migrant’s cat-
egory. While no statistics are available on the specific migrant categories, knowl-
edge workers, entrepreneurs, manual workers, domestic workers, sex workers and 
trafficked persons, students and non-working spouses are known to be common 
migrant categories in Turkey and as will be discussed below, some migrant catego-
ries have less advantaged experiences of migration. Against this background, more 
in-depth information on the urban regions will shed light on the implications of 
CEE migration in Edirne and Istanbul.
12.3.1  CEE Migration in Edirne
To begin with, the largest community among the permanent migrant population in 
Edirne is the ethnically Turkish Bulgarians settled in this area during the Cold War 
period. Welcoming this migration wave on the grounds of ethnic kinship, Turkish 
state built migrant neighborhoods, namely Binevler area which today is the most 
upscale neighborhood in Edirne. Most members of this ethnic Turkish community 
received dual citizenship when Bulgaria’s accession to Europe became evident and 
currently, enjoy a transnational life style with high mobility across the border and 
continuing connections to Bulgaria. Moreover, this permanent migrant population 
6 Temporary stay is shorter than one year, mid-term is between one and five years, permanent stay 
is five years or longer and circular stay is repeated migration.
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is well integrated and perceived by the public as well educated, high skilled and 
hardworking. Permanent CEE migrants, according to the general opinion, have well 
employed the benefits of multiple citizenship and state services that allowed them 
easy access to housing and employment. Today, permanent and regular CEE 
migrants from Bulgaria, Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, Hungary, Kosovo, 
Macedonia, Moldova, Romania and Ukraine form Edirne’s highest socio-economic 
group and belong to the migrant categories of knowledge workers, entrepreneurs 
and less often, manual workers. Concurrently, these high CEE migration rates in the 
urban region generate the migrant category of non-working spouses and children.
Aside from the permanent CEE migrants, Edirne receives a large-scale student 
migration from Kosovo, Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia and Macedonia in connection 
to the University of Trakya, which has established the well-known Balkan Research 
Center and the Department of Balkan Languages and Translation. Aiming to draw 
students from Balkans, University of Trakya is shaping the student migration pat-
terns in the province. To illustrate, CEE students enrolled in the university in 2013 
are approximately 47 percent of the total foreign student population in the province. 
The largest CEE student communities are from Kosovo with 287 students, Bulgaria 
with 215 students, Macedonia with 103 students and Albania with 33 students, 
which are mostly gender balanced groups. Membership of student solidarity orga-
nizations based on nationality is very common among this well integrated popula-
tion. It should be noted here that even though student migration can be categorized 
under temporary or mid-term migration, CEE students in Edirne often have long- 
term plans to reside in Turkey permanently after graduation. Unfortunately, no spe-
cific data is available on the number and backgrounds of the students who actually 
realize this plan.
12.3.2  CEE Migration in Istanbul
The second research area under study is Istanbul, known as Turkey’s migration hub 
hosting a diverse range of CEE migrants. To begin with, since the 2000s, female 
domestic migrants, mostly caretakers from the CEE region have replaced the inter-
nal migrants from less developed regions in the care sector. In this category, irregu-
lar Moldovan and Bulgarian women are assumed to be the most numerous among 
the CEE migrants (Suter 2008).7 Recent legal amendments concerning domestic 
labor have facilitated the acquisition of residence and work permits. However, 
employers’ unwillingness to pay the high social security fees for the migrants, the 
lack of migrants’ documents and migrants’ fear of deportation once noticed by the 
authorities persist the widespread irregularity. As a high number of female migrants 
spend long periods in Turkey despite their irregular status, the line between 
temporary and permanent migration for this migrant type is blurred. Moreover, 
7 Suter, B. (2008) ‘The different perception of migration from Eastern Europe to Turkey: The case 
of Moldovan and Bulgarian domestic workers.’
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excluding the ethnically Turkish Bulgarians, the common prejudice that CEE 
women engage in prostitution creates even more adversity for irregular female CEE 
migrants in Turkey.
A second type of CEE migrant category in Istanbul is the high skilled migrants 
and entrepreneurs who consider Istanbul as an attractive destination to live and 
work due to the historic ties between Turkey and CEE. Apart from the CEE profes-
sionals employed in the highly competitive job market, small-scale Hungarian and 
Czech entrepreneurship through Turkish partnership–as required by the Turkish 
business laws, is common. As frequent among the Czech community, high skilled 
migrants often re-unite with their families in Istanbul. While most migrants in this 
group are career oriented, temporary stayers, some CEE migrants engaged in inter-
national trade can also be categorized as circular migrants.
Thirdly, in linkage to this last point, family unification and marriage migration 
are common patterns of CEE migration in Istanbul. A great majority of Hungarian 
and Czech migrants in Istanbul are women married to Turkish citizens. Furthermore, 
the number of dual citizens with Hungary is on the rise after Hungary’s facilitation 
of dual citizenship for those married to citizens of Hungary as well as their chil-
dren.8 Therefore, although this group constitutes mostly of permanent stayers, those 
with dual citizenship often enjoy the trans-border life style and can be categorized 
as circular migrants.
A fourth type of frequent CEE migration in this urban region is student migra-
tion. However, the weight of exchange students involved in Erasmus, bilateral stu-
dent exchange agreements, and other EU scheme characterizes CEE student 
migration in Istanbul more temporary compared to Edirne. Finally, a migration type 
that still remains partially in dark is human trafficking. The highest populations of 
human trafficking cases, according to the IOM, originate from Moldova and the 
Ukraine and involve women aged between 18 and 24 years.9 Accordingly, Istanbul 
is a main port of human trafficking where women are brought into Turkey “legally” 
under the cover of tourist visas valid for 3 or 6 months.10 However, the lack of data 
on this migrant category does not allow making further assumptions on these 
migrants’ duration of residence.
12.4  Diversification of CEE Migrants: Temporality 
and Socio-Economic Status
Overall, temporality and socio-economic status seem be two key points of diversifi-
cation for the major types of CEE migrants in Turkey. To illustrate the diversifica-
tion based on temporality, first, the permanency of the most settled community of 
8 The information specific to Hungarian and Czech migrants is based on interviews with the 
Hungarian and Chech Consulates.
9 http://www.turkey.iom.int/pa2.htm accessed on November 10, 2015
10 http://www.turkey.iom.int/pa2.htm accessed on November 10, 2015
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Bulgarians becomes questionable as they spend longer periods in Bulgaria com-
pared to before Bulgaria’s EU accession. Second, student migration and short-term 
exchange programs are being encouraged at a greater extent, which increases the 
weight of temporary stays among the CEE migration. Third, as qualitative findings 
demonstrate, professional migrants in Istanbul mostly regard employment in 
Istanbul as a temporary life-plan rather than seeing Turkey as their home. Finally, 
other types of CEE migration move towards more permanent migration. The 
increasing family unification and marriage migration patterns, migrants in the 
domestic sector who reside permanently despite their irregularity, and finally, CEE 
students enrolled in universities who often make long-term plans to reside in Turkey 
illustrate this tendency towards permanent residence. Thus, temporality is an ele-
ment that sheds light on the diversity of CEE migrants in Turkey.
Another key point in the diversification of CEE migration is migrants’ socio- 
economic status, which seems closely related with their migration type. In Edirne, 
first, ethnic Turks from Bulgaria are considered to enjoy higher living standards 
than the general population. As this community brought with them a certain level of 
social capital and artisanship when they settled in Edirne during the Cold War 
period, in time, they also acquired a socio-economically higher status. Second, CEE 
students generally seem in conformity with the university student profile in Edirne. 
Hence, even though the distinction between high/low socio-economic statuses may 
not always be crystal clear, CEE migrants in Edirne have either higher or similar 
socio-economic status compared to the general population. In Istanbul, the socio- 
economic status of CEE migrants is more diverse compared to Edirne. On the one 
hand, low skilled migrants employed in the domestic sector as caretakers, whether 
irregular or regular, generally earn less compared to Turks working in the same sec-
tor. On the other hand, high skilled migrants, such as Hungarians and Czechs regu-
larly employed in the job market or those residing in Istanbul either as spouses seem 
to present a socio-economically high profile.11 In parallel with the findings in Edirne, 
CEE students in Istanbul do not display a great variance from the general university 
student profile in terms of socio-economic status. Thus, along with temporality, the 
different levels of socio-economic status also prove the diversity of CEE migrant 
population.
12.5  Urban Implications of CEE Migration
Assessing the implications of CEE migration is a challenging task. First, the pres-
ence of a high number of non-CEE migrants overshadows the specific implications 
of CEE migration. Second, the expertise on CEE migration is immature in Turkey. 
In this regard, the fact that solely a handful of public institutions or non- governmental 
organizations only partially, concentrate on the topics concerning migration results 
11 The information specific to Hungarian and Czech migrants is based on interviews with the 
Hungarian and Chech Consulates.
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in a major data constraint. Third, the implications on the domains concerning less 
heated issues such as social and political participation, housing and neighborhood 
consequences or education and language are outweighed by hotly debated domains 
of labor and registration of migrants in general. Within this frame, to shed light on 
the influences of CEE migration in Edirne and Istanbul, CEE specific data was col-
lected through online surveys, expert interviews and a focus group organized with 
the participation of migration experts, stakeholders including public offices and 
NGOs. Based on this data, the following part will focus on five domains where CEE 
implications are visible: (1) labor market, (2) housing and neighborhood conse-
quences, (3) registration, (4) social security and welfare, health, societal and politi-
cal participation and finally, (5) education and language.
12.5.1  Urban Implications of CEE Migration in the Case 
of Edirne
A better comprehension of CEE implications requires a quick glance at Edirne’s 
general character. This urban region offers only a limited job market due to its con-
strained industrial base and thus, most residents join the labor force as public ser-
vants, agricultural workers or entrepreneurs. CEE migrants enliven the small local 
economy and broaden the narrow employment profile by entering the job market as 
knowledge workers and entrepreneurs. In this context, manual workers are more 
infrequent than knowledge workers and entrepreneurs because the Roma population 
or the internal migrants from Eastern Turkey often take the low number of disquali-
fied jobs in Edirne’s labor market.
In more detail, to begin with the knowledge workers, time of migration is a key 
determinant of the challenge level in the labor market. To illustrate, permanent CEE 
migrants employed as knowledge workers experience fewer problems in compari-
son to newcomers due to their established networks, market experience and accred-
ited diplomas. Today, qualified newcomer migrants face major challenges concerning 
diploma accreditation considering that many workplaces refuse to make prelimi-
nary contracts with migrants before their diplomas are formally recognized and in a 
vicious cycle, that Turkish authorities start the accreditation only once they receive 
a migrant’s preliminary work contract.
Second, entrepreneurs who deal with trans-border trade or own small busi-
nesses are a frequent migrant category in Edirne. Following their mass migration, 
ethnically Turkish Bulgarians were provided business credits and benefitted from 
their bilingualism, which is a high asset due to Edirne’s proximity with Bulgaria. 
Many CEE entrepreneurs join Edirne’s labor market as entrepreneurs in small busi-
nesses ranging from restaurant management and the beauty sector to goldsmith. 
Overall, labor implications of CEE migration are widely considered as positive as 
CEE migrants have vitalized the economy and the labor market in the province.
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Concerning housing and neighborhood consequences of CEE migration, 
permanent CEE migrants reside in the most expensive Binevler region state-built 
for the ethnic Turks from Bulgaria. Utilizing the facilitated mortgage options 
offered by the state, members of this community could afford buying housing and 
even renting their second housing to newcomers in the early 2000s. In-depth inter-
views with stakeholders demonstrate, however, that jealousy arose among the low 
socio- economic groups in Edirne living in Edirne’s poorest neighborhoods with bad 
housing conditions. Meanwhile, in-depth interviews also reveal CEE migrants’ 
skepticism against the internal migrants from Eastern Turkey. Aside from the 
positive experiences of permanent migrants, mid-term CEE students often share 
housing with crowded groups as rents have increased with the incoming student 
population. In response to this difficulty, several CEE investors started buying 
houses to transform into student accommodation and new public dormitories are 
being built for foreign students. Concerning neighborhood consequences, public’s 
perception of students is generally positive and the students’ preference for Edirne 
is considered as a source of pride for the locals.
Concerning registration, at a first glance, most permanent CEE migrants 
employed as knowledge workers, entrepreneurs and manual workers in Edirne 
are registered as citizens and thus, face no problems in this domain. In terms of 
labor registration, Edirne’s Chamber of Commerce introduced an electronic system 
for business registration to facilitate the process to encourage entrepreneurs and 
investors. Dissimilar to these positive experiences of CEE migrants, registration for 
students involves a long bureaucratic procedure between the Ministry of Education, 
their university and the police department. Once the Turkish Ministry of Education 
recognizes students’ high school diploma and the university receives their recogni-
tion document, students will apply to the police department, which then issues a 
residence permit. Thus, being accepted to a Turkish University does not always 
guarantee registration. This registration duty has been transferred from the 
Foreigners’ Police to the provincial organization of Directorate General of Migration 
Management in May 2015, however, the performance of the new registration model 
is not yet clear. Finally, concerning the migrant category of non-working spouses, 
CEE migrants in mixed marriages usually apply for Turkish citizenship, which 
takes between six months and three years, but is often a smoothly working 
process.
Regarding the domain of societal participation, permanent CEE migrants are 
quite visible and well represented by numerous migrant NGO’s. In-depth interviews 
reveal that politically, CEE migrants from ex-socialist countries often avoid the left- 
wing and instead, feel closer to migrant solidarity organizations advocating their 
national roots, e.g., “Organization of Turks from Bulgaria’s Kardzhali” and “Turks 
from Bulgaria’s Razgrad”. Likewise, CEE students are active in organizations such 
as the Kosovan Students Club or Bosnian Students Club, which have networking 
activities with other CEE student organizations and migrant business people that 
sometimes financially support CEE students in Edirne. Apart from this, economic 
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vulnerability sometimes drives CEE students to membership in Islamic organiza-
tions for scholarships, as widespread in Turkey with both Turkish and non-Turkish 
students.
Next, within the frame of reciprocity agreements and high public investments in 
Edirne’s health sector, the domain of social security and health services is gener-
ally a settled area for permanent CEE migrants. For students with no scholarships, 
however, expensive health services and high social security fees are a major disad-
vantage. Aside from this, the well-known hospital under the University of Trakya 
has started health tourism by attracting high numbers of patients from Bulgaria, 
Romania and Greece.
The implications of CEE migration in education and language vary mostly in 
connection with duration of residence in Edirne. To begin with, the education level 
of the permanent CEE community is generally high and language does not seem to 
be a challenge for this migrant population as they mostly arrived in the Cold War 
period. However, except from the Turkish-speaking students from Kosovo, 
Gagauzia or Macedonia, newcomer students experience language difficulties as 
they are expected to follow classes in Turkish. Overall, language and language edu-
cation, especially of Bulgarian and Greek, play a major role in Edirne’s economy. 
For instance, CEE knowledge workers or entrepreneurs, who sometimes experi-
ence language problems in business negotiations or concerning legal contracts, 
employ bilingual CEE migrants as translators. At the same time, Bulgarian entre-
preneurs often attend Turkish courses in Bulgaria to trade with Edirne. In this con-
text, Turkish and Bulgarian governments agreed to facilitate the establishment of 
language institutions. Apart from the issue of Turkish, in-depth interviews demon-
strate the concern of the Ukrainian community over the preservation of their lan-
guage and culture as the second and third generations of Ukrainians in Edirne are 
now fully integrated into Turkey.
12.5.2  Urban Implications of CEE Migration in the Case 
of Istanbul
Implications of CEE migration in Istanbul are currently overshadowed by the Syrian 
mass migration. As the unforeseen, intensive flows of Syrians and their highly vis-
ible presence in Istanbul is a much-heated topic both with the public and state 
authorities, “migrant” has recently become synonym to “Syrian” in Istanbul. The 
arrival of unexpectedly high numbers of Syrian migrants into Istanbul has caused a 
sudden appearance and surfacing of extreme xenophobia, and a deteriorating public 
image of migrants and refugees. Due to the scapegoating against the Syrians and 
migrants in general, most locals typically adopt a totally negative stance against the 
presence of migrants in Istanbul, or for some of them, their negativity towards 
the Syrian migrants pushes them to consider the CEE migrants as “better migrants”. 
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In spite of this adversity, as a huge center of trade and industry, Istanbul attracts 
migrants of various backgrounds from around the globe including knowledge work-
ers, entrepreneurs and manual workers of both regular and irregular status. Coupled 
with the widespread informal labor in most labor areas, the lack of social policies 
concerning child and elderly care services also opens a vast employment area for 
domestic workers. Finally, both short and long-term international students are 
attracted to nine public and 40 private universities in Istanbul.
In this frame, Istanbul’s vast labor market consists of various CEE migrant cat-
egories ranging from permanent knowledge workers and entrepreneurs from 
Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Kosovo, Macedonia, Romania and Ukraine, 
manual workers from Moldova, Belarus, Croatia, Montenegro, Poland and Serbia, 
domestic workers from Moldova and Ukraine and in some cases, CEE students 
involved in the labor force irregularly. Until 2008, CEE sex workers and trafficked 
persons, mostly consisting of women from Romania and Moldova were the largest 
migrant community among all sex workers and trafficked persons in Istanbul. Since 
then, their numbers have decreased and fallen behind the Central Asian migrants. 
Information gathered from the in-depth interviews and a focus group study provides 
more detailed information on the implications of labor market in Istanbul.
Accordingly, the main challenge for high skilled CEE professionals is Istanbul’s 
competitive labor market, which includes both local and international migrants and 
reduces the likelihood of finding permanent employment. As the second category, 
CEE entrepreneurs in Istanbul mostly focus on suitcase trade through which they 
sell Turkish goods and products in their home country and also transport goods to 
the families of irregular CEE migrants in their home countries. Due to the high 
demand for Turkish commodities in Bulgaria, Macedonia, Bosnia Herzegovina, 
Kosovo and Romania and the constant need of irregular migrants to send goods to 
their home countries, this entrepreneurship is very common, especially in the 
migrant populated areas.
Apart from these two migrant categories, the enormous labor market also hosts 
foreign manual workers. Although the Syrian, Afghan and Iraqi irregular migrants 
take the current disqualified jobs, Bulgarian migrants worked in the temporary, low- 
skilled jobs as irregular migrants in the 1990s. Today, many irregular CEE manual 
workers are employed in the textile sector; however, their irregularity leads to lack 
of information on their numbers, market conditions and profile. Here, it should be 
highlighted that there is no consensus on how the irregular labor force should be 
evaluated in Turkey. According to the one side of the debate, irregular workers 
should be registered to end their vulnerability against employers and to standardize 
better working and living conditions while according to the other side of the debate, 
state’s registration or irregular migrants may first, increase unemployment and sec-
ond, generate the risk of deportation for the irregular migrants.
Another migrant type that is partially in dark due to irregularity is the domestic 
workers most of whom are female CEE migrants who enter with tourist visa and 
overstay. Employed as caretakers or cleaners, most migrants in this category live in 
their employers’ house to save enough to send remittances. Subject to employers 
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some of whom seize migrants’ passports, irregular domestic migrants often earn 
less than Turkish women employed in this sector. Similarly, CEE students also may 
become part of the irregular labor force in Istanbul due to the low number of schol-
arships and the insufficiency of existing scholarships’ allowances. As the work 
hours allowed for foreign students is 24 hours per week and this right is not valid 
until a student completes the first academic year, many CEE students irregularly 
join the labor force in the areas of tourism and service sector as most speak Turkish, 
Russian and English. However, due to their irregularity, they are vulnerable against 
employers and they encounter the risk of losing scholarships.
In the domain of housing and neighborhood consequences, CEE migrants are 
found dispersed across Istanbul where their experiences differ significantly based 
on their residence status. An analysis of the heavily migrant-populated Beyoğlu, 
Fatih and Zeytinburnu districts demonstrates this dissimilarity. For instance, regu-
lar CEE migrants from Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Macedonia and 
Romania live in the middle class Telsiz neighborhood of Zeytinburnu which is home 
to a high number of well integrated and permanent CEE entrepreneurs and man-
ual workers with good reputations as talented, disciplined and trustworthy migrants.
Irregular CEE migrants, however, are found in the poorer Tarlabaşı in Beyoğlu 
and Aksaray in Fatih all of which are also home to manual workers from Syria, 
Iraq, Uzbekistan and African Countries. Due to high rents for low quality housing, 
irregular CEE migrants in these areas often rent single rooms alone or share flats 
with other CEE migrants employed in textile shops that sell cheap leather products 
to foreigners in Aksaray. In the past, Aksaray was associated with CEE sex workers 
who now seem dispersed in the urban region. Still, it is common to label all CEE 
women in these neighborhoods as Natashas that is used as a synonym for sex work-
ers from the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. As another negative example 
concerning neighborhood consequences, Georgian manual workers in Aksaray are 
claimed to often dispute with the local residents and seem to be generally disliked 
because they are believed to engage in theft. In contrast, in the heavily migrant 
populated district of Fatih, CEE migrants seem to be more accepted compared to 
African and Syrian migrants. Apart from these, most Ukrainian and Moldovan 
domestic workers reside in their workplaces in Istanbul’s most expensive neigh-
bourhoods. While they face the risk of exploitation due to their irregularity, they live 
in better housing conditions compared to most irregular CEE migrants.
Regarding registration, besides the widespread irregularity, CEE knowledge 
workers must undergo an exhausting bureaucratic process during the recognition or 
verification of their documents due to the phenomenon of purchased diplomas in 
their countries. Because most companies require a work permit from a job candidate 
and state authorities frequently refuse to issue a work permit if a foreigner does not 
have a job contract, knowledge workers’ have difficulties in registration. Concerning 
the other categories, entrepreneurs are encouraged to make their monthly wage pay-
ments to their manual workers via Turkish banks as a means for the Ministry of 
Finance to monitor the registration of foreign workers and repress irregular employ-
ment. Irregular migrants, whether manual workers or female domestic workers, 
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even if they wish to be registered, find it risky to approach the police authorities due 
to the fear of deportation and prefer to remain invisible. For the category of sex 
workers and trafficked persons from CEE countries, the domain of registration 
appears to be more problematic compared to the other migrant categories. In some 
cases, a very thin line separates domestic workers from sex workers or trafficked 
persons and the state authorities may deport migrant women without considering 
the possibility of human trafficking. Unlike most other CEE migrant categories, 
non-working spouses, typically women married to Turkish citizens; do not appear 
to encounter registration difficulties as they obtain citizenship through their 
marriage.
The domains of societal and political participation are mostly dependent on 
migrants’ residence status. Regular and permanent CEE migrants have high rates of 
membership in migration organizations and are well integrated in their communi-
ties. Furthermore, their political ideologies appear to be of lesser importance com-
pared to their group loyalty. Thus, when a community member joins a political 
party, others often support this party even if they do not share their political views. 
For the CEE students, despite their high number, the number of student organiza-
tions is lower than in Edirne in spite of the high number of CEE migrants. However, 
unlike Edirne where each community has its own student organization, NGO’s in 
Istanbul, such as the Balkan Dialogue Groups bring together students from various 
Balkan countries. Apart from these, irregular migrants, even though they do not 
have formal membership in migrant NGO’s, are very well connected in their com-
munities. However, this connectedness is mostly related to sharing information on 
registration and security or the available job opportunities. Thus, political participa-
tion is not a concern for irregular migrants. Likewise, non-working spouses do not 
seem to be interested in political participation and instead, they have migrant soli-
darity organizations for their own community, e.g. Latvian wives.
Concerning the educational backgrounds and language proficiency, the het-
erogeneity of CEE migrants in Istanbul does not easily permit generalizations. 
Firstly, the regular and permanent CEE migrants settled in Istanbul during the Cold 
War period are generally high skilled, well educated and as they are fully integrated, 
they speak Turkish well. The language domain for the well-educated CEE knowl-
edge workers seems primarily to depend on their employment area. Among the 
permanent or short-term CEE employees of international firms and universities, the 
motivation to learn Turkish is very low as English is often a valid working language 
in these circles. In similar, CEE students are mostly enrolled in short term univer-
sity exchange programs for which they may not need to learn Turkish. As most 
universities offer programs in English, Turkish is not an obligatory language for 
university studies. While the entrepreneurs’ education level in Istanbul is not well 
known, learning Turkish seems to be more crucial for this category. Likewise, less 
educated CEE manual workers, whether regular or irregular, often need to learn 
basic Turkish to get on by every day. However, there are no state efforts for the 
integration of foreign manual workers into the education system or provision of 
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language courses for permanent or short-term migrants. In the category of non- 
working spouses and children, no information is available regarding the implica-
tions of spouses concerning education and language. However, children born in 
Turkey have the right to attend public schools, regardless of their residence status. 
For the domestic workers and sex workers and trafficked persons, migrant pro-
files seem to vary greatly but no concrete data exists on the educational backgrounds. 
However, in-depth interviews reveal that learning Turkish increases sex workers’ 
chances for working as domestic workers or manual workers.
12.6  Conclusion and Discussion
The heart of the distinctions between the implications of CEE migration in Edirne 
and Istanbul is linked to their dissimilar characters. On the one hand, Edirne is a 
small, strictly controlled border city with a limited industrial base and mostly per-
manent migration. On the other hand, Istanbul is a large, less controlled province 
that is home to extensive flows of short and long-term internal and international 
migrants. This context shapes the implications of CEE migration in the domains of 
labor market, housing, neighborhood consequences, registration, social security, 
societal and political participation, education and language.
To outline the basic points, CEE migrant types in Edirne and Istanbul show vari-
ances. In Edirne, the most visible CEE migrant categories are knowledge workers, 
entrepreneurs and students well integrated into Edirne’s urban fabric and is known 
to have enlivened the province through their education and skills. In Istanbul, the 
most frequent CEE migrant categories are knowledge workers, entrepreneurs, man-
ual and domestic workers. However, the heterogeneous migrant profile does not 
easily permit general statements. In addition, the category of CEE sex workers and 
trafficked persons is known to exist even though little is known on this migration 
type. In both urban areas, knowledge workers, entrepreneurs and students receive 
most of the attention and overshadow the remaining categories of manual workers, 
non-working spouses and in the case of Istanbul, domestic workers, sex workers and 
trafficked persons.
Based on the stakeholder survey results, the most frequent trend in both urban 
regions is permanent CEE migration followed by circular migration. In the case of 
Edirne, the presence of dual citizens coupled with the strong role of trade with the 
CEE and in Istanbul, the substantial number of irregular domestic workers may lead 
to this weight of circular migration. Still, Istanbul holds more mid-term and short- 
term stayers compared to Edirne. Additionally, unlike Edirne, Istanbul is home to an 
irregular CEE population. Here, irregularity of long-term migrants is also possible, 
e.g. irregular domestic workers. Moreover, given the changing nature of migration 
systems, the established patterns also evolve. Even in the case of earlier migrations, 
where CEE migrants are considered as permanent migrants, their permanency may 
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be questionable. For instance, with the accession of Bulgaria into the EU, many 
ethnically Turkish Bulgarians applied for Bulgarian citizenship to become dual citi-
zens and have begun to lead more transnational lives. In this mode, their permanent 
migration becomes more transnational. Hence, as the old migration patterns are 
evolving, and new patterns are emerging, the task of mapping CEE migration on 
temporality and socio-economic status is becoming harder. Thus, in cases similar to 
the highly diverse CEE migration in Turkey, these two elements typically used to 
categorize international migrants may be insufficient.
In summary, against this background, in the domain of labor market, CEE 
migrants in Edirne appear to be generally more privileged in comparison to Istanbul 
as they are strongly supported by the local authorities, admired for their hard-work 
and high skills. In Istanbul, a much higher level of competition and the availability 
of both local and foreign knowledge workers complicate the labor market. Likewise, 
in the domain of housing, CEE migrants in Edirne appear to mostly have better 
standards of housing than those in Istanbul. Concerning neighborhood conse-
quences, dissimilar to Edirne several CEE migrant types in Istanbul face discrimina-
tion (e.g. irregular female migrants). Regarding registration, majority of CEE 
migrants in Edirne have obtained citizenship while irregularity is frequent in 
Istanbul. The consequences of irregularity are the inability to benefit from the social 
security and welfare systems and difficulties in access to health services. Regarding 
the domain of societal and political participation, regular CEE migrants in both 
urban areas are represented by numerous migrant organizations except the less vis-
ible categories of domestic workers, sex workers and trafficked people in Edirne. 
The implications concerning education and language seem to vary mostly in con-
nection with the migrant categories and their duration of residence. Still, education 
profiles are more heterogeneous in Istanbul compared to Edirne and language seems 
to be less required to live in Istanbul where learning Turkish is more widespread in 
Edirne due to the weight or permanent migrants.
Overall, research on migration corridors, migrant categories and urban implica-
tions of CEE migration is challenging due to the unavailability of basic statistics, 
lack of expertise, stakeholders’ disinterest on some migrant categories and domains, 
invisibility of irregular CEE migrants and the dominance of Syrian mass migration 
in the public and state discourse. Still, the parallel and contrasting features of impli-
cations based on the existing information demonstrates how the dissimilar migra-
tion contexts shaped the outcomes for the CEE migrants and reflected on specific 
domains ranging from labor market to education. Thus, the diversity in the CEE 
migrant profiles in the two urban regions is remarkable.
As Turkey currently receives an increasing number of migrants with diverse 
backgrounds, the management of urban consequences of temporary and more per-
manent forms of migration is of key importance. However, in spite of the immigra-
tion since the 1980’s policy makers only recently accepted that Turkey is a migrant 
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receiving country. The fact that the first comprehensive legal instrument on manag-
ing international migration, the Law No. 6458 of Foreigners and International 
Protection, endorsed in May 2015, illustrates how international migration to Turkey 
has become a policy concern only very recently. Thus, Turkey is going through a 
time of major change in its migration management.
Due to this policy vacuum on international migration, the Turkish legal frame-
work in relation to migrants typically consists of state centered legal orders frag-
mented into ad hoc, jurisdictionally complex and sometimes inconsistent 
arrangements. In this setting, the Law on Foreigners and International Protection 
aims to embrace a comprehensive approach to migration management, eliminate the 
excessive bureaucracy of registration and establish procedural standards in every 
migration related domain. In this direction, following the endorsement of the law, 
the Directorate of Migration Management was established under the Ministry of 
Interior in 2015. Seemingly contradictory to the aim of reducing the bureaucracy, 
another state institution, the Prime Ministry Head Advisory for Migration and 
Humanitarian Aid has entered the scene in 2016 as a new stakeholder in migration 
management with the aim of establishing a network and coordination between state 
institutions on the management of the Syrian mass migration. Moreover, the first 
days of 2016 also witnessed the enforcement of new regulations regarding the work 
permits of foreign nationals under temporary protection, tailored specifically for the 
Syrian migrants in Turkey. While the enforcement of regulations facilitating employ-
ment for Syrians may raise eyebrows due to the unfairness against non-Syrian 
migrants, it is not yet possible to imagine their reflections on the future of migrants 
in Turkey. The key question here is whether the expansion of Syrian migrants’ rights 
will have positive repercussions on other migrants; however, it is still too early to 
make any predictions on the subject.
Furthermore, these progresses do not yet bring an end to the debates surrounding 
the governance approaches to migration. Despite the progress, the state-centered 
hierarchical order, the top-down understanding towards policy making and a secu-
rity based approach still dominate the migration governance. The sharp shift from 
neglect to integration of millions of migrants requires an enormous change of mind-
set. The main fault line in this critical debate runs between those who believe 
migrants should be offered easy access to labor and extensive rights of social secu-
rity and those who fear this would create an inequality between migrants and 
Turkish citizens who do not enjoy a high level of social security, especially if they 
are employed informally. This fault line, appearing in relation to almost all policy 
areas, runs deep because it is linked to most basic ideas on immigration, integration 
and naturalization. The common suggestion shared by all sides, however, is the need 
for more state focus on migrants’ integration and the necessity to create a positive 
public opinion of migrants to facilitate this process.
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Chapter 13
Conclusions and Reflection
Mark van Ostaijen and Peter Scholten
This book shows that intra-European movement not only raises various practical 
social and governance issues, but also deepens important theoretical and conceptual 
issues. This includes fundamental questions concerning the conceptualization 
within migration studies about its core object of analysis; when can something be 
considered as migration? In this book this concerns in particular whether to concep-
tualize intra-European movement as ‘migration’ or ‘mobility’; can those who move 
in the EU be considered ‘migrants’ in a sociological sense or should they be concep-
tualized merely as mobile EU citizens making use of their right to free movement? 
The contestation of this very basic conceptualization reveals not only the political 
character of some of concepts used in this research field, but also the need for more 
cross-disciplinary work in the conceptualization of migration, here in particular 
between sociology and political sciences.
Furthermore, the book spurs theoretical thinking on intra-European movement; 
what are the implications, for whom, and why? Here the book builds on the existing 
body of knowledge on labour migration in particular. However, as Penninx amongst 
others in this volume shows, knowledge about the guest labour system of the last 
century cannot be simply extrapolated for understanding the contemporary intra- 
European labour movement system. In particular, it highlights that the political con-
text in which current movements takes place does matter to understand its 
implications. Once again, the political setting of the EU has emerged as pertinent 
here. However, the book shows, based on empirical research in various countries, 
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that the implications of intra-European movement become especially visible on the 
local level, in urban settings where intra-European movers often settle, work and 
interact. In particular, the book reveals a high-degree of internal complexity and 
diversity in terms of various (urban) implications for different forms of intra- 
European movement. This clearly renounces simplified objectives of intra- European 
movement in terms of ‘EU citizens’ ‘moving freely’ for ‘economic purposes’.
This speaks directly to a third theoretical contribution from this book, regarding 
the conceptualization and theorization of multi-level governance in this area. 
Adopting a critical lens on relations between various levels of governance, and 
bringing together sociological research on the implications of intra-European 
movement with a thorough analysis of governance on these levels, the book shows 
that multi-level governance is more an ideal than an achievement in this policy 
area. In fact, various chapters in this volume speak of decoupling or a mismatch 
between levels, with a variety of implications both for EU free movers, as well as 
for the places in which they settle. This speaks more broadly to the literature on 
multi-level governance, which has often focused primarily on EU-national rela-
tions and has presumed the existence of effective vertical channels for policy 
coordination between different levels (Hooghe and Marks 2001). However, our 
analysis shows that the local level is equally important to understanding multi-
level governance, that vertical channels are difficult to achieve and to some extent 
even absent in this case, and that sometimes vertical relations between levels are 
initiated from below by local governments rather than top-down from the EU 
(Scholten et al. 2017).
A key issue running through these three theoretical contributions is the need for 
a reflexive use of categories and even theories to understand pertinent issues within 
the research-policy nexus. The book shows that in various ways, the political con-
text is central to understanding the language scholars use to approach intra- European 
movement. This applies not only to the conceptual contestation on migration versus 
mobility, but for instance also on whether the implications of intra-European move-
ment can be understood in terms of ‘integration’ and even on whether we should 
speak of ‘multi-level governance’ in this area. This political context should there-
fore be considered endogenous to our conceptual and theoretical understanding of 
intra-European movement. We need to be reflexive in the use of concepts and theo-
ries for understanding a phenomenon that is in itself politically constituted. Working 
across disciplines, bringing together disciplines and fields such as sociology, politi-
cal science and governance studies, provides a strategy for enhancing this 
reflectivity.
In this concluding chapter we will bring together the key (analytical) findings 
from this book and elaborate on the main contributions to the literature that have 
already been briefly outlined above. This also involves confronting the empirical 
chapters on intra-European movement (based largely on the IMAGINATION proj-
ect) with the theoretical chapters.
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13.1  The Diversification of Intra-European Movement
The book started with a number of expectations based on previous studies of 
(European) migration. First of all, we expected that especially in terms of time-span 
and socio-economic background, free movement of people would result in a ‘diver-
sification of diversity’, a further diversification of migration types. This echoes 
findings from various studies that show that intra-European movement can be 
temporary or circular, but can sometimes also evolve into a more permanent form 
of settlement migration, as well as into ‘in-between’ categories that have been 
described as ‘liquid mobility’ (Engbersen 2012).
Indeed, various chapters in this volume confirm that ‘CEE migrants’ cannot be 
considered as a homogenous group based on their region of origin, culture or ethnic-
ity. Instead it is a rather differentiated category with high and low skilled, as well as 
temporary and permanent migrants. The research confirms our expectation on the 
diversification of diversity, showing a wide range of types in terms of socio- 
economic status and duration of stay. It shows that the free movement of persons in 
Europe enables a wide range of Europeans to move outside their national-state bor-
ders and search for opportunities in other nation-states. This however does not 
imply that the status one has by leaving the origin region is the same status in the 
receiving region. The valuation of skills and the socio-economic position differs 
from both perspectives. And to put it more sharp, sometimes one starts as a manual 
worker and end up as homeless and sometimes one begins its trajectory in the agri-
cultural industry but ends up in a blue-collar profession. This economic mobility 
within territorial mobility complexifies this diversification argument even more and 
illustrates the heterogeneous picture of this population. This is an important empiri-
cal observation that is not always reflected in societal or political debates and has 
important implications, also described in this book, which we will elaborate on in 
this chapter. Next to this diversification, it also reveals a feminization of migration, 
which is described here as an increasing number of female migrants in CEE migra-
tion, but we lack knowledge about gender relations or the changing profile and sta-
tus of female migrants.
Next to this diversification of diversity, the previous chapters show some 
significant data on migration corridors, or on the historical path dependency of 
sending and receiving regions. The cases illustrate the importance of the historical 
context and the legacy of certain migration networks. For example, the Chaps. 10, 
11 and 12 of Marta Kindler, Dusan Drbolav Lena Pavelkova and Deniz Korfali and 
Tugba Acar show that the migration corridors between Poland and the Netherlands, 
Czech Republic and Austria and Bulgaria and Turkey are quite substantive and 
transformed over time. In many ways, institutional regimes (such as the European 
framework of free movement) rather than geographical proximity (such as in the 
case of Bulgaria and Turkey and Poland and the Netherlands), have played a 
significant role in these transformations. In other cases, such as the Czech and 
Austrian commuting routes show the importance of even further diversifying the 
mobility argument towards a ‘mico-type’; between migration and commuting.
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The country cases, with all different transitional restrictions, also show some 
interesting findings. In those countries where transitional restrictions were exer-
cised, it only had consequences for formal employment. Sometimes despite these 
transitional rules, deploying different tactics, such as self-employment, migrants 
from the CEE member states still arrived and worked in all these countries. However, 
it did show quite clearly the labour market as governance tool, since this type of 
movement is mainly characterized by socio-economic reasons, such as work. Not 
insignificantly, because the European framework is designed to make the ‘Single 
Market’ more flexible. While all EU citizens have the right to move, but this right 
can be better applied, when one has a position on the labour market. It shows the 
significance of the European and national labour market to regulate, legalize and 
penalize some of the newly moving EU citizens. Moreover, taking everything into 
account, we see a diversification of intra-European mobility, where historical path- 
dependency and political-institutional structures have contributed to specific migra-
tion corridors.
13.2  Consequences of Intra-European Movement
A second expectation that lay at the foundation of this book was that, given the 
‘uneven distribution’ of migrants in specific localities, the diversification of intra- 
European movement would also lead to a diversification of local consequences: not 
only in terms of labour market issues, but a wide range of issues that evolve from 
short-term (housing) to long-term implications (language and education) in the 
receiving and sending countries. We developed this expectation since there are huge 
differences between types of migrants in terms of access to and provision of local 
resources, the respective trajectories as well as barriers they are facing.
The Chap. 3 of Ursula Reeger also shows a nuanced perspective to intra- European 
movement, a perspective that proves that the triple-win scenario promoted by the 
EU does not entirely hold true (Favell 2008). Especially if we take the consequences 
on the labour market into consideration, as one of the most significant domains. 
Migrants may sometimes gain on their socio-economic circumstances, in terms of 
higher wages, but have to take in on their socio-cultural position and status, espe-
cially regarding their work and living circumstances. It reveals that individual impli-
cations are often interrelated with each other, resulting in a ‘chain of implications’, 
or like ‘the dominoes of dependency’ (Zelano et al. 2016). With a close look at these 
implications, despite that EU citizens have almost the same rights as nationals and 
being treated like them legally, does not necessarily result in equal outcomes 
(e.g. Favell 2008; Ciupijus 2011; MacKenzie and Forde 2009; Sabater 2015). EU 
citizens still face obstacles and are in need of help and guidance at least at the 
beginning of their stay, and this is where they do not differ much from third 
country nationals (TCN) (van Ostaijen et al. 2017). But contrary to TCN, EU 
citizens are, at least up to now, often not subject to integration policies due to the 
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principle of  non- discrimination of EU-citizens which could evolve into some unin-
tended consequences as well.
Furthermore, the analyses in this book show significant variation in the 
implications for urban regions and cities. This involves both different types of 
implications, ranging from labour market issues to housing and social security, 
language and integration, as well as variation between cities. Here the type of 
movement that is involved as well as the history of intra-European movement to a 
specific city, matters significantly. For instance, whereas in Sweden there was a 
strong focus on the situation of homeless and beggars, in the Netherlands the focus 
was almost entirely on low-skilled manual workers, housing and labour market 
issues, whereas in Austria the focus was more on circular migration from household 
and manual workers.
What speaks from these findings is that implications of intra-European movement 
cannot simply be understood only by economic motives. In fact, this book shows 
that intra-European movement has broader social implications, often situated at the 
urban level. This includes implications that are described by stakeholders in terms 
of ‘integration issues.’ Although from a regulatory perspective the notion of 
integration would not apply to intra-European citizens, this study shows that from a 
more sociological perspective, integration issues do arise particularly at the local 
level. The extent to which this is problematized differs between cities, with the 
Dutch cities being most particularly focused on integration while Austrian cities, 
also because of proximity and the history of migration, were much less concerned 
about integration issues in relation to intra-European movement.
However, this also involves implications for intra-European movers themselves. 
Especially in the Dutch case, examples emerged of intra-European movers being 
put in situations of significant economic and social dependency. For example, some 
situations occurred where labour recruitment agencies developed integral packages 
for intra-European movers, which included next to a labour contract also housing, 
transport, security and health care. Combined with the fact that many intra- European 
movers do not register in the place where they live, have little knowledge and under-
standing of where and how to get services when required, and the fact that there has 
been significant malpractice in terms of housing facilities, this has led to clear cases 
where intra-European movers were exploited. The ‘economic’ freedom of move-
ment within the EU can thus sometimes come at significant costs.
Finally, this book also shows that intra-European movement has consequences 
not only for the urban regions of arrival but also for the regions of origination. As 
Kindler observes (Chap. 10), this includes positive as well as negative consequences. 
Positively, financial remittances have been rather important for sending regions 
(such as Opolskie), as well as (more limited) social remittances. Negatively, depop-
ulation but in particular the decline of the workforce in the sending region, is also 
indicated as an important effect. In fact, the Polish case shows a combination of 
policies facilitating labour migration in Europe, facilitating return migration, but 
also facilitating labour migration into Poland in order to replace the workforce that 
left for other parts of Europe. In this sense, sending regions can develop into central 
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areas of chain migration, such as in the case of Poland sending labour migrants to 
other parts of the EU as well as receiving labour migration from Ukraine in 
particular.
13.3  Between ‘Multilevel Governance’ and ‘Disjointed 
Governance’
A third expectation explored in this book was that to what extent the wide range of 
local consequences leads to multi-level governance: mutual collaborations between 
the European, national and local governmental levels resulting into a coordinated 
‘politics’ of ‘European free movement’. Despite this expectation, the Chaps. 6 and 
7 of Zelano and Bucken-Knapp et al. show that in spite of a multilevel setting, not 
much has emerged in terms of multilevel governance. In other words: the EU level 
is more or less absent. Curry suggests in his Chap. 8 that it can be seen as troubling 
and indeed, what stands out is that many of the issues connected with CEE migra-
tion appear at the local level and are dealt with at the local or maybe national level, 
which is remarkable. Local level municipalities and cities sometimes seek for finan-
cial or legal support from the national level which result in some immediate hori-
zontal ties and networks at the local level. But this does not always result into 
vertical collaborations between governments or institutional venues where problem 
definitions are met.
As such, we cannot confirm our expectation on multi-level governance, which is 
at least theoretically, surprising. When new laws, policies and legislations were 
developed, these mostly concerned the most primary issues such as housing, 
employment and registration. It is clear that depending on the policy area, different 
institutional logics applied in different countries (and sometimes in different regions 
within the same country). Moreover, different historical paths guided how govern-
ments reacted upon this EU migration. All the studied cases show large variety in 
their local-national approaches and focus areas, but the absence of the EU level is a 
comparative element observed in all cases.
In some cases active engagement of local municipalities was visible, pushing up 
this issue on the agenda not only of their local council but striving for national atten-
tion as well. This kind of policy entrepreneurship has not been observed in all cases, 
sometimes also because of a lack of political significance, social urgency or 
historical- institutional path dependency. But in the cases where this policy entrepre-
neurship worked, and levels of government felt responsible to act and collaborate, 
these levels surprisingly seemed to have the same ground. In terms of Durkheim, 
these actors did not only have an agreement in terms of logical but also moral con-
formity: they not only agreed on their logical presuppositions and perceptions but 
also agreed upon their values. However, in most cases this did not occur, and one 
important lesson is that in spite of its broad theoretical definition and application in 
the literature, multi-level governance is hard to achieve in practice and need to be 
seen as one of the varied ideal types of governance in a multi-level setting.
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These findings speak to the broader literature of multi-level governance, raising 
attention to the agency of local, national and European governments in establishing 
horizontal and vertical governance configurations in a multi-level setting (Hooghe 
and Marks 2001; Bache and Flinders 2004; Piattoni 2010). The Chaps 8 and 9 of 
Curry and Balch also show “the importance of a bottom-up understanding of policy 
in explaining governance processes, one that takes into account implementation as 
well as decision-making” (Curry), sometimes even leading to disintermediation. It 
highlights the importance of the local level for governance in a multi-level setting, 
and the need to regard local actors as strategic entrepreneurs in moulding multi- 
level governance processes. This complements with a more bottom-up perspective 
to the typology of Hooghe and Marks (2003), having a rather top-down approach of 
Europeanization. This finding adds new insights how governance in multi-level set-
tings work and argues that multi-level governance is not the only one but just one of 
the ideal types one could investigate. Rather than taking multi-level governance as 
a given, or as ‘independent variable’, our study shows why one cannot assume 
‘multi-level governance’ but it has relevance to study this as one ideal typical con-
figuration. It displays that a better understanding is required how and why multi- 
level governance evolves under specific circumstances, as a ‘dependent variable.’ 
This contributes to a more precise theoretical understanding and conceptualization 
of multi-level governance.
Moreover, in terms of governance in a multi-level setting, this book not only 
raises significance to the local level, it also gives substance to cases of non- 
governance in a multi-level context, which has institutional consequences. Not only 
did we observe cases of institutional non-collaboration, this eventually also resulted 
in dispersed, contested or even incongruent policies. One example also mentioned 
before, there was for instance a four-Minister-letter written to the Vivian Reding to 
ask attention for the consequences “since this type of immigration burdens the host 
societies with considerable additional costs” (Mikl-Leitner et al. 2013). This was 
complemented with a call from the Dutch Minister Asscher in the Netherlands sig-
nalling a ‘Code Orange’ considering free movement (Asscher and Goodhart 2013), 
while a Dutch aldermen earlier indicated free movement as a ‘tsunami of Eastern- 
Europeans’ (Zuidervaart 2010) and European cities developed a Memorandum of 
Understanding to address the ‘complex manageable influx’ of EU citizens (MoU 
2011). As a response, the European Commission developed a meeting for mayors in 
which Vivian Reding concluded “that there is not just simply one single perspective 
on free movement. There are a variety of experiences” (Reding 2014: 1). Moreover, 
the then Home Affairs Commissioner, Cecilia Malmström, criticized this member- 
states letter since “EU citizens who have the right to travel, live, work and study 
where ever they want in the Union are put on a par with immigrants from countries 
outside the EU. For instance, they are being called ‘EU immigrants’, a concept that 
does not exist”. She even stated that: “they are mixing apples and oranges” by 
“mixing up internal EU mobility and immigration” (Hansen 2015). Also, Vivian 
Reding, the then Commissioner for Justice wanted “to make it absolutely clear: free 
movement is a fundamental right, and it is not up for negotiation. Let language not 
betray us: European citizens exercising their right to free movement are not 
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 ‘immigrants”’ (Reding 2013). It made clear that the different authorities involved 
do not hold a comparable perspective and have dispersed interests. Moreover, in a 
response to the local and national level concerns, the European Commission asked 
for an independent research to study the effect of free movement in cities. In this 
study they concluded that: “the overall evidence suggests that this situation is not 
placing major issues and burdens on the local communities or local public services, 
whereas issues related to discrimination are being gradually overcome and positive 
attitudes towards migration and mobility are generally recorded” (EY 2014: 2). 
This did not marked the end of the controversy, since after this, seven European 
Ministers wrote a letter to the EC to address ‘the improper and abusive use’ of the 
Posted Workers Directive (Hundstorfer et al. 2015). It gives an insight in the contes-
tation and controversy of this issue between local municipalities, member-states and 
the European Commission.
Importantly, such controversy is not limited to statements only since such 
statements lead to different institutional practices and sometimes evolves into policy 
deadlocks or policy stalemates. Such contestation or controversies can also have 
consequences on for instance the efficacy of multi-level arrangements. In Chap. 8, 
Curry also observed that “significant parts […] display either decoupled or dis-
jointed governance. The relative lack of EU-level coordination indicates gover-
nance decoupling between EU and member state levels. Again, this is partly the 
result of the unique supra-national powers of the EU, but it also creates the risk of 
a clear split between EU and member state goals”. This gives again a different 
contribution to the multi-level governance literature, with some different substance 
around ‘ideal’ typical configurations.
13.4  Central and Eastern European Perspectives; Beyond a 
North-West European Bias
Various contributions in this book also show that a deeper understanding of intra- 
European movement requires migration studies to look beyond a North-Western 
European bias. Intra-European movement invokes issues in receiving as well as 
sending regions and countries. For instance, Kindler’s contribution to this volume 
shows that intra-European movement also has various positive but also negative 
consequences for the sending regions in Poland, such as Opolskie. Especially this 
Polish case shows how the departure of labour force to other European countries is 
also creating a need for labour migration towards Poland. In what is described by 
Kindler as a ‘double governance challenge’, Polish regions try to organize and 
enhance the benefits from migration to other EU regions as well as liberalize labour 
migration towards Poland (especially from Ukraine). This shows how intra- 
European movement is connected to broader (labour) chain migration from East to 
West, which also involves migration from non-European countries. Once again, the 
observed social reality shows much more complexity than a simplified distinction 
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between EU and non-EU migration could cover. The Chap. 11 by Drbohlav and 
Pavelkova shows that across the borders of European countries, a specific form of 
migration is emerging that they describe as the MICO type, combining elements of 
migration and commuting. CEE countries are also developing their own governance 
responses to intra-European movement. This includes efforts to organizing the dias-
pora across Europe as well as facilities to promote return migration. Moreover, 
Chap. 12 shows the specificity of Turkey. Apart from emigration from Turkey to 
various parts of Europe, especially the Edirne and Istanbul areas have seen a gradual 
increase of migration from especially Central and Eastern Europe. To some extent 
this involves ethnic Turks, but it also includes broader categories of labour migrants 
seeking for work (industries, services, household work) in the growing Turkish 
economy (as well as student migration). Although there are indications that this 
migration recently decreased and that Turkey itself is much more concerned about 
refugee migration than labour immigration, this does reinforce the conclusion that 
intra-European movement is not bound by EU borders and should be considered as 
part of a broader migration system.
13.5  Reflectivity Towards Idioms on the Research-Policy 
Nexus
A topic that runs throughout this book, is the key role of language or ‘discourses’ on 
intra-European movement. This applies, as we have seen above, both to the concep-
tualization of intra-European migration or mobility as well as to whether the impli-
cations of intra-European movement are framed in terms of ‘integration.’ What 
springs from the analyses in this book is the importance of the political context in 
which discourses on intra-European movement develop (van Ostaijen 2016). The 
language we use to understand intra-European movement is itself produced in inten-
sive and sometimes contested research-policy dialogues. From an academic per-
spective it is not interested whether intra-European movers should or should not be 
considered migrants, but rather whether the concept of ‘migration’ helps us to 
understand the phenomenon of border movement better in ways that cannot be 
achieved with other concepts. Therefore, as this book has argued at various points, 
a more reflective use of idiom is required, especially when it comes to concepts that 
originate from broader research-policy dialogues.
This reflective use of idiom should involve a more critical use of concepts, based 
on a sound conceptualization as well as a sound empirical understanding of social 
reality, also when this may counteract specific institutional discourses. For instance, 
this volume brings insights by showing that European movement cannot solely be 
seen as just migration from a settlement perspective, but it can also not be seen as 
just mobility from a circular or liquid perspective (See also Chap. 4 of Engbersen). 
Furthermore, it shows that many stakeholders, including representatives from intra- 
European movers themselves, clearly recognize the importance of integration 
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issues, while it also shows that traditional theories of assimilationism or even trans-
nationalism are not always suited to understand these consequences. In fact, what 
the book shows is that the social (and political) reality of intra-European movement 
is characterized by much more complexity than implied in simplifying dichotomies 
such as migration versus mobility. Rather than reducing this complexity, migration 
research should aim at enriching its conceptual apparatus in order to grasp this com-
plexity, to which this book has sought to contribute.
Furthermore, a more reflexive use of idiom should treat the political context in 
which migration discourses originate, as endogenous to our analyses. In the case of 
intra-European movement, this involves in particular a problematization of the 
European context in which key concepts emerge. Since the European Union plays a 
key role in defining citizenship, constructing a territory and managing a regulatory 
and legal framework, European movement displayed in different member-states 
need to be understood in this specific ‘new’ political and institutional context. And 
this context is unprecedented from a European point of view, but is also incompa-
rable with the US context, as an immigrant country of ‘united’ states. It shows that 
scholars in the European context studying intra-European movement, need political- 
institutional sensitivity, not only to embed this case in its right legal context but also 
to refine and be reflexive of the vocabulary used. For instance, terms as migration 
and integration are commonly associated with nation-states, while the European 
Commission defines this phenomenon as ‘EU movement’ and the ‘mobility’ of ‘EU 
citizens’. This is not just a linguistic difference, but a clash of discourses, represent-
ing different institutional consequences on this topic (van Ostaijen 2016). This vol-
ume displays that such a struggle cannot be met without a political sensitive lens of 
our conceptual tools to understand the topic of investigation.
Finally, we believe that a more reflective idiom on intra-European movement 
requires more cross-disciplinary cooperation. All key findings from this book origi-
nate from a confrontation between sociological research on the character of intra- 
European movement, its (social) implications and a more political science driven 
analysis of the governance of intra-European movement at various levels. It is this 
cross-disciplinary work that brought to light not only the discrepancies between 
concrete implications and the policies developed at the local level, but also the con-
ceptual contestation to understand and address intra-European movement.
13.6  The Consequences of Failing Multi-Level Governance
Furthermore, speaking more broadly to the literature on governance studies, this 
book shows that contestation of intra-European movement is not without conse-
quences. The contestation on discourses is not just some juggling with words, but is 
the epitome why multi-level governance fails. The conflicting discourses, the con-
tested perspectives on this phenomenon, and the non-congruent positions conse-
quentially sometimes have led to a dialogue of the deaf. It led to a deadlock situation 
in which certain governmental authorities did not met in terms of cooperation, 
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concerted interventions and synchronized actions. Instead it led to a diversified pal-
ette of varied laws, policies and legislations active on ‘EU migrants’ and ‘EU citi-
zens’, sometimes even widening the gap between authorities than bridging it. It 
shows the significance of the different positions, resulting in different discourses, 
causing a wide range of varied institutional actions.
As argued above, our analysis shows little evidence of effective multi-level 
governance, in spite of intra-European movement clearly being a policy area that is 
characterized by a multi-level setting. The absence of common basic understanding 
of intra-European movement obstructs the development of a common or even 
coordinated approach across various levels. The different logics (political, social and 
sometimes economic) per governance level appear so strong that the logic of 
governance in this area is primarily ‘horizontal’ (per level) rather than ‘vertical’ 
(across levels). This shows that the concept of multi-level governance should not be 
used too light; it remains an empirical question whether multi-level governance is 
actually achieved across levels. We have seen efforts, especially by local governments 
acting as policy entrepreneurs, to establish such multi-level governance relations, but 
this has not resulted (at least not yet) in strong horizontal governance logics per level.
As a consequence, this book finds many illustrations of ‘disjointed’ or ‘decoupled’ 
governance and points out the need for much more work to understand why 
governance decoupling occurs and what the effects may be. However, this book 
clearly shows that the dominance of level-specific factors (including legal and polit-
ical principles such as free movement) seem to be much stronger than the will to 
cooperate across levels. It also shows that the overall effectiveness of the gover-
nance of intra-European movement decreases because of this decoupling. For 
instance, issues of social integration at the local level can be much less addressed for 
intra-European movers than for instance for TCN migrants, which may in itself also 
pose an impediment to achieve free movement in the EU itself.
Besides consequences in terms of disjointed governance, the failure of multi- 
level governance also has consequences for intra-European movers themselves. It 
stimulates the dominance of a hospitality paradigm on the national level by the 
discourse of welfare chauvinism. This crucial point, made by Balch in Chap. 8, 
reminds us that “the result of conflicts and compromise over intra-European mobil-
ity has been to construct a kind of social denizenship for mobile European citizens 
by those Member States that have been the main recipients of this kind of migra-
tion”. The continued dominance of such national paradigms rearticulate the divid-
ing lines between the excluded and included ones based on nationality. 
Consequentially, this causes that despite legal and regulatory European frameworks 
to equalize the rights of European citizens, the position of a substantive group of 
European ‘mobile workers’ stays precarious and vulnerable (Sennet 1998; Beck 
1992). It means that the labour market position of European mobile workers, espe-
cially in low skilled positions, does not extremely differ from that of undocumented 
or irregular migrants such as Third Country Nationals (Ruhs and Anderson 2010; 
Bommes and Sciortino 2011; Favell 2008; Standing 2011; van Ostaijen et al. 2017). 
This demonstrates the relevance of a more differentiated perspective on the down-
sides and benefits of European free movement.
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13.7  Intra-European Movement as a Critical Case 
in Migration Studies, Governance Studies 
and European Studies
Finally, we conclude this volume by a concise discussion about how the case of 
intra-European movement speaks more broadly to theoretical developments in 
migration studies, governance studies and European studies. For migration studies, 
intra-European movement invokes not only an important topic in terms of its size 
and degree of public contestation (as seen for instance in Brexit debates), but also 
touches upon one of the most fundamental questions in this research field; how to 
conceptualize migration. Thus far, migration scholars have been able to ground their 
analyses on a clear distinction between domestic and international movement. Intra- 
European movement defies this simple distinction, and shows that different political 
contestations (such as within the EU) matter to the conceptualization of what can be 
seen as migration. It also shows the importance of the political setting to understand 
how migration is framed for the ‘migrants’ involved and its governance. This means 
that migration studies will increasingly need to problematize the political constitu-
tion of anything as ‘migration’ to understand such a phenomenon.
This also raises a further need for cross-disciplinary work between migration 
studies and governance studies, and touches upon various questions of broader rel-
evance to governance studies. This book shows that the issue of intra-European 
movement raises issues that apply at the EU as well as the national and the local 
(urban) level. This makes intra-European movement into a critical case for the study 
of multi-level governance in Europe. Reaching beyond traditional state-centric 
views on policymaking or top-down perspectives on Europeanization, multi-level 
governance is positioned in the literature (and in policy discourse) as a response to 
those complex policy issues that call for a broader approach across policy levels. 
However, this book shows that multi-level governance appears more as an ideal type 
than as a reality when it comes to intra-European movement. This can be attributed 
towards the dominant policy logics per level (‘horizontally’) but also because of the 
lack of a shared understanding of intra-European movement that would allow cross- 
level (‘vertical’) interactions. For governance studies, this raises questions how 
multi-level governance could be designed in more effective ways especially in the 
context of such a complex multi-layered policy systems as the European Union.
To conclude, this brings us to a final contribution, which applies in particular to 
European Studies. Intra-European movement perhaps touches upon the most funda-
mental ‘pillars’ of the European project, which is free movement. While this book 
and this research has not been an attempt to undermine the ‘fundamental’ belief in 
this ‘pillar’ of free movement, it delivers empirical insights that inform such beliefs 
in free movement and the European project. This book shows that free movement 
invokes fundamental questions at the local level regarding ‘integration’ issues of 
intra-European movers. Regardless of how such questions will be addressed, which 
is in itself a political decision, our research shows that the local implications of 
intra-European movement are in many ways in conflict with the ideal of free move-
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ment. In fact, this book has shown that intra-European movement can also work out 
rather negatively for intra-European movers involved. This ranges from a lack of 
access to information and services to more extreme cases of exploitation of intra- 
European workers. Despite new European legal and regulatory frameworks to 
equalize the rights of European citizens, this book shows that the position of a sub-
stantive group of European ‘mobile workers’ stays precarious and vulnerable 
(Sennet 1998; Beck 1992). Their precariousness and vulnerability carries some 
resemblances pointing at a ‘new Victorian servant class’ or a ‘new precariat’, char-
acterized by a lack of agency, stability and security (Favell 2008; Standing 2011). It 
means that the labour market position of European mobile workers, especially in 
low skilled positions, does not extremely differ from that of undocumented or irreg-
ular migrants such as Third Country Nationals leading to exploitative and greedy 
relationships in many countries (Favell 2008; Standing 2011; Ruhs and Anderson 
2010; Bommes and Sciortino 2011; van Ostaijen et al. 2017). As such, this volume 
contributes to a more balanced understanding of the ‘shadow sides’ of European 
free movement, as it shows that not all free movement of persons is totally free 
(Ciupijus 2011). Moreover, instead of bold political statements, this book demon-
strates the relevance of a more differentiated perspective on the downsides and ben-
efits of European free movement. We hope this volume gives constructive empirical 
insights and critical theoretical substance for various publics and speaks to the daily 
reality of those readers involved in this topic personally and professionally.
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Chapter 14
The New European Migration Laboratory: 
East Europeans in West European Cities
Adrian Favell
The IMAGINATION project and its varied outputs represent the fruition of a 
research agenda that ought to be substantially shifting the mainstream paradigm of 
research on international migration (for the developing agenda see: Wallace and 
Stola 2001; Favell and Hansen 2002; Favell 2008a; Black et al. 2010; Crul 2016; 
Lafleur and Stanek 2016). The new European migrations heralded by European 
economic integration, in particular the Eastern enlargements of 2004 and 2007, rep-
resent a challenge to assumptions about immigration and citizenship, framed as they 
are by a legal-institutional transformation of the notion of international migration 
within and across the European regional territory. East European (CEE) popula-
tions, hitherto a peripheral part of the continent, had historically been a source of 
immigrant labour to their richer West European neighbours (Olsson 1996). For 
many years, then, movement Westwards was restricted by the barriers of the Cold 
War. In the post 1989 period, they still faced substantial restrictions on mobility. 
With the accession of eight new members in 2004, followed by Romania and 
Bulgaria in 2007 and Croatia in 2013, these populations all became putative EU citi-
zens and post-national members (Soysal 1994, 2012). On paper they would be equal 
with all West Europeans before international law, and free to choose to move as 
individuals, to travel, study, live and work in all other member states of the European 
Union. In other words, they would be free of the restrictions of immigration legisla-
tion and categories—as have been West Europeans for many years. As international 
migrants they would thus become co-citizens and “free movers”, in theory at 
least. Once transitional barriers were also down, older assumptions about one-way 
migration systems from poorer to richer countries – via lower-end incorporation in 
(typically) exploitative or exclusionary labour markets, followed by settlement, 
integration, and eventually change of nationality (citizenship) – would be called into 
question (for classic discussions see Massey et al. 1998; Castles and Miller 2003; 
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see Penninx in this volume for a comparison of the old and new migration systems 
in Europe). For the regional integration of the continent and its open borders, would 
create also, in theory, a new space of mobility. In this space, temporary and pendular 
movements, and long term life and work as a foreigner based on European member-
ship rights, without the need for settlement or change of citizenship, would all 
become more likely, along with a healthy transnational flow of capital and popula-
tions back and forth between receiving and sending countries (Garapich 2008). The 
emergence of new South-North flows alongside the East-West system after the 
financial crisis of 2008 has further complexified this new European map of migra-
tion (King 2002; King et al. 2016)
My own work on free movement was initially about West European movers in 
West European cities: the young, highly mobile, mostly professional pioneers tak-
ing their opportunities as EU citizens in the post Maastricht era in the classic 
European hubs of Amsterdam, Brussels and London (Favell 2008b). With the 
PIONEUR project, this ethnographic work was complemented with an extensive 
quantitative survey which revealed a broader typology of free movers, including 
ongoing lower-end labour migrants and retirees (Recchi and Favell 2009). It also 
included a qualitative study which suggested the experiences of Polish and 
Romanian movers were different, and a lot more negative than the ideal theory 
might suggest (Favell and Nebe 2009). In subsequent work, which engaged with a 
large project (KNOWMIG) Christina Boswell was conducting at the Hamburg 
Institute for International Economics, I extended the framework of my work on 
Eurostars to the “new face” of CEE movers now able to move, live and work as EU 
citizens across the EU (Favell 2008a; Favell 2009). The 2008 and 2009 articles – 
which are taken as a starting point for the IMAGINATION project – posed the issue 
as a hypothesis driven by the normative-legal logic of European free movement 
accords. “Textbook narratives, in terms of standard accounts of immigration, inte-
gration and citizenship based on models of postcolonial, guestworker and asylum 
migration, will need to be rethought,” I wrote (Favell, 2008a: 701). Free movement 
for East Europeans offered the potential of a transformation of lowly classified 
“immigrants” into newly equalized “free moving” European co-citizens, and the 
realisation of a kind of “post-national” space of mobility at a European regional 
scale. The transformation here would be more than just the end of the East/West 
division of the continent; it was also potentially a fundamental challenge to the very 
order of a nation-state centred Western world, divided into self-contained bordered 
territories built on a distinction between citizens and foreigners, and ordered by a 
hierarchy of privilege between rich and dominant receiving states, and poor, subor-
dinate sending states—with an always ready abundance of willing migrant workers 
on hand to serve their colonial masters. The integration of the European Union – at 
least in the principle of “non-discrimination” by nationality it instituted between 
citizens of all member states  – offered not only the image of a unified Europe 
beyond the Cold War, but the glimpse of a viable, de-colonialised world of border-
less free movement—albeit on a European scale, and heavily reliant on other bor-
derings and hierarchies at, and beyond, its outer edge.
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That at least was the theory. Sociologically speaking, the work on the “new face” 
of EU migration took seriously that it was an empirical question how much this 
legal-normative ideal for the new European citizens would be realised. In a more 
extended version of the article published recently, I laid out four hypothetical sce-
narios, stated in political economy terms, in which the exploitation and/or exclusion 
of, i.e., Polish and Romanian movers in distinct West European locations, could be 
measured to determine the precise degree of citizenship status achieved within the 
European regional integration proposed by the Eastern enlargements (Favell 2015: 
176–178). In the first, “neo-liberal” Europe, the migration is demand driven, leading 
to a successful top end selection of highly employable movers and their settlement 
and inclusion as immigrants in their new countries, but with a substantial brain drain 
and growing inequalities across Europe. In the second, “exclusionary” Europe, the 
East European migrants encounter substantial racialisation, and fall into negative 
competition with existing migrant-origin ethnic and racial groups in receiving coun-
tries as unwanted newcomers. In the third, “EU” Europe, there is a Panglossian 
outcome of migrants moving successfully West according to temporary and pendu-
lar patterns, leading to rising investment in the East, economic equilibrium and 
decreasing economic imbalances between West and East. In the fourth, “exploit-
ative” Europe, East Europeans move and find work, but encounter significant down-
ward evaluation by the market, as they are exploited and marginalised as a new 
flexible labour force.
As clearly underlined in this volume, the answer to what in fact happened has in 
large part been negative, and mostly in line with the fourth scenario; although there 
are elements of all four when the experiences of different nationalities with different 
education levels, gender, and cultural backgrounds in different national locations 
are compared. Yet the overall picture is rather clear. CEE movers were indeed 
“cadet” Eurostars, but cultural distinctions and (even) racialised subordinations 
have been commonplace among the experiences of CEE movers, even among the 
more highly educated (Csedö 2008; Morosanu and Fox 2013). Moreover, as this 
volume also stresses, the idea of all migrations from the East to the West embodying 
a new logic of temporary, pendular and “free” free movement, has certainly been 
confounded by the many types and distinctions found among intra-EU migrants in 
this study. The idealised economists’ labour market, driven entirely by supply and 
demand moving West, and matched by a balancing flow of capital investment East, 
gives way to a complex, differentiated patchwork of migrants and movers on a con-
tinuum from knowledge workers and students, through informal employees, to sex 
workers, beggars and the homeless. And across the six West European regions stud-
ied (I leave aside the Turkey case, driven by rather different sources and patterns), 
we find national and local governments reacting quite differently to the rather varied 
mixes of migrants attracted to these cities.
The present volume offers an invaluable documentation of these new migrants 
and the strategies of governance engaged by receiving regional governments. In 
this, and the accompanying published policy formulations (Fermin et al. 2016), it 
seeks to aid the recovery of a missing degree of multi-levelled governance, which 
ought to be hooking up EU and local level responses, over and beyond the pervasive 
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national level government of “classic” immigration politics. Thus, the volume con-
tributes not only to a more nuanced sociology of intra-EU migration – a “next gen-
eration” on from the initial work of the 2000s – but also offers rich material for 
political scientists looking to grapple with the multi-levelled political economy and 
policy terrain of immigration and diversity politics (Hepburn and Zapata-Barrero 
2014; Barker 2015). A welcome dimension of this is that it is focused on less heav-
ily studied mid-sized nations – and their component metropolitan regions – which 
often have mixed, patchwork approaches to migrant diversity, rather than coherent 
national “philosophies” (Favell 1998). It is a complement, for example, to 
Barbulescu’s (2018) study of migration governance in Italy and Spain, which itself 
added new perspectives at national and local level to the classic cases of the UK, 
France, Germany or Switzerland (Ireland 1994; Garbaye 2005).
Godfried Engbersen’s notion of “liquid migration” captures the fluid sense of 
new migration types, patterns and social/political formations signalled by the new 
East European migrations in West European urban contexts. Its association with 
Zygmunt Bauman’s metaphor of “liquid modernity” may be misleading, however, 
in that the veteran social theorist’s terminology in fact signalled his rather despair-
ing take on the old Marxist adage that “all that is solid melts into air” (Berman 
1992). It was an anti-empiricist stance; that the old apparatus and tools of classic 
sociological theory and measurements of social structures, social class, social insti-
tutions and social groups (etc.) – were now blunt and unable to adapt to the new, 
fluid, postmodern environment. All that remained to grasp this change faster and 
more complex than any science could capture, were the literary metaphors that 
could still be invented by a suitably soundbite-driven “mobile” social theory (Urry 
2000). This exaggerated epistemological position is not Engbersen’s, who is clearly 
engaged still in the empirical business of typologising, classifying and hypothesis-
ing the new migrations against the evidence found, albeit against a quite different 
potential range of migration systems. As Engbersen confirms in his chapter here, 
though, 5 million new CEE migrants in Western Europe between 2004 and 2010 
does constitute a seismic population shift in the continent—and we are right to 
focus on how that ought to shift our standard migration theories and paradigms. In 
2008, I argued that the new intra-EU migrations could be conceptualised with the 
help of models and theories from North America that had evolved around Latin and 
Central American migration to the US—itself a particular kind of fluid, transna-
tional system born of a regional integration, open bordered in more informal and 
ambiguous ways that the European legal regime (Massey et al. 2002). My optimism 
at a shift in international migration scholarship was, perhaps, unwarranted. Although 
it would provide perfect material for rethinking the methodological nationalism of 
standard immigration studies, East-West migration and EU free movement does not 
feature in some of the most sophisticated reflections rethinking immigration research 
in the context of US sociology (Wimmer 2013; Waldinger 2015). And, among those 
North American scholars interested in applying comparatively US models and the-
ory on immigration in Europe, there is a lack of awareness of the distinctiveness of 
intra-EU migration to “classic” non-European immigration and settlement pat-
terns—even if in many situations, EU migration is more numerous and more 
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 dramatic in its consequences (for example, Alba and Foner 2015; see Favell 2016). 
As yet, there is little or no sign of such classic models of nation-centred immigration 
and citizenship, and the methodological nationalism on which it is built, being 
shifted in transatlantic comparative work.
This is an area indeed where the present volume’s focus could be profitably 
extended. While intra-EU movements “between mobility and migration” is noted as 
a challenge to standard conceptions of immigration and settlement across national 
borders, there is not much attempt to compare the intra-EU migrants to other non- 
European migrants or other ethnic and racial minorities, who may well take up simi-
larly marginalised social, economic and cultural positions in the receiving cities. 
Many of the “integration” and “incorporation” reflexes of local governance indeed 
are caused by the fact that local policy makers and stakeholders have simply applied 
the same tried and testing policy thinking and methods to these new migrants as to 
older immigrants—however ill-suited or inappropriate. This may apply to anti- 
discrimination efforts, coercive functional or normative integration expectations 
and obligations, or (even) minority cultural provisions. It should come as no sur-
prise that there is no one size fits all “integration” policy likely to work for, at once, 
a single, skilled, pendular Polish entrepreneur in his 30s, and the stay-at-home 
young teenage spouse of a South Asian Muslim shop worker. Issues to do with race 
discrimination meanwhile are heavily complicated by the distinctly “white” status – 
and sometimes attitudes – of CEE movers finding themselves in the multi-racial 
super-diversity of many West European cities (Crul et al. 2013). The ambivalence of 
CEE migrants often lies in their tangential postion in the usual post-colonial hierar-
chies. They are new migrants and so may face disadvantages as newcomers in com-
parison to established racial and ethnic minorities with a longer standing place in 
the diversity of the host nation (Fox et al. 2012); but at the same time they are white 
Europeans, who can find themselves more easily in an advantaged “invisible” posi-
tion in the host country, contributing in some cases to the ongoing racialising dis-
criminations of others (Datta 2009; Fox 2012).
The recent experiences of a case not much mentioned in the book – yet crucial to 
its message given the sheer size of the CEE population – i.e., the UK – could here 
be of great significance. These have been sharpened by the “Brexit” vote in June 
2016 to leave the European Union, a vote driven in substantial part by reactions 
amongst British citizens against the new European resident population in the UK 
(Clarke et al. 2016). The UK and the EU is now faced with retrenchment in European 
citizenship rights, in which European citizenship will be stripped from the over 3 
million foreign EU residents in the UK, as well as the British population as a whole. 
This again constitutes an extraordinary natural laboratory of potential social science 
research into the social effects as well legal-political accommodations of this situa-
tion. What has been clear for some time in the parts of the UK (mainly England), 
which have voted heavily UKIP and then for Brexit, is that this is fuelled consider-
ably by anti-EU migrant sentiment, including sometimes among British Black, 
Asian and Minority Ethnic populations (BAME), and notably also among many 
working class Labour supporters. This explosive mix can be seen in some particular 
provincial areas of the UK where there is a substantial presence of ethnic minority 
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British alongside CEE workers, such as some of the post-industrial towns of the 
North and the West Midlands, many of which voted heavily for Brexit. To these can 
be joined agricultural towns in the East of England—where there are substantial 
numbers of casual CEE workers; and many poor, mainly white coastal towns in the 
South East—again, where CEE families have often settled. London, and other major 
cities, on the other hand, as well as smaller university towns, voted to stay in the 
EU. This observation suggests that the real place to be studying the dynamics of 
migrant and immigrant relations and “exclusion”/”integration” may be provincial 
locations, rather than the big cities featured in this study. It is a question about the 
urban versus non-urban conditions of cosmopolitanism.
As a collected project, IMAGINATION, offers a comprehensive synthesis of the 
best research on intra-EU migration of the last decade, as well as a handbook of 
policy responses. It is clearly also “impact” related current affairs research of the 
most intense interest, having established extensive relations and cooperation with 
many of the cities and migrant groups involved. The signs are, pessimistically, that 
policy responses to the innovation and progressive promise are being swallowed 
back into standard, national, security- and restriction- driven responses, that will rip 
from the idea of European citizenship the non-discrimination of all European citi-
zens that lay at its (post-national) heart (Hansen 2015). East European EU citizens 
are facing differentiation and relegation to a subordinate status within a more “con-
trolled” Europe; and, increasingly, the hitherto “invisible” new movers from the 
South of Europe to the North West are also being cast as unwanted “immigrants”. If 
this signals the end of non-discrimination by nationality within the EU, then the 
legal-political experiment that was tried in the laboratory of European migrations 
with the East European accessions, will leave a bitter taste of failure for those who 
believed in a unified European future. Yet it may still point the way forward to pro-
gressive alternatives to the question of international and regional inequality between 
populations which surely will be demanded again someday.
References
Alba, R., & Foner, N. (2015). Strangers no more: Immigration and the challenges of integration in 
North America and Western Europe. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Barbulescu, R. (2018). Migrant integration in a changing Europe: immigrants, European citizens 
and co-ethnics in Italy and Spain. Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press.
Barker, F. (2015). Nationalism, identity and the governance of diversity: Old politics, new arrivals. 
London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Berman, M. (1992). All that is solid melts into air. New York: Verso.
Black, R., Engbersen, G., Marek, O., & Pantiru, C. (Eds.). (2010). A continent moving west? EU 
enlargement and labour migration from central and Eastern Europe. Amsterdam: University 
of Amsterdam Press.
Castles, S., & Miller, M. (2003). The age of migration: International population movements in the 
modern world (3rd ed.). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
A. Favell
269
Clarke, H, Goodwin, M & Whiteley, P. (2016). Why Britain voted for Brexit: An individual level 
analysis of the 2016 referendum. Paper presented at the EPOP conference, Sept 10. https://
blogs.kent.ac.uk/epop/files/2016/07/Clarke-Goodwin-and-Whiteley.pdf.
Crul, M., Schneider, J., & Lelie, F. (2013). Super-diversity: A new perspective on integration. 
Amsterdam: VU Press.
Crul, M. (2016). Super-diversity vs. assimilation: How complex diversity in majority–minority 
cities challenges the assumptions of assimilation. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 
42(1), 54–68.
Csedö, K. (2008). Negotiating skills in the global city: Hungarian and Romanian professionals and 
graduates in London. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 34(5), 803–823.
Datta, A. (2009). Places of everyday cosmopolitanisms: East European construction workers in 
London. Environment and Planning A, 41(2), 353–370.
Favell, A. (1998). Philosophies of integration: immigration and the idea of citizenship in France 
and Britain. London/New York: Macmillan-Palgrave and St Martin’s Press.
Favell, A., & Hansen, R. (2002). Markets against politics: Migration, EU enlargement and the idea 
of Europe. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 28(4), 581–601.
Favell, A. (2008). The new face of East-West migration in Europe. Journal of Ethnic and Migration 
Studies, 34(5), 701–716.
Favell, A. (2008b). Eurostars and Eurocities: Free movement and mobility in an integrating 
Europe. Oxford: Blackwell.
Favell, A. (2009). Immigration, migration and free movement in the making of Europe. In J. 
Checkel & P. Katzenstein (Eds.), European identity (pp. 167–189). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Favell, A. (2015). The new face of East-West migration in Europe [revised]. In A. Favell (Ed.), 
Immigration, integration and mobility: New agendas in migration studies. Essays 1998–2015 
(pp. 169–184). Colchester: ECPR Press.
Favell, A. (2016). Just like the USA? Commentary on Richard Alba and Nancy Foner, Strangers 
no more: Immigration and the challenges of integration in North America and Western Europe 
(2015). Ethnic and Racial Studies, 39(6), 2352–2360.
Favell, A., & Nebe, T. (2009). Internal and external movers: East-West migration and the impact 
of EU enlargement. In E. Recchi & A. Favell (Eds.), Pioneers of European integration (pp. 
205–223).
Fermin, A., et al. (2016). Handbook of urban governance of free movement in the EU. Facts. In 
Implications and policies. The Hague: EUKN.
Fox, J. (2012). The uses of racism: Whitewashing new Europeans in the UK. Ethnic and Racial 
Studies, 36(11), 1871–1889.
Fox, J., Morosanu, L., & Szilassy, E. (2012). The racialization of the new European migration to 
the UK. Sociology, 46(4), 680–695.
Garapich, M. (2008). The migration industry and civil society: Polish immigrants in the United 
Kingdom before and after EU enlargement. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 34(5), 
735–752.
Garbaye, R. (2005). Getting into local power: The politics of ethnic minorities in British and 
French cities. Oxford: Blackwell.
Hansen, Peo. (2015). Undermining free movement: Migration in an age of austerity, Eurozine. 
http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2015-02-06-hansenp-en.html
Hepburn, E., & Zapata-Barrero, R. (Eds.). (2014). The politics of immigration in multi-level states: 
Governance and political parties. London: Palgrave.
Ireland, P. (1994). The policy challenge of ethnic diversity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press.
King, R. (2002). Towards a new map of European migration. International Journal of Population 
Geography, 8, 89–106.
King, R., Lulle, A., Conti, F., & Mueller, D. (2016). Eurocity London: A qualitative comparison 
of graduate migration from Germany, Italy and Latvia. Comparative Migration Studies, 4(3).
14 The New European Migration Laboratory: East Europeans in West European Cities
270
Lafleur, J.-M., & Stanek, M. (Eds.). (2016). South-North migration of EU citizens in times of crisis. 
Amsterdam: Springer.
Massey, D., Arango, J., Hugo, G., Kouaouci, A., Pellegrino, A., & Taylor, J. E. (1998). Worlds in 
motion: Understanding international migration at the end of the Millenium. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press.
Massey, D., Durand, J., & Malone, N. (2002). Beyond smoke and mirrors: Mexican migration in 
an era of economic integration. New York: Russell Sage.
Morosanu, L., & Fox, J.  (2013). No smoke without fire’: Strategies of coping with stigmatised 
migrant identities. Ethnicities, 13(4), 438–456.
Olsson, L. (1996). Labor migration as a prelude to World War I. International Migration Review, 
30(4), 875–900.
Recchi, E., & Favell, A. (Eds.). (2009). Pioneers of European integration: Citizenship and mobility 
in the European Union. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Soysal, Y. N. (1994). Limits of citizenship: Migrants and post-national membership in Europe. 
Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Soysal, Y.  N. (2012). Citizenship, immigration and the European social project: Rights and 
obligations of individuality. British Journal of Sociology, 63(1), 1–21.
Urry, J. (2000). Sociology beyond societies. London: Routledge.
Waldinger, R. (2015). The cross-border connection: Immigrants, emigrants and their homelands. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Wallace, C., & Stola, D. (Eds.). (2001). Patterns of migration in Central Europe. London: Palgrave.
Wimmer, A. (2013). Ethnic boundary making: Institutions, power, networks. New York: Oxford 
University Press.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, 
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate 
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and 
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative 
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not 
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by 
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from 
the copyright holder.
A. Favell
